Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001204

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62746/2023
LP/08518/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUTH

Between

SJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sadeghi of Counsel, instructed by BHD Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. This remaking decision follows my previous conclusion that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) be set aside, in part, because of material errors of law in the assessment of risk to the appellant in light of his accepted sur place activities in the United Kingdom. The findings of fact of the FtT were preserved such that other aspects of his international protection claim fall away.

3. As set out in my error of law decision, remaking in this matter had been delayed so that the respondent could produce more recent background country information and in view of an expected new country guidance case. At the remaking hearing there was no new country guidance case, but the respondent did produce two new Country Policy and Information Notes (‘CPIN’): Actors of Protection of September 2025 and Internal relocation of October 2025. Both parties continued to rely on the CPIN Opposition to the government of the KRI of July 2023 (‘the KRI CPIN’). The parties also relied upon the applicable country guidance cases, most notably SMO Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (‘SMO2’).

4. In advance of the remaking hearing the appellant's solicitors submitted a large bundle of additional evidence that had not been placed before the FtT. In the event, and given the nature of my conclusions in the error of law decision, counsel for the appellant did not seek to have that bundle of documents admitted into evidence and I have put it to one side. The hearing proceeded on the basis of submissions only, given that all the findings of fact made in the FtT had been preserved and the nature of this hearing was simply to assess those facts against relevant country background information.

5. The respondent does not dispute that, taken at their highest, the claims of the appellant engage the 1951 Refugee Convention and that, if credibly of adverse interest to the KRI authorities, he could not rely on sufficient State protection or relocate internally.

6. The factual matrix in this matter, either not disputed by the parties or preserved from the findings of the FtT is as follows:

a. The appellant is a Kurd from the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq (‘KRI’);
b. In the UK the appellant is an active member of ‘Dakok” , a Kurdish organisation critical of the KRI authorities;
c. The appellant has attended, held up anti-KRI material, and assisted with practicalities at twelve demonstrations in the UK linked to ‘Dakok’ and many photographs of this have been posted on his public Facebook account;
d. The appellant has been otherwise highly politically active on his public Facebook account, reposting content critical of the KRI authorities and accumulating 5,000 ‘friends’;
e. The appellant has twice appeared in broadcasts of the Kurdish television station NTV, albeit he has not directly criticised the KRI authorities in those broadcasts;
f. The appellant’s sur place political activism against the KRI authorities in the UK is in bad faith and he is not a genuine political activist. If returned to Iraq he would not continue with his political activism, would resign from ‘Dakok’ and would delete his Facebook account.

7. The parties made detailed oral submissions. The essence of the submissions on behalf of the respondent was that as the appellant was not a genuine political activist and would delete his Facebook account and resign from ‘Dakok’, he would be in a position to explain to the KRI authorities, if questioned upon return and in the event his low-level activities were known to them, that his political activities online, in person and on television had been carried out in bad faith. The respondent argued that the KRI authorities would not care about such activities and would understand he had been seeking to bolster a false asylum claim and was not a genuine political activist. The position of the appellant was that the background country information strongly suggested the position of the respondent was untenable and that even if the appellant deleted his social media activity and resigned from ‘Dakok’, it would be too late because of the real risk of past monitoring, knowledge of his activities online and at demonstrations in the UK and given his television appearances.

Legal Framework

8. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a 1951 Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection or human rights grounds an appellant must show a real risk of a breach of his Article 2 or 3 ECHR rights or otherwise a real risk serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.

Discussion

9. In my judgement, having regard to the relevant standard of proof, the submissions made on behalf of the appellant are correct. The appellant need not establish the certainty or even probability of risk. A reasonable chance or serious possibility is enough. I find there is a reasonable chance or serious possibility that the appellant will be identified as a political activist against the KRI authorities and that the risk exists even in the light of his bad faith. If so identified, the background country information establishes at least a serious possibility that he would be subjected to forms of harm amounting to persecution, including mistreatment in detention and arbitrary killing as set out at paragraph [3.1.2] of the KRI CPIN.

10. The first thing to note is that the background country information carefully assessed in SM02 establishes, at headnote [30], that individuals returning to the KRI will be subjected to security screening. The appellant is therefore likely to be questioned and screened for any potential security risk to the KRI authorities. Even if the appellant removes himself from social media and denies his political activities against the KRI were genuine, there remains a real risk or serious possibility, not only that the KRI authorities would be able to trace his past political activities, but that they would not accept his assurances these were merely opportunistic.

11. Reminding myself again of the guidance in WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894, I note the preserved findings that the appellant has participated in twelve demonstrations in the UK, playing an active role, holding up anti-KRI materials and assisting with practical matters. I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that, even if the references to adverse action by the KRI authorities against those involved in anti-government demonstrations, for example in the KRI CPIN at [3.1.7], only relate to physical demonstrations in Iraq, the fact of adverse action against demonstrators at all is sufficient to establish a serious possibility that, as set out in WAS (Pakistan) , the authorities could be aware of the appellant’s past activity as an anti-government demonstrator in the UK. The risk he will therefore be identified at security screening as anti-government as a result of his physical presence at UK demonstrations and practical assistance role is not far-fetched or fanciful.

12. The risk profile is enhanced, in my judgement, by the fact that the appellant has been photographed at these demonstrations in the UK and these photographs posted online to an accepted public Facebook account, which was also accepted by the FtT judge to be one containing extensive anti-KRI political material. The respondent’s own conclusions in the KRI CPIN from [14.1] are that bloggers and online activists may be monitored and subjected to harm. Online activity is not geographically limited and the risk this could be known to the KRI authorities at security screening upon return to the KRI, even if taken down by the appellant on departure from the UK, is not far-fetched or fanciful.

13. I note also the information at KRI CPIN from [14.2] that media outlets and critical television stations, such as that upon which the appellant is accepted to have appeared twice, are monitored, have been closed down and some appearing on them associated with anti-government activity and subjected to adverse action. In combination with his physical and online activity, the two appearances by the appellant on this television network, making this case rather unusual and outside the generality of Kurdish, bad-faith sur place cases, represents a further enhanced risk factor, in my judgement. The possibility that his appearances on a known KRI-critical television station, even without making direct critical comment, could come to light at security screening on return to the KRI is not far-fetched or fanciful.

14. It follows that I agree with this submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the risk his past activities in the United Kingdom, even though carried out in bad faith and even where he removes himself from social media and resigns from ‘Dakok’, could be known to the authorities in the KRI is a real one, even if it is not certain or even probable.

15. The position of the respondent is that even if this is the case, the appellant will be able to explain to the authorities in the KRI that all of this activity was concocted in order to obtain asylum in the United Kingdom nefariously. The argument is that the authorities in the KRI will understand this and will not care about what appears to be extensive anti-government activity. In my judgement, the background country information does not support the likelihood of this turn of events.

16. Firstly, I was presented with no evidence indicative of such an approach by the KRI authorities to individuals returned after failed asylum claims. Secondly, section [3.1.2] of the KRI CPIN confirms that there is evidence that opponents of the KRI authorities have been arrested, detained, assaulted and killed. Even where this is not systematic and the instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the numbers involved, the appellant need establish only a real risk that he would be so treated. Such action by the KRI authorities in at least some cases does not suggest officials inclined overlook what appears to be a combination of factors pointing to an apparently significant anti-government profile. Thirdly and further, it is necessary to take a wholistic view of the three aspects of the appellant’s activities. He attended twelve demonstrations in which he played a practical and supportive role to the organisers and held up anti-KRI materials. He was accepted to have carried out extensive social media posting and, crucially, his appearance on a known KRI-critical news channel on two occasions is not something he can now delete. Looking at all of these activities together, I do not consider his concocted role could reasonably be described as low-level and beneath the likely notice of the KRI authorities. In my judgement, there is a real risk he could be seen by the KRI authorities, despite his protestations of innocence and opportunistic behaviour, to be a higher profile anti-government activist as referred to at paragraph [3.1.3] of the KRI CPIN.

17. As set out above, this leads to a real risk of arrest, mistreatment or even arbitrary killing. Since there is no dispute these actions would be taken by the State and are linked to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it follows the appellant succeeds under that convention. Given the risks to him, he also establishes a real risk of a breach of his rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Having reached those conclusions, the appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection.

Notice of Decision

On remaking this appeal decision, I allow the appellant’s appeal brought under the 1951 Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds. I dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.

Evan Ruth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 January 2026