Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001205

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/50585/2023
LP/02247/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

XS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms V Easty, Counsel instructed by BHT
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal. As this is a protection claim, I maintain the order.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Albania who entered the UK in February 2020 and applied for asylum in June 2020. In January 2023, his application was refused. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Loke. In a decision dated 7 January 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against this decision.
3. The appellant claims to face a risk from a criminal gang that, amongst other things, forced his mother into prostitution, kidnapped him, and forced him to work in a cannabis factory.
4. At the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent’s position was that credibility was not in dispute. In the light of this, the appellant did not give evidence. This is set out in paragraph 10 of the decision where it is stated:
“The Appellant attended but given credibility was no longer is issue he did not give evidence.”
5. The judge found that the appellant would be able to access sufficient state protection and/or relocate internally on return and therefore did not face a risk of serious harm. The central reason given by the judge for reaching this conclusion was the availability of family support.
6. In respect of internal relocation, the judge stated:
“the Appellant would have the support of his mother and his maternal uncles” (para. 20)
“the family support available to the Appellant will prevent such an eventuality” (para. 21)
“the Appellant will have his mother and other family members on his mother’s side and father’s side who could assist him” (para. 24)
7. In respect of sufficiency of protection, the judge stated in paragraph 29:
“As indicated previously, I do not accept that there is an absence of a strong family. The Appellant has a number of supportive family members in Albania. …. As previously stated the family support that will be available to the Appellant will mitigate his fear of stigma and fear of further abuse.”
8. The grounds argue that the judge was wrong to find that the appellant will have family support when the unchallenged evidence (set out in his witness statement) indicates that he will not. It is also argued that it was procedurally unfair to find that the appellant would have family support without this being put to him.
9. A further submission in the grounds is that the judge failed to have regard to the expert evidence concerning the risk the appellant would face were he to contact his mother and the expert evidence as to the inadequacy of state protection.
10. Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt succinctly summarised the appellant’s case when granting permission, as follows:
“The Judge was told that the appellant’s credibility was not in issue and on this basis the appellant did not give evidence. At [75] – [76] of his witness statement the appellant stated that he has fallen out with his mother and no longer speaks to her or her brothers (his uncles). In these circumstances it is arguable that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to make the finding at [20] that the appellant is in contact with his mother and her brothers without this being put to the appellant (ground 3).”
11. The judge found that the appellant “has a close relationship with his mother” and “would have the support of his mother and his maternal uncles”.
12. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the appellant’s evidence as set out in his witness statement of 30 March 2023, indicating that there has been a deterioration in his relationship with his mother and his mother’s relationship with her brothers. Paragraph 76 of the witness statement states:
“I would also like to update the Court and confirm that my mother no longer lives in the same area as she used to live in. I did not want to talk about this before because it makes me so upset and angry. In October she told me on the phone that she had got re-married to a man called [******] and had moved to live with him. I don't know her address but I know that she is still lives in the Kamez area, but no longer in Kamez. I was the last one to know and she told me after she had married this man. I do not know him, but I find the idea of my mother have, remarried repulsive and I feel so hurt that she has gone and done this without telling me first or seeking my approval. I am very unhappy about it and do not approve. She also told me on the phone that she had fallen out with my two maternal uncles and that she no longer speaks to them. She didn't tell me why but I am guessing that they do not approve of her marriage either. As a result of this I no longer speak to my mother as much as I used to because I feel angry and hurt by her.”
13. As the Supreme Court made clear in Tui v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, fairness generally requires that if evidence of a witness is to be rejected, the witness should have an opportunity to address the issue. This is particularly important in a case where the parties have agreed that credibility is not in dispute and therefore the appellant could not reasonably be expected to anticipate that an aspect of his evidence would not be accepted.
14. It was therefore incumbent on the judge, before making a finding about the appellant’s relationship with his mother and uncles that, at least on one view, was not in accordance with the appellant’s evidence as set out in paragraph 76 of his witness statement, to give him an opportunity to address the issue. The failure to do so was procedurally unfair. This procedural unfairness is material because the judge, both when considering sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, placed considerable emphasis on the appellant having a close relationship with his mother and being able to access support from her and her brothers.
15. As I have set aside the decision on procedural fairness grounds, para. 7.2(a) of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers applies and accordingly the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
16. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
17. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be made afresh by a different judge.

D. Sheridan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24.6.2025