The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001219

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55324/2023
IA/00594/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE


Between

HYM

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Hollywood
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 27 January 2026


Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a male citizen of Somalia born on 18 July 2004. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State, dated 19 July 2022, to refuse his claim for international protection. The First-tier Tribunal, in a decision promulgated on 13 January 2025, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

2. Granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst wrote: ‘The Appellant's grounds of appeal contend that the judge erred in concluding that the situation in Mogadishu was not inconsistent with that considered in the country guidance cases, and that the Appellant would be at risk in Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab and/ or would need to live in a camp for displaced persons. The Appellant asserts that the judge's finding at §24 that the Appellant could regain contact with his mother did not accurately reflect the evidence. It is arguable that the judge's consideration of the Appellant's likely situation in Mogadishu did not adequately consider the more recent country guidance in OA (Somalia) CG [2022] UKUT 00033 (IAC), nor the emphasis therein on the need for a support network in Mogadishu on return. Although I consider that the other grounds have less merit there is considerable overlap and I do not limit the grant of permission, which is granted on all grounds.’

3. Notwithstanding the grant of permission, Mr Holloway, for the appellant, told me at the initial hearing that he intended to focus in his submissions only on the mischaracterisation of the factual matrix by the judge, in particular what she had found at [24] regarding the appellant’s ability to contact family members and seek support from them on return to Somalia. He made no direct reference in his submissions to country guidance, including OA. He submitted that the appellant was unsure that he could again contact his mother in Somalia and consequently the judge’s finding that he could do so if he wished to was unsound. He noted that the appellant had travelled to the United Kingdom as an unaccompanied minor.

4. For the Secretary of State, Ms Arif, Senior Presenting Officer, submitted that the judge had not erred in law. The judge’s findings had been based entirely on the appellant’s evidence, which the judge had not misunderstood or mischaracterised. At [14] the judge had referred directly to OA and she had applied the relevant sections of MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC). The judge’s analysis at [13-27] had included a consideration of the appellant’s age, health and the absence of any targeted risk. The proper application of those risk factors had led the judge to the firm conclusion that the appellant would not face a real risk on return; that conclusion was valid irrespective of whether the appellant could obtain the help of his mother or other family members.

5. I prefer the submissions of Ms Arif to those of Mr Hollywood. First, I do not find that the judge has mischaracterised the appellant’s evidence as he claims. In his supplemental statement of 10 December 2024 the appellant states: ‘I wish to provide an update on developments since then. Approximately a month ago, I managed to speak to my mother. It was through someone else's phone so I still do not have a number to reach her directly and do not know if and when we can speak again, but it was a huge relief to talk with her.’ That statement is not, in my opinion, in any way inconsistent with the judge’s finding at [24]: ‘The appellant says that he has only spoken to his mother a few times since arriving in the UK. In his witness statement of 10 December 2024 he said that he had spoken to her a month previously on someone else’s phone and that she is still in Halgan in the Hiiran region. Although he said that he has no means of directly contacting his mother, he did not say that he would be unable to contact her again through this or other direct or indirect means. The appellant's mother and siblings remain in Somalia. Although he would not be returning to his home area, he could regain contact with his mother and obtain support from her on return to Mogadishu if he requires it.’ [my emphasis]. Significantly, the appellant had not claimed to have lost touch with his mother completely or that it would be impossible for him to contact her again. On the evidence, the judge was entitled to find that, if he were to make an attempt to do so, the appellant could re-establish contact with his mother. If he is compelled to return, then the judge found that he would make that attempt and it was likely to be successful. That finding was available to the judge and is not in any way inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence.

6. Given that Mr Hollywood did not otherwise challenge the First-tier Tribunal’s decision (which is, on any reading, reached findings and a conclusion wholly in line with relevant country guidance including OA), I find that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision is not flawed in law either for the reasons advanced in the grounds of appeal or at all. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


Dated: 28 January 2025