Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-001225
[HU/01153/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On 9 May 2025

15th May 2025

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

Mr VIOREL CONSTANTIN SCHIOPU
(NO ANONIMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr W Ahmed, Counsel
(instructed by Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Permission to appeal was granted to the Appellant by First-tier Tribunal Dieu on 12 March 2025 against the decision to dismiss the Respondent’s Article 8 ECHR appeal made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulholland in a decision and reasons dated 18 February 2025.
2. The Appellant is a national of Romania, born on 8 October 2000. His representatives claimed he arrived in the United Kingdom in January 2016, when he was 16 years old. On 17 April 2021, he submitted an in-time application to regularise his stay under the EU Settlement Scheme. He was granted limited leave to remain valid until 1 May 2026. On 11 August 2023, he was convicted at North West London Magistrates Court for one count of ‘Destroy Or Damage Property (Value Of Damage £5000 or Less.)’ He was fined £150. On 9 September 2023, he submitted an out-of-time application to regularise his stay under the EU Settlement Scheme. On 13 December 2023, he was convicted at Inner London Crown Court for one count of ‘Wounding/Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm.’ On 13 December 2023, he was convicted at Harrow Crown Court for one count of ‘Affray’ and one count of ‘Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm.’ On 13 December 2023, he was sentenced at Inner London Crown Court to 30 months’ imprisonment and a restraining order, in force until further order. On 13 December 2023, he was sentenced at Harrow Crown court to 12 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively.
3. On 3 January 2024, he was made the subject of a decision to deport pursuant to the Immigration Act 1971 and the UK Borders Act 2007. In the Respondent’s notice of decision dated 3 January 2024, the Secretary of State deemed his deportation to be conducive to the public good under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 pursuant to section 3(5) and in accordance with section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007.
4. The Appellant claimed that he enjoyed family and private life in the United Kingdom, with his partner, his parents and other close relatives, as well as with friends. There was genuine remorse. His deportation to Romania would be unduly harsh and disproportionate.
5. Judge Mulholland found that the Appellant did not enjoy family life in the United Kingdom with a partner or parent. His serious offending showed that he had not integrated into the United Kingdom. His private life was not strong. He satisfied none of the relevant exceptions and there were no very compelling circumstances. He retained various Romanian connections and there were no very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Romania. His deportation would not amount to a breach of his Article 8 ECHR rights. Hence the appeal was dismissed.
6. Three grounds of appeal were advanced to the Upper Tribunal. It was submitted that Judge Mulholland had erred in the following ways:
Ground 1: The Judge had not considered core features of the claim and had not given “due reasons” for the consideration of the core features;
Ground 2: J has erred in the assessment of ¶ 117C(5) and used the outdated definition of “partner”; and
Ground 3: J has made irrational findings.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu in respect of Grounds 1 and 2 only:
“Ground 1: it is arguable that the FTTJ having made reference at [7] to remorse and rehabilitation courses, and then at [44] onwards to factors in favour of the public interest to deport, fails to counter balance matters weighing against that by way of rehabilitation.
“Ground 2: it is arguable that the FTTJ erred in approach to the definition of partner under S.117C(5) by looking for the need to have cohabited for at least 2 years. S.117D does not require it.
“Ground 3: is not arguable. The absence of the matters observed by the FTTJ are relevant to the consideration of integration. Those facts are not disputed. The FTTJ at [42] proceeds in any event in the alternative. Even if there is an error, it is not material therefore.”
8. The Respondent served a rule 24 notice opposing the error of law appeal. Further reference will be made to the notice below.
9. Mr Ahmad for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission to appeal in respect of Grounds 1 and 2. As to Ground 1, he submitted in summary that the Judge’s determination was unsafe and should be set aside. Rehabilitation had not been addressed at all by the Judge, when it ought to have been. Rehabilitation had (for example) been raised in [15] of the First-tier Tribunal Appellant’s skeleton argument. The OASys report had not been properly considered. Nor had the witness statement of Elena Pop.
10. As to Ground 2, the Judge had ignored evidence of the subsisting partnership and had applied too restrictive a definition of “qualifying partner”. There was no requirement that the partnership had lasted two years or more. The Judge had accepted at [31] that there was a relationship between the Appellant and his partner. The error of law appeal should be allowed.
9. Mr Hulme for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 Notice which had been served earlier and submitted that sustainable findings had been reached and explained. There was no material error of law.
10. As to Ground 1, the Appellant’s argument placed heavy reliance on there being no mention of rehabilitation in the Judge’s determination. This was not an error. The Court of Appeal set out settled principles on error of law at [26] of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201:
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g., MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at [25]…
11. The Judge had not at any point asserted that the Appellant has failed to rehabilitate, or to take steps to address his offending behaviour.
12. Jallow v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 788 made clear that factors such as a low risk of re-offending will not generally carry much weight. It cannot properly be suggested that rehabilitation could have any material impact on the FTTJ’s assessment of very compelling circumstances at [44] onwards. That is particularly the case here where the FTTJ has relied on the serious nature of the Appellant’s criminal conduct, as made clear at [46]-[49]. There were ordinarily significant factors which would weigh against a deportee, such as the principle of deterring other foreign criminals and marking social revulsion at the nature of crimes.
13. The FTTJ was entitled to be satisfied of the significant public interest in deportation, even with the presence of a witness who had attested to the Appellant now being a kind and compassionate person. The FTTJ’s findings at [41] are in relation to the separate question of whether the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. The existence of some evidence of rehabilitation does not re-write history or change the fact that the Appellant’s behaviour has been damaging towards UK society. The Respondent is in great difficulty understanding how the consideration at [41] is evidence of a failure to consider rehabilitation. The Appellant’s witness Alina Pop had not attended the hearing to give evidence and had not even produced supporting identity documents, so her evidence attracted minimal weight if any.
14. As to Ground 2, GEN.1.2 of Appendix FM to the archived rules Immigration Rules - Archive 28-12-23, includes the two-year requirement at (iv). This was in force at the time the Appellant was served with the decision to deport on 4 January 2024. The FTTJ was entitled to rely on that definition of a partner, which was also considered in the Respondent’s reasons for refusal.
15. The Appellant’s arguments were hollow. The FTTJ’s findings at [23] refer to the Appellant having never lived with his claimed partner, apart from a short period in his father’s home. That fact overwhelmingly weighs against the claim of a genuine and subsisting relationship, particularly when bearing in mind the Upper Tribunal’s guidance in Buci (Part 5A: “partner”) [2020] UKUT 00087 (IAC):
“(2) A person who satisfies the definition in GEN 1.2 should, as a general matter, be regarded as being a partner for the purposes of Part 5A, Where, however, a person does not fall within that definition, the judge will need to undertake a broad evaluative assessment of the relationship, bearing in mind that a "partner" is a person to whom one has a genuine emotional attachment, of the same basic kind as one sees between spouses and civil partners, albeit not necessarily characterised by present cohabitation. A "partner" is not the same as a friend; nor is an adolescent's or other young person's boyfriend or girlfriend necessarily a "partner".
16. Even if the Respondent were to accept that the FTTJ’s assessment were flawed, the FTTJ has considered the effect of deportation on the claimed partner at [31]. It was unchallenged that she could visit the Appellant in Romania or live there with him, should she choose to do so.
17. The Respondent offered further submissions in respect of Ground 3, but as permission to appeal was refused for that ground it is not necessary to summarise that part of the submissions. Mr Hulme submitted that the onwards appeal should be dismissed.
18. At the conclusion of submissions the Tribunal indicated that it found that there was no error of law in Judge Mulholland’s decision, so that the onwards appeal would be dismissed. Full reasons were reserved and now follow.
19. As Mr Hulme submitted, which submissions the Tribunal accepts and so need not repeat here, the Judge’s decision was properly reasoned. The decision addressed all of the points which the Appellant had raised. Rehabilitation was not raised as a specific issue at the First-tier Tribunal hearing. It was not listed in the schedule of issues. [15] of the Appellant’s skeleton argument does not raise rehabilitation as such. It is in the context of the Appellant’s claimed relationship and refers to the fact that the Appellant had completed 20 courses in prison. That fact was expressly noted by the Judge early in his decision, at [7], so it was clearly a factor in the proportionality assessment which was considered by the Judge. As was noted in Jallow (above), “the fact that an offender presents a low risk of re-offending may be a factor in assessing the strength of the public interest in deporting that particular offender. In practice, however, such factors will not generally carry much weight for the reasons identified by Moore-Bick LJ in Danso v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 596. There, a prisoner had undergone courses in prison designed to address aspects of his offending and there were reports indicating that the risk of further re-offending was low.”
20. It was too obvious to require the Judge to mention that the Appellant had only recently been released from prison, so that it was still much too soon to say whether the 20 courses undertaken by the Appellant had had any lasting beneficial effect. At [32] the Judge stated that he had taken into account the OASys report, reinforced by [53] where the Judge stated that he had taken all of the evidence into account when reaching his decision. There is no reason to doubt that statement. The Tribunal considers that Ground 1 has no substance.
21. As to Ground 2, the Tribunal again accepts Mr Hulme’s submissions, as summarised from the rule 24 notice set out above. Some indication of the nature of the Appellant’s claimed relationship is the fact that his partner is referred to as “his girlfriend” at [7] of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. Far from adopting a restrictive approach, the Judge examined the evidence of the claimed partnership in detail. He gave sustainable reasons for finding that the applicable definition was not satisfied because the duration of the partnership was of insufficient length. The rule 24 notice sets out the applicable definition’s source, which need not be recited again here. There is no error of law in the Judge’s finding. Ground 2 has no substance.
22. The grant of permission to appeal, even in restricted form, was generous. The facts of the appeal showed serious offending, as noted in the sentencing remarks quoted by the Judge. The public interest in the Appellant’s deportation was weighty, as the Judge clearly explained. Thus in the Tribunal’s judgment the First-tier Tribunal Judge reached sustainable findings, in the course of a thorough determination, which securely resolved all of the issues. There was no material error of law.
DECISION
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
There was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and reasons, which stands unchanged.

Signed Dated 13 May 2025

R J Manuell
DUT Judge Manuell