Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001228
UI-2025-001229

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64373/2023
HU/64375/2023
LH/06327/2024
LH/06326/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

RADHIKA ADHIKARI
LAXMAN BABU ADHIKARI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G McCall, Counsel instructed by Richmond Chambers LLP
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants, who are nationals of Nepal, appeal the decisions of the respondent dated 21 July 2023 refusing their applications for leave to remain on human rights grounds.
2. The appellants’ appeals were dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-Harry in a decision promulgated on 17 December 2024. However, that decision was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce on 10 September 2025 on that basis that it was vitiated by a material error of law. The appeals now come before me for remaking.
3. For the reasons set out below, I dismiss the appeals.
Background
4. The first appellant was born in Nepal in 1973. The second appellant, who is the first appellant’s husband, was born in Nepal in 1966. They have two children: their daughter Era, who born in 1999; and their son Apil, who was born in 2000.
5. On 31 August 2009, the first appellant entered the UK using a Tier 4 student visa valid until 30 January 2011. On 14 January 2011, the first appellant applied for further leave to remain as a Tier 4 student which was granted until 7 July 2011. On 25 March 2011, the first appellant applied for leave to remain as a Tier 1 post-study graduate worker with her husband and her son as her dependents. That application was granted until 6 May 2013. The second appellant and Apil joined the appellant in the UK in September 2011. Era remained in Nepal with her grandmother.
6. On 5 April 2013, the first appellant applied for further leave to remain as a Tier 2 general migrant with her husband and son as dependents. On 22 April 2013, they were granted leave until 18 May 2016. On 19 December 2013, the first appellant applied for leave to remain as a Tier 4 general student. That application was granted on 7 January 2014 and was valid until 30 September 2015. In 2014, Era joined her family in the UK.
7. On 29 September 2015, the family applied for leave to remain on family and private life grounds. However, that application was refused on 11 May 2016 with an out-of-country right of appeal. Despite having no leave to remain, the appellants and their children remained in the UK unlawfully. On 1 October 2018 they again applied for leave to remain on human rights grounds. That application was refused with no right of appeal on 17 April 2019 but reconsidered and refused for a second time on 4 June 2019. On 29 November 2019, the respondent reconsidered the application again. This time it was refused with an in-country right of appeal. However, their appeals were dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Fowell on 27 February 2020 and it appears that by 15 December 2020 they had exhausted their appeal rights.
8. On 6 February 2023, Apil was granted leave to remain on private life grounds due to his length of residence. Era had made her own application for leave to remain on human rights grounds on 5 April 2022. However, while that application was refused by the respondent on 5 May 2023 her appeal against that decision was allowed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Juss on 22 June 2024 for reasons I find difficult to discern from reading his determination. Both of the appellants’ children therefore have limited leave to remain in the UK.
9. Meanwhile, the appellants submitted further representations on 15 February 2021 but these were refused on 11 February 2022 with no right of appeal. The appellants submitted more further representations on 28 March 2022. It was argued that the appellants could not return to Nepal because they had no connections left with that country. They did not own any property there and had no family or friends who could support them. It was therefore asserted that they would be rendered destitute. It was also stated that both of the appellants’ children had lived in the UK for a significant part of their lives and that it would be unjust to deprive the family of the opportunities that were available to them in this country. The appellants claimed that there were very significant obstacles to them re-establishing their private lives in Nepal and that their removal would lead to a disproportionate interference with their right to a family and private life in the UK given the ties they had formed in this country. It is these representations that led to the decisions under appeal.
The respondent’s decisions
10. In her decisions dated 21 July 2023, the respondent first considered the appellants’ family life claims. However, she found that they did not meet the requirements for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules because they did not have a relationship with a qualifying partner, parent or child. The respondent then considered their private lives. She rejected the appellants’ claims that there were very significant obstacles to them re-establishing their private lives in Nepal given that they had spent most of their lives in that country. It was not accepted that they would face destitution on return. The respondent noted that they had managed to maintain and accommodate themselves in the UK without having permission to work or access public funds and it was therefore likely they could manage to support themselves in Nepal. While it was acknowledged that they may have made friends and formed relationships in the UK, the respondent said that they had done so without any expectation that they would be allowed to remain here permanently. She therefore found that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify granting the appellants leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules.
The law
11. I must determine whether the appellants’ removal from the UK would breach their right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. That right is qualified. The appellants must establish on the balance of probabilities the factual circumstances on which they rely and that Article 8(1) is engaged. If it is, then I have to decide whether the interference with the appellants’ right is justified under Article 8(2). If an appellant does not meet the Immigration Rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate. I take into account the factors set out in s.117B the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant.
Documents
12. I had before me the 589-page consolidated hearing bundle (HB) prepared by the appellants for the error of law hearing. This contains the bundles of evidence relied upon by each party before the First-tier Tribunal. The appellants also filed a 169-page updated evidence bundle (UHB). I also had before me Ms McCall’s skeleton argument dated 14 October 2025 and the respondent’s review dated 23 August 2024 which had not been included in the HB.
The hearing
13. The appellants and their children all gave evidence before the Tribunal and were cross-examined by Ms Ahmed. The appellants gave evidence through a Nepali interpreter (although both can speak English) while their children gave evidence in English. Their evidence is set out in their respective witness statements and is recorded in the record of proceedings and is not rehearsed here except where it is necessary to do so.
Issues in dispute
14. In her error of law decision, Judge Bruce preserved the First-tier Tribunal’s findings that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellants integration in Nepal and that the appellants enjoyed Article 8 family life with their children. Consequently, as Ms McCall acknowledges in her skeleton argument, the sole issue to be determined by me is whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render the appellants’ removal a breach of Article 8 because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them and their children.
Findings – Remaking
15. As it is not in dispute that the appellants have developed private and family lives in the UK, the key consideration, therefore, is whether any interference with their protected rights would be proportionate.
16. On the respondent’s side of the balance, I remind myself that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest: see s.117B(1) of the 2002 Act. In the present case, the appellants remained in the UK unlawfully after their leave to remain expired 11 May 2016. I also take into account that the appellants’ failure to meet the requirements for leave under the Immigration Rules is a weighty, although not determinative, factor: see Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 30 at [112].
17. Regarding the considerations under s.117B(2) and (3), I am satisfied that both of the appellants speak English and, given their qualifications and employment history, they would be self-sufficient if permitted to remain in the UK. These are, however, neutral factors in the balance.
18. Turning to the appellants’ side of the scale, I accept from the evidence that the appellants enjoy a private life with extended family and friends in the UK as evidenced by the numerous letters of support, and that they play a role in the Nepalese community in this country. Ms McCall submits in her skeleton argument that the friendships the appellants have formed in the UK could not be replicated in Nepal because they “have been formed over a period of 15 years of shared experience at common life stages and events”. I am not persuaded by that argument. The first appellant was almost 36 when she arrived in the UK and the second appellant was 45 years old. It is reasonable to assume that they had made friends in Nepal prior to coming to the UK and that they can reestablish those friendships or else make new friends on return. I also note that the first appellant’s parents still live in Nepal. Importantly, the appellants were admitted to the UK on temporary visas and had no expectation that they would be able to live here permanently. Their private lives were therefore developed at a time when their immigration status was either precarious or, post-11 May 2016, at a time when they were present in the country unlawfully. I therefore attach little weight to their private lives in accordance with s.117B(4)(a) and (5).
19. Furthermore, I am bound by the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal that there are no very significant obstacles to the appellants re-establishing their private lives on return to Nepal. That consideration took into account the appellants’ length of residence in Nepal and their knowledge of life in that country as well as a finding of fact that they could obtain work in Nepal, even if not skilled employment commensurate with their academic achievements: see [11] to [16] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
20. While there is some evidence that the second appellant has some health issues, this was not a point that was expressly relied upon by Ms McCall at the hearing, presumably because of the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal.
21. With regards to the appellants’ family life with their two adult children in the UK, I accept that the appellants and their children live together and they are close and mutually supportive. I also take into account that Apil currently has leave to remain until 11 February 2028 while Era has leave to remain until 5 March 2027.
22. The family claim that they have been blighted by mental health issues and that this makes them especially dependent on each other:
a. The first appellant says that she suffers from anxiety and depression arising from her lack of immigration status and that she has been prescribed sertraline and receives talking therapy. She says that her mental health worsened after her appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal.
b. Apil says that he also suffered from depression and anxiety in the past. This has returned as a consequence of the uncertainty caused by his parents’ lack of immigration status as well as issues arising from his university studies. He also has trouble sleeping. Apil has also been prescribed sertraline.
c. Era has also suffered from depression in the past as a result of her lack of immigration status but it was not suggested that she is currently suffering from this.
23. Ms Ahmed submitted that both the first appellant and Apil may be exaggerating their mental health issues in order to bolster the appellants’ appeals: see HA (expert evidence, mental health) [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC). However, the first appellant’s claim is supported by medical notes included in the UHB and it is in my view unsurprising that she might suffer from depression and anxiety as a result of her lack of immigration status and the prospect of being separated from her children, although I bear in mind that this is a consequence of the appellants’ own decision not to leave the UK when their leave expired in 2016. There is no evidence before me to say what would likely happen if the first appellant did have to return to Nepal given that would remove the main driver behind her mental illness, i.e. her uncertain immigration status. Ms McCall argues that there would be an increased suicide risk. That is based on information the appellant provided to the NHS in which she referred to fleeting suicidal thoughts as a result of her immigration issues [UHB/48]. Ms Ahmed submitted that the medical notes recorded that the first appellant had no suicidal thoughts or plans to commit suicide [UHB/54]. The notes do appear to be contradictory in that they say that the first appellant has no suicidal thoughts but also that she has “fleeting to intense” thoughts that can last “for a few hours”. While I accept that she has had suicidal thoughts in the recent past, there is insufficient evidence before me to show that she had an intention to act on them. I also find that there is insufficient evidence before me to show that there is a real risk that she would attempt suicide were she required to leave the UK especially when she would be returning to Nepal with her husband who is recorded in the medical notes as being a protective factor.
24. Relying on the March 2022 Country Information Note on Nepal (CIN), Ms McCall asserts in her skeleton argument that the first appellant may struggle to access healthcare in Nepal, where there is significant mental health stigma. The CIN is clear that mental health services are available in Nepal (see para 6.2.1) and while I accept that stigma and discrimination towards people with mental illness is “a major problem and mental health literacy is low, resulting in hiding mental health problems, avoiding treatment and seeking alternative care” (see para 6.2.2), I take into account that the first appellant is a highly educated woman who has been willing to access mental health treatment in the UK and presumably has some knowledge of her condition. In my view, it is more likely than not that she would seek access to mental health treatment in Nepal if she required it, if necessary with the support of her family.
25. With regards to Apil, I accept that he has suffered from mental health issues in the past. There is a note from his GP records dated 18 November 2021 that says he had been seeing a counsellor due to depression and he was prescribed sertraline for this [HB/475]. This is supported by letters from an organisation called italk confirming appointments in 2021. It appears that this counselling continued into 2022 [HB/474]. The only documentary evidence of Apil’s depression returning more recently is a photograph that shows he collected a prescription for sertraline on 26 September 2025 [UHB/144]. Ms Ahmed argued that this indicated that Apil had only obtained the prescription shortly before the hearing in order to bolster his parents’ case. Given that this is the only documentary evidence of the recurrence of Apil’s mental health problems, the timing is indeed curious. However, in the light of Apil’s history of mental illness I find it more likely than not that he is depressed and anxious about the possible removal of his parents to Nepal. That would be an understandable reaction. There is, though, insufficient evidence before the Tribunal that he is currently suffering from suicidal ideation as he has done in the past [HB/479].
26. I accept that the family provide emotional and practical support to each other in respect to their health difficulties and place weight on this element of their claim. However, there is no medico-legal report before me, and the evidence that has been provided does not in my view prove that either the first appellant or Apil’s mental health issues are particularly severe or that they are likely to deteriorate to a significant extent were they to be separated. Certainly, no Article 3 ECHR claim has been raised in this appeal. As already explained, there is insufficient evidence before me to show that the first appellant would be unable to access adequate treatment in Nepal and neither is there sufficient evidence to prove that Apil would be unable to adequately manage his condition with the support of the health services he has already accessed in the UK.
27. As noted above, at the date of the hearing the appellants’ children have limited leave to remain in the UK. Ms McCall submitted that requiring the appellants to leave the UK would force their children to decide between breaching their family life with their parents or giving up their private life in the UK. That may be correct. But they are both adults and, ultimately, it is up to them whether they wish to return to Nepal with their parents or remain in the UK in order to develop their private lives here. There is nothing unusual or exceptional about young adults having to make decisions that will separate them geographically from their parents and other family members, whether that is for studies, work or to form their own family units. Indeed, the first appellant had to make such a choice in 2009 when she came to the UK to study, leaving behind the second appellant and their children. It was two years before she was able to reunite with her husband and son in the UK and five years before she was able to reunite with her daughter. As Ms Ahmed submitted, there is no reason why Apil and Era cannot support each other, if necessary with the assistance of their extended family in the UK. Furthermore, both are entitled to work and are therefore able to provide for themselves should they need to do so.
28. Era’s evidence was that she wants to study for a master’s degree but the family cannot afford to pay the fees at present. It was not explored whether she could obtain a career development loan to pay for her intended course, but, in any event, as of the date of the hearing she is not studying or working. In my view, this weakens the claim advanced by Ms McCall that moving to Nepal would disrupt Era’s studies.
29. There was consistent evidence before the Tribunal that Apil understands some Nepali but does not speak the language. To the extent that may be true, given that he lived in Nepal for the first 11 years of his life, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to relearn the language were he to decide to return there with his parents.
30. In my view, the separation of the appellants from their children (should they choose to remain in the UK) would undeniably be very upsetting to the family. They would not be able to rely on each other in the same way that they currently do and the relationships would have to continue through visits and modern methods of communication. However, I must also bear in mind that the appellants have never had a reasonable basis to believe that they would be allowed to develop their family life in the UK indefinitely. When deciding to remain the country unlawfully following the expiry of their visas, the appellants must surely have been aware that they were facing an uncertain future and that difficult decisions might have to be made.
31. Having considered all the factors in the round and carefully weighed both sides of the scale, I am led to the conclusion that the consequences of the appellants’ removal to Nepal would not be unjustifiably harsh. The respondent’s decision does not therefore amount to a disproportionate interference with their or their children’s rights under Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeals are dismissed on human rights grounds.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30th October 2025