Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001231
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/19166/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

GEORGE OSBOURNE MARKE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Keerthy, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: none (the appellant appeared in person)

Heard at Field House on 23 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Pursuant to s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the Upper Tribunal remakes the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Manuell (the judge) who, in a decision promulgated on 21 February 2025, allowed the human rights (Article 8 ECHR) appeal of Mr George Osbourne Marke (appellant) against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (respondent) dated 11 November 2019 refusing his human rights claim.
2. The judge found that the appellant fulfilled the requirements of ‘Exception 1’ in s.117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act)) in that he had (i) lawfully resided in the UK for more than half his life; that he was (ii) socially and culturally integrated; and (iii) that he would face very significant obstacles to his integration in Sierra Leone, his country of nationality. The judge additionally found that there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above ‘Exception 1’ that outweighed the public interest in his deportation to Sierra Leone in accordance with s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act.
3. The respondent obtained permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision to the Upper Tribunal. In an ‘error of law’ decision issued on 20 January 2026 the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) made a legal mistake in its decision that required the decision to be set aside. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal and adjourned for a further hearing to remake the decision. There were no retained findings preserved from the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision.
Background
4. I summarise the salient features of this appeal. The appellant, a national of Sierra Leone born on 26 January1983, lawfully entered the UK on 18 December 1988 aged 5 years. He was accompanied by his mother and siblings as dependents of his father, a person with permission to reside in the UK as a student. The family as a whole successfully extended their stay until early 1991. During 1992, the appellant’s father sought asylum and that claim was refused in 1995. Thereafter the family remained in the United Kingdom without leave until 26 October 2000 when the appellant was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain as a dependant of his mother.
5. The appellant’s offending history began in 2004 and there followed a considerable range of convictions for which he was sentenced at Magistrates Courts including for violence, fraud and drug related matters.
6. During 2019, the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply controlled Class A drugs, namely heroin and cocaine, for which he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Following this conviction, the appellant was considered for deportation and invited to make submissions as to why this should not take place. Those representations referred to the appellant’s long residence in the United Kingdom, that he had minor British citizen children from previous relationships, a British citizen partner, no family in Sierra Leone, mental health issues, and that his deportation would have a deleterious effect on his disabled mother.
7. On 6 November 2019 a deportation order was made. An accompanying letter dated 13 November 2019 explained why the appellant’s human rights claim was refused. In short, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with any of his four children. Nor was it accepted that two of the children were aged under 18. The respondent did not accept that it would be unduly harsh for any of the children to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant. The appellant’s claim to be in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a British citizen was rejected owing to an absence of supporting evidence. As for the private life exception to deportation, the respondent accepted that the appellant had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and that he was socially and culturally integrated to ‘some extent.’ The appellant’s claim to face ‘very significant obstacles’ to his integration was rejected for detailed reasons as was his claim that there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ which outweighed the public interest in deporting him.
8. The appellant appealed the decision refusing his human rights claim. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant was unrepresented. He and his eldest adult daughter gave evidence and supporting letters were provided by the appellant’s mother and the appellant’s partner.
9. In allowing the appeal, the judge considered that there were no seriously disputed facts nor challenges to the reliability of any of the evidence. The appeal was allowed on the basis that the appellant met the private life exception to deportation and that this combined with his family life with his children also amounted to very compelling circumstances.
10. In its ‘error of law’ decision the Upper Tribunal found that in concluding, with reference to Section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act (as amended), that there were very significant obstacles to the appellant reintegrating in Sierra Leone, the judge’s reasons were inadequate and unsupported by any evidence other than the appellant’s assertions in his oral evidence and witness statement. Nor was there any mention of nor engagement with the relevant authorities relating to very significant obstacles. In particular, there was a failure to carry out the broad evaluative assessment referred to in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [14]. The Upper Tribunal also found that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for accepting the appellant’s account of his relationship with his children as well as in concluding that it ‘must be’ in their best interests to maintain a relationship with the appellant. The supporting evidence relied upon by the appellant dated from around 2013- 2014 and was, therefore, more than a decade old. In addition, that evidence was unaccompanied by any indication that authorisation had been obtained from the Family Court to use it in immigration proceedings. That evidence was plainly irrelevant to the circumstances in 2025. At [33] the appellant is found to have a ‘strong family life’ with two of his children and, in respect of his other two children, at [34] the judge found that ‘there is no reason to doubt that the two children should have contact with their father to the extent that the Family Court decides, if the dispute over contact continues. That must be in the children’s best interests…’ That conclusion was reached solely based on the appellant’s oral evidence and without reference to his considerable offending.
11. Although the Upper Tribunal’s ‘error of law’ decision was issued on 20 January 2026, the hearing before the Upper Tribunal took place on 13 May 2025. At the ‘error of law’ hearing the Upper Tribunal noted that the appellant required time to obtain legal representation and indicated that the remaking hearing was to be listed no earlier than 14 August 2025. The Upper Tribunal made several directions including requiring the respondent to serve on the Upper Tribunal and the appellant a complete and up to date copy of the appellant’s PNC record as well as any OASys reports relating to the appellant. No OASys report has been produced.
The re-making hearing
12. The appellant was not legally represented at the hearing to remake the decision. He confirmed that it was only him giving evidence and that he had not provided any further documentary evidence. He indicated that he had no funds to instruct a lawyer. He asked whether the hearing could be adjourned to enable him to obtain legal representation. I considered this application. The applicant has had an opportunity since the error of law hearing, over 7 months earlier, to obtain legal representation. The remaking hearing was specifically adjourned to give the appellant the opportunity to obtain legal representation. The appellant indicated that he had insufficient funds to instruct a lawyer and was unable to identify any source of funds that he was likely to be able to draw upon in the near future. I reminded myself of the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to deal with cases fairly and justly, and I considered whether proceeding without legal representation would deprive the appellant of a fair hearing (Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC)). Given the already significant delay in determining the appeal, the fact that I had a bundle of documents that had been prepared for the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) hearing, that I could hear further evidence from the appellant and the low likelihood of him being able to obtain legal representation, I refused to adjourn the hearing.
13. I granted permission to the Presenting Officer to serve an updated PNC printout dated 21 February 2026. The appellant now has 17 convictions in respect of 44 offences. His first date of conviction was 16 January 2004; his late date of conviction was 20 August 2025. The appellant has accumulated, amongst other things, 11 offences against the person, 5 fraud offences, 3 public order offences, 13 offences relating to police/court/prisons, and 6 drugs offences (including the index offences committed on 13 July 2017 for possession of Class A drugs with intent to supply for which he was imprisoned for 2 years on 6 February 2019).
14. I recorded the oral evidence from the appellant and his oral submissions and those of the Presenting Officer. I have read and considered with care all the documents before me even if they are not specifically identified later in this decision. These include a statement from the appellant dated 22 April 2021 and a letter from Greenwich Time to Talk dated 16 October 2020. Both parties are aware of the evidence, both written and oral, that was before the Tribunal. This evidence is, in any event, a matter of record. I shall refer to this evidence only in so far as it is necessary for me to lawfully determine the appellant’s human rights appeal.
Legal framework
15. Under s.117A of the 2002 Act, in considering whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private life and family life is justified under Article 8(2) ECHR, I must have regard in all cases to the considerations listed in s.117B, and in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in s.117C.
16. S.117B includes the considerations that:
(1) The maintenance of effective immigrations controls is in the public interest.
(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(4) Little weight should be given to –
(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
…
17. S.117C is entitled “Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals” and provides that:
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where -
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”.
18. The statutory framework is a “complete code” and “...the entirety of the proportionality assessment required by article 8 can and must be conducted within it”: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1176, at [27].
19. I remind myself that the burden of proof rests on the appellant to prove that he meets the Exceptions in s.117C(4) & (5) of the 2002 Act and that the respondent’s decision interfere with Article 8 ECHR. Once the appellant has shown that the decision does interfere with his Article 8 ECHR rights, it is for the respondent to demonstrate that the decision is proportionate. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
Findings of fact and conclusions
Exception 1: “very significant obstacles”
20. It is accepted that the requirements of s.117C(4)(a) and (b) have been met (the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, and he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom). Although the 2019 decision stated that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated “to some extent” the Presenting Officer did not resile from the position that s.117C(4)(b) was met even taking into account the appellant’s continuing criminality. I therefore proceed on the basis that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.
21. I now consider whether the appellant meets the requirements of s.117C(4)(c). In SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 (“Kamara”) and AS v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1284 (“AS”) the Court of Appeal considered the concept of “integration” for the purposes of s.117C(4)(c). In Kamara Sales LJ, with whom Moore-Bick LJ agreed, stated at [14]:
“In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's "integration" into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
22. At [58] and [59] of AS Moylan LJ rejected a submission that so-called ‘generic’ factors, such as intelligence, health, employability and general robustness of character, were irrelevant when assessing a person’s ability to integrate and held that such factors can be relevant to whether there are “very significant obstacles to integration” as they form part of the “broad evaluative judgment”. The Court of Appeal rejected a submission that whether someone is “enough of an insider” is to be determined by reference to their ties to the country of proposed removal.
23. In making my “broad evaluative judgement” I take into account the fact that the appellant entered the UK as a young child aged 5 and that he has never returned to Sierra Leone. Although his experience of life in Sierra Leone was as a very young child, he would have retained some cultural familiarity given that he continued to live with his family and therefore would have been brought up within a Sierra Leonean household in the United Kingdom.
24. The appellant did not produce any further documentary evidence at the remaking hearing. He made several assertions relationing to the lack of any familial support available to him from his mother and two siblings and from his large extended family in general, in respect of his mental health and claimed neurodevelopmental condition, and in respect of his relationships with his children and claimed current partner. I have concerns in relaying on unsupported assertions made by the appellant. In his oral evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) on 14 February 2025 the appellant claimed he had not committed any crimes since that which led to his conviction in ‘2018’ (this is likely a mistake and should be a reference to the conviction for the key offence in 2019). The appellant had however committed a further 14 offences by that time. I also note that the appellant has 5 convictions for fraud or kindred offences. This indicates that he is someone who has been dishonest. The appellant claimed in the hearing before me that he struggles with these proceedings and finds it very difficult to engage. I acknowledge this explanation, but it does not oblige me to accept the appellant’s unsupported assertions. It would also have been relatively straightforward for the appellant to have provided independent document evidence in support of his appeal.
25. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant maintained that his mother was disabled, although there was no independent evidence and she did not mention any disability in the undated written statement provided to the judge. In his oral evidence before me the appellant claimed his mother suffered from dementia and was in a care home in Lewisham and had recently been hospitalised. There was no independent support for any of these assertions.
26. The appellant asserts that he has no family or friends in Sierra Leone. I note that his eldest daughter also stated in evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) that the appellant had no family left in Sierra Leone. I am willing to accept that he has no established network of support within Sierra Leone or close family members living there given that he left at such a young age.
27. The appellant claimed he did not have a good relationship with his two sisters living in the UK. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant maintained that his extended family all live in the UK. In his evidence before me the appellant claimed he had aunts and uncles in the UK, and that about 7 or 8 aunts on his mother’s side had moved to the UK and that he also had family in Maryland in the USA. The appellant claimed however that none of these family members would support him in Sierra Leone. He maintained that his aunts had offered no support since the onset of his mother’s dementia. There was no independent support for these assertions by way of statements or letters. Given my concerns expressed above about the appellant’s honesty I find I can place only limited weight on his assertion that he would be unable to receive any support from any of his extended family members or his siblings were he to be deported to Sierra Leone.
28. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant claimed he was feeling suicidal and anxious. Before me the appellant claimed to have been diagnosed with PTSD after being stabbed in 2018 (he described having no spleen or bladder and having a significant scar), that he suffered from depression and was recently told he was pre-diabetic. He also claimed he had been assessed by a mental health team for ADHD and autism. There was however no recent independent medical evidence that any mental health or neurodevelopmental condition that the appellant may have is serious or that it would constitute an impediment to his deportation to Sierra Leone. There was no independent medical evidence that the appellant had ever suffered hallucinations and been sectioned as he claimed before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC). I have considered a letter from Greenwich Time to Talk dated 16 October 2020 addressed to the appellant in which he self-reported as suffering from anxiety following his stabbing in 2018. The risk level to the appellant from self-harm was placed at ‘low’ and he was placed on a waiting list for a course of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy. There was no medical evidence before me that appropriate medication for anxiety or depression or PTSD was not available in Sierra Leone, or indeed that the appellant had ever been diagnosed with PTSD or depression.
29. I further note that the appellant’s claimed mental health and neurodevelopmental conditions have not prevented his from undertaking employment. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant said he worked as a delivery driver. In his evidence before me he claimed to have a full-time job and worked 6 days a week as a sub-contractor. He claimed to support his current partner’s household and that she was in temporary accommodation. He also claimed that he previously had his own business, but it broke down as he had to support his daughter A. The appellant has been industrious enough to establish his own business and, on his account, has been working for several years. I find that he will be able to use the experience and skills accumulated through his employment in the UK to obtain employment in Sierra Leone.
30. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant claimed he could understand some Krio (and English based Creole language widely spoken in Sierra Leone) but could not speak it. The appellant has not produced any independent evidence that his lack of proficiency in Krio would materially inhibit his ability to find low-level or unskilled employment, or that he would be in any way restricted in finding such employment if he only spoke English. There was no independent evidence before me that the appellant’s limited knowledge of Krio would in any way inhibit him from establishing new Article 8 ECHR private life relationships in Sierra Leone where English is the official language.
31. Having considered the evidence relating to the obstacles the appellant would face in integrating into life in Sierra Leone, including, inter alia, his absence from the country since the age of 5, his employment experience, the fact English is an official language, and the absence of clear independent evidence of any mental health or neurodevelopmental condition, and applying the test established in Kamara, reiterated in Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62, I find that the appellant would not face ‘very significant obstacles’ if deported to Sierra Leone. Although he would face significant difficulties in terms of finding accommodation and employment, I find he will quickly achieve an understanding of how life in Sierra Leonian society operates and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private or family life.
Exception 2: “unduly harsh”
32. In KO (Nigeria) [2018] UKSC 53 Lord Carnwath considered the meaning of “unduly harsh” for the purposes of s.117C(5). At [23] he stated:
"… the expression 'unduly harsh' seems clearly intended to introduce a higher hurdle than that of 'reasonableness' under section 117B (6), taking account of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. Further the word 'unduly' implies an element of comparison. It assumes that there is a 'due' level of 'harshness', that is a level which may be acceptable or justifiable in the relevant context. 'Unduly' implies something going beyond that level. The relevant context is that set by section 117C (1), that is the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. One is looking for a degree of harshness going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent. What it does not require in my view (and subject to the discussion of the cases in the next section) is a balancing of relative levels of severity of the parent's offence, other than is inherent in the distinction drawn by the section itself by reference to length of sentence. Nor (contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal in IT (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 932, [2017] 1 WLR 240, paras 55, 64) can it be equated with a requirement to show 'very compelling reasons'. That would be in effect to replicate the additional test applied by section 117C (6) with respect to sentences of four years or more."
33. In HA (Iraq), RA (Iraq) and AA (Nigeria) (Respondents) v SSHD (Appellant) [2022] UKSC 22 Lord Hamblen said at [31]:-
“I consider that far too much emphasis has been placed on a single sentence in Lord Carnwath’s judgment [in KO (Nigeria)] and that if his judgment is considered as a whole it is apparent that he was not intending to lay down a test involving the suggested notional comparator. It is correct that in para 23 of his judgment Lord Carnwath was recognising that the unduly harsh test involves a comparison, but the comparison made was between the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals and the greater degree of harshness which is connoted by the requirement of “unduly” harsh. As Underhill LJ pointed out, Lord Carnwath was not seeking to define the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable”. Had this been his intention he would have addressed the matter in considerably more detail and explained what the relevant definition was and why. Similarly, if he had been intending to lay down a test to be applied in all cases by reference to the suggested notional comparator he would not only have so stated but he would have explained the nature of and justification for such a test. The reference to the harshness which would be involved for “any child” is to be understood as an illustrative consideration rather than a definition or test.”
34. At [41] to [44] he said:
“41. Having rejected the Secretary of State’s case on the unduly harsh test it is necessary to consider what is the appropriate way to interpret and apply the test. I consider that the best approach is to follow the guidance which was stated to be “authoritative” in KO (Nigeria), namely the MK self-direction:
“… ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
42. This direction has been cited and applied in many tribunal decisions. It recognises that the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals involves an “elevated” threshold or standard. It further recognises that “unduly” raises that elevated standard “still higher” - ie it involves a highly elevated threshold or standard. As Underhill LJ observed at para 52, it is nevertheless not as high as that set by the “very compelling circumstances” test in section 117C(6).
43. Whilst it may be said that the self-direction involves the use of synonyms rather than the statutory language, it is apparent that the statutory language has caused real difficulties for courts and tribunals, as borne out by the fact that this is the second case before this court relating to that language within four years. In these circumstances I consider that it is appropriate for the MK self-direction to be adopted and applied, in accordance with the approval given to it in KO (Nigeria) itself.
44. Having given that self-direction, and recognised that it involves an appropriately elevated standard, it is for the tribunal to make an informed assessment of the effect of deportation on the qualifying child or partner and to make an evaluative judgment as to whether that elevated standard has been met on the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
Whether the appellant’s deportation would have an unduly harsh impact on his children and/or his partner
35. I note the best interests of any relevant child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration and the child's best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration and can be outweighed by other factors (ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 11).
36. The appellant does not appear to have any direct contact with either AM (his daughter aged 13) or GM (his son aged 11). There is no evidence of any Family Court proceedings relating to these two children. In his evidence before me the appellant confirmed that he was not in contact with either AM or GM, although he said he sometimes had indirect contact with AM. There was no evidence in support of this last assertion. I note that on 24 August 2022 the appellant was convicted in Scotland of offences relating to using threatening and abusive behaviour and stalking in relation to his ex-wife (the mother of AM and GM) that attracted a domestic abuse aggravator and that an 18-month restriction order was imposed on him not to approach, contact or communicate with the mother of AM and GM.
37. In the absence of any independent evidence concerning the appellant’s relationship with AM and GM I am unable to find that he currently has a parental relationship with either child. There is consequently insufficient evidence before me to support a finding that the impact of the appellant’s deportation on either AM or GM will be unduly harsh.
38. The appellant claimed at the hearing that he continued to have a relationship with A, who is currently 15 years old. In his evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant claimed that A had a variety of serious problems and had moved school several times, and that she had lived with him for a period and listened to him. There was however no independent documentary evidence supporting the appellant’s assertions. I note that A’s sister, Olivia, did state at the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) hearing that the appellant took a close interest in A’s welfare and that she had various problems. There was no such evidence however at the remaking hearing one year on.
39. The appellant has produced no recent independent evidence relating to A. There is no school or medical evidence, and no evidence from A’s mother. This is surprising given the appellant’s claim that he co-parents with A’s mother and that A resides with him every other weekend. In his evidence before me the appellant claimed A had been diagnosed with ADHD and had been thrown out of 4 schools. He claimed her behaviour got worse when she did not see the appellant, but this assertion was entirely unsupported by any independent evidence. The appellant claimed he financially support A but this was not supported by any independent evidence. A lives with her mother who is her primary carer. There is no reliable evidence before me that the impact of the appellant’s deportation on A would be unduly harsh.
40. The appellant claimed at the remaking hearing that he was in a relationship with ZL, who had been his partner on and off for around 9 years. He said she had a 10-year boy and a 6-year-old girl who was severely autistic and claimed that she gave birth to his son on 7 February 2026, at Hastings Hospital, and that his son has been attending Eastbourne hospital because of a potential neurological issue concerning his eyesight and possible fluid on the brain. The appellant described how ZL had a volatile relationship with her own mother and that ZL was now living in temporary accommodation.
41. The appellant has produced no evidence of any sort in support of his claimed relationship either with ZL or with his newborn son. The appellant claimed ZL was going through post-natal depression and he had not informed her about his immigration problems as she does not cope well. It is however up to the appellant to obtain evidence to support and substantiate his appeal. I am not obliged to accept his unsupported assertions. Given my concerns with his credibility I find I can attach only limited weight to any unsupported assertion relating to his relationship with ZL and their son in circumstances where independent supporting evidence could readily have been obtained. I am not consequently satisfied that the impact of the appellant’s deportation on ZL or their child would be unduly harsh.
“Very compelling circumstances”
42. If a foreign criminal cannot come with Exceptions 1 or 2 in s.117C, he can only succeed if he shows that there are “very compelling circumstances” over and above Exceptions 1 and 2 so as to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
43. A foreign criminal is entitled to rely on matters falling within the scope of the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2. He would, however, need to be able to point to features of his case of a kind mentioned in Exceptions 1 and 2, or features falling outside the circumstances described in those Exceptions, which make his claim based on Article 8 ECHR especially strong. In NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662 the Court of Appeal gave the following guidance (at [32]):
“… in the case of a medium offender, if all he could advance in support of his Article 8 claim was a "near miss" case in which he fell short of bringing himself within either Exception 1 or Exception 2, it would not be possible to say that he had shown that there were "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". He would need to have a far stronger case than that by reference to the interests protected by Article 8 to bring himself within that fall back protection. But again, in principle there may be cases in which such an offender can say that features of his case of kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 have such great force for Article 8 purposes that they do constitute very compelling circumstances whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to Article 8 but not falling with the factors described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
44. The threshold for establishing ‘very compelling circumstances’ is a high one. In Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60 the Supreme Court stated that in a case where a foreign criminal cannot come within Exceptions 1 or 2 “great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of such offenders, but … it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed”.
45. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances, I must assess the weight that attaches to the public interest. In Akinyemi v SSHD (No. 2) [2019] EWCA Civ 2098 the Court of Appeal stated at [45] that the public interest is “minimally fixed” as it “can never be other than in favour of deportation”. Later the Court of Appeal went on to say at [50]:
“In my judgment there can be no doubt, consistent with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, that the Supreme Court has clearly identified that the strength of the public interest will be affected by factors in the individual case, i.e. it is a flexible or moveable interest not a fixed interest. Lord Reed provides the example at [26] of a person who was born in this country as a relevant factor. Applying this approach to the weight to be given to the public interest in deportation on the facts of this case could lead to a lower weight being attached to the public interest.”
46. The Strasbourg cases of particular relevance are well known. They include Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50, Üner v Netherlands (2007) 45 EHRR. 14 and Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47. The factors identified in [57] and [58] of Üner have been approved subsequently in both European and domestic case law and are uncontentious. These include, the nature and seriousness of the offence(s) committed by the foreign criminal, the length of the foreign criminal's stay in the country from which he is to be expelled, the time elapsed since the offence(s) was/were committed and the foreign criminal's conduct during that period, and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
47. Taking into account the various and competing considerations set out above, the basic task for any tribunal or court, as identified by Lord Reed JSC in Hesham Ali at [50] is as follows:
“In summary, therefore, the tribunal carries out its task on the basis of the facts as it finds them to be on the evidence before it, and the law as established by statute and case law. Ultimately, it has to decide whether deportation is proportionate in the particular case before it, balancing the strength of the public interest in the deportation of the offender against the impact on private and family life. In doing so, it should give weight to Parliament’s and the Secretary of State’s assessments of the strength of the general public interest... and also consider all factors relevant to the specific case in question.”
Factors in favour of deportation
48. The appellant is a foreign criminal. It is, therefore, in the public interest that he be deported (section 117C(1)). The public interest includes the need to protect society from those who have engaged in serious criminal behaviour and who pose a danger to society, deter criminal behaviour, discourage foreign nationals in the UK from believing that they can commit serious crimes and yet be allowed to remain, and to maintain public confidence in the immigration system and in respect of all these issues.
49. The appellant’s index offence is serious as reflected in the 2-year sentence and its nature (involvement in the supply of drugs). In his evidence before me the applicant sought to minimise his culpability for his index offence by claiming that his solicitor put pressure on him to plead guilty. He claimed that his convictions for assault by beating of emergency workers (police officers) on 13 June 2020 was triggered by PTSD as he believed the police officers were other people trying to kill him. There was however no medical evidence before me in support of this claim.
50. In his response to the decision to refuse his human rights claim the appellant wrote a letter stating that life had taught him adequate lessons and the mistakes he made in his youth “will never be repeated”. In his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) the appellant stated that he had accepted his mistakes and maintained that they would not be repeated. The appellant has however continued to offend. Since becoming aware that he faced deportation in 2019 the appellant has accumulated 6 further convictions in respect of a further 17 offences. He continued to offend even after the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)’s decision by failing to comply with the requirements of a community order, by being in possession of a Class A drug (cocaine) and by committing a battery, both on 23 March 2025 which he claimed was triggered by PTSD. I have already noted that there is no independent evidence that the appellant suffers from PTSD.
Factors against deportation
51. I take account of the undated letter from the appellant’s mother describing how the appellant witnessed domestic abuse from his father and that the appellant and his mother have a strong relationship. In his oral evidence the appellant said he shared supporting his mother with his two sisters. There was however no evidence from the sisters in support of this assertion or from the care home, and his sisters will be able to continue supporting their mother.
52. The appellant has lived in the UK for 37 years. I place significant weight on this factor. Although I have found he would not face very significant obstacles if deported to Sierra Leone it remains that case that the appellant has spent most of his life in this country and regards it as his home given the solidity of his social cultural and family ties with this country. I note however that the appellant has experience of employment in this country which he could utilise in Sierra Leone as well as some educational qualifications from Woolwich and Greenwich Community College in June 2001.
53. Although I have not found that there is sufficient evidence that the impact on the appellant’s partner or children will be unduly harsh, and although there is little cogent independent evidence before me relating to where the best interests of his children lie, at least in relation to A and his infant son it is likely that their best interests are in the appellant remaining in the UK.
54. The appellant’s eldest daughter, Olivia, is now an adult. She gave evidence at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) in support of the appellant. She did not however attend the remaking hearing. The appellant claimed this was because she had a newborn child. There was no independent evidence in support of this assertion. Olivia did not write any letter or statement in further support of the appellant.
Conclusion on ‘very compelling circumstances’
55. I have balanced the factors in favour of the appellant’s deportation with those against. In balancing the competing factors I acknowledge the difficulties the appellant is likely to encounter if deported to Sierra Leone, his significant length of residence in the UK and the negative impact that is likely to be felt by his mother, his children (particularly A) and partner and infant son. The appellant has however continued to commit criminal offences and therefore continues to pose a danger to society. Having holistic regard to all the relevant factors identified above I find the strong public in his removal outweighs the factors militating against his deportation. I find that the factors weighing against his deportation do not establish the existence of very compelling circumstances rendering his deportation disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 February 2026