Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001234

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/50523/2023
LP/11197/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 11 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

ME
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Greer, Counsel instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 4 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellant, a national of Egypt, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bennett (“the Judge”) dated 3 February 2025, whereby she had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal based on both protection and human rights grounds.
3. In this appeal I am assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I conclude that there is no material error of law then the decision of the Judge shall stand. If however, I conclude that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision then I shall set aside the decision and decide whether to remake the decision here at the Upper Tribunal or to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be made there.
Permission to Appeal
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Murray had granted the Appellant permission to appeal by way of a decision dated 12 March 2025. The learned First-tier Tribunal Judge had said when granting permission as follows,
“All grounds are arguable. It is arguable that the FTTJ errs in the assessment of the risk of re-trafficking due to the arguably flawed findings in relation to N’s evidence and a failure to consider the risk of human traffickers outside his family. It is also arguable that the FTTJ failed to conduct an analysis as to whether the state operates a system of domestic protection and failed to analyse the background evidence set out in the grounds. The grounds in relation to the findings with regard to those suffering disabilities are also arguable.”
The Hearing Before Me
5. Mr Greer, who had also appeared before the First-tier Tribunal, had drafted the grounds of appeal and he had amplified those grounds of appeal before me today. There are three grounds of appeal which are then subdivided into sub-grounds. The summary of the grounds is as follows.
6. Ground 1 contends that there was perversity in that the findings in relation to availability and relevance of family support were erroneous findings. Ground 2 contends and that there was perversity and/or inadequate reasoning in relation to the availability of state protection. Ground 3 alleges perversity in relation to the findings in respect of the situation affecting those with disabilities.
7. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Tan submitted that in reality, the Judge had made sufficient findings and that the reasoning was adequate. He said that because the Appellant was relying in rationality, then that meant that the Appellant had to meet the high threshold.
8. Mr Tan said that in respect of Ground 1, there had been a great deal of reliance on a witness referred to as ‘N’ and the judge had considered N’s evidence at paragraphs 25 to 31 and had found N to be less than convincing. Mr Tan said that the Judge was entitled to make the findings which were made and indeed such findings were made on a reasonable and rational basis in respect of whether or not family members of the Appellant would be contactable or not. I was invited to consider various paragraphs of the Judge’s decision including paragraphs 36 to 38 which dealt with vulnerability in respect of exploitation.
9. In respect of ground 2, Mr Tan said that although there was indeed reference to the Country Guidance case from 2013, that was a case specifically in relation to Coptic Christians and at that time in Egypt, there was a state of emergency. There was reference to the US State Department Report and there was reference to news articles, but these were reports which were limited in their nature and there was no full copy and in any event. Mr Tan said that the evidence therefore had been considered by the Judge.
10. In respect of Ground 3, which related to background material, Mr Tan said it was right to focus on the context of what had occurred. Here the Appellant had provided evidence late, nonetheless the Judge did consider the country material and that was the context of why there had not been any, as it were, rebuttal evidence.
11. Mr Tan said that the Judge had also referred at paragraph 43 to the Appellant’s mental health improving. He said that needed to be considered alongside paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision. There the expert evidence which had been summarised previously and including the Appellant suffering with depression, according to a consultant psychiatrist. It was said that, “the difficulties he experiences are now being exacerbated by the stress and anxiety inherent in his current situation”. Mr Tan also said therefore there was nothing wrong in the circumstances with the Judge saying at paragraph 43: “It may be that when his immigration situation is resolved that his ‘presentation’ will start to improve.”
12. I heard from Mr Greer in reply.
Consideration and Analysis
13. I remind myself that the Judge had the benefit of having heard the evidence and that there must be judicial restraint and respect of the decision of the expert First-tier Tribunal Judge. I must not interfere with the Judge’s decision unless there is a material error of law.
14. In the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025) Lord Justice Arnold, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice King agreed, reiterated this and summarised,
“The role of an appellate court or tribunal
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
15. In my judgment it is important to consider the Judge’s decision as a whole.
16. Whilst I agree with Mr Tan submissions that Judge did not find witness ‘N’ to be particularly persuasive or reliable and that there were views expressed in relation to the expert medical evidence, the consideration of the Appellant’s particular circumstances against the background material was the real issue in the grounds of appeal before me.
17. I see the strength in Mr Tan’s arguments before me that the Judge found N’s evidence less than satisfactory in terms of how coincidentally N had come across the Appellant here in the United Kingdom after so many years. I also see the strength in Mr Tan’s submissions that the Judge took the expert medical evidence into account as referred to at paragraphs 22 and 43.
18. However, having said those things, what has troubled me significantly in this case, as I made clear today during the parties’ submissions, is that the Judge was distracted by the dates of the background material and Country Guidance cases and which she concluded, in reality, was out of date. The background material was from 2010; the Country Guidance was from 2013. It was not out of date. It had not been superseded with more ‘favourable’ outcomes for someone like this Appellant.
19. It is worthwhile referring again to the Judge’s findings in relation to the Appellant’s cognitive presentation. One can see that referred to perhaps rather vividly at paragraph 23(b) when the Judge explained in her decision,
“The Appellant’s presentation at the Tribunal hearing. Although I am wary of placing undue weight on this factor I consider that his bearing, his over-familiarity with the interpreter who he was hugging during submissions, his lack of focus throughout the hearing, his lack of inhibition shown by his informal behaviour (standing and stretching, and checking his wallet during proceedings) is consistent with a cognitive impairment.”
And the Judge also said at paragraph 23(i):
“I consider that the Appellant’s vagueness and inability to answer questions such as which side of the road cars drive on in Egypt, even when he was relatively forthcoming with answers in his AIR, support a finding that he has a cognitive impairment. I note that he also appeared to make several obvious errors with dates.”
20. Then ultimately at paragraph 24 the Judge said, looked at in the round she was satisfied that the Appellant has some form of cognitive impairment.
21. It is obvious that even during the relatively short hearing, the Judge observed things about the Appellant which made her comment as she did in clear terms in her decision in respect of the Appellant’s intellectual function or disability. I take judicial notice of this being a rather unusual presentation from an Appellant in First-tier Tribunal (IAC) appeals.
22. The Judge also noted at paragraph 32 of her decision that the Appellant had already been trafficked in Egypt, in Libya, Italy and the UK. Indeed, the Judge went on to say that there was a serious possibility that the Appellant’s family were complicit in his trafficking, perhaps believing it to be a way for the Appellant to find better prospects.
23. I remind myself of what is set out within the Equal Treatment Bench Book in respect of vulnerable adults and those with disabilities, including matters relating to intellectual disability.
24. The Appellant had provided a schedule of background material for the Judge. I have to say that some of the blame rests with the Appellant’s solicitors for filing the updating bundle late and I have sympathy for the Judge. Nonetheless, the Appellant had made clear that there were unusual aspects to this case, such as that,
“At point 2 of the Appellant’s country schedule, the Appellant placed before the Tribunal background evidence tending to suggest that those suffering from disabilities face formidable barriers to integration owing to stigma caused by superstitious beliefs.”
25. Therefore, on return this Appellant would have to seek the assistance of the state (or some NGO’s if he can access them) in relation to the matters which he has faced and against the background of where trafficking had been established in his home country, including complicity by his own family.
26. In my judgment, there was no real evidence available to the Judge to enable her to come to the conclusion that this Appellant, with his intellectual disability/ limited intellectual function, that he would receive or be able to access the assistance which he required and which was essential. Not least because, at best, the availability of such assistance was extremely limited.
27. In terms of the background material, Mr Greer submits that the Judge was wrong in law to conclude, as she did, at paragraph 36 that there was evidence that there are shelters for men and additional support for those with disabilities or other vulnerabilities provided by non-governmental organisations. Therefore, Mr Greer submitted that the Judge was wrong to find that it was not less likely that the Appellant as a male with disabilities would get assistance with shelters.
28. Mr Greer submits that the opposite was the position. In support he referred me to the US State Department Report (which was before the Judge). That states: “Government-provided victim services and shelter remained insufficient, as officials relied on international organizations and NGOs to provide some services, especially for men and foreign victims, without financial or in-kind support”.
29. At paragraph 14 of his grounds, Mr Greer submits, (in respect of the section relating to non-governmental organisations) that, “Some NGOs stated MoSS shelters did not meet the specific needs of some trafficking victims because of concerns about security, privacy, and a lack of adequately trained staff …”.
30. Mr Greer therefore submits that the Judge was entirely wrong to say what she did at paragraph 36 of her decision and contends that what was required was an assessment of the correct background material.
31. In my judgment that ground is made out. I acknowledge that there are three identified grounds with the various subheadings and meaning no disrespect, I think the grounds overlap in a significant way but this, in my judgment, is a very clear material error of law in respect of the Judge’s conclusions and findings. I conclude that the Judge reasoned her decision in a speculative way. There was no sufficient foundation for the Judge’s conclusion. The background material did not support the Judge’s findings and indeed the background material was indicative of support not being available or it being very unlikely that it would be available.
32. I must therefore set aside the Judge’s decision.
33. Against all of that I return to what I ought to make of the Judge’s decision as a whole. Here there is a vulnerable Appellant. Whilst adverse findings were made by the Judge in respect of the witness N, there still remain other favourable aspects of the Judge’s decision which are intertwined within her findings, especially in respect of the vulnerability aspects.
34. I was initially considering whether or not some of the favourable findings by the Judge in respect of vulnerability ought to remain, the difficulty is the Judge has also made adverse findings in respect of the witness N. The whole decision is, in reality, intertwined. I have also considered whether the matter ought to remain here at the Upper Tribunal.
35. I canvassed with the parties what the venue of the remaking ought to be. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully consider whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I also take into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case. On balance I cannot be satisfied that the Judge would have made the decision if the correct background material had been considered whether in respect of the witness N or the availability of assistance for this vulnerable trafficked Appellant. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.
36. In summary, in my judgment it is appropriate in this case, in view of the rather unusual nature of it, that there be a complete rehearing. There has to be fairness for both parties and the fairest approach in this instance is that none of the findings shall stand.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside.
There shall be a complete rehearing on all issues at the First-tier Tribunal.
The anonymity direction is continued.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 July 2025