Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001236

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/50766/2024
LP/07636/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

MAH (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hussain joining via remote link
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 10th September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bowen (the judge) who on 2nd January 2025 dismissed the appellant’s appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
2. The appellant, a citizen of Iraq, asserted he was at risk on return to Iraq owing to a claimed blood feud between rival sub-tribes and clans of the Khoshnaw tribe. Further, he had engaged in political activity against the IKR authorities in the UK. He left Iraq on 31st October 2020 and travelled through Turkey, Italy and France arriving in the UK in the back of a lorry on 12th January 2021 and claimed asylum the same day. The appellant claimed he belonged to the Karashi clan which was a sub-tribe within the Khoshnaw tribe and his claim centred on a blood feud between rival sub-tribes of the Khoshnaw tribe. He claimed the backdrop to his claim was a long-standing feud whereby his father’s cousin’s son F injured a child from the Haidari clan despite explaining it was an accident. F was killed two days later by the Haidari clan and there were reprisals such that four members of the Haidari claim were ambushed, either killed or injured and taken to the hospital where the appellant’s brother H worked. H was murdered as he left the hospital that night. The appellant fled with his family.
3. At [24] the judge made a series of credibility findings and ultimately found the appellant’s account lacked credibility. Nor did the judge find that the appellant was at risk owing to his sur place activities.
The grounds of appeal.
4. At [24(iv)] the judge made a series of findings as to what he found inherently implausible.
5. It was submitted that the timeframe between the ambush in court and the appellant’s brother being killed was around six to seven hours and the timeframe between the killing of the appellant’s brother and the appellant’s family travelling to S’s house was another six hours. It was unclear why the judge found these twelve hours as short or why the events referred to could not have happened within this period.
6. HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [27] to [30] stated as follows:
“27. The difficulty of the fact-finding exercise is particularly acute in asylum cases, as has been said on more than one occasion in this court - see for instance Gheisari –v- Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 1854 at paragraphs 10 and 12 per Sedley LJ and at paragraphs 20 and 21 per Pill LJ. The standard of proof to be applied for the purpose of assessing the appellant’s fear of persecution is low. The choice is not normally which of two parties to believe, but whether or not to believe the appellant. Relatively unusually for an English Judge, an Immigration Judge has an almost inquisitorial function, although he has none of the evidence-gathering or other investigatory powers of an inquisitorial Judge. That is a particularly acute problem in cases where the evidence is pretty unsatisfactory in extent, quality and presentation, which is particularly true of asylum cases. That is normally through nobody's fault: it is the nature of the beast.
28. Further, in many asylum cases, some, even most, of the appellants story may seem inherently unlikely but that does not mean that it is untrue. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence (where there is any).
29. Inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience. Indeed, it is likely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly unfamiliar. The point is well made in Hathaway on Law of Refugee Status (1991) at page 81:
‘In assessing the general human rights information, decision-makers must constantly be on guard to avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own perceptions of reasonability.’
30. Inherent improbability in the context of asylum cases was discussed at some length by Lord Brodie in Awala –v- Secretary of State [2005] CSOH 73. At paragraph 22, he pointed out that it was ‘not proper to reject an applicant’s account merely on the basis that it is not credible or not plausible. To say that an applicant’s account is not credible is to state a conclusion’ (emphasis added). At paragraph 24, he said that rejection of a story on grounds of implausibility must be done ‘on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation’. He went on to emphasise, as did Pill LJ in Ghaisari, the entitlement of the fact-finder to rely ‘on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is not plausible’. However, he accepted that ‘there will be cases where actions which may appear implausible if judged by…Scottish standards, might be plausible when considered within the context of the applicant's social and cultural background’.”
7. It was submitted that the judge had failed to take into account material matters when assessing credibility. At [24(v) and (vi)] the judge found that the appellant’s parents had returned to the family home without coming to any adverse attention, and further that the other family members continued to live in their home area and that substantially detracted from the appellant’s claim.
8. The objective evidence confirmed, however, that blood feuds may give rise to long cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge and could sometimes flare up after being dormant for years, CPIN on Iraq: Blood feuds, and paragraph 10 of the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument.
9. The objective evidence could account for why the appellant’s father had been able to remain in the family home and continue his life in Iraq and also why the appellant’s other family members could have continued to live in their home area and was not taken into account by the judge. The grounds stated:
“It may well be the case that the blood feud, after a cycle of retaliatory violence which caused the appellant to leave the country, had entered into a cycle of dormancy which enable families involved in the blood feud to continue to live in their home areas”.
10. Also the finding that the appellant’s father was able to continue his life without difficulties was contrary to the evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant’s parents were living in fear, see paragraph 7 of the appellant’s witness statement.
11. The Tribunal also found at [24(vi)] that “The Appellant has not ever suggested that he has ever personally received threats from the Haidari and continued to live in Iraq for more than 7 months after the claimed escalation”.
12. The suggestion by the Tribunal that the appellant must be personally targeted to be at risk was an arguable error of law. It was the appellant’s membership of his family that put him at risk as a result of the blood feud and not being specifically targeted by the Haidari family.
13. The judge in essence had materially misdirected himself in law.
Submissions
14. At the hearing before me Mr Hussain joined by remote link electronically but his client attended the court in person. They had not had an opportunity to engage that day. I thus explained to his client the procedure, albeit that Mr Hussain stated that the solicitors had already explained the procedure and this was an error of law only.
15. Mr Hussain essentially relied on the grounds in particular that the judge’s finding at [24] that the account was inherently implausible such that at [24(iv)] there was an extraordinary sequence in a short period was not implausible and he relied on HK. The judge had not relied on further evidence to explain why there were difficulties with the account. It was highly subjective.
16. In relation to the second ground and [24(v) and (vi)], the judge had found that the blood feud had dissipated but he had failed to take into account the CPIN on Blood feuds such that a feud could lie dormant for years and Mr Hussain pointed out that the CPIN confirmed that protracted feuds could resurrect themselves and this was one of those examples. He invited the court to set the decision aside.
17. Ms Rushforth submitted that the grounds disclosed no material error.
18. In relation to the first ground the judge was entitled to note the sequence of events was subjectively surprising and there was nothing irrational nor perverse and this was just one of a number of adverse findings against the appellant, albeit that Mr Hussain submitted the finding was axiomatic and flawed the remainder of the findings.
19. In relation to ground 2 the judge was entitled to note the position in relation to the appellant’s family such that the evidence was that it was not about the appellant but about everyone in the tribe and the judge was entitled to note what had happened to his family and whether he was threatened and in order to establish the claim the appellant needed to show he was personally at risk.
20. The other credibility findings were not challenged and were sustainable.
21. Mr Hussain responded that the foundation on which the decision was based was on shaky reasoning and the judge was required to grapple with pivotal pieces of evidence within the CPIN.
Analysis
22. In terms of both grounds, HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department guides judges to consider the evidence ‘against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence…’.
23. Under the rubric ‘Findings’ at [16]-[17] the judge set out as follows:
‘16.In circumstances where the credibility of the Appellant’s account is forcibly challenged, I remind myself that the assessment of credibility is a holistic exercise of judgment which requires the Tribunal to consider all the relevant evidence in reaching a conclusion. An assessment of credibility can only be properly made against the background evidence. An individual’s account must also be assessed on the basis of its cultural and societal context.
17. The approach to the assessment of future risk is a single-stage process of evaluating all the evidence for what it is worth (Karanakaran v Home Secretary [2000] 3 All ER 449). The approach to the evidence as set out in that case does not entail the decision maker purporting to find ‘proved’ facts, whether past or present about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, but means that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future, unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur.’
24. At [19] the judge set out that the appellant had quoted extensively from the CPIN:Iraq. Blood Feuds, February 2020 and that a new CPIN Iraq, Blood feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribunal Violence was published in July 2024. From [19(i)] onwards the judge set out salient extracts from the CPIN and also at [20] cited the EUAA report identifying that the two reports were consistent. It is simply not arguable that the judge failed to consider country background material when addressing the specific circumstances of the appellant and the credibility of his account throughout.
25. The first ground of challenge rested on the assessment of the timeframe at [24(iv)] between the ambush in court and the appellant’s brother killing. It was submitted that the disbelief of the account owing to the timeline was essentially flawed owing to the failure to observe HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department . The judge failed to consider that even if the appellant’s story seemed inherently unlikely it did not mean it was untrue and the ingredients of the story should be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence.
26. I find, however, that the judge did consider the evidence as a whole, as identified above, and took a balanced approach to the evidence; at [22] for example, he specifically noted the appellant’s various interviews and accounts finding them consistent.
27. However, the judge made further findings which undermined the appellant’s account and which were not challenged. For example, the judge at [24], and prior to the finding at [24(iv)], found at [24(i)] that there was an internal inconsistency in the appellant’s basic account of whether the child was merely hurt or killed in the initial car crash. As the judge identified, this was said to be the catalyst for the escalation in the dispute. The judge nevertheless did not weigh that as a determinative factor on its own but this was the background against which he determined the appellant’s account.
28. When turning to the criticism of [24(iv)], it is clear that the judge had in mind the objective/background evidence, again as noted above. The judge did not reject all assertions out of hand and noted that the appellant’s description of the claimed ambush of the 4 Haidari members at court detracted from the appellant’s account as recorded at [22] of the FtT decision (see above) and accepted that the discrepancy in the date of his brother’s, H’s death was a mere mistake. In this instance the judge specifically stated he factored in the appellant’s comments in his witness statement; these recorded the appellant maintained ‘it not impossible for all these things to happen on the same day’ and ‘there is nothing implausible about my account’.
29. When assessing the timeframe, the judge did specifically, factored in cultural considerations such that there was a need to bury members of the Muslim faith with speed.
30. It was open to the judge after setting out the events in the timeframe, and against the background material and evidence, to find that there was an extraordinary sequence of events which occurred between the time of the court hearing and the hiding of the appellant with the interim happening of the murder of his brother who just happened to be working at the hospital.
31. It should be noted that the judge also reasoned in the criticised paragraph that:
“... further upon the extent of the corroborating evidence provided below - in respect of evidence in relation to the claimed events of 4 March 2020, whilst media reports and other documents have been provided in support of a shooting at Court, no substantive evidence (whether documentary evidence of H’s role, date/time of death for example, or supporting statements from family members have been provided”).
32. It was against this lack of reasonably expected supporting statements from family members that the judge overall made the findings on credibility at [24]. Nothing in this contravenes HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
33. Moreover, the grounds of challenge are significantly undermined by the judge’s following cogent findings at [35] which confirmed, after considering all the evidence, that he did not accept that on the evidence produced, the appellant was even linked to any blood feud. Those findings did not appear to be effectively challenged. The judge found:
35. I remind myself that there is no requirement for an Appellant to corroborate his account and that an account should not be rejected solely because there is no corroboration. There can, however, be circumstances in which the corroborating evidence could be obtained with ease, such that the lack of evidence may impact credibility (TK (Burundi) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 40 refers). In that respect, I note that despite his family continuing to live in their home area and being in contact with them throughout:-
i) The Appellant has provided no documentary evidence demonstrating that he is related to F, S or any of the other people directly involved in the feud. The Appellant has similarly provided no supporting witness statements from his parents, uncles or cousins, setting out the nature of his relationship with them. I do not consider that the limited message exchange with RR discloses any information linking the Appellant to those involved.
ii) Despite the Respondent directly challenging the Appellant as to the plausibility of events on 4 March 2020, the Appellant has provided no evidence to demonstrate that H was his brother, that H worked at the hospital or that he was killed and buried on 4 March 2020. Whilst the Appellant has provided evidence of the gravestones of the Haidari members who were killed, no such evidence has been provided in relation to H (whose death is not mentioned in the media reports).
iii) In circumstances, where more than 4 years have elapsed since the Appellant left Iraq, the Appellant has provided no statements from his family that remain in Iraq as to the current position in relation to any feud. He has not disclosed the Snapchat message in which he states he learnt of his cousin M being injured in a shooting in 2021 or any other evidence in support of that claimed evidence. Indeed, he has provided no updated evidence from Facebook or any other sources which demonstrate that there are ongoing issues between the families/clans. Whilst the Appellant has suggested that his parents “live in fear” there is no evidence from them to say so. Whilst mindful of the background evidence as to periods of dormancy in a blood feud, in circumstances where he is the only family member to have left Iraq, I find this to be a significant omission. There is no recent evidence to show that any feud persists (or if does at the levels of 2020).
36. I find that the Appellant’s failure to provide easily obtainable evidence corroborating his relationship to those involved in the claimed feud, that his own brother had been killed in the feud or any wider evidence from family members (to include the current position in relation to the feud) are factors which detract from his credibility.
34. Turning to the second ground and the failure to take into account material matters, the grounds advanced that it may well be the case that the blood feud, after a cycle of retaliatory violence which caused the appellant to leave the country, had entered into a cycle of dormancy; the CPIN on Iraq: Blood feuds confirmed that such feuds could sometimes flare up after being dormant for years.
35. It is not evident, however, that the judge failed to take into account material factors. Not only does Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 confirm at 2(iii) ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration...’ but it can be seen from above, that the judge specifically referenced possible dormancy of the feud. Additionally, the judge at [21] specifically found that
‘On the basis of the background evidence, I find that blood feuds are prevalent in Iraq, to include in the KRI. These feuds can be long lasting and factors such as land disputes and unintentional killing can be a catalyst for a dispute (or an escalation of an existing dispute). This is the lens through which I assess the Appellant’s credibility.’
36. As the judge found at [24(v)] notwithstanding that the parents apparently lived in fear they had “experienced no problems to date since the Appellant had left Iraq” and that the appellant had not “otherwise asserted that his parents have experienced any difficulties as a result of the feud since the Appellant left Iraq”.
37. Notwithstanding that it is asserted that the objective evidence showed that blood feuds could remain dormant, as held in EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC) ‘Where there is an active feud affecting an individual and self-confinement is the only option, that person will normally qualify for Refugee status.’
38. This refers to an active blood feud rather than one which is dormant. There is no reason to suppose a different approach to a feud should be adopted in relation to Iraq.
39. Additionally, the finding that the judge actually made was not only that the other family members were not harmed but also that it was
“... objectively surprising that he [the appellant] initially stated he was not aware of the whereabouts of his wider family or S’s other sons. He went on to suggest however that he believed they are all still in Ranya. The Appellant has not suggested therefore that any other family members, to include those more closely related to S (to include 7 of his sons) or those who were more actively involved in the claimed escalation, have fled Iraq or otherwise relocated”.
40. The further obvious point is that if they were subjectively or objectively in fear of an eruption of the feud from dormancy they would not continue to remain in the vicinity. It was this point that there were others who were more closely related and more actively involved in the claimed escalation and who had not been targeted which also led the judge to make the conclusion that he did.
41. As the judge observed, the appellant claimed, “it’s not specifically about me, it’s about everybody in my tribe and he wants to kill anyone that belongs to my tribe”. That was advanced in the present tense and not that the feud was dormant. When viewed against this backdrop, that the other family members had continued to live in their home and no adequate explanation had been given as to why the appellant himself was targeted rather than the more closely involved family members, notwithstanding any dormancy, it was open to the judge to find as he did.
42. The fact that the judge stated “The Appellant has not ever suggested that he has ever personally received threats from the Haidari and continued to live in Iraq for more than 7 months after the claimed escalation” at [24(vi)] is not suggesting that the appellant must himself be personally targeted and the judge appreciated that the appellant’s membership of his family put him at risk but that was the context in which the judge simply did not accept that no other family member would be targeted.
43. Adequate findings were made in relation to credibility and the judge made an overall holistic and lawful assessment of the relevant evidence. A careful reading of the decision reveals that the grounds are not sustainable.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law and will stand.
The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3rd October 2025