UI-2025-001239 & Ors.
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The decision
INCLUDEPICTURE "cid:image003.png@01DB60FC.A4434A20" \* MERGEFORMATINET
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001239
UI-2025-001240
UI-2025-001241
Ft T No: HU/51484/2024, LH/04119/2024
HU/51485/2024, LH/04121/2024
HU/51486/2024, LH/04122/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 September 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAFFER
Between
PI
NI
AI
(Anonymity order made)
Appellants
and
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
On the papers
Prepared at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 15 August 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are citizens of Afghanistan who appealed on human rights grounds against the Respondent’s Decisions dated 31 January 2024 refusing their application for Leave to Enter dated 13 December, 2023. The Appellants appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hillis, promulgated on 5 December 2024, dismissing the appeal. The brevity of this decision is due to the clarity of the issue and concession by the Respondent.
Permission to appeal
2. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Farmer on 13 March 2025 who stated:
“3. Ground 1 discloses an arguable error of law on the basis of procedural unfairness. Credibility was not listed as an issue to determine and at the commencement of the hearing the Judge expressly asked if the presenting officer was challenging the sponsors credibility and was told that there was no challenge. The Judge specifically states that the facts in this case were not substantially in dispute. The Judge then goes on to reject part of the undisputed factual narrative that the appellants’ father and uncle are no longer alive and living in Afghanistan or able to care for the appellants despite the fact that this was not an issue before him. It is clearly arguable that this is procedurally unfair.
4. Ground 2 discloses an arguable error of law as no clear findings were given by the Judge for rejecting the sponsor’s oral evidence in circumstances where a credibility challenge was not mounted by the respondent at the hearing.
5. Ground 3 discloses an arguable error of law. The Judge found that Article 8(1) was not engaged on family life grounds but failed to address or make reference to the correct legal test of whether there was real or committed or effective support between the appellants and their sponsor.
6. Ground 4 discloses an arguable error of law as the Judge failed to address the legal test set out in Paragraph 297 which was relevant to the third appellant who was a minor at the date of the application and failed to address the “serious and compelling reasons” argument.”
The Upper Tribunal hearing of 15 May 2025
3. Following submissions by the representatives the Tribunal issued the following directions:
“1. The Appellants are at liberty to file and serve a transcript of the hearing before Judge of the First Tier Tribunal Hillis of 22nd November 2024 by no later than 25th June 2025.
2. Should the Appellants file a transcript of the hearing before Judge Hillis, the Respondent shall file and serve a Response to the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal in accordance with Tribunal Procedure Rule 24 by no later than 23rd July 2025. If the Appellants file and serve the transcript mentioned at 1, above, the Respondent must indicate whether she continues to dispute the claim at Paragraph 8 of the Appellants’ grounds.
3. Alternatively, the Tribunal considers that the parties may wish to arrange to listen to a recording of the hearing in-person at the Bradford Hearing Centre and attempt to reach agreement as to what concessions of fact, if any, were made before Judge Hills. This would involve less cost and delay. If the parties adopt this approach, they are to write to the Tribunal no later than 25 June 2025, identifying which specific factual issues, as opposed to general observations about the credibility or quality of the Sponsor’s evidence, were expressly conceded
4. If either party seeks an extension of time, the Upper Tribunal must be informed why an extension of time is necessary with reasons provided.
5. The matter will go before the Upper Tribunal at Bradford on the first available date after 6th August 2025.”
4. Upon application the time to file an agreed position statement was extended to 29 July 2025.
Agreed position statement
5. The Respondent filed the following agreed position statement:
“1. Ms S Khan and Miss Z Young listened to the recording on Tuesday 15th July starting at 15:00 at Bradford IAC. Whilst listening to the recording, Ms S Khan emailed a copy of Jack Dingley’s statement and hearing notes (18-page document) to Miss Z Young to assist.
2. There were a number of preliminary issues discussed at the FTT hearing before FTTJ Hillis on 22nd November 2024 which are not recorded at [6]-[8] of the FTT determination.
3. It is accepted by the Secretary of State that the PO at the FTT hearing accepted they were not challenging the credibility of the appellant’s account. There were no concessions made in relation to the sponsor’s credibility or the evidence given by the sponsor nor was the PO asked by the FTTJ. However, the PO then stated that they wished to cross-examine the sponsor on the current situation in Afghanistan which was permitted and no objection raised by the representative.
4. A draft of this response was submitted to the Appellant’s representatives on 25th July. Ms S Khan responded on Monday 28th July and after further discussions with Miss Z Young, the Appellant’s representative does not agree with the assessment set out at paragraph 3 above. Ms S Khan’s impression was that the PO was not challenging the credibility of the sponsor but wanted to ask questions to clarify. The parties cannot agree a position on this point. However, both parties agree this point is immaterial to the agree outcome set out at paragraph 11 of this response.
5. There was further discussion around whether it was accepted Article 8 was engaged or not and the final position from the PO was that Article 8 was not accepted as engaged in relation to all three appellants.
6. The PO did accept there was no issue taken about adequate maintenance, accommodation and the biological relationship. The PO did not accept that the financial contributions covered the whole period the sponsor has claimed to send funds to the appellant in order to engage Article 8 which was in response to the FTTJ’s questions.
7. The sponsor was cross-examined as indicated above and credibility issues arose from the questions put to the sponsor. However, the PO made no direct submissions on credibility, but Ms S Khan did as noted at paragraph 2, page 17 of Jack Dingley’s statement and hearing notes.
8. The Secretary of State does not accept paragraph 8 of the grounds of appeal [EOL bundle page 11] is correct in its entirety. The Secretary of State accepts the concession made by the PO as recorded at paragraph 3 above but submits it is ambiguous in light of then proceeding to cross-examine the sponsor. It is then clear from the recording, that credibility issues arose during cross-examine albeit should have been addressed in the submissions of the PO. The Secretary of State accepts that paragraph 9 of the grounds of appeal [EOL bundle page 11] was not put to the sponsor by the PO or the FTTJ. The Secretary of State accepts there is a material error of law in relation to how the FTTJ has dealt with the issue of credibility and that does amount to procedural unfairness. The Secretary of State accepts ground two amounts to a material error of law as the FTTJ failed to make a specific finding on the sponsor’s credibility.
9. In light of the acceptance on ground one and two that the FTT determination does contain a material error of law, the decision needs to be set aside and remitted back to the FTT de novo before a FTTJ other than FTTJ Hillis. In light of the decision being set aside de novo, the concession re credibility falls away. The Secretary of State seeks to put the appellants and sponsor on notice that credibility will be in issue at the next FTT hearing. The Secretary of State will be referring this one back to the POU and advising them to file a further review, making clear what the issues are and the position re sponsor’s credibility as indicated at paragraph 8 above. This is a matter for the FTT to actioned as part of their case management once the matter has been remitted.
10. The remainder of the grounds have not been addressed in light of the position taken on grounds one and two. Ground one amounts to procedural unfairness and therefore the decision should be set aside in its entirety and remitted de novo as submitted at paragraph 8 above.
11. This is an agreed response from the Appellant and Respondent as per the UT directions. The parties also respectfully ask that the matter is dealt with on the papers in light of this response and therefore the hearing listed for the 18th of August can be vacated.”
Discussion
6. Given the concession made by the Respondent, and having considered it myself, I am satisfied that the Judge materially as set out above in the agreed position statement.
Notice of Decision
7. The Judge made a material error of law. I set aside that decision and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard de novo by a Judge other than Judge Hillis.
Laurence Saffer
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 August 2025
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001239
UI-2025-001240
UI-2025-001241
Ft T No: HU/51484/2024, LH/04119/2024
HU/51485/2024, LH/04121/2024
HU/51486/2024, LH/04122/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 September 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAFFER
Between
PI
NI
AI
(Anonymity order made)
Appellants
and
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
On the papers
Prepared at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 15 August 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are citizens of Afghanistan who appealed on human rights grounds against the Respondent’s Decisions dated 31 January 2024 refusing their application for Leave to Enter dated 13 December, 2023. The Appellants appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hillis, promulgated on 5 December 2024, dismissing the appeal. The brevity of this decision is due to the clarity of the issue and concession by the Respondent.
Permission to appeal
2. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Farmer on 13 March 2025 who stated:
“3. Ground 1 discloses an arguable error of law on the basis of procedural unfairness. Credibility was not listed as an issue to determine and at the commencement of the hearing the Judge expressly asked if the presenting officer was challenging the sponsors credibility and was told that there was no challenge. The Judge specifically states that the facts in this case were not substantially in dispute. The Judge then goes on to reject part of the undisputed factual narrative that the appellants’ father and uncle are no longer alive and living in Afghanistan or able to care for the appellants despite the fact that this was not an issue before him. It is clearly arguable that this is procedurally unfair.
4. Ground 2 discloses an arguable error of law as no clear findings were given by the Judge for rejecting the sponsor’s oral evidence in circumstances where a credibility challenge was not mounted by the respondent at the hearing.
5. Ground 3 discloses an arguable error of law. The Judge found that Article 8(1) was not engaged on family life grounds but failed to address or make reference to the correct legal test of whether there was real or committed or effective support between the appellants and their sponsor.
6. Ground 4 discloses an arguable error of law as the Judge failed to address the legal test set out in Paragraph 297 which was relevant to the third appellant who was a minor at the date of the application and failed to address the “serious and compelling reasons” argument.”
The Upper Tribunal hearing of 15 May 2025
3. Following submissions by the representatives the Tribunal issued the following directions:
“1. The Appellants are at liberty to file and serve a transcript of the hearing before Judge of the First Tier Tribunal Hillis of 22nd November 2024 by no later than 25th June 2025.
2. Should the Appellants file a transcript of the hearing before Judge Hillis, the Respondent shall file and serve a Response to the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal in accordance with Tribunal Procedure Rule 24 by no later than 23rd July 2025. If the Appellants file and serve the transcript mentioned at 1, above, the Respondent must indicate whether she continues to dispute the claim at Paragraph 8 of the Appellants’ grounds.
3. Alternatively, the Tribunal considers that the parties may wish to arrange to listen to a recording of the hearing in-person at the Bradford Hearing Centre and attempt to reach agreement as to what concessions of fact, if any, were made before Judge Hills. This would involve less cost and delay. If the parties adopt this approach, they are to write to the Tribunal no later than 25 June 2025, identifying which specific factual issues, as opposed to general observations about the credibility or quality of the Sponsor’s evidence, were expressly conceded
4. If either party seeks an extension of time, the Upper Tribunal must be informed why an extension of time is necessary with reasons provided.
5. The matter will go before the Upper Tribunal at Bradford on the first available date after 6th August 2025.”
4. Upon application the time to file an agreed position statement was extended to 29 July 2025.
Agreed position statement
5. The Respondent filed the following agreed position statement:
“1. Ms S Khan and Miss Z Young listened to the recording on Tuesday 15th July starting at 15:00 at Bradford IAC. Whilst listening to the recording, Ms S Khan emailed a copy of Jack Dingley’s statement and hearing notes (18-page document) to Miss Z Young to assist.
2. There were a number of preliminary issues discussed at the FTT hearing before FTTJ Hillis on 22nd November 2024 which are not recorded at [6]-[8] of the FTT determination.
3. It is accepted by the Secretary of State that the PO at the FTT hearing accepted they were not challenging the credibility of the appellant’s account. There were no concessions made in relation to the sponsor’s credibility or the evidence given by the sponsor nor was the PO asked by the FTTJ. However, the PO then stated that they wished to cross-examine the sponsor on the current situation in Afghanistan which was permitted and no objection raised by the representative.
4. A draft of this response was submitted to the Appellant’s representatives on 25th July. Ms S Khan responded on Monday 28th July and after further discussions with Miss Z Young, the Appellant’s representative does not agree with the assessment set out at paragraph 3 above. Ms S Khan’s impression was that the PO was not challenging the credibility of the sponsor but wanted to ask questions to clarify. The parties cannot agree a position on this point. However, both parties agree this point is immaterial to the agree outcome set out at paragraph 11 of this response.
5. There was further discussion around whether it was accepted Article 8 was engaged or not and the final position from the PO was that Article 8 was not accepted as engaged in relation to all three appellants.
6. The PO did accept there was no issue taken about adequate maintenance, accommodation and the biological relationship. The PO did not accept that the financial contributions covered the whole period the sponsor has claimed to send funds to the appellant in order to engage Article 8 which was in response to the FTTJ’s questions.
7. The sponsor was cross-examined as indicated above and credibility issues arose from the questions put to the sponsor. However, the PO made no direct submissions on credibility, but Ms S Khan did as noted at paragraph 2, page 17 of Jack Dingley’s statement and hearing notes.
8. The Secretary of State does not accept paragraph 8 of the grounds of appeal [EOL bundle page 11] is correct in its entirety. The Secretary of State accepts the concession made by the PO as recorded at paragraph 3 above but submits it is ambiguous in light of then proceeding to cross-examine the sponsor. It is then clear from the recording, that credibility issues arose during cross-examine albeit should have been addressed in the submissions of the PO. The Secretary of State accepts that paragraph 9 of the grounds of appeal [EOL bundle page 11] was not put to the sponsor by the PO or the FTTJ. The Secretary of State accepts there is a material error of law in relation to how the FTTJ has dealt with the issue of credibility and that does amount to procedural unfairness. The Secretary of State accepts ground two amounts to a material error of law as the FTTJ failed to make a specific finding on the sponsor’s credibility.
9. In light of the acceptance on ground one and two that the FTT determination does contain a material error of law, the decision needs to be set aside and remitted back to the FTT de novo before a FTTJ other than FTTJ Hillis. In light of the decision being set aside de novo, the concession re credibility falls away. The Secretary of State seeks to put the appellants and sponsor on notice that credibility will be in issue at the next FTT hearing. The Secretary of State will be referring this one back to the POU and advising them to file a further review, making clear what the issues are and the position re sponsor’s credibility as indicated at paragraph 8 above. This is a matter for the FTT to actioned as part of their case management once the matter has been remitted.
10. The remainder of the grounds have not been addressed in light of the position taken on grounds one and two. Ground one amounts to procedural unfairness and therefore the decision should be set aside in its entirety and remitted de novo as submitted at paragraph 8 above.
11. This is an agreed response from the Appellant and Respondent as per the UT directions. The parties also respectfully ask that the matter is dealt with on the papers in light of this response and therefore the hearing listed for the 18th of August can be vacated.”
Discussion
6. Given the concession made by the Respondent, and having considered it myself, I am satisfied that the Judge materially as set out above in the agreed position statement.
Notice of Decision
7. The Judge made a material error of law. I set aside that decision and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard de novo by a Judge other than Judge Hillis.
Laurence Saffer
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 August 2025