Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001244

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66277/2023
LP/08295/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J K SWANEY

Between

WL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Mughal, legal representative
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, senior presenting officer
Heard at Field House on 9 June 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals the decision of First-tier Tribunal judge Beg (the Judge) promulgated on 6 February 2025 to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
2. An anonymity direction was made in the First-tier Tribunal, which I have maintained, as the interests of giving effect to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweigh the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 November 2021 with entry clearance as a visitor. He claimed asylum on 29 November 2021.
4. The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution in the DRC for reason of his actual or imputed political opinion. He claims that he is a member of the DRC International Training Centre for Human Rights and Development and that he was detained in the DRC. The appellant also claims that a risk arises as a result of his activities in the United Kingdom, because he is a member of APARECO.
5. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim on 5 December 2023 and the appellant appealed the decision. His appeal was heard on 5 February 2025 and was dismissed by the Judge in a decision promulgated on 6 February 2025. The Judge gave the following reasons for dismissing the appeal:
(i) The appellant is not credible.
(ii) There is no documentary evidence of his photographs or films; there is no credible evidence that he ever worked as a photographer or filmmaker; and there is no evidence from the NGO for which he claimed to work or from the UN Mission to the DRC.
(iii) There is no corroborative evidence of the appellant’s claimed injuries as a resulting beatings during his detention.
(iv) There is no documentary evidence to support his claim of how he came to be released.
(v) The appellant’s claim of being able to say goodbye to his wife and children and being able to leave the DRC using his own passport is inconsistent with his claim that the authorities were looking for him.
(vi) The appellant fabricated his claim to have used an agent to apply for a visa for him.
(vii) The appellant’s intention in coming to the United Kingdom as a visitor was to remain here permanently and his claim that his home in the DRC had been raided was fabricated.
(viii) There is no credible evidence to support the appellant’s claim about his house being ransacked, such as photographs, and there is no credible reason as to why it was not reported to the police.
(ix) Letters from the appellant’s relatives are self-serving and attract little weight.
(x) Documents relating to the appellant being wanted by the authorities carry little weight and are inconsistent with the appellant being able to leave the country using his own passport.
(xi) The letter from the DRC International Training Centre for Human Rights and Development carries little weight because it makes no mention of the appellant’s activities on behalf of the organisation and does not mention that he is a photographer.
(xii) The appellant’s failure to mention an arrest warrant at his screening interview damages his credibility.
(xiii) There are no photographs of the appellant’s activities with APARECO and because he has never been politically active, his involvement in APARECO is not genuine.
(xiv) The letter from APARECO carries little weight because of a lack of detail about the appellant’s activities and because the letter refers to the appellant as a female.
(xv) The appellant is not of adverse interest to the authorities.
(xvi) There is no evidence from someone qualified to provide it that the appellant has PTSD or that he would be unable to access treatment in the DRC.
(xvii) The appellant’s asylum claim is fabricated.
6. The appellant made an application for permission to appeal, which was granted. The grant of permission notes that the grounds of appeal are unfocused, but that the main thread is that the Judge erred in placing too much weight on an absence of corroborative evidence without putting that to the appellant. The grounds of appeal also assert that the Judge failed to make proper findings and/or give any/adequate reasons for the findings made. The grant of permission to appeal was not limited.
The hearing
7. Directions were made that the appellant must provide a composite electronic hearing bundle by no later than 26 May 2025. That direction was not complied with and on 28 May 2025 the tribunal sent a further direction requiring the appellant to provide a composite bundle by no later than 4:00 pm on 29 May 2025. Ms Mughal stated that the bundle was provided ‘last week’ but was unable to provide a specific date on which it was sent or any reasons as to why directions were not complied with. Mr Ojo did not object to the bundle’s admission, and I formally admitted the bundle.
8. I asked Ms Mughal to clarify the grounds of appeal given that they were somewhat unfocused. She confirmed that there are essentially two grounds of appeal:
(i) That the Judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility by effectively imposing a requirement for corroborative evidence.
(ii) That the Judge erred by failing to consider the appellant’s explanation of how he was able to leave the DRC without coming to the attention of the authorities.
9. Ms Mughal highlighted the numerous occasions on which the Judge noted that the appellant had failed to provide evidence to support various aspects of his claim. She submitted that the Judge rejected the appellant’s claims without giving any reasons other than the lack of corroboration and contended that this gave rise to an incorrect assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
10. Ms Mughal submitted that in finding the fact that the appellant did not leave the DRC after his first detention damaged his credibility, the Judge failed to have regard to the point of distinction made by the appellant between the two detentions. The first was over very quickly and the appellant was able to go about his business. In contrast, the second lasted longer and the appellant was transferred to prison. Ms Mughal contended that there was no clear reason why submissions in relation to the two detentions were rejected.
11. Ms Mughal relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216. She accepted that while the burden of proof is on the appellant, there is no requirement for corroboration and submitted that the Judge ought to have assessed the appellant’s oral evidence together with the documentary evidence that was available.
12. In respect of ground two, Ms Mughal submitted that there is no indication that the Judge took the appellant’s most recent statement into account. She submitted that the appellant provided a clear account of how it was possible for him to leave the DRC, and that the Judge failed to even make reference to his evidence, much less give reasons for rejecting it.
13. Ms Mughal submitted that the errors of law identified in the grounds are material because they mean that the Judge failed to carry out a proper assessment of credibility.
14. Mr Ojo also sought to rely on MAH. He accepted that although there is no general requirement for corroboration, there are circumstances in which a lack of corroboration will be a material factor that can properly be taken into account in the assessment of credibility. He referred me to paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules and the respondent’s guidance on assessing credibility, which was found to contain an accurate summary of the law in MAH.
15. Mr Ojo submitted that the appellant was aware that his credibility was in issue because it is clearly stated in the decision under appeal that none of the material facts of his claim were accepted. The consequence of that was that the appellant ought to have been on notice that supporting evidence would reasonably be required and a lack of such evidence would not have needed to have been put to the appellant.
16. Regarding the five factors set out in paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules, Mr Ojo submitted that corroboration was reasonably required because he had not satisfied points (ii), (iv) or (v). He submitted that:
(i) The appellant had made a genuine effort to substantiate his claim because he had provided some documentary evidence.
(ii) A satisfactory explanation as to a lack of other relevant material was required.
(iii) It is arguable that the appellant’s statements were coherent and plausible and not counter to general and specific information relevant to his case.
(iv) The appellant did not claim asylum at the earliest opportunity and was required to provide an explanation for his failure to do so.
(v) The appellant’s general credibility was not established, because the Judge gave sustainable reasons (aside from a lack of documentary evidence) for finding the appellant not credible.
17. In respect of point (v), Mr Ojo referred to the finding that the appellant was inconsistent about being involved in political activities in the DRC; his failure to mention his involvement with the DRC Training Centre for Human Rights and Development at his screening interview; the appellant’s evidence to his counsellor, which was inconsistent because he only referred to one period of imprisonment and the reasons for that.
18. Mr Ojo submitted that the Judge was entitled to criticise the documentary evidence, in particular, the lack of information about the appellant’s claimed activism.
19. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Mr Ojo submitted that the Judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s ability to leave the DRC using his own passport was inconsistent with his claim that he was of adverse interest to the authorities.
Discussion
20. The first finding the Judge makes is at paragraph 10 where she states: ‘I do not find the appellant is a credible witness’. The remainder of paragraph 10 relates to the appellant’s failure to provide any documentary evidence to confirm his work as a film director or photographer; that he ever ran a business as a photographer or filmmaker; that he ever provided photographs or films of demonstrations to the DRC Training Centre for Human Rights and Development or the UN Mission in the DRC; and the fact that the Judge was not clear as to why he would take such photographs or film if it would put him at risk. This is the first instance of the Judge appearing to require the appellant to provide corroborative evidence without first considering whether it is in fact necessary with reference to the appellant’s evidence as a whole, paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules and relevant case law.
21. The decision contains several further examples of whether the Judge has expressly relied on a lack of corroborating or documentary evidence without considering whether or why it might reasonably be required, see paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17, 21.
22. Where the appellant has provided documents in support of his claim, the Judge gives them little weight but does not explain why. Even if the second part of paragraph 23 is to be regarded as her reasons for placing little weight on the documents, they are unclear. The appellant’s explanation in his witness statement was that he was able to leave the airport without going through the normal process of checking, instead being taken through back routes before boarding a flight. The Judge makes no reference to the appellant’s witness statement in which this explanation is provided. It is capable of explaining why the authorities might have issued a summons for the appellant after he had left the country and ought to have been addressed before a finding was made about the reliability of the documents.
23. Mr Ojo’s submission is that even if this does amount to an error of law, it is not material because there are sufficient other reasons given by the Judge for finding that the appellant is not credible. I disagree. The Judge’s decision does not demonstrate that she has considered the appellant’s evidence with the lower standard of proof in mind and does not demonstrate that she has considered all of the evidence in the round before reaching a conclusion about the appellant’s credibility. By focusing on the absence of evidence rather than considering the evidence that was before her and giving clear reasons for accepting or rejecting that, the Judge has failed to give adequate reasons for her finding that the appellant is not credible.
24. The Judge’s finding on credibility caused her to conclude that the appellant fabricated his claim for asylum and the errors in the credibility assessment are therefore clearly material.
Disposal of the appeal
25. Having had regard to the views of both parties, paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022], Civ 1512, I find that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing. This is because the flawed credibility assessment infects all of the judge’s findings such that none should be preserved.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of an error of law.
27. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside, and no findings are preserved.
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House for a hearing before any judge other than Judge Begg.

J K Swaney
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 June 2025