Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001246

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51755/2024
LH/07031/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

FATJET VUCAJ
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Raw of counsel, instructed by Reiss Edwards Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms R Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Richard Wood (“the Judge”) promulgated on 8 December 2024 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 6 February 2024 to refuse his application under the Immigration Rules for leave to enter as a partner made on 24 January 2024.
Background
1. The Appellant is Mr Fatjet Vucaj. He was born on 23 December 1996. He is a national of Albania. He entered the UK on 15 September 2013 (aged 17) and claimed asylum on 28 November 2013, which was subsequently refused. On 19 December 2013 he was served with an Illegal Entrant form. On 11 June 2014, the Appellant applied for leave to remain (“LTR”). This application was subsequently refused.
2. In 2015, when he was aged 18, there were four occasions on which he failed to report pursuant to a condition of immigration bail. It is not in dispute that these failures occurred in the context that the Appellant’s reporting location changed from Folkestone to London Bridge. The Appellant contended that his failures to report were the result of health reasons and because he was unable to afford the travel cost from his then home in Margate.
3. The Appellant met Sandy Moreta, the sponsor, in January 2022. Their relationship commenced in April 2022. Ms Moreta is an EU citizen who has settled status in the UK.
4. In February 2023, the Appellant was detained upon reporting as a condition of his immigration bail, and removed at public expense from the UK to Albania.
5. On 24 November 2023, the Appellant married the sponsor in Albania.
6. On 4 January 2024, the Appellant made an application for entry clearance into the UK under the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) as a partner of the sponsor.
7. The application was refused by letter dated 6 February 2024. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant satisfied the relationship, financial, and English language eligibility requirements. The Appellant’s application was refused on the basis of suitability under paragraph S-EC.1.5 of Appendix FM and paragraph 9.8.2 of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. The Respondent took the view that there were no exceptional circumstances which might justify the granting of leave to remain outside of the rules based on the Appellant’s article 8 rights.
8. An appeal was brought challenging the Respondent’s decision. This was heard on 7 November 2024 at a remote hearing at which the Appellant and Ms Moreta gave oral evidence.
9. Following clarification from the Respondent that the Appellant did not, in fact, have a criminal conviction, this aspect of the Respondent’s suitability argument was in the event not pursued by the Respondent. The Respondent maintained that the Appellant had made immigration applications that were without merit, however as these were not produced, the Judge did not consider that to be relevant to suitability [18].
10. The Respondent also relied upon the Appellant’s failure to return to Albania voluntarily, thereby putting the state to the expense of effecting a compulsory return, and upon the previously mentioned failures to report on four occasions (and late reporting on a fifth) in 2015, as aggravating features in relation to the suitability assessment for the purposes of the Rules.
11. By a decision issued on 8 December 2024, the appeal was dismissed.
12. The Appellant appeals with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on 3 April 2025.
The error of law hearing
13. We were provided with a composite bundle containing all relevant documents. We heard submissions from Mr Raw and Ms Tariq, to whom we are grateful for their assistance.
14. Mr Raw confirmed that Ground 1, alleging that the fairness of the hearing before the Judge was compromised by the Judge being vexed or frustrated by delays and adjournments to the hearing, was not pursued. We regard this concession as being properly made, as no transcript or recording of the hearing has been put before us.
15. The focus of Mr Raw’s submissions was that the Judge had placed disproportionate and unlawful weight upon the Appellant’s four instances of failing to report in 2015, so as to amount to an error of law. It was submitted that the Judge himself had identified that the cost of travel to London Bridge was relevant to whether the failures to report amounted to a suitability issue. It was further submitted that two of the aggravating features relied upon by the Respondent had either been withdrawn (the criminal conviction) or been rejected by the Judge (the without merit applications) so that what remained in terms of suitability issues did not warrant the Judge’s conclusion at [22] that “there is sufficient aggravating of the breach of immigration laws to justify refusal on the grounds set out in paragraph 9.8.2”.
16. The Judge expressed some sympathy with the financial burden that the Appellant experienced by being required to travel to London Bridge [21] and took into account the time that has elapsed since these breaches of reporting restrictions [21]. The Judge regarded the fact that there had been subsequent compliance as indicative that the Appellant was able to comply.
17. The grounds of appeal in relation to the Judge’s consideration under the Rules amount, in our view, to disagreement with the Judge’s conclusion and do not disclose a material error of law.
18. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693.
19. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 sets out general principles to be applied to appeals on pure matters of fact. Those principles, said by the Court of Appeal to be “well-settled” are:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
20. We have kept these considerations in mind when coming to our decision.
21. We are satisfied that the Judge’s approach to the assessment of suitability under the Rules does not disclose any material error of law. He noted that the key consideration was whether paragraph 9.8.2(c) of the Rules applied to the Appellant, i.e.
“the applicant has previously contrived in a significant way to frustrate the intention of the rules, or there are other aggravating circumstances (in addition to the immigration breach), such as using a false identity, or a failure to properly comply with enforcement processes, such as failing to report, or absconding.”
The Judge conducted his analysis of suitability having regard to all relevant facts, including the cost and inconvenience to the Appellant of the altered reporting requirements. The Judge found at [20] to [22] that the Appellant’s failure to report on four occasions in 2015 was sufficient to engage paragraph 9.8.2(c). Ms Tariq submitted that while the Appellant’s reporting centre had been changed from Folkstone to London Bridge, the frequency of the Appellant’s reporting had also been reduced from fortnightly to monthly, which meant that the Appellant had failed to report for four months. While Mr Raw submitted that the Judge should have taken into account the lengthy period during which the Appellant did comply with reporting conditions, it was for the Judge to decide what weight to give to the competing evidence. We are unable to conclude that the Judge’s decision was irrational or unsupportable.
22. As to the Judge’s consideration of the Appellant’s family life relationship with his wife, the relationship had been accepted as being genuine and as amounting to family life. Mr Raw’s reliance upon text message exchanges between them was therefore not necessary, in light of that acceptance.
23. He sought to argue that the Judge had not permitted evidence to be adduced as to Ms Moreta’s professional role. It is apparent from her witness statement, payslips and a letter from her employer in the bundle that information as to the nature of her employment was before the Judge.
24. It is clear from [33] that the Judge acknowledged the difficulty Ms Moreta would experience were she to relocate to Albania. The Judge was also in our view entitled to take into account the fact that she had previously relocated to the UK and established a professional and private life, and to draw from that the finding as to her resilience in such circumstances when finding that she could live in Albania with the Appellant. We regard those findings as within the spectrum of decisions properly open to the Judge and as disclosing no error of law.
25. The Judge at [25] to [35] identified the correct legal principles and then applied these.
26. The Judge’s approach to the circumstances in which the relationship was formed (at a time when the Appellant did not have legal status in the UK) is consistent with s.117B(4) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 [34]. In assessing the proportionality of the interference with the Article 8 ECHR rights, the Judge conducted a balancing exercise at [35] which discloses no material error of law.
27. We conclude that there is no material error of law, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Notice of Decision
(1) There is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.

Siân Davies

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 June 2025