Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001248

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/65148/2023
LH/07246/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

Between

R I
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, counsel instructed by Kalam Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 9 August 2022, having been granted a visit visa valid until 3 February 2023. On 1 February 2023, she applied for leave to remain on account of her ill health and dependency on her UK-based relatives. The application was refused by the respondent on 7 September 2023, and an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was dismissed on 23 January 2025. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted by a different Judge of the FtT on 14 March 2025.
2. While no anonymity order was made in the FtT, I consider that the sensitive medical details discussed in this decision mean identification could cause sufficient harm that derogation from the principle of open justice is justified.
3. I take each of the grounds of appeal in turn. I mean no disrespect to the capable arguments put forward by Mr Karim and Ms Nolan by only setting them out where necessary to explain my conclusions.
Ground 1 – ‘very significant obstacles to integration’
4. One issue to be decided by the judge was whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh. The appellant suffers from medical problems that the Judge summarised as follows:
16. There is no challenge to the medical evidence. The Appellant has significant medical problems - paranoid schizophrenia, depression, Parkinson’s disease, hypertension and insomnia. Hypertension, Generalised anxiety disorder, and possible bipolar disorder were diagnosed and treated in Bangladesh, before she came here, by a professor at a well-known institute in Bangladesh identified in the CPIN. There is now a further suggestion of an additional diagnosis of dementia, made since she arrived, but this is not confirmed. She certainly appears to be having memory problems. I find that, wherever she is, it is likely that she will need more medical and other assistance in the future than she has had in the past. It is clear that she has already had paid help in the past, from her maid […] and from [a distant relative].
5. The approach to assessing whether there are very significant obstacles to integration was described as follows in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813:
14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s “integration” into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.
6. In NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, the Court of Appeal considered Kamara alongside two other relevant authorities, Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and Lal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1925, to hold that:
25. It is not in doubt, based on these authorities, that (i) the decision-maker (or tribunal on appeal) must reach a broad evaluative judgment on the paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) question (see Kamara at [14]), (ii) that judgment must focus on the obstacles to integration and their significance to the appellant (see Parveen at [9]) and (iii) the test is not subjective, in the sense of being limited to the appellant’s own perception of the obstacles to reintegration, but extends to all aspects of the appellant’s likely situation on return including objective evidence, and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles (see Lal at [36]-[37]).
26. I would add this. The test posed by paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) is a practical one. Regard must be had to the likely consequences of the obstacles to reintegration which are identified. In a case like this, where the only obstacle identified is the appellant’s genuine but unfounded fear, particular care must be taken to assess the ways in which and the extent to which that subjective fear will or might impede re-integration. It cannot simply be assumed that it will. The likely reality for the appellant on resuming her life in her home country must be considered, given her subjective fear, and the availability of support and any other mitigation must be weighed. It is against that background that the judgment on whether the obstacles to reintegration will be very significant must be reached.
7. Mr Karim argued that the Judge had lost sight of the correct test, his decision wrongly focusing on the ability to obtain day-to-dare essential personal and medical care rather than the appellant’s ability to build up “a variety of human relationships to give substance” to her private life.
8. This ground amounts to disagreement with the weight that the Judge placed on particular circumstances. The Judge referred to Kamara at [19], before setting out his assessment:
20. I bear in mind that I am applying this test to a woman who is single and has significant mental and physical health problems, which may worsen. I agree that her integration is made more difficult by these factors, but that that is true wherever she is. However she was able to live in Bangladesh for 51 years, 26 of them as a divorcee; and was already receiving treatment for her mental health problems in Bangladesh from a well-respected hospital in Dhaka. She will return to accommodation which she owns and knows. It was not suggested that she was not integrated before she left, and that she could not enjoy a private life then. There have been developments since she came here in August 2022, in particular, the possibility that she may have dementia and the fact that her two male helpers, at least one of which she paid, have left her area, one for Dhaka and one for the US. But it was not established that no other help, paid or otherwise, could not assist her in her dealings with the world, insofar as they are required, or in accessing medical treatment, in order to assist her integration. Her return in those circumstances is clearly not the desired outcome for her or the sponsor; it will probably not be the optimal outcome. But those are not the tests to be satisfied; and on the balance of probabilities, the relevant tests are not met. The Appellant has not established on the balance of probabilities that there are very significant obstacles to her integration in Bangladesh.
9. The reference to the lack of any suggestion that the appellant did not enjoy a private life when in Bangladesh, that she would return to accommodation “which she owns and knows”, and to help that would “assist her in her dealings with the world” makes clear that the Judge was correctly considering her integration as described in Kamara. The discussion of essential care simply recognised that it was necessary for that integration to take place. The Judge’s assessment discloses no error of law.
Ground 2 – unduly harsh
10. Having found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the rules, the Judge turned to whether refusal would be a disproportionate interference with the right to respect for her family and private life afforded by Article 8 ECHR. This required the Judge to balance that interference against the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. Ground 2 argues that the Judge mistook how much weight was carried by the latter. Two paragraphs of the decision are relied upon: (emphasis added)
21. Finally I have considered whether the consequences of the Appellant’s return would be unduly harsh, so as to amount to a breach of Article 8. I proceed by way of the well-known case-law starting with Razgar [2004] HL 27 and the five questions to be asked. In that respect I find that Article 8 private life is engaged; and that the Appellant’s removal may have an impact upon it. As to whether the Appellant and her adult niece enjoy family life here, I accept that in principle that such a relationship could constitute family life. The test that was established in Kugathas countenances the consideration of relationships other than that between an adult child and a parent. Ms Joly has housed the Appellant for 2 and a half years since her arrival here, has provided her with significant care and has offered to assist her in the future. This is certainly beyond the normal bonds of affection between adult family members. I conclude that Article 8 family life is also engaged. Next, I bear in mind that effective immigration control is in the interests of the economic well-being of the country.
[…]
27. The Appellant does not satisfy the requirements of the Article 8 compliant rules. As to Article 8 outside the rules, having applied the balance sheet approach, and having considered all the matters in the round, I have concluded that although the optimal outcome for the Appellant would be to remain in the UK, supported and cared for by her relatives (with whom she enjoys family life) at their expense, her ability to access medical treatment in Bangladesh in the past, her resources, and her ability to find and pay individuals to assist her in the past and the absence of evidence that this will not be possible in the future, have led to my conclusion, that to remove the Appellant would not be unduly harsh so as to amount to a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 rights such as itself to breach the UK’s obligation
11. It is common ground that the applicable standard was not “unduly harsh” as used above, but instead “unjustifiably harsh” as provided by para GEN.3.2 of Appendix FM:
GEN.3.2.
(1) […] where an application for entry clearance or leave to enter or remain made under this Appendix, or an application for leave to remain which has otherwise been considered under this Appendix, does not otherwise meet the requirements of this Appendix or Part 9 of the Rules, the decision-maker must consider whether the circumstances in sub-paragraph (2) apply.
(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) above applies, the decision-maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance, or leave to enter or remain, a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant, their partner, a relevant child or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from that information would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.
12. Despite the superfluous addition of “exceptional” earlier in the rule, the term “unjustifiably harsh” can be seen as simple shorthand for where the consequences of refusal cannot be justified by a failure to meet the substantive requirements of the rules.
13. The phrase “unduly harsh”, on the other hand, comes from the law concerning criminal deportation. A so-called ‘medium offender’, usually meaning someone sentenced to between one and four years in prison, will avoid deportation if the consequences would be unduly harsh upon a qualifying partner or child. “Unduly harsh” in that context poses a fixed, self-contained and elevated threshold that recognises the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals, and would certainly impose a higher hurdle than that faced by the appellant in this case.
14. The question is therefore whether the use of the word “unduly” is a simple slip, and the Judge nonetheless applied the correct test, or whether it indicates that the appellant was required to meet too high a threshold. In support of the latter interpretation, Mr Karim cited the Judge’s finding that remaining in the UK would be “the optimal outcome” as suggesting that a threshold had been imposed rather than an evaluative assessment conducted as required by Article 8. He also referred to the strength of the appellant’s case as making a simple drafting error less plausible.
15. Immigration law is replete with adjectival thresholds, an abundance of definition and exposition lying behind every one, so careful self-expression is important. If the Judge had only set out the relevant test by reference to “unduly” I would be concerned that too high a threshold had been imposed. Reading the entire decision however, the two uses of the word are drafting errors and nothing more. The Judge cites the correct test of “unjustifiably harsh” at [3(vii)(ii)] when setting out the appellant’s case, and there, as well as at [12(vii)], refers to the issue being Article 8 proportionality. At [4(iii)] he likewise records the respondent’s arguments as relating to whether refusal would be “unjustifiably harsh”. As can be seen extracted above at [21], and is apparent from the Judge’s consideration of the individual circumstances at [22]-[25], he engaged in a conventional Article 8 balancing of the respective interests.
Ground 3 – availability of care in Bangladesh
16. The Judge found that the appellant had not proved that she would be unable to access paid carers in Bangladesh, despite the individuals who had previously provided it no longer being there. Mr Karim argued that this was over-speculative, there being no evidence that care would be available, and that the Judge’s analysis required the appellant to prove a negative.
17. Within his decision, the Judge had addressed whether the appellant’s removal would be contrary to Article 3 on medical grounds. That discrete issue is no longer pursued, but as part of his consideration the Judge held as follows:
17. […] Overall, given her own resources, those of her family, and her past access to treatment, I find that she has not established that she faces a real risk of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy as a result of the absence of medical treatment or lack of access to such treatment. Insofar as she may be subject to a dementia diagnosis, she will be able to access treatment, as in the past, with the assistance of paid help, as she had before. She also has a supportive family here. The distance from her home to the doctor was not an issue in the past. Although Professor Rahman is based in Dhaka, and the Appellant is in Sylhet which is several hours away by car, that journey has clearly been managed in the past; with help, it can be managed in the future. I note the finding in Dr Karim’s first report that she may not be able to maintain adequate self-care and take prescribed medication correctly; that removal of family support may lead to deterioration; and that she needs help with the daily task of medication compliancy. However, no independent evidence about problems in recruiting paid carers to undertake these tasks was produced. The issue was raised in the psychologist’s report, but only in very general terms. He refers to a shortage of care-givers and difficulties in finding people to help her; he makes no reference to the treatment she has already accessed; or to the care she accessed in Bangladesh. He does not say such caring assistance cannot be obtained. He also states that if she was removed from her current environment, where she has family and medical support, the impact will be profound, both in the short and long term. However he does not address the possibility and the effect of her obtaining care again in Bangladesh, or that she has only lived in her current environment for 2.5 years; the rest of her life has been spent in Bangladesh, mainly in the home to which she will return, where she has managed some of her present conditions for many years. When the witness was asked whether if [her relatives and her maid] were still in place she would be content for the Appellant to return, she said she would be. I find that the Appellant will be able to access paid help in the future, as she has in the past; and that treatment will be accessible to her. As a result, overall, I have concluded that the high threshold for an Article 3 medical claim has not been met.
18. Despite being made in the context of Article 3, when taken together with the findings at [20] the Judge’s assessment provides a complete answer to this ground. The Judge was plainly entitled to conclude that care was obtained in the past so could be again, for the reasons given. Determining the appellant’s situation on return was necessarily speculative in the absence of direct evidence, and it was open to the Judge to find that something akin to the previous arrangements would resume. I reject that the appellant was faced with a burden of proof that was impossible to meet; a claimed systemic lack of paid carers in Bangladesh could have been addressed with country evidence.
Ground 4 – male protector
19. As developed in Mr Karim’s oral submissions, it is argued that the Judge wrongly treated paid care and support in Bangladesh as a cure for the lack of a protective male relative – since the appellant had come to the UK, her nephew had left Bangladesh. The Judge had been referred by Mr Karim to the Home Office’s Country policy and information note: women fearing gender-based violence, Bangladesh (“CPIN”). I note that the version placed before the Judge was dated July 2020, whereas by that time a new version had been published in 2024. This is unfortunate, and both parties bear responsibility.
20. I agree with Ms Nolan that this ground amounts to factual disagreement. The Judge was plainly aware of the country evidence, as it is referenced within his summary of Mr Karim’s submissions at 12(v). The relevant findings, again contained at [20] and set out above, make clear that account was taken of the lack of a male relative. I can only interfere with the Judge’s overall findings if he was plainly wrong to give that factor the weight he did: Clin v Walter Lilly & Co [2021] EWCA Civ 136 at [85]. The country evidence does not establish that life without a protective male relative is impossible for all women, but rather that it must be taken into account. The Judge was entitled to conclude that financial support taken together with the previous ability to live in Bangladesh meant that she would be able to do so again.
Conclusion
21. None of the grounds establish a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

J Neville
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 September 2025