Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001251

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56277/2023
LP/04824/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
7TH July 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the appellant: Ms P. Yong, Counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer Solicitors
For the respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Raymond (‘the Judge’), which was promulgated on 18 December 2024 following a hearing held on 23 September 2024. In that decision, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity and Sunni Muslim faith. He is originally from Sulaymaniyah City, located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). He departed Iraq on 26 July 2019, initially travelling by air to Turkey, and subsequently continued his journey through Greece, Italy, and France, ultimately entering the United Kingdom clandestinely by boat on 7 August 2020. He submitted an application for asylum the following day.
3. The appellant's claim for asylum is based upon a claimed risk of being a victim of an honour-based crime. He alleges that he fled Iraq due to threats from his former father-in-law, AQ, a prominent and influential politician affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). According to the appellant, he was accused of bringing dishonour upon AQ’s family by divorcing his daughter, HAM.
4. The appellant also advanced a claim for Humanitarian Protection on the grounds that he is an undocumented Iraqi national. As such he claims that he would face a real risk of serious harm upon return, due to his inability to obtain a Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) or an Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (INID).
5. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on 15 August 2023. While it was accepted that the appellant is an Iraqi Kurd who was previously married and has since divorced, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had experienced problems from his ex-father-in-law or that he could not re-document himself with the assistance from his family in Iraq.
First-tier Tribunal appeal
6. In a decision promulgated on 18 December 2024, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s claim for asylum. In a comprehensive determination, the Judge found the appellant’s account to lack credibility. While acknowledging that corroborative evidence is not a legal requirement, the Judge noted that the appellant’s claim revolved around an alleged honour-based conflict with a powerful local politician, AQ, arising from the appellant’s divorce from AQ’s daughter, HAM. Despite the gravity of these allegations, the appellant failed to submit any supporting documentation linking AQ to HAM or the appellant.
7. The Judge further questioned the credibility of the marriage itself, given the disparity in social status between AQ, a prominent and respected member of the PUK, and the appellant, a minimally educated taxi driver from a marginalised tribe. The Judge also found inconsistencies and omissions in the appellant's account, including the lack of risk to HAM herself (despite local cultural norms punishing female promiscuity), and the failure to provide evidence of their shared life or child custody arrangements. The Judge noted that the appellant had potential access to numerous sources of supporting evidence, such as family members, legal representatives involved in the divorce, and the tribal leader who allegedly provided him shelter, yet no statements or documentation were provided from any of these individuals.
8. Additional credibility issues arose regarding the Appellant’s account of a violent attack supposedly linked to the honour feud. The appellant’s account of having escaped from four armed men despite suffering 17 stab wounds was found implausible and unsubstantiated by any hospital records or medical evidence. The Judge accepted that the appellant had visible scars but concluded they could have arisen at another time or from unrelated circumstances.
9. Ultimately, the Judge concluded that the appellant’s asylum claim was entirely lacking in credibility and determined that it was a complete fabrication. His identity documents were also deemed retrievable, making his return to the KRI feasible. In the absence of any significant health issues or established private life in the United Kingdom, the Judge further determined that there were no grounds for relief under Articles 3 or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Grounds of appeal
10. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The appellant advanced three grounds:
(1) That the Judge erred in law by making adverse findings on material facts that had been expressly accepted by the respondent in the reasons for refusal letter and not put to the appellant during the course of the hearing;
(2) That the Judge materially erred in law in the assessment of the alleged attack on the appellant; and
(3) That the Judge made a material error of law in evaluating the appellant’s ability to return to Iraq in the absence of identity documents.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson on 22 April 2025. In granting permission, Judge Jackson held that it was arguable that the Judge had erred in law by making adverse findings on facts that the respondent had accepted, specifically the appellant’s claimed marriage and divorce. Judge Jackson further noted that there was no indication that the concerns relied upon by the Judge in rejecting these claims were ever put to the appellant, giving rise to an arguable case of procedural unfairness.
12. Judge Jackson also found that the remaining two grounds were arguable. It was noted that the adverse findings concerning the appellant’s marriage and divorce arguably tainted the broader assessment of the appellant’s credibility, including the evaluation of risk on return and documentation issues.
Upper Tribunal appeal
13. I heard submissions from both parties. In reaching my decision, I have carefully considered the First-tier Tribunal’s determination, the documentary evidence that was before the Judge, the appellant’s grounds of appeal, and the parties’ submissions at the hearing. While it is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions in full because they are a matter of record, I will refer to any relevant arguments where appropriate in the course of my decision.
14. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
Decision and Reasons
15. Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before the Upper Tribunal, I find that the appellant’s grounds do disclose a material error of law in the Judge’s decision, such that the decision must be set aside.
16. The respondent’s refusal letter dated 15 August 2023 explicitly accepted the appellant’s account of his marriage and subsequent divorce. The respondent’s review dated 16 April 2024 relied on the refusal letter and raised no concerns regarding the appellant’s evidence or account of these events. Despite this, at paragraphs 15 to 17 of the First-tier Tribunal determination, the Judge expressed several criticisms of the marriage and divorce certificates, stating:
15. A peculiarity of this marriage certificate is that, unlike the many marriage certificates that this court has seen from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Africa and elsewhere, it bears on its face no record of the parents of the parties, or of witnesses to their union. Which could have been expected to include, in my experience, the claimed father of the bride AQ.
16. The Appellant also submits with translation of a divorce document issued by the same court of the Court of Appeal Sulaymaniyah, dated 08.03.15, with the Claimant being the Appellant represented by his two lawyers HHK and AOM. This certifies the Appellant divorcing HAM outside court on 17.02.15, in absentia of HAM, and the Appellant bearing the costs of the proceedings.
17. A peculiarity of this divorce certificate is that it does not refer to any provision after divorce for the child of the marriage, or any separate arrangement certified by the court in that regard, unlike many court divorce orders that this Tribunal has seen from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Africa, and elsewhere.
17. Crucially, none of these concerns were raised by the Judge at any point during the hearing. Ms Yong submitted that this omission deprived the appellant and his representative of the opportunity to respond to or provide further evidence addressing these concerns. This, she argued, resulted in procedural unfairness.
18. In response, Mr Terrell argued that the Judge’s adverse comments related not to the appellant’s marital status itself, which the Judge did not reject, but rather to the appellant’s claim that AQ was his father-in-law. According to Mr Terrell, the Judge was merely concluding that the certificates failed to establish a connection between the appellant and AQ, which was the crux of the appeal. While I have carefully considered this submission and the Judge’s determination, I find that the Judge’s reasoning, when read as a whole, extends beyond this narrow interpretation.
19. Beyond the initial criticisms at paragraphs 15 to 17, the Judge further referred at paragraph 82 to “defects… in the divorce certificate” and at paragraph 85 to “defects to the marriage certificate.” At paragraph 86, the Judge highlighted a “complete lack of evidence” for the appellant’s married life with HAM, and at paragraph 133, the claim was dismissed as a “complete fabrication.” These concerns about the reliability and authenticity of the marriage and divorce certificates were not previously raised by the respondent, nor were they put to the appellant during the hearing. Given the respondent’s explicit acceptance of the appellant’s marital and divorce status, this was not a situation where some obvious inconsistency in evidence might reasonably be expected to be addressed without the First-tier Tribunal specifically raising it.
20. In TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, the Supreme Court held that fairness generally required that if a witness's evidence is to be rejected, it should be challenged at the hearing to give them an opportunity to address the challenge. This principle was more recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, which emphasised that a failure to put to a party a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice because he must have a proper opportunity to deal with the point.
21. Whether procedural unfairness arises depends on the facts of each case. Here, I find that the Judge’s failure to raise his concerns about the authenticity and reliability of the marriage and divorce certificates, concerns not previously identified by the respondent, deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to address the Judge’s doubts. The Judge’s findings on the marriage and divorce certificates contribute to his overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility, and the ultimate finding that the appellant’s claim was fabricated. Consequently, this procedural error is material and permeates the entirety of the Judge’s decision, affecting his conclusions on credibility, risk, and documentation.
22. In light of the findings under Ground 1, the decision of the Judge must be set aside in its entirety. Given that Ground 1 is dispositive of the appeal, it is unnecessary to address Grounds 2 and 3.
23. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The decision is set aside in its entirety.
Disposal
24. Having identified an error of law, I must now determine whether to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal or remit it to the First-tier Tribunal. In either case, I must also consider whether any of the judge's findings should be preserved.
25. The decision involved an error of law which rendered the overall proceedings unfair such that the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing. In those circumstances the only appropriate disposal would be to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to decide the appeal de novo.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a judge other than Judge Raymond.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

02 July 2025