Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001259
UI-2025-001481

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66787/2023
LP/09978/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

ZS
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood, of Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 20 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellant, born on 6 June 1999, is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, from Suleymaniyah. He arrived in the UK on 8 October 2021, having left Iraq on 26 September 2021 and travelled through various countries including Turkey, and claimed asylum. He attended a screening interview on 10 October 2021 and was interviewed about his claim in full on 16 November 2023. His claim was refused on 9 December 2023. He appealed against that decision.
3. The appellant claims to fear persecution in Iraq arising out of problems with a powerful family in Suleymaniyah. He claims that he is a kickboxer and holds a black belt in kickboxing and that he ran a martial arts business with his friend D and competed professionally in kickboxing. He also worked in a dry cleaning/ ironing business. The appellant claims that, during a kickboxing championship on 24 September 2021 he fought against A, the son of the head of Asayish in Suleymaniyah, and injured him in his left eye in the fight. 15 days prior to that he had been involved in an argument with A in the dry cleaning business about when some clothes were ready for collection. A’s brother, M, had come to the shop later and hit him and he had reported the matter to the police but they had taken no action due to the position of A’s father. The appellant claims that after the kickboxing fight D told him that M had come to the kickboxing gym looking for him as he wanted to take revenge for the injury to his brother and he raided his home when he was out. His home had since been burned down, but he did not know who was responsible. The appellant claims that he stayed with his uncle for two days after the fight as he wanted a rest and he then left Suleymaniyah on 26 September 2021 and fled Iraq. He claims that he left with his mother, sister and uncle but became separated from them in Turkey and that he had tried, but had not been able, to find them through the Red Cross. He claims that his identity documents were taken from him by the agent who brought him to the UK. The appellant claims that he has been told by D that A’s family have threatened him (the appellant) and have visited the kickboxing hall looking for him. He also fears persecution as a result of his activities in the UK including attending demonstrations and posting on social media.
4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that he was of Kurdish ethnicity and that he was involved in kickboxing, but did not accept his account of having come to the adverse attention of a powerful family in Suleymaniyah or of having attracted adverse attention due to any political activities in the UK. The respondent considered that the appellant was at no risk on return to Iraq as a result of attending demonstrations in the UK or posting on social media, given the limited extent of his activities. The respondent considered that the appellant could obtain identity documents to enable him to return to Iraq. The respondent considered further that the appellant could seek protection from the police in Iraq or that he could relocate to another area of the country and would therefore not be at risk on return. It was not accepted that his return to Iraq would breach his human rights.
5. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 17 December 2024. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account. She did not accept that he was at risk from Asayish and she did not accept that he was at risk as a result of his sur place activities in the UK. The judge did not accept that the KRI authorities would have any interest in the appellant on return to Iraq. The judge considered that the appellant was still in contact with family members in Iraq and that they could assist him in obtaining replacement documents. The judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 18 December 2024.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on three grounds. Firstly, that the judge had materially misdirected herself in law in requiring corroboration for the appellant’s account and had misapplied the standard of proof and failed to make findings of fact on supporting material evidence. Secondly, that the judge had failed to consider how the appellant would conduct himself, as regards his political opinion, upon return to Iraq and what would be the consequences for him as per HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. Thirdly, that the judge had materially erred in law in her findings on the appellant’s ability to redocument himself and return to his home area, in accordance with the guidance in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110.
7. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on the third ground only, but upon renewal the Upper Tribunal granted permission on the remaining two grounds. The respondent issued a rule 24 response opposing the appeal, but on the basis of the initial grant of permission only.
8. The matter then came before me for a hearing and both parties made submissions. The submissions are addressed in my analysis below.
Analysis
9. It was Mr Wood’s submission, in relation to the first ground, that the judge made material errors at [28] of her decision in requiring corroborative evidence, that she applied the wrong standard of proof and that she made no findings on the evidence that had been provided to support the appellant’s account of the kickboxing fight, namely the letter from D. However I do not consider there to be any merit in this ground. The judge properly directed herself on the standard of proof at [20] and applied the correct standard when assessing the appellant’s evidence. Although the judge could perhaps have expressed herself in better terms at [28], it is the case nevertheless that she was perfectly entitled to draw adverse conclusions from a lack of evidence which would have been readily accessible and which could reasonably be expected to have been obtained and adduced. In so far as the grounds rely upon [86] of MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 in asserting that there was no requirement for corroboration, they ignore the second part of the paragraph which states that “On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight.” It was entirely open to the judge to have regard to the absence of evidence of what would have been an important and publicly reported event, and to conclude that that undermined the credibility of the appellant’s account. As for the letter from the appellant’s friend D, it is clear that the judge took that into account when assessing the appellant’s claim. The judge confirmed at [25] that she had considered all the evidence. She specifically referred to the letter from D at [11]. At [34] she referred to, and made findings on, the screen shots from CCTV footage which were referred to in D’s letter. The judge was not required to refer to each and every piece of evidence, but it is sufficient that she took it into account when assessing the evidence as a whole. The judge gave numerous reasons, from [28] to [35], for rejecting the appellant’s account of having come to the adverse interest of Asayish, including but not limited to the absence of supporting evidence, and was fully and properly entitled to make the adverse findings that she did.
10. Mr Wood submitted, with regard to the second ground of appeal, that the judge had erred by failing to undertake an assessment in line with HJ (Iran), making no findings as to whether or not the appellant’s activities in the UK were disingenuous and as to how he would conduct himself in Iraq. He submitted that that was material, given the references in the CPIN report (the Home Office Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Version 3.0, July 2023) to the risk of harm arising from mere attendance at demonstrations in Iraq. However, whilst the judge made no specific finding on the genuineness of the appellant’s political beliefs, it is clear from her findings at [36] to [40] that she did not consider him to be a person who would intend to involve himself in political activities in Iraq at any significant level. That was made clear by her findings that the appellant was not previously politically involved when in the KRI, that he had no links to any political party in Iraq or the UK, and that he only recently joined the Dakok support centre despite having been in the UK for some time previously. The judge gave cogent reasons, with reference to the country background evidence, for concluding that a person of such a low profile with such limited involvement would be of no adverse interest to the authorities in the KRI. That was a conclusion the judge was fully entitled to reach. The grounds are essentially a disagreement with the judge’s conclusions, but do not identify any error of law in her assessment of risk on return.
11. Finally, with regard to the third ground, it is submitted that the judge materially erred in her assessment of risk arising from a lack of documentation. Mr Wood relied upon his own email enquiry to KRG (UK) about the process relied upon by the Home Office in the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN)- Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (October 2023) which would suggest that the appellant could obtain replacement identity documents with the assistance of his family members remaining in the KRI, to which he had not received any reply. He submitted that the process described in the CPIN at section 5.1.1 relied upon information originating from Dr Fatah which had been rejected in SMO(2), and that there was no process by which the appellant could obtain a replacement CSID, even if he had contact with his family, given that his original CSID was retained by the agent.
12. It is indeed the case that the judge did not make any actual finding on whether or not she accepted that the appellant’s CSID was retained by the agent. In that respect the judge erred in her decision. However the error is not material given the judge’s findings that the appellant could nevertheless enter the KRI with the assistance of family members and travel to the CSA office in his home area to be documented and obtain an INID. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family in the KRI and concluded that there were family members who could assist him in re-documenting himself. Other than the challenge to the judge’s overall credibility findings, no direct challenge is made to that finding and indeed it was one the judge was entitled to make for the reasons cogently given at [41] and [42]. Mr Wood submits that the fact that the appellant had family in the KRI was of no relevance if his original CSID was not accessible, since he could only enter the KRI if he had a CSID or INID, and since he would only be able to obtain an INID card, the current form of identification, in person, at his local CSA office after entering the KRI. He relied upon the grounds of appeal, at [12] and [13], which in turn relied upon the CPIN for October 2023 at sections 3.6.7 and 3.8.11, in that respect. However, as Ms Newton submitted, the appellant would be returned directly to his home governate of Suleymaniyah and there was therefore nothing in those sections of the CPIN which undermined the judge’s conclusions. Further, as Ms Newton submitted, the judge’s findings were consistent with [144((30) to (35))] of SMO2. The judge had specific regard to SMO(2) at [43] and made her findings on that basis, together with paragraphs 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the CPIN.
13. Mr Wood sought to argue that those sections of the CPIN were based upon information from the Inspection report on Home Office country of origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma) January 2023 which came from the report of Dr Fatah in 2022, which had in turn been rejected in SMO(2) at [100]. However I note that the report from Dr Fatah was from December 2022 which post-dated SMO(2), and in any event contained information which was not the same as that considered and rejected in SMO(2) at [100]. I do not consider there to be anything contradictory in the information relied upon by the judge to that considered in SMO(2). In the circumstances I find no merit in the assertion in the grounds and in Mr Wood’s submissions that the judge’s findings were in conflict with, or failed to follow, the country guidance. The judge clearly took account of the country guidance and the CPIN and was fully and properly entitled to make the findings that she did.
14. For all these reasons I do not find the grounds to be made out. The judge did not find the appellant to be a reliable witness and did not accept his account of events in Iraq leading him to leave the country. His adverse findings were made on the basis of a full assessment of all the evidence and were fully and cogently reasoned. He was entitled to conclude as he did and his decision is accordingly upheld.
Notice of Decision
15. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.
Anonymity Order
The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 October 2025