Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001264

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57487/2023
LP/07867/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

HOAJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
(A CHILD, BY HER LITIGATION FRIEND AIB)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person assisted by her litigation friend.
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 10 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria, born in December 2007. This is the re-hearing of her human rights appeal against a decision made by the Respondent in September 2023. That decision was initially appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and dismissed in a determination of 10 January 2025. This appeal previously came before UTJ Hanson and myself on 29 July 2025, when we found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s analysis of the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim.
2. At the previous hearing in the Upper Tribunal the Appellant’s uncle, whom I will anonymise as ‘AB’, was appointed as her litigation friend. Her aunt, whom I will anonymise as ‘JB’, attended both hearings.
3. For the reasons set out below, we allow the Appellant’s appeal.
The hearing
4. The Appellant attended the hearing with AB and JB. Prior to the hearing a 363 stitched bundle had been prepared by the Tribunal. This contained a small number of updating documents, which AB took me to in the course of the hearing.
5. As the Appellant is a child and a litigant in person but had not provided an updating witness statement, I asked her some questions about her current situation. She was briefly cross-examined by Dr Ibisi. I asked AB and JB some questions about the family’s situation and Dr Ibisi briefly asked questions of AB. I note the key points in their evidence below.
6. In closing, AB acknowledged the legitimate aim of immigration control and submitted that the only factor against the Appellant was the fact that she arrived her on a visit visa and overstayed. He emphasised there were no other adverse public interest factors. He impressively cited ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 and Lady Hale’s dictum that “if a non-citizen parent is compulsorily removed and agrees to take her children with her, the effect is that the children have little or no choice in the matter”. He explained that he had taken responsibility for the Appellant after her mother abandoned her and meant to adopt her but failed to pursue the application. He emphasised that “We’re in the best position to support her” and that, if she stayed in the UK “the sky is not the limit” for the Appellant.
7. Dr Ibisi simply stated that the Appellant did not meet the immigration rules, her family life had been developed while she was in the country precariously, and invited me to dismiss the appeal. In response to questioning from Judge Bruce, she accepted that the Appellant speaks English, is financially independent, and has private life in the UK.
8. At the end of the hearing, after a brief discussion, we announced our decision that the appeal should be allowed.
The Appellant’s evidence
9. The Appellant’s account is that she was born in the UK in December 2007. There has been some questions raised about this point but we do not need to determine it for the purposes of this appeal as the relevant considerations all relate to her time in the UK from the age of ten onwards. Her account in any event is that she left the UK, under her mother’s care, while still a baby.
10. The Appellant returned to the UK with her mother in March 2018. She was ten years old at the time. The Appellant has explained that her mother was fleeing her stepfather who planned to subject her and her younger sister to FGM. The family stayed with the Appellant’s uncle, aunt, and cousin.
11. Very shortly after the Appellant arrived in the UK, she awoke one morning to discover that her mother had left the country, taking her younger sister. It is clear from the evidence before us that this was a very traumatic and distressing incident. The Appellant’s evidence is that she has had only limited contact with her mother since and has not seen her in person since that time.
12. The evidence before us comprised various documents prepared by social workers at Oldham Council. These documents are fairly extensive but, in summary, they explain that:
a. The Appellant is academically bright and a dedicated student.
b. The Appellant was clearly very distressed by her abandonment by her mother, struggling to talk about this and feeling a sense of rejection and loss.
c. The Appellant had come to see her aunt, uncle and cousin and her parents and sibling. Their relationship is described as a “lovely connection […] it is clear that they dearly love [the Appellant]”. One report concludes “[the Appellant] is being cared for well […] [The Appellant] has a strong bond with [her aunt and uncle], and they treat her like their own daughter”.
d. The Appellant wished to remain in their care, and Oldham concluded that this would be in her best interests.
e. The Appellant’s aunt and uncle are safe and loving care givers who provide full support with all aspects of the Appellant's welfare, including her education, mental health, and personal development. The family home is safe and appropriate for her needs. There is reference to them exploring a Special Guardianship Order or adoption, but it does not appear that this was progressed.
f. Oldham have spoken to the Appellant’s mother and expressed her desire for the Appellant’s uncle to have full parental responsibility for her. She has also expressed this in writing.
13. The Appellant’s uncle, aunt, and cousin provided a written statement in line with the above analysis. JB and AB’s oral evidence was also consistent with the above.
14. In evidence, the Appellant explained that she continued to do well at school. She was studying maths, chemistry and biology for A-Levels and was in her final year, intending to go on to study pharmacology at Manchester University. She said that, if allowed to remain in the UK, she would continue to live with JB and AB, whom she said were “basically my parents”. Their son, whom I will refer to as FB, she referred to as “my brother and my best friend”. She said she had no family in Nigeria other than her grandmother who was unwell and required care. She said that she doesn’t really speak Yoruba, which is her grandmother’s language but that they had a good relationship.
15. In answer to questions from Dr Ibisi, she explained that her mother was in the USA. She didn’t know why her mother had left and had not spoken to her mother since earlier this year, explaining that they speak about ever six months. She didn’t have any clear knowledge of her mother’s work or relationship status.
16. AB explained that his mother was 75. She has mobility problems and uses a wheelchair. She has carers in Nigeria but they are not family members. She has her own home and is financially dependent on AB as she is retired. If AB went to Nigeria he could offer financial support. He is in touch with the Appellant’s mother (his sister), who is in the USA. They are in touch two to three times a year, generally when there is reason to be in touch about the Appellant’s case or if his sister needs money. In response to Dr Ibisi’s questions, he expressed uncertainty about his sister’s immigration status and confirmed that she had not visited the Appellant since leaving her in the UK.
17. JB explained that she was a mental health nurse and works with children and adults and so knows the impact which the events described above have had on her. She explained that FB had hydrocephalus as a baby and required surgery and now has significant developmental issues, including non-verbal autism. It would have a “massive” impact on him if the Appellant left suddenly and on the Appellant if she left. She mentioned that the Appellant is head girl of her school and that AB was the only father she had ever known.
18. There are school documents in the papers before us which are consistent with Oldham’s description of the Appellant as a good student who is excelling academically.
Legal framework
19. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that:
“117B Article 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases
(1) The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.
(4) Little weight should be given to—
(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
(6) In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom”
20. S. 117D(1) of the 2002 Act defines ‘qualifying child’ as a person who is under 18 and is either British or who “has lived in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of seven years or more”.
21. In ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 Lady Hale held that:
“… what is encompassed in the “best interests of the child”? As the UNHCR says, it broadly means the well-being of the child. Specifically, as Lord Bingham indicated in EB (Kosovo), it will involve asking whether it is reasonable to expect the child to live in another country. Relevant to this will be the level of the child’s integration in this country and the length of absence from the other country; where and with whom the child is to live and the arrangements for looking after the child in the other country; and the strength of the child’s relationships with parents or other family members which will be severed if the child has to move away’.
Although nationality is not a “trump card” it is of particular importance in assessing the best interests of any child. The UNCRC recognises the right of every child to be registered and acquire a nationality (Article 7) and to preserve her identity, including her nationality (Article 8) . . .
[The children in this case] are British children; they are British, not just through the “accident” of being born here, but by descent from a British parent; they have an unqualified right of abode here; they have lived here all their lives; they are being educated here; they have other social links with the community here; they have a good relationship with their father here. It is not enough to say that a young child may readily adapt to life in another country. That may well be so, particularly if she moves with both her parents to a country which they know well and where they can easily re-integrate in their own community (as might have been the case, for example, in Poku, para 20, above). But it is very different in the case of children who have lived here all their lives and are being expected to move to a country which they do not know and will be separated from a parent whom they also know well.
Nor should the intrinsic importance of citizenship be played down. As citizens these children have rights which they will not be able to exercise if they move to another country. They will lose the advantages of growing up and being educated in their own country, their own culture and their own language. They will have lost all this when they come back as adults . . .
We now have a much greater understanding of the importance of these issues in assessing the overall well-being of the child. In making the proportionality assessment under article 8, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that they must be considered first. They can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations. In this case, the countervailing considerations were the need to maintain firm and fair immigration control, coupled with the mother’s appalling immigration history and the precariousness of her position when family life was created. But, as the Tribunal rightly pointed out, the children were not to be blamed for that. And the inevitable result of removing their primary carer would be that they had to leave with her.’”
22. In Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] 1 WLR 3690 Lord Hodge identified the relevant principles for an assessment of the best interests of the child as follows:
(1) The best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR;
(2) In making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration; and the child’s best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration;
(3) Although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant;
(4) While different judges might approach the question of the best interests of a child in different ways, it is important to ask oneself the right questions in an orderly manner in order to avoid the risk that the best interests of a child might be undervalued when other important considerations were in play;
(5) It is important to have a clear idea of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child’s best interests before one asks oneself whether those interests are outweighed by the force of other considerations;
(6) To that end there is no substitute for a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved in an Article 8 assessment; and
(7) A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent.
Findings
23. We find the Appellant as well as AB and JB to be wholly credible. Rightly, Dr Ibisi did not challenge their credibility in cross-examination or closing. All three witnesses from whom we heard were entirely candid, openly answering questions regardless of how ‘helpful’ their answers might be. Their accounts were wholly consistent with the background evidence. It was completely obvious that they are a close, loving, and committed family who have provided support for each other in challenging circumstances. We accept that the Appellant enjoys family life with AB, JB, and FB and that they are her de facto parents and brother. We consider that these are particularly significant ties, as:
a. The ties between minor children and their caregivers are of particular significance, given the vulnerability of children and the formative role which parental figures play in their development;
b. The ties between the Appellant and her family in the UK have been formed following the significant trauma of her abandonment by her mother. It is enormously to AB and JB’s credit that they took on the responsibility of caring for the Appellant as they have done; they have clearly been committed and successful parents who have shepherded the Appellant to the edge of adult life with great skill and care;
c. These ties have formed and deepened at a particularly significant period in the Appellant’s development, namely from ten to the cusp of adulthood; these have been her ‘formative years’.
24. We therefore find that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with AB and JB and that these are very deep family ties. We also find that she enjoys family life with FB, with whom she is particularly close. JB explained that FB would often prefer to go to the Appellant rather than his own parents and we note the Appellant’s evidence that he is her “best friend”.
25. We also find that the Appellant has a well-established private life in the UK. It is clear that she is completely integrated into British society. She is Head Girl of her school, which is an impressive achievement and a testament to her talents. She is clearly doing well academically and has impressive academic plans. There was no suggestion of any criminality or antisocial behaviour; conversely, the Appellant is clearly a smart and able young woman with a very bright future ahead of her. She has strong ties to her family as described above as well as to her extended family (we heard evidence of cousins whom she sees regularly).
26. Having found that the Appellant has deep family and private life ties in the UK, we now consider the balancing exercise under Article 8 and the Appellant’s best interests.
27. As Dr Ibisi accepted, the only adverse factor under s. 117B is the maintenance of effective immigration controls. The Appellant has not had status in the UK since the expiry of her visit visa. However, we consider that this cannot be treated as a factor holding any significant adverse weight as the Appellant was brought to the UK by her mother at an age when she had no choice in her movements, as Lady Hale described in ZH (Tanzania). She is still a child and there is no basis for criticism of her lack of status.
28. We also note that the Appellant has spent seven years of her life in the UK; as set out above, these are particularly formative years. The statutory framework recognises that seven years is a sufficiently lengthy period that it may entitle a child to remain in the UK.
29. We accept that the ‘little weight’ provisions under s. 117B(4) and (5) apply to the Appellant’s private life but they do not apply to family life. We therefore give full weight to the Appellant’s family life and consider that her private life warrants weight at the upper end of the little weight spectrum.
30. We find that it is plainly in the Appellant’s best interests to remain in the UK with her family. We accept that she has not been to Nigeria since she was ten years old. She has never known her biological father. She was abandoned by her mother at a very young age and has recovered from that trauma with the support of her family in the UK. She is extremely close to the people she sees as her mum, dad, and brother. We accept the suggestion of JB that sudden removal to Nigeria would have a very significant adverse impact on her wellbeing and development. While she has a grandmother with a home in Nigeria and while her UK family could provide financial support, this would be no substitute for the love and emotional and practical support she has in the UK. There is no suggestion that she has any right to reside in the US with her mother.
31. The Appellant is at a significant and formative stage in her education and development as she is on the cusp of adulthood and hopes to go to university. She is not integrated in Nigeria and it would be strongly contrary to her best interests to wrench her away from all meaningful ties and leave her in an unfamiliar country at the very start of her adult life. Her best interests lie firmly in her remaining in the UK. While the Appellant’s best interests are not a ‘trump card’, we must treat them as a primary consideration.
32. We consider that the foregoing factors strongly outweigh any interest in the Appellant’s removal. We therefore find that the Appellant’s would be a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2025