Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001271

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50895/2024
LP/06752/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

EA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Joseph, Counsel instructed by the Stuart and Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. Nappey, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 October 2025

ORDER REGARDING ANONYMITY

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, and any family member likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought by appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Woolley (the Judge). In that decision the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against a decision made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to refuse her protection and human rights appeal.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Honduras. She fears return to Honduras from the gang MS-13. This is because of the activities of her foster mother (with whom the appellant has lived for ten years) activities. The appellant’s foster mother, her husband and one of the appellant’s foster aunts have been granted asylum in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim based on her credibility.
3. The Judge found that:
“31. … I can accept that the threats were made to MM and her family, which would include the appellant. MM has described the living arrangements with the three houses close together and I find that the inhabitants find of these houses would be considered as her family. I find however that the threats were not made personally to the appellant, but only in the context of her being a member of MM’s family.
32. I find that the appellant would be at risk of persecution from the MS-13 gang on return to either San Pedro Sula (where the threats were made) and also in Corazal.”
4. The Judge concluded that the appellant could internally relocate because she had not been threatened directly and there but be no adverse interest in her outside Corozal or San Pedro Sula.
Grounds of Appeal
5. The Grounds of Appeal are fourfold.
6. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge’s decision to refuse an adjournment application to link her appeal with that of her foster mother deprived the appellant of a fair hearing;
7. Grounds 2(a) and 9(b) are that the Judge made a material error of law in concluding that the appellant could reasonably and safely relocate. They criticise the Judge’s attempt to distinguish the appellant from her foster family. One reason relied on by the Judge is that she has a different name but the grounds dispute this fact (not relied on by the respondent in any event), and fails to take into account that the appellant has been identified as part of MM’s family. Further, the appellant’s foster aunt, who had not personally received threats had been granted asylum by the respondent and the respondent’s CPIN (Honduras: Gangs – November 2023) shows that the gangs track people who they believe are guilty of betrayal or enmity. The Judge also failed to consider the appellant’s personal characteristics with regards to the reasonableness of internal relocation.
8. Ground 3 is that the Judge made a material error of law in their assessment of the appellant’s private life.
9. Ground 4 is that the Judge made a material error of law in their Article 8 ECHR assessment.
Grant of Permission
10. Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson granted permission to appeal in a decision dated 3 April 2025. In this she stated:
“The grounds of appeal in relation to the assessment of internal relocation are all arguable, particularly the apparent inconsistent as to accepting the appellant as an identified member of a family (of whom at least two members have been granted asylum on that basis) and distinguishing her from them, including by name despite a shared name. Further, there is an arguable failure to engage with the information available in the CPIN as to the extent of risks and factors relevant to relocation, including that the appellant would be returning as a young single woman accepted to be at risk from gangs (in particular in cities and places of previous residence). The latter is also relevant to the fourth ground of appeal in relation to obstacles to reintegration and is arguable for the same reason.”
11. Following the grant of permission the respondent filed a brief rule 24 response to the appeal.
12. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below
Discussion
Internal relocation
13. The rule 24 response on this issue is limited to a four line paragraph. At the hearing Mr. Nappey accepted that the Judge had not identified the area where the appellant could reasonably be expected to relocate. He further submitted that women generally are not at risk and that gang power is fragmented in Honduras. His position is that the Judge has properly taken into account all factors in assessing this issue.
14. I find that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision with regards to the issue of internal relocation. The Judge accepted that the appellant was and would be perceived as part of her foster mother’s family. Further, that the appellant’s foster-mother and other relatives had been granted refugee status by the respondent even though they had not all individually been threated directly. Although the Judge is correct in their statement that questions of relocation must be assessed on an individual basis I find that their reasons that the appellant would not be associated with her foster-family outside of Coarazal or San Pedro-Sula are unclear, incorrect (in so far as the appellant’s name) and do not appear to have taken into account the respondent’s CPIN which amounts to a material error of law:
“5.1.3 The IDMC report of 2019 stated that people who gangs believe are guilty of betrayal or emnity may be tracked by them. The source also noted the chances of finding safety in another area vary according to economic resources: safer neighbourhoods are generally more expensive and often gated (see Displacement).
5.1.4 Gangs monitor movement in and out of areas they control and reportedly check people moving from one gang-controlled area to another, with reports that residents must request and pay for a permit to travel between neighbourhoods. LGBTI persons, women, girls and youths, without support networks, may be particularly vulnerable to abuse and may find it difficult to support themselves in areas of relocation (see Gangs size and reach, Women and children, Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex persons, Displacement and Freedom of movement)
15. Having reached this conclusion I am not persuaded that it is necessary for me to consider the remaining grounds.
Remaking the Decision
16. Both parties agreed that if I found that there had been an error of law it would be appropriate for me to remake the decision immediately. It was agreed that the following findings of fact would be preserved:
“31…I can accept that the threats were made to MM and her family, which would include the appellant. MM has described the living arrangements with the three houses close together and I find that the inhabitants of these houses would be considered as her family. I find however that the threats were not made personally to the appellant, but only in the context of her being a member of MM’s family.
32. I find that the appellant would be at risk of persecution from MS-13 gang on return to either San Pedro Sula (where the threats were made) and also in Corazal.
35. The appellant is now a young woman aged 23. She is no longer a child and even though she has lived with her foster mother since the age of 10 is not now dependent on her in terms of decision making with her life skills. She is of an age when she can be expected to form her own independent household. This would be the case in Honduras just as much as it is in the UK. She has a mother in Corazal, Honduras with whom she is in contact. She also has a father and even though I accept her mother and father are separated her father still showed enough interest in her to sign the document permitting exit.
36…The appellant has not claimed to have been singled out by MS-13 or to have received any threat herself. The risk to her arises from the association with her foster mother and family…
37…The appellant is a young woman in good health. She has family support within Honduras, even if this might have to be remote. She is educated to the normal standard of many Hondurans. As a woman she is not at risk generally throughout Honduras – any risk as a member of a PSG only exists in relation to gang interest.”
17. Both parties made submissions on the substantive issues in the appeal.
18. My starting point is that the appellant is a the member of a family that has been targeted by MS-13. Further, that family members, including those who have not (like the appellant) been directly targeted have been accepted as refugees by the respondent. Although each appellant must be assessed individually I place significant weight on the way in which the appellant’s family members have been treated. I am also satisfied that (and it was agreed) the appellant does not have any family in Honduras to whom she can turn for practical support. Further, that the respondent’s CPIN (3.3.1. recognises that being a woman places an individual in a “particularly vulnerable group” with respect to the gangs).
19. I find that with regards to the issue of internal relocation the respondent’s CPIN (part of which I have cited above) satisfies me that this particular appellant would be real risk of serious harm wherever she were to live in Honduras:
“22.2.7 The IDMC report 2019, citing various sources, noted: ‘The same risks and threats that caused displacement may persist after flight, particularly for those persecuted by gangs because they are perceived to have committed an act of betrayal or enmity, those who flee political persecution… New risks may emerge when people flee from one marginalised and gang-controlled urban area to another, or from rural to urban areas. They may also arise as a result of people’s economic coping strategies, which can make them vulnerable to extortion, dangerous work or violence in the workplace… ‘People’s inability to find safety and security within the country may make their situation unsustainable, leading to further displacement and psychological and economic harm. Some may eventually decide they have no option but to leave the country, while for others internal displacement may not be a viable option in the first place. Others still may resort to self-containment in an effort to escape their continued persecution.’”

Conclusion
20. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant meets the requirements of the Refugee Convention. She cannot reasonably internally relocate in Honduras.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Judge contained an error of law and is set aside.
I remake the decision and allow appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 October 2025