Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001274

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66138/2023
LP/14252/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

D S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Vokes, Counsel instructed by Legal Justice Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 22 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal promulgated on 6 February 2025 dismissing the appellant’s appeal from the respondent’s decision of 4 December 2023 to refuse his international protection and human rights’ claims made on 24 November 2021. The appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, formerly resident in Chwarqurna, Raniya district, Sulaymaniyah. The respondent, when refusing his asylum claims, accepted that he had experienced problems from his partner’s family after their relationship was discovered, but considered he would have sufficient protection from the police and/or he would be able to relocate. By decision issued on 9 July 2025, errors of law were found in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal and that decision was set aside for remaking in the Upper Tribunal (see annex below). It is on that basis that the appeal comes before me.

Anonymity
2. I continue the anonymity direction made in the First-Tier Tribunal and continued previously. I have considered the public interest in open justice, but I consider it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection, because of the need for confidentiality.

The issues before me/the hearing
3. The appellant’s case was that his partner’s father AN was influential with the KDP and so he would not be protected by the authorities. He would not be able to relocate. The appellant said he had also involved himself in sur place activity in the UK and was a member of the Dakok Support centre. He contended that his sur place activity would put him at risk, or in any event it would mean that the authorities would be even less likely to be interested in protecting him (the sur place activity was a new matter, but the respondent had consented in the review to that being raised).

4. Mr Vokes at first contended that the respondent had accepted that the appellant’s persecutors were influential because the respondent had said in the decision letter that the material facts of the appellant’s claim had been accepted [8]. Ms Arif disagreed. I considered however that the respondent had only accepted the facts which were summarised at [1] as the basis of the appellant’s claim. The respondent set out in that paragraph the basis of the appellant’s claim by describing his relationship with his partner, the rejection of his request to marry her, how he was caught with his partner by her father and brother and that they indicated to the appellant’s family that they would kill the appellant if they found him. The respondent did not include in the basis of the appellant’s claim the positions held by his partner’s family, and I am not satisfied that the respondent has tacitly accepted that part of the appellant’s case by saying that the material facts were accepted. I consider the only facts which were accepted were the facts summarised in the basis of claim.

5. The issues before me were therefore:

(i) Would there be sufficiency of protection for the appellant in his home area from his partner’s family;
(ii) Would the appellant be at risk/not achieve sufficiency of protection because of his political activity;
(iii) Would the appellant be able to redocument;
(iv) Would internal relocation avoid any risk and be reasonable/not unduly harsh.
(v) Was there a Convention reason?

6. After the hearing began, it was discovered that Ms Arif did not in fact have a copy of the new evidence in the appellant’s bundle and was working from an old bundle. We identified the new evidence in the bundle which she had not seen, and I was able to extract the relevant parts from my copy and send a copy to her so that we could proceed with the hearing.

7. The appellant gave evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and after his evidence I heard submissions from both representatives which I refer to as necessary in my analysis of the issues. I have also considered the documentary evidence submitted; all references to page numbers are to page numbers on the pdf reader rather than the markings in the bundle.

Discussion and findings
8. To qualify for asylum, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Although the burden of proof is on an appellant, I remind myself that the standard of proof is low, below the balance of probabilities, namely a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.

Power and influence of appellant’s persecutors?

9. The appellant in his asylum interview explained that he feared AN, his partner’s father, who was a powerful official, he said a secretary of the KDP. In a supplementary bundle, produced shortly before the hearing in the First-Tier Tribunal (see [7] of the original decision), the appellant evidenced AN’s Facebook profile page (p 414 bundle), a picture taken from Facebook of AN with his three sons (one of whom was carrying a gun (p 412 bundle) (I also have the profile pages of AN’s three sons to identify them) and numerous pictures of AN and his sons with men in uniform and older men who appeared to have authority, in large meetings/conferences.

10. Ms Arif submitted that I should place little weight on the Facebook evidence which had been provided relatively late. She said that it did not show what exact posts the people held whom the appellant feared or what exactly their profile was and there was nothing to show that they were linked to the appellant’s partner.

11. I bear in mind that the respondent has accepted the core facts on which the appellant relies. No point is taken in the refusal letter against his credibility, indeed the respondent accepted the appellant’s explanation for not claiming asylum in the safe European countries he passed through and so his credibility was not considered damaged by the provisions of section 8 of the 2004 Act. The appellant named AN from the first as his partner’s father, and although the Facebook pages do not show what position AN and his sons hold, the photographs show them associating with men who seem high up in the military by their decorations and the offices they are pictured in, and show AN in large meetings/conferences posing in front of flags and shaking hands with older men in suits. The impression is that AN is a well to do, well connected man who at least has connections with those with power and influence. I am satisfied therefore, taking together the pictures with the appellant’s credible evidence, that the appellant’s partner’s family have influence with those in power in the area.

Sur place activity

12. The appellant says that he is involved in sur place political activity and he has been a member of the Dakok Support Centre since 2023 and became a trustee early in 2025. The centre is engaged in political and social activities aimed at promoting democratic values and human rights in Kurdistan and focussing attention on injustice and human rights violations in the area. The appellant has produced his membership card and has a support letter from the centre and witness statements from Mr J, the former chairman of the centre and Mr A, a fellow activist confirming his involvement in organising public events and demonstrations. The appellant’s Facebook profile, which is public (p 36) shows that he has 3,100 friends (a subsequent page shows he also has 708 followers (p 403)) and describes him as an activist of the organisation. His Facebook posts show him participating in and speaking at demonstrations and meetings, promoting demonstrations, and condemning the arrest and torture of activists in the KRI, and accusing the leaders of corruption. He is also shown participating in events with the wider local community as part of his organisation. Most of his posts read as if he has composed the commentary himself rather than simply copying or forwarding on the posts of others. Most of his posts receive more than 100 likes, and up to 100 comments, some more. His Facebook posts have links to the Dakok website referring to protests in London and Manchester being covered on NRT TV and to the Iraqi Consulate in Manchester monitoring protesters (p 50).

13. Bearing in mind that the respondent accepted the core of the appellant’s account as credible and that he has produced good evidence as described above to indicate that he is indeed a trustee of the Dakok Support Centre and is active politically, not simply attending demonstrations, but speaking at demonstrations and meetings and posting his original opinions on Facebook, I am satisfied that the appellant is indeed the genuine political activist he claims to be.

Sufficiency of protection in appellant’s home area?

14. The respondent accepted that around the time the appellant left Iraq, AN went to the family home and told his family that if they found him, they would kill him. They had previously shot at him.

15. That was four years ago, but there is nothing to indicate that AN would no longer be interested in pursuing the appellant.

16. The CPIN of December 2020 – Iraq: Actors of Protection referenced in the refusal letter states at 2.3.16 that within the KRI the security apparatus has the potential to provide effective security but their willingness to do so may depend on the profile of the person. Individuals who are in conflict with politicians or those with a perceived affiliation with Daesh are unlikely to have protection available to them. Paragraph 10.1.4 relating to the justice system in the KRI indicates that the criminal justice system is reported to be weak and does not meet international and domestic legal obligations. Trials are reportedly prone to undue political influence and perpetrators affiliated with the political or security elite often enjoy impunity. Bearing all that in mind and noting my conclusions that AN has influential connections with those in power, I am satisfied to the low standard applicable that the police and criminal justice system would not provide the appellant with sufficiency of protection in his home area from AN and his family.

The effect of the appellant’s political activity

17. I was not taken to evidence that the authorities in the KRI are interested or have the capability to monitor political activity outside the KRI save for the suggestion that officials from the Manchester consulate had been monitoring the protests outside that building. I had very little evidence that the authorities in the KRI had been actively monitoring the appellant specifically. The appellant was adamant that officials in the KRI monitored Facebook, because although he had not been directly threatened on his own Facebook account, posts through Dakok had attracted threatening comments. On questioning however, the appellant was making assumptions, as he said the threats were from fake accounts, not using real names, and he just assumed that they were people reporting to the authorities in Iraq.

18. Nevertheless, as I have found the appellant’s political activity to be credible, I am satisfied that he would want to carry on the same type and level of political activity if he returned to the KRI, or would do so were it not for fear of persecution. The appellant would therefore want to be involved in the affairs of a body criticising politicians in the KRI and complaining of human rights abuses. He would want to be actively involved, not simply attending demonstrations, but speaking at demonstrations and meetings and composing his own posts on social media. I do not agree with Ms Arif’s submission that the appellant would be seen as someone with a low profile; I consider that as a trustee, he is someone who is active in running an activist organisation and he takes a high profile at meetings and demonstrations. I have considered the July 2023 CPIN on opposition to government in the KRI and I consider that the appellant would fall into the category of an individual with a higher profile who has a prominent public presence, who is actively involved in or has a previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations and who would be at higher risk of arrest, detention, assault, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killing by the authorities (paragraph 3.1.3 of the CPIN).

Documentation

19. My findings above mean that the appellant would be at risk if he were to return to the KRI. To relocate, he would need to obtain documentation as he does not have documentation with him in the UK. The appellant said in interview that he is no longer in contact with his family, but when he spoke to them when he was in France, they told him that AN and his men had raided the family home, taken everything belonging to him and made threats about killing him.

20. Given the respondent accepted the basic facts of the appellant’s claim and that I have found the appellant to be credible in aspects relating to the influence of AN and to his political activity, I am satisfied to the low standard applicable that AN and his men took the appellant’s documents so that they are no longer available to him.

21. I have no reason to doubt, given the appellant’s credibility, that he did not have an INID before he left Iraq. The internal relocation and civil documentation CPIN explains that nationals of Iraq can no longer apply for a CSID at home or abroad and can only obtain an INID from their home governate. The appellant would not therefore be able to redocument himself now without returning to his home area which would put him at risk.

Internal relocation

22. The appellant would not be able to relocate safely without a CSID. The country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 explains that it is necessary for an individual to have a CSID or an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR, for example at the checkpoints.

23. In any event there would be real difficulties with the places of relocation proposed in the refusal letter. Relocation to Baghdad is according to SMO likely to be reasonable for Arab Shia and Sunni single men but other individuals are likely to require external support, that is a support network of family, extended family or tribe who are willing and able to provide genuine support. The appellant as a person of Kurdish ethnicity would require external support, but there are no indications that he would have that support available in Baghdad. It is difficult to see how it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Basra, a city known to be a major Shia city with a mostly Arab population. SMO explains that relocation to the formerly contested areas (such as Mosul, the other place suggested by the respondent) is unlikely to be either feasible or reasonable without a prior connection to, and a support structure within, the area in question. The appellant has neither.

24. Internal relocation will therefore not be safe, and/or unreasonable and unduly harsh.

Convention reason

25. As I have found one of the reasons the appellant would be at risk in the KRI is his political opinion, he qualifies for asylum. Even if I am wrong, and the appellant would not be at risk purely for his political opinion, I consider that Mr Vokes is right that the authorities would be even less likely to help the appellant if he requested protection from them because he would be seen as a troublemaker.

26. Even if I am wrong therefore, and the appellant is only directly at risk from AN and his family, the appellant’s well-founded fear would be at least partly for the Convention reason of his political opinion.

Conclusion

27. The appellant therefore qualifies for asylum and his return would breach Article 3 ECHR.

Notice of Decision

On remaking, I allow the appellant’s appeal on asylum and Article 3 ECHR grounds.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 October 2025

Annex (Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001274

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66138/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

09.07.25

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

D L S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Represented by Legal Justice Solicitors; although there was no appearance
For the Respondent: Ms Young, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 4 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Manchester (Virtual Region) on 5 April 2025, in which the Judge dismissed his claim against the Secretary of State’s refusal dated 4 December 2023 of his protection claim made on 24 November 2021.
2. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 17 March 2025, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:

3. Whilst alone, the first ground may not demonstrate a material error, given the findings in relation to sufficiency of protection, it is arguable that the Judge’s credibility findings in relation to risk as a result of the blood feud, impacted on the credibility findings relating to the appellant’s sur place activity. It is arguable that the Judge went behind the issues identified by the parties, and made findings on matters which were clearly not in issue. It is apparent from paragraph 4 of the decision and reasons that the only issues for determination were sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The respondent had accepted in the refusal decision that it was accepted that the appellant’s account about his prohibited relationships and the consequences of discovery were accepted by the respondent.
4. Whilst the Judge clearly considered the CPIN relating to actors of protection, it is arguable that they failed to consider the relevant contents of the CPIN relating to honour violence, which was relevant to the issues in the appeal.
5. Furthermore, it is arguable that the Judge failed to carefully consider the evidence provided by the appellant’s witness in relation to his role with Dakok Support Centre. Alternatively, if this evidence was considered, the Judge arguably failed to provide adequately reasoned findings for rejecting this evidence.
6. In those circumstances, permission to appeal is granted on all grounds.
3. Two issues have arisen in relation to the conduct of this appeal by the Appellant’s representatives which would, in different circumstances and but for the stance taken by Ms Young, probably have resulted in their needing to show cause why a wasted costs order should not be made against them.
4. The first issue relates to the failure of the representatives to file an appeal bundle in accordance with the standard directions issued by the Upper Tribunal. The representatives were clearly aware of the need to do so as on 28 June 2025 an email was received from them asking the Upper Tribunal to provide a letter for the Grant of Permission to enable them to complete the hearing bundle, a copy of which was provided.
5. On 23 June 2025 a bundle request was sent to the Appellant’s representatives by the Upper Tribunal as the bundle had not been uploaded onto the CE file nine days prior to the hearing in accordance with the standard directions. No satisfactory explanation for their failure has been provided.
6. The second issue arose in relation to today’s hearing. The Upper Tribunal, as the cases being heard at Bradford today are considering challenges to decisions of the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester, agreed that the representatives could appear via CVP.
7. Legal Justice Solicitors are the Appellant’s appointed representatives in this case and in a second case UI-2025-001737 involving an Afghan Sikh.
8. Confusion arose as Ms Jegarajah of counsel had logged onto the hearing via CVP, but when asked whether she was representing the Appellant in this case she stated she was not but was representing a client who is an Afghan Sikh.
9. That second case has not been listed before the Upper Tribunal today.
10. A representative at Legal Justice Solicitors was contacted by a manager of the Upper Tribunal Judicial Liaison Team on 4 July 2025 who asked the representative to confirm the appeal number on the CVP hearing link notice that they had received. The representative is record as stating that it was both the case number for this appeal and UI-2025-001737.
11. The representatives were clearly aware of this hearing and although Ms Jegarajah was present it soon became clear that she believed the appeal that she had been instructed to represent the client on related to the Afghan Sikh case and not this case which relates to an Iraqi Kurd. From what she said it appeared Ms Jegarajah had no knowledge of the actual appeal that was being considered by the Upper Tribunal today and understandably withdrew.
12. When the situation was fully understood Ms Young was asked what her position was in relation to the appeal as no Rule 24 response had been filed.
13. The Secretary of State’s position was that it was accepted the Judge had erred in relation to Ground 1 and Ground 3 on the basis of the pleadings and grant of permission to appeal.
14. In light of the Secretary of State’s concession I find it appropriate to proceed in the Appellant’s absence, for if the matter was to be put off to come back at a later date the result would be the same. The interests of justice do not favour delay and the Appellant is not prejudiced in proceeding in this manner.
15. I find the Judge has erred in law in a manner material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. I set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal aside.
16. The following directions shall apply to the future management of this appeal:
a. List for a Resumed Hearing on the first available date after 11 August 2025 before a salaried or deputy judge of the Upper Tribunal sitting at the Manchester CJC. Time estimate three hours.
b. The Appellant shall, no later than 4 PM 1 August 2025, file with the Upper Tribunal and send to the Secretary of State’s representative an updated, consolidated, indexed and paginated bundle, containing all the documentary evidence he seeks to rely on in support of his appeal. Witness statements must be signed, dated, contain a declaration of truth, and shall stand as the evidence in chief of the maker who shall attend for the purposes of cross-examination and re-examination only (if any).
c. The Appellant’s representatives must, no later than 4 PM 1 August 2025 advise the Upper Tribunal if an interpreter is required and, if so, in what language, dialect, and for whom.

Notice of Decision

17. The First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law. The decision is set aside.
18. The appeal shall be managed in accordance with the directions set out above to substitute a decision to either allow or dismiss the appeal.

C J Hanson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 July 2025