Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001298

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57316/2023
LP/01398/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

F M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Norman, Counsel instructed by Rashid & Rashid Law Firm
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania. She and her two children claimed asylum under the Family Asylum Claim process on 10 August 2021. The respondent accepted that she and her children were trafficked in Spain but refused their claims by letter of 20 September 2023, considering that they would not be at risk in Albania and/or that there would be sufficiency of protection for them and they would be able to relocate. The appellant and her children appealed but by decision of 30 January 2025 a First-Tier Tribunal judge (“the FTJ”) dismissed their appeals. The appellant alone sought, and was granted, permission to appeal.

Anonymity
2. I maintain the order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. The appellant and her children are admitted victims of trafficking who have claimed asylum, and in the circumstances their need for privacy and the best interests and welfare of the children outweighs the strong public interest in open justice.

Grounds, discussion, conclusions
3. The grounds aver that the FTJ did not apply the lower standard of proof, that he went behind the NRM decision and the respondent’s concession by attacking the factual matrix of the trafficking claim, that he did not consider country guidance and that he did not consider the risk to the children properly or the risk to the children of any deterioration of their mother’s mental health.

4. I discussed the case with the representatives. Ms Ahmed initially said that she opposed the pleaded grounds but very fairly considered that there was a Robinson obvious point that when making credibility findings the FTJ had not considered the appellant as a vulnerable witness.

5. I explained that my preliminary view was that the FTJ had failed to apply the right standard of proof. He wrote at [7] under the heading “Burden and Standard of Proof” that “the appellants bring this appeal and bears the burden of proof. The appellant must satisfy this burden on the balance of probabilities.”

6. As the claim pre-dated the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the appropriate standard throughout was the lower standard of “reasonable degree of likelihood” (it can of course be expressed in different ways).

7. Of course, [7] could on its own be an immaterial cut and paste error if it were evident that the FTJ had in fact applied the correct standard of proof. Unfortunately, that is not so. The FTJ did not set out a full self-direction on the law, although I am aware that there are sample paragraphs available to first-tier tribunal judges to help them identify the correct law applicable. His only self-direction is the wrong direction at [7]. When coming to his findings, he used the phrases “I am of the view” (at [13], [15], [16] and [17]) noted that he preferred the respondent’s background material (at [12]) and that he found the evidence of the appellant not credible on certain points (at [11]). Those phrases do not indicate that he did in fact apply the correct standard and I can therefore only take it that he did indeed apply the erroneous standard referred to in his self-direction.

8. Having heard what I said, Ms Ahmed indicated that she accepted she would have difficulty attempting to support the decision and she agreed that it should be set aside.

9. I conclude for the reasons above that the FTJ did err in law by failing to apply the lower standard of proof. This is of course a material error. He also failed even to mention the country guidance case of TD & AD (Trafficked Women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 let alone apply it to the appellant’s circumstances, again a material error. Indeed, the decision could well have been set aside by the First-Tier Tribunal under rule 35 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2014 without the need for an appeal in this Tribunal.

10. I discussed with Ms Norman that the former representatives had persisted in not seeking permission to appeal for the child appellants, despite the omission being pointed out to them. She told me that her instructing solicitors had recently been instructed and would make good the deficiency. It seemed that (provided the First-Tier Tribunal considered it appropriate to grant permission out of time) the respondent would concede an error of law in line with my decision and the rehearing of the appellants’ cases could proceed together. I told Ms Norman that it would be sensible to include a copy of this decision with the application for permission out of time so that the judge considering the application was fully aware of the position. Of course, it is a matter for the First-Tier Tribunal, but if they considered it appropriate to extend time, it might be that the decision in respect of the child appellants could be set aside under rule 35.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside in respect of this appellant with no findings preserved.

This appellant’s case is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal (Hatton Cross) for consideration by another judge.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 October 2025