Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001307

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67731/2023
LP/14001/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANTZIS

Between

JHH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Brakaj of Iris Law.
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Newcastle on 21 January 2025, in which she dismissed the appeal against the refusal of his application for asylum dated 29 November 2021, but refused on 13 December 2023.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq born in 1979 who claimed to be entitled to refugee status as a member of a particular social group, based upon a fear of a family of a girl with whom he had a relationship without the family’s knowledge. The Appellant claimed the family is seeking to restore their honour by killing him.
3. The Secretary of State accepted the Appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. The Judge records the relevant issues at [12] of the decision under challenge.
4. Having considered the documentary and oral evidence the Judge sets out what she considered to be a number of inconsistencies and discrepancies that arose at [14 (a) – (k)] of the determination.
5. The Judge also expresses further concerns about the credibility of the claim at [15] – [22] based upon the evidence given.
6. In relation to whether males can be victims of honour crimes in Iraq the Judge finds, after reading all the material provided, that it was not possible to exclude men from being victims of honour crimes [24], but that to accept that the Appellant was a member of the particular social group claimed it was necessary to find the Appellant’s claim was credible and that he was a reliable witness of truth. The Judge’s core finding on this issue is, however, that the Appellant was not found to be a witness of truth or credible for the reasons set out earlier in the determination. The Judge therefore finds the Appellant will not face a real risk of serious harm because of an honour killing at the hands of the girl’s family [25].
7. The Judge also records that the Appellant will be able to relocate to another area of the IKR if he found it uncomfortable to live in his home area of Sulaymaniyah [25], although the primary finding is that the Appellant can return to his family home where he lived in peace since birth [27].
8. Having rejected the protection claim the Judge went on to consider the issue of documentation from [31] where the Judge make a number of findings before concluding no risk arises as a result of a lack of documentation.
9. In relation to the human rights claim, the Articles 2 and 3 ECHR claims fell with the findings on the asylum claim [35] leading to the Judge dismissing the appeal on all grounds at [37] – [39].
10. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 17 March 2025, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
Application by Appellant- Permission is granted, limited to ground 3.
REASONS FOR DECISION (including any decision on extending time)
1. The appellant seeks permission to appeal (in time) against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Hands dated 3 February 2025, which dismissed their appeal.
2. Ground 1 is that the judge erred when concluding that there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence regarding when he was encountered by the authorities. This ground is meritless and is an attempt reargue the point; the appellant’s evidence on when he and his girlfriend were encountered was inconsistent.
3. Ground 2 is that the judge erred when finding that the contents of an arrest warrant did not tie in with the appellant’s account. This ground is also without merit, the judge was entitled to conclude that inconsistent information in an arrest warrant adversely affected the appellant’s credibility.
4. Ground 3 relates to the matter of ID documentation in Iraq and the decision in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC). The judge found that the appellant had channels through which he could obtain documentation, and a business partner was able to send a copy of his INID. The ground contends that a replacement INID can only be sought, with the assistance of family and friends, if the individual concerned had previously been issued with an INID and had biometrics taken (referring to the respondent’s guidance). There appears to be divergence in terms of the facts; the judge found that the appellant had received a copy of his INID via a business partner, yet the grounds contend that the appellant has never been issued with an INID. Having reviewed the papers the basis of the judge’s finding that the appellant had received a copy of his INID card (and had therefore been issued that document previously) is unclear. Within the refusal letter it is said that the appellant admitted to having a CSID, and the appeal skeleton argument refers to the appellant not having been issued with an INID.
5. I cannot identify the basis for the judge’s finding that the appellant had been issued with an INID and had received a copy of it. This is, in my view, a material fact, since the ability to redocument will depend on the circumstances and therefore infects the judge’s conclusions on the matter. This ground is arguable.
6. Permission to appeal is granted on ground 3 only.
11. The Secretary of State opposes the appeal in a Rule 24 Reply dated 8 July 2025, the operative part of which reads:
[…]
2. The respondent notes that the single ground on which permission has been granted relates to documentation (Ground 3). The SSHD accepts that on the face of it the findings made at [31] by the First-tier Tribunal Judge (FTTJ) do not appear to relate to this appellant- namely the loss of contact with his family, being in touch with his business partner, and being sent a copy of his INID. This appellant has provided an account of having held a CSID, and consistent contact with his family, particularly his siblings.
3. A consideration of the Presenting Officer’s record of proceedings reveals the following questions and answers provided in cross-examination:
What family members do you have in Iraq?
ANSWER: My brother and my sister.

Are you in contact with them?
ANSWER: Yes, I have telephone contact with them.

When did you last speak to them?
ANSWER: 3-4 days.

When you lived in Iraq, what ID documents did you have?
ANSWER: CSID and nationality certificate.

Where are those documents now?
ANSWER: I was sent photographs which I forwarded to the Home Office, the originals are in Sulaymaniyah.

4. In that context, the SSHD accepts that the FTTJ has erred at [31].
5. However, the SSHD invites the Tribunal to consider the agreed issues in dispute in relation to documentation in accordance with the principles in Lata.
6. At para 11 of the ASA before the FTT (p22 of Composite Bundle) it was argued that the issue of documentation would ‘stand or fall with the assessment of credibility’. This was agreed at para 12 of the SSHD’s Review (page 233 of Composite Bundle). The FTTJ rejected the claim of the Appellant for want of credibility, therefore as agreed the only expected outcome would be for the appeal to be dismissed.
7. In addition, or in the alternative, the evidence of the Appellant at the FTT hearing as outlined above was that his original documentation was in Sulaymaniyah. There would in that scenario be no issue for him to return to Sulaymaniyah and be met at the airport with his documentation.
Discussion and Analysis
12. At the outset we advised the parties that our preliminary view was that although it was accepted that the Judge had erred in law for the reasons set out in Ground 3 and the grant of permission to appeal, that error was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal for the reasons set out in the Rule 24 reply.
13. Ms Brakaj was invited to make her submissions.
14. We have listened very carefully to those submissions but find that the position before the Judge was that the documentation question would stand or fall with the assessment of credibility. The refusal of permission to appeal on Ground 1 and Ground 2 means that the Judges adverse credibility findings are preserved. On the basis of the position as it was before the Judge, the claims in relation to documentation made by the Appellant when he was claiming that he did not have access to the required documents, was properly rejected in line with the finding he was not credible in his core claim.
15. We do not agree with Ms Brakaj that the Judge proceeded on the basis that the Appellant was undocumented. We do not find the error identified in relation to [31] of the determination impacted the settled position. Litigation before the First-tier Tribunal is issue-based with the parties being expected to highlight those issues which a Judge is required to consider as the Judge did. There was nothing before the Judge to warrant her going behind the agreed facts and issues.
16. Ms Brakaj was asked during the course of the hearing whether she accepted that [3] of the Rule 24 reply was accurate, which she eventually conceded it was. Therefore, not only is there the fact that the documentation issue stood or fell with the credibility assessment, and that as the adverse credibility assessment is preserved the Appellant’s evidence in relation to whether he could obtain the relevant documents falls in line, there is the additional fact the Appellant gave evidence that his CSID was in Sulamaniyah and he was in contact with his siblings. There was no evidence he could not have it sent to him or be met at the airport by a family member who could hand it to him. This means that he has access to the necessary documents to enable him to be able to travel freely and live a normal life in Iraq.
17. We find the error of law made by the Judge is not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
18. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law. The decision shall stand.

C J Hanson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 July 2025