Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001316

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50647/2024
LP/08805/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of September 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

HT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs L Barton, Counsel instructed by Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 26 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He arrived in the UK on 3 August 2021 and claimed asylum. His protection claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated 26 December 2024. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant is an Iraqi citizen of Kurdish ethnicity. He was born in July 2000 in a village in the Zummar district of Nineveh (about 80km northwest of Mosul). His family moved to an IDP camp in Baghdad from 2014 to 2017 due to conflict in their home area. The family then moved back to their home village, but in July 2017 the family fled to Turkey.
3. The appellant fears return to his home area due to the continuing instability there. He fears Daesh (ISIS), Hashd al-Shabi (PMF), and the Jalolah family.
4. The respondent refused the protection claim on the basis that it was not accepted that the appellant had given a credible account of events in Iraq. The respondent stated that, even if the appellant’s account were found to be credible, then he could access effective protection in Iraq or alternatively he could relocate to the IKR.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Farrelly on 22 November 2024.
6. The Judge did not find the appellant’s account of events in Iraq to be credible. The Judge did not find the appellant to be at risk on return to his home area. Judge Farrelly found that the appellant could relocate to the IKR. Judge Farrelly dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
7. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge. These were rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. However, on renewal to the Upper Tribunal, by decision dated 16 April 2025 Judge Loughran granted permission on the following terms:
It is arguable that the judge materially erred in law by: (Ground 1) failing to have regard to relevant country background evidence, (Grounds 2 and 4) placing significant weight on the appellant’s failure to mention risk from the Jalolah family in his screening interview without considering the context of that interview and (Ground 3) failing to have regard to the appellant’s evidence as to why he could not internally relocate.
8. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Farrelly’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
9. Mrs Barton relied upon the grounds of appeal and expanded on them. She accepted that grounds one, two and four were linked regarding risk in the home area, and that ground three related to internal relocation to the IKR.
10. She submitted that the Judge had given insufficient reasons in his short decision. She submitted that there was no reference to the country information which showed that Sunni Kurds were targeted by the PMF. Mrs Barton highlighted the background information that supported the appellant’s claim.
11. Mrs Barton stated that the Judge had placed too much reliance on the Screening Interview and that this was unfair and contrary to the case law.
12. In relation to ground three, Mrs Barton submitted that the Judge had failed to consider the appellant’s evidence regarding his ability to relocate to the IKR.
13. I asked Mrs Barton if she could assist regarding the whereabouts of the appellant’s original CSID. She was unable to confirm where it was.
14. Ms Newton submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. She submitted that the Judge was entitled to rely on the fact that the appellant had failed to mention the claimed risk from the Jalolah family in the Screening Interview.
15. She submitted that the Judge had made sustainable findings about the appellant’s contact with his family and other matters which would make internal relocation reasonable.
16. In relation to the appellant's CSID, Ms Newton was unable to confirm whether it was only a copy that had been provided to the respondent. In any event, she submitted that the appellant had his CSID and so could return to either government-controlled Iraq or the IKR.
17. I asked Ms Newton about the Judge’s application of the relevant Country Guidance (i.e., SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG)) Iraq [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC)) which gave extensive guidance about factors to be considered in relation to risk in the home area, and about factors relevant to internal relocation to the IKR. It appeared that the Judge had not considered these matters. Ms Newton acknowledged the limitations in the decision but submitted that the Judge’s decision was still sustainable.
18. Mrs Barton briefly responded. She highlighted the lack of consideration of the Country Guidance.
19. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.
Discussion and Analysis
20. When considering whether the Judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have remined myself of the following principles.
21. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).
22. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge's decision is “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.
23. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
24. The appellant left Iraq in 2017, when he would have been aged 16 or 17 years of age. Thus, understandably, the appellant’s claimed fears related primarily to the general country situation. This was highlighted in the second issue before the First-tier Tribunal as detailed in the Appeal Skeleton Argument and the Review. This issue related to the risk on return to his home area in Nineveh due to his personal characteristics, including his ethnicity, religion, age and gender.
25. The Judge’s consideration of this issue is included in paragraph 20 of his decision. I find that the Judge’s decision fails to consider the relevant country information and the relevant Country Guidance. Thus, I find that ground one is made out and discloses a material error of law.
26. The Judge makes no reference to any country information or the Country Guidance cases. The Judge concludes that “The country information would not indicate a risk of prosecution [sic] by reason of his ethnicity or religion. I do not find he is at risk because he is Kurdish and Sunni.” There is no indication to what “country information” the Judge is referring to.
27. In SMO and KSP the Upper Tribunal stated:
“3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact-sensitive, "sliding scale" assessment to which the following matters are relevant.
4. Those with an actual or perceived association with ISIL are likely to be at enhanced risk throughout Iraq. In those areas in which ISIL retains an active presence, those who have a current personal association with local or national government or the security apparatus are likely to be at enhanced risk.
5. The impact of any of the personal characteristics listed immediately below must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area. Within the framework of such an analysis, the other personal characteristics which are capable of being relevant, individually and cumulatively, to the sliding scale analysis required by Article 15(c) are as follows:
(i) Opposition to or criticism of the GOI, the KRG or local security actors;
(ii) Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;
(iii) LGBTI individuals, those not conforming to Islamic mores and wealthy or Westernised individuals;
(iv) Humanitarian or medical staff and those associated with Western organisations or security forces;
(v) Women and children without genuine family support; and
(vi) Individuals with disabilities.
28. There is no evidence that the Judge undertook a careful assessment of the situation in the appellant’s home area of the Zummar district of Nineveh with a particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIS activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area.
29. There is no evidence that the Judge assessed the personal characteristics of the appellant to make a fact-sensitive, “sliding scale” assessment of the risk on return.
30. Country information was included in the bundle provided by the appellant to the First-tier Tribunal. Furthermore, in the earlier Country Guidance case of SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 00400 (IAC) the country situation was considered (and this was not reconsidered in SMO and KSP (see paragraph 7).
31. Thus, there was material before the Judge which required evaluation in resolving the issues and the Judge failed to have any regard to the relevant country background evidence. This is a material error of law.
32. Ground three relates to the issue of internal relocation. I find that this ground is also made out.
33. The Judge states in paragraph 20 that “There is always the option open to the appellant of going to the Kurdish region where there is effective security.” This is the totality of the Judge’s analysis of the issue of internal relocation.
34. It is appreciated that the Judge’s primary finding is that the appellant is not at real risk in his home area and so internal relocation is only an alternative finding. However, if making such an alternative finding, it is necessary to correctly apply the relevant Country Guidance. This is especially important when the primary findings of risk in the home area are found to be flawed.
35. In relation to internal relocation of a Kurd from government-controlled Iraq to the IKR, the Country Guidance case of SMO and KSP states:
“30. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
32. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a 'relatively normal life', which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P's family on a case by case basis.
33. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a 'critical shelter arrangement', living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
34. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.
36. There is no evidence that the Judge applied the Country Guidance factors when considering whether it would be safe and reasonable for the appellant to relocate to the IKR. I find that this is a material error of law and thus ground three is made out.
37. Grounds two and four are more problematic. These grounds are said to relate to the weight the Judge placed on the appellant’s failure to mention his fear of the Jalolah family in the screening interview.
38. The grounds are poorly drafted, and it is difficult to discern precisely the challenge being made by the appellant. There is reference to YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 and thus the relevance of the screening interview. However, there are also more general challenges to the Judge’s credibility findings in paragraph 21 of the decision.
39. The Judge rejects the appellant’s claim about the Jalolah family in paragraph 21. His reasons are brief. There is reference to the appellant not mentioning the Jalolah family originally. The Judge then states that the appellant “mentioned four other brothers but there is no evidence they have encountered any difficult [sic].” However, as detailed in paragraph 22, the appellant’s brother has provided a letter of support. This is evidence that this brother had to flee Iraq, and the letter also confirms the appellant’s account of events in Iraq.
40. Furthermore, the Judge considers the appellant’s brother’s evidence in paragraph 22 but fails to make any findings about the reliability of this evidence or the impact that this evidence has on the credibility of the appellant’s claim to fear the Jalolah family.
41. On careful consideration, I find that the Judge’s consideration of the credibility of the appellant’s account of fear of the Jalolah family is flawed. The Judge has provided inadequate reasons for his findings and failed to consider material evidence when reaching his findings. I find that grounds two and four are made out.
42. Thus, in conclusion, for the reasons above, I find the Judge has made material errors of law in their decision and reasons. I set aside the decision in totality as none of the findings are safe.
43. Applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), given the issues and the amount of fact-finding that will be required to do, I am satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved.
44. I would add as a postscript that the issue of documentation will need to be fully addressed when this matter is reheard in the First-tier Tribunal. Neither advocate could assist on this matter, and the documents were unclear. There is copy of the front of the appellant’s CSID in the respondent’s bundle at page 53. There is some suggestion that the original CSID (or perhaps just a copy) was submitted to the respondent. It is not clear where the original CSID is; this will need to be confirmed by the parties
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal has been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester for a complete rehearing with no findings preserved before any judge other than Judge Farrelly.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2025