Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001333

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/64702/2023
LP/09462/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

MF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Wass, Barnes, Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinterton (‘the judge’) dated 20 October 2024.
Anonymity
2. We maintain the anonymity order that was granted by the First-tier Tribunal. No party requested that the order be set aside.
Background
3. The appellant, a citizen of Iraq, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the respondent’s decision dated 7 December 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim made on 15 November 2021.
4. The appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return due to his being a potential victim of an honour killing because he divorced his former wife whose family has powerful members in the Peshmerga and links to the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and also due to being politically active whilst he has been in the UK.
The Appeal to the First tier Tribunal
5. The appeal came before the judge on 16 October 2024. Ms Efurhierwe represented the appellant and Mr Jerwood, a Home Office Presenting Officer represented the respondent. The judge recorded that the parties agreed that the following issues were in dispute:
(a) does the appellant qualify for asylum and humanitarian protection owing to a well-founded fear of persecution due to being a victim/potential victim of an honour killing?
(b) does the appellant qualify for humanitarian protection in light of the claimed absence of identity documentation?
(c) is the appellant at risk of serious harm throughout Iraq in light of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive? and
(d) are there very significant obstacles to the integration of the appellant in Iraq and would the removal of the appellant breach Article 8 of the ECHR?
6. The appellant gave evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter adopting his witness statements and was cross-examined.
7. In a decision dated 20 October 2024 the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal making the following findings of fact:
(a) The appellant had given completely inconsistent evidence in respect of whether he had received threats directly. The judge did not find the evidence of the appellant to be credible in relation to the claimed threats he received either directly or indirectly.
(b) The judge found it difficult to understand why the appellant would be seen as dishonouring his former wife (by wanting to go ahead with the divorce) when his former wife’s infidelity had led to the divorce.
(c) The appellant did not mention that he had received threats from CM, a commander in the PUK in his two witness statements that were served prior to the appeal. The appellant’s former wife does not have any high profile family members in the PUK or KDP and no threats have been made against the appellant.
(d) In respect of the appellant’s sur place activities the judge found that based on the available evidence the appellant had not had a specific role in the demonstrations that he claimed to have attended and that he was simply an attendee. He found that he had provided some images from his Facebook account. He noted that the respondent submitted that those images could be manipulated and he therefore concluded that the appellant would be of no interest to the authorities in Iraq based on his sur place activities in the UK.
(e) The judge rejected the appellant’s accounts of not having contact with his family. The judge did not consider that there was any reason why his family would discontinue to have contact with him.
(f) It is the appellant’s account that he left his INID at home. As the appellant is still in contact with his family and they can help him to get it.
8. In respect of Article 8 the judge found that there were no exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In essence the grounds were that:
Ground 1
10. The judge made a mistake as to the material facts capable of becoming a material error of law:
(a) The appellant did in fact mention that he had received threats from CM in his witness statement. However, he was referred to as UM. The judge mistakenly thought that the appellant had not mentioned him because the interpreter had incorrectly spelt his name at the hearing.
(b) The appellant was not inconsistent as to whether he had received direct threats.
Ground 2
11. The judge came to an irrational conclusion on matters material to the outcome.
(a) the judge disregarded corroborative evidence;
(b) the judge failed to have regard to the fact the appellant was internally consistent;
(c) the judge failed to correctly apply MH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 in his approach to the appellant’s credibility; and
(d) the judge failed to make a finding as to whether the appellant held a genuine political belief.
Ground 3
12. The judge materially misdirected himself in law by:
(a) failing to consider whether the appellant would be at risk on account of his imputed or actual political opinion; and
(b) failing to consider the appellant had a specific role at demonstrations.
(c) failing to consider the appellant’s Facebook evidence.
13. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 4 March 2025 but it was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 11 April 2025 in the following terms:
“I give permission on all grounds but I am particularly concerned that the judge may have skewed the adverse credibility findings by making a mistake of fact as explained at ground 1 and may have applied a wrong test when considering the impact of sur place activities. Arguably the judge was more concerned with the appellant’s sincerity than with the risk, if any, that they created in the event of his return.”
14. The respondent did not file a response under rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. However, on 11 June 2025, the day before the hearing, the respondent filed and served a skeleton argument drafted by Mr Parvar. In the skeleton argument the respondent accepted:
(1) the judge misunderstood CM to be a different person to UM (who the appellant had in fact mentioned in his witness statement) and that that error had arisen due to the interpreter’s misspelling of the name; and
(2) the judge materially erred by failing to undertake an adequate assessment of the appellant’s online sur place activities.
15. The respondent contested the other grounds raised by the appellant.
The Hearing
16. At the hearing we asked Mr Parvar to address us on the respondent’s position. He stated the respondent accepted the judge had materially erred in law in the manner outlined in the skeleton argument. He confirmed that the respondent accepted that CM had been spelt differently by the interpreter at the hearing and that the judge had relied on that to reject the appellant’s account.
17. Mr Parvar also confirmed that it was the respondent’s position that there had been a lack of an assessment of the Facebook evidence.
18. Mr Parvar stated that the accepted errors were material to the outcome and it was the respondent’s position that the decision should be set aside.
19. Mr Parvar submitted that the judge’s finding that the appellant was in contact with his family was not infected by the judge’s errors and could be preserved. Ms Wass submitted that because the errors the judge made were in respect of the appellant’s credibility, no findings could be preserved.
20. We indicted that we were satisfied that the respondent’s concessions were rightly made. We set the decision aside with no findings of fact preserved and informed the parties that written reasons would follow.
21. Ms Wass submitted that in the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate to remit it to the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Parvar did not oppose that submission.
Discussion
22. We are satisfied that the respondent’s concession is rightly made. We are satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal decision is infected with material errors of law and should be set aside.
23. We are satisfied that the judge made a material mistake of fact that the appellant had not mentioned CM in his witness statements when he had in fact done so, although his name was spelt differently in those witness statements (UM). The parties agree that this mistake arose because the interpreter spelt the name incorrectly at the hearing.
24. We are also satisfied that the judge materially erred in his approach to the appellant’s sur place activities. The judge notes the respondent’s submission that the images from the appellant’s Facebook account are capable of being manipulated but does not make a finding as to whether he accepted that submission. In those circumstances, we are satisfied that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his finding that the appellant would be of no interest to the authorities based on his sur place activities in those circumstances.
25. We are satisfied that these errors affect the entire decision. Accordingly, we do not need to address the other grounds relied on by the appellant.
26. We considered Mr Parvar’s submission that we should preserve the finding that the appellant remains in contact with his family. However we consider that the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s credibility in respect of his claim that he is seen as dishonouring his former wife impacts on the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s account to have lost contact with his family and therefore cannot be preserved.
27. Applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), given the issues and the amount of fact-finding that will be required to do, we are satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.
Notice of Decision
(a) There is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
(b) The decision will be remitted to the First tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.
(c) No findings of fact are preserved.

G. Loughran
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 June 2025