Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001335

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03577/2024
PA/67350/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

ABJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: ABJ in person.
For the Respondent: Ms Z Young, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 18 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 7 February 2025, in which she dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom, based on further submissions made on 21 March 2023 and refused on 15 December 2023.
2. At [6] of the determination the Judge writes:
Preliminary issues
6. The Appellant did not appear, and no representative for him arrived, despite the fact that the file indicated that he was legally represented. The correspondence indicated that the Appellant had been notified of the hearing date to his last known home address. The representatives were also contacted on the morning of the hearing by the court staff, and said they did not have knowledge of the case. The Appellant had filed no documents for his appeal, and had not engaged with the directions given previously by the Tribunal. In the circumstances I indicated that the representatives should be invited to formally come off the record. I also indicated that I would proceed to hear the appeal in the Appellant’s absence, in accordance with the overriding objective. Ms Begum made brief submissions, and I reserved my Decision and Reasons.
3. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on six grounds which can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: Absence of an interpreter - the appellant was expecting an interpreter to be present. No interpreter was provided, which left them unable to follow the discussion and effectively communicate his situation.
Ground 2: Non-attendance of legal representative - the appellant’s solicitor did not attend and they were not informed of their absence beforehand and this deprived them of legal guidance and the ability to properly present their case.
Ground 3: Directions by the judge - despite the absence of an interpreter and legal representative, the judge instructed him (the appellant) to leave without any consideration of rescheduling the hearing to a time when an interpreter and the representation were present.
Ground 4: Inadequate consideration of his political activities.
Ground 5: Misapplication of credibility findings - failure to consider new evidence adduced at the hearing.
Ground 6: Failure to assess risk associated with his public profile following his sur place activities.
4. The First-tier Tribunal judge who refused permission considered grounds 1 – 3 together but found that outside the bare assertion the Appellant attended the appeal hearing and was told by the judge to leave (and the appeal was heard without him) there is no evidence to substantiate the Appellant’s allegations. It was found in the absence of any substantiating evidence there was no merit to these grounds.
5. Grounds 4 – 6 were found to amount to nothing more than a disagreement and an attempt to re-litigate the case as a result of which permission to appeal was refused.
6. The application for permission to appeal was renewed to the Upper Tribunal following which permission was granted on 13 May 2025, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
1. I have considerable reservations about granting permission in this case. According to the Decision and Reasons the appellant did not appear before the judge and the judge determined the appeal in the absence of the appellant having careful regard to the papers.
2. However the grounds include the extraordinary contention that the appellant did appear before the judge and the judge told the appellant to leave. This may be hard to accept but I find that the appellant should have an opportunity to make out his case.
3. I am particularly concerned that the appellant says that he was expecting legal representation but according to the judge (paragraph 6 of the Decision and Reasons) his solicitors were contacted on the morning of the hearing and told Tribunal staff that they had no knowledge of the case. Arguably in those circumstances the judge should not have continued with the hearing.
4. The appellant is reminded that he will have to show that any error of law was material.
5. It is a matter for him but this may be a case where the solicitors he thought would represent him might want to assist further. They cannot be blamed for not attending a hearing of which they were unaware.
6. I give permission on all grounds.
7. The appeal is opposed by the Secretary of State in a Rule 24 response dated 5 June 2025, the operative part of which is in the following terms:
Grounds 1-3
2. The Respondent submits that these matters may be considered together. The Respondent does not accept that the Appellant attended the hearing and was asked to leave by the Judge. The Respondent submits that the Judge is correct to note the Appellant did not attend. This is supported by the attached Appeal Hearing Minute, titled 28.01.2025 Hearing Minute PA 03577 2024, in which the PO records A had not attended by 11.05am.
3. The Judge records at paragraph 6 that the representatives on file were contacted on the morning of the hearing, and did not have knowledge of the case. Therefore, they were not acting for the Appellant. The Judge also records that correspondence indicated the Appellant had been notified to the hearing date to his last known home address. Therefore the Judge made appropriate enquiries as to whether the Appellant had been duly notified of proceedings and had opportunity to attend, and whether the representatives on file were intended to attend.
4. The Respondent notes that the Presenting Officer’s hearing minute records that the Judge allowed until 11.05am before proceeding, at which time the Appellant was not in attendance, nor was a legal representative, nor any documents from the Appellant. Thus the Judge also afforded the Appellant additional time, after scheduled the 10am start time of the hearing.
5. The Respondent submits that the Appellant has made a bare assertion that he was asked to leave by the Judge, and was not afforded the opportunity to adjourn his hearing in the absence of an interpreter and his legal representatives. This directly contradicts what is recorded by the Judge in his determination, and the Appeal hearing Minute of the Presenting Officer, which also records that the Appellant did not attend. The Respondent invites the Tribunal to find these allegations have not been made out, and there is no merit therein.
6. For completeness, the Respondent notes that there is an Appeal Hearing Minute from the 08/01/2025 recording that the Appellant attended a hearing before Judge Hillis on that date, at which no interpreter or legal representatives for the Appellant attended. On that date, the appeal was adjourned in order to obtain an interpreter. Please find this minute attached, titled 08/01/2025 Hearing Minute PA 03577 2024. Grounds 3-6
7. The Respondent submits that these matters may also be considered together. It is submitted that the determination provides clear, rational reasons for reaching the findings on these points at paragraphs 14 - 18. It is submitted that these grounds are merely an attempt to relitigate the case, and that there is no material error of law on these grounds.
8. In summary, the Respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed themselves appropriately.

8. The Presenting Officer’s minute of the hearing referred to in the Rule 24 response reads:

Substantive hearing

Immigration Judge: []
Legal Representatives: Unrepped
Presenting Officer: Shuhena Begum

Preliminary issues: N/A

Hearing:

No A and no rep and no files at 11:05am.
He was sent the hearing notice and he does appear to have solicitors on the records but they haven’t complied with any previous instructions.
The person who he spoke to had no idea what was happening.
It would appear from the correspondence, they were originally represented, then they came off the record, he had new reps who have not done anything but it appears for one reason or another and they should have applied to remove themselves off the record.
Judge heard the appeal in his absence.
PO relied on RFRL and asked for it to be dismissed.

Notes for SAT
N/A
SIGNED: S Begum POU Leeds

9. And in relation to the earlier hearing referred to in the Rule 24 response:

Ref: PA/03577/2024
Name: ABJ
HO Ref: 12841545
Bradford IAC Judge []
PO: C Emmerson
Rep: unrepped
Interpreter: none in attendance
Language/Dialect: n/a
Start time: 14:07
End time: 14:15
Pre-lims
No interpreter in attendance, A struggled to understand judge when being spoken to, appeal adjourned to get an interpreter for next hearing. Appellant in person.

Discussion and analysis

10. Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2024 (‘the Procedure Rules’) reads:

Hearing in a party’s absence

28. If a party fails to attend a hearing the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing if the Tribunal—

(a) is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing; and
(b) considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.

11. It is therefore permissible for a judge to hear an appeal in the absence of a party provided the necessary safeguards have been satisfied. The Judge makes a clear finding that the Appellant had been served with a notice of the hearing, and that is not actually challenged in the grounds seeking permission to appeal.
12. The Judge finds the interests of justice satisfied by reference to the overriding objective which is to be found to Rule 2 of the Procedure Rules.
13. What is clear from reading the information now available is that Grounds 1 – 3 of the application for permission to appeal bear a resemblance to the earlier hearing which was adjourned because no interpreter was present and the Appellant and judge could not understand each other, resulting in the judge adjourning the proceedings and sending the Appellant away, rather than the relisted hearing which took place on 28 January 2025 and which resulted in the decision promulgated on 7 February 2025.
14. The Appellant was asked whether the judge whose decision he was complaining about was male or female, to which he stated it was male. The male judge was the first one and the judge who heard and dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 28 January 2025 female.
15. When the Appellant was asked why he had not attended the hearing on 28 January 2025 he claimed that he had not received notice of it from the First-tier Tribunal. That statement was explored in some detail with the Appellant by Ms Young.
16. What transpired is that the Appellant had provided an address for service of documents in Huddersfield. He claimed it is his friends address and that communication sent to that address was passed on to him. He claimed that before 28 January 2025 he had moved to another address, but he accepted he had not advised the Tribunal of any other address to which documents should be sent.
17. The Judge was therefore correct in her decision to note that the Appellant had been validly served with a notice of hearing sent to the address nominated for service. Indeed, it appears that every previous notice and decision that has been sent for the Appellant’s attention to the Huddersfield address has been received by him.
18. I find no material error in the finding by the Judge on this point. I do not accept the Appellant’s claim that the notice of hearing was not brought to his attention either directly or through the normal channels that he referred to. There was, in particular, no attendance by the friend referred to by the Appellant who could have supported his claim.
19. I find no arguable legal error material to the decision of the Judge made out in relation to Grounds 1-3.
20. Ground 4 in which the Appellant asserts inadequate consideration of his political activities by the Judge is without arguable merit. The Judge’s findings in relation to the relevant issues are set out from [14] of the decision under challenge. The Judge addresses the question of whether the Appellant’s political activities in the UK were sufficient to bring him to the adverse attention of the IKR authorities at [14] – [15], in which the Judge makes specific reference to the Appellant’s evidence that he had attended a modest number of demonstrations and posted limited material on his Facebook account, and that the Appellant had not filed sufficient material to answer the point that he did not have a sufficient profile based upon the country information and case law that would create a real risk to him on return. The Judge finds the Appellant’s activities are at a low level and the finding the Appellant had not shown there was a reasonable likelihood that his political activity in the UK would have come to the adverse attention of the authorities in the IKR has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
21. Ground 4 is, in effect, disagreement with the Judge’s findings on this particular point.
22. Ground 5 asserts a misapplication of credibility findings, arguing the Judge relied on previous negative credibility findings without acknowledging new evidence and arguments provided in the Appellant’s recent submissions, overlooked his political involvement which had evolved significantly since the initial claim, especially after the dismissal of his previous appeal, and claiming there had been a genuine intensification of his political engagement motivated by ongoing events in Iraq and the IKR. The Appellant asserts the Judge should have recognised the change in his circumstance.
23. The Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny and any claims to the contrary is without arguable merit. The Judge considered whether the Appellant’s political activities are genuinely motivated at [16] and gives ample reasons in support of the finding that they are not. At [17] the Judge considers whether there was reason to depart from the negative credibility findings of the previous judge, but on the basis the Appellant had not put forward sufficient reasons and/or evidence to depart from the earlier findings, concluded there was not.
24. The Devaseelan principle required the Judge to take the earlier findings as the starting point for her deliberations. The Judge clearly considered the new material being relied upon by the Appellant and gave that evidence the weight that she felt it appropriate to give. The Appellant’s ground is without merit as the Judge clearly acknowledged the evidence that was provided relating to developments since the earlier appeal had been dismissed, and however the Appellant quantifies his activities since that time the Judge did not consider they were sufficient to warrant departing from the earlier adverse credibility findings. That is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. The Appellant’s disagreement and desire for a more favourable outcome does not warrant a finding of arguable material legal error on this point.
25. Ground 6 asserts a disregard for current risk based on public profile in which the Appellant claims the Judge did not fully appreciate the risk associated with his public profile and that the Judge’s findings are based on a misunderstanding of the facts and a misapplication of the law, but such claim was without arguable merit. The finding of the Judge is that the Appellant did not have the type of profile that will give rise to a real risk on return on the basis of the country material. That has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
26. There is no merit in the claim the Judge misunderstood the facts or misunderstood or misapplied the law.
27. The Court of Appeal have made it clear that appellant judges should not interfere in decisions of judges below unless they are ‘plainly wrong’. Although the Appellant disagrees with the outcome the Grounds fail to establish the Judge’s findings, which are supported by adequate reasons, and overall conclusion following on from those findings, are outside the range of those reasonably available to the Judge on the evidence, are rationally objectionable, or ‘plainly wrong’. No procedural unfairness is made out sufficient to amount to a material error of law. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision

28. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
29. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 July 2025