Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001347
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64204/2023
Case No: UI-2025-001348

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64207/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

FEMINA RAJANKUMAR BHATT
RAJANKUMAR JANAKKUMAR BHATT
(NO ANONYMITY ORDERS MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Dellar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondents: Ms M Gherman of Counsel, instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 25 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This has been a hybrid hearing which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was by video, using Teams, with Mr Bhatt appearing remotely and all other parties attending in person. There were no technical difficulties for the hearing itself and the papers were all available electronically.
2. In a decision promulgated on 5 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 10 February 2025 which allowed the appeals against the Respondent’s refusal of human rights claims dated 30 November 2023. That decision is annexed and sets out the background to this appeal, which will not be repeated herein unless necessary. This is the remaking of both appeals on human rights grounds. For ease I continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, with Ms Bhatt as the First Appellant and Mr Bhatt as the Second Appellant and the Secretary of State as the Respondent.
3. The Appellants married in India in 2004. On 1 July 2009 they sought entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a Tier 4 student and dependent; which was granted and further to which they entered the United Kingdom on 28 August 2009. A further application for leave to remain on 3 July 2011 was rejected and they have remained unlawfully in the United Kingdom since. A human rights application made on 21 February 2017 was refused on 4 April 2017 and the latest application was made on 31 August 2002. It is that decision which is the subject of this appeal.
4. The Respondent refused the applications on the basis that the Appellants did not meet any of the requirements in paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds. In particular, there were no very significant obstacles to their reintegration on return to India. Further, there would be no breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on medical grounds as treatment would be available for their conditions (including pneumonia, anxiety, depression and alcoholism, with specific hospitals and organisations who provide support listed) on return to India. Overall, there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules.
The appeal
The Appellants’ evidence
5. In her first written statement dated 14 February 2025, the First Appellant set out her and her husband’s immigration history and their marriage on 11 August 2004 in India which was not approved of by their families due to differences in their castes, which is thought to bring shame on a family and risk honour killing. If they return to India, the Appellants would have to conceal their marriage as if their families found out, they would either be killed or forced to commit suicide. Neither of their families will offer any protection or support and the First Appellant would be forced to re-marry. Both families are said to have significant political influence in India and be able to find the Appellants on return. The Appellants had no choice but to stay in the United Kingdom after the expiry of their leave and had no resources or knowledge as to how to regularise their stay.
6. The First Appellant states that if removed to India, it would be unjustifiably harsh on her to be removed from the support, relationships and friends she has established in the 14 years she has lived here and would place the Second Appellant in a vulnerable position due to his medical problems. The couple have no retained knowledge of life and culture in India and no connections there, nor any accommodation, maintenance or financial support. Both would be deprived of medical attention currently being received in the United Kingdom.
7. In her second written statement, dated 21 October 2025 the First Appellant states that her husband has a number of serious medical conditions, including chronic liver disease (from previous alcohol-related illness) and is under supervision for symptoms associated with hypoglycaemia. The Second Appellant was recently admitted to hospital after developing complications linked to the decompression of his liver disease. The First Appellant acts as his primary carer and gives emotional support to her husband, helping him with everyday needs, medical appointments and care when he is unable to manage on his own. Their future if removed from the United Kingdom would be precarious and there is concern the Second Appellant’s health would deteriorate. The Second Appellant also can not travel for long hours and needs to access the bathroom on a frequent basis.
8. The First Appellant attended the oral hearing, adopted her written statements and gave oral evidence through a Court appointed interpreter. The Respondent asked no questions in cross-examination. I asked a number of questions for clarification of the Appellants’ current circumstances. She stated that there is no contact with any family in India. The Second Appellant’s mother knows about the marriage and supports it, but she is elderly and the Appellants did not want her to have any problems in the community because of it, so contact was stopped. She had previously helped the Appellants to come to the United Kingdom. Prior to their departure from India, in the five years that the Appellants were married, the First Appellant stated that they suffered a lot because of the caste system and because her family were old fashioned and didn’t accept her marriage to a Brahmin (she is Patel). The First Appellant’s family found out about her marriage from the court documents, following which the Appellants moved to Mumbai as her parents were very angry. The First Appellant stated that because the Patel community is very big, someone, somewhere would find out if the couple returned to India.
9. In re-examination, the First Appellant stated that she would not contact her mother-in-law for any help on return and they have not been in contact for many years. When asked for an example of the problems faced in India, the First Appellant stated that there were problems marrying outside of her caste which her parents won’t accept and there was pressure from the community to leave the Second Appellant and marry someone else; which she did not want to do. The First Appellant stated that this was the main problem.
10. In his first written statement dated 14 February 2024, the Second Appellant essentially adopts his wife’s first written statement.
11. In his second written statement dated 21 October 2025, the Second Appellant gives details consistent with those given by his wife in her second written statement as to his health. He adds that he experiences persistent weakness, fatigue and periods of instability which adversely impacts his daily functioning. He has additionally been diagnosed with haemorrhoids and had a period of worse health in early October 2025 with mobility problems and difficulty in breathing. The Second Appellant states that he continues to receive regular medical treatment and monitoring in the United Kingdom which is vital to his survival and recovery. If returned to India, he would not be able to access the same standard of medical attention or support; with he and his wife being very vulnerable and face severe emotional, social and physical hardship.
12. The Second Appellant attended the oral hearing remotely, adopted his written statements and gave oral evidence through a Court appointed interpreter. In cross-examination, when asked what problems he had following his marriage, the Second Appellant stated that every day there was some kind of issue because it was an inter-caste marriage. He didn’t tell his wife, but he had problems when he left the house by himself and had to have two friends with him as their community was quite big and would come out in gangs. The Second Appellant stated that police were sent to his house, he was threatened with violence and the police were supporting them. In the United Kingdom, friends have told the Second Appellant on the phone that he would be at risk if he went back and they have all emigrated so there will be no one there to support him. He stated that he would not be able to survive by himself.
13. In terms of healthcare, the Second Appellant said there was no point trying to research what would be available to him in India as the doctors there are not good and any treatment would not be good and would be expensive.
14. I also asked the Second Appellant a number of questions for clarification. His current diagnosis is cirrhosis of the liver. He also has dizziness; has been given a machine to monitor his blood pressure; his feet swell if he walks or stands for long periods; he has to go to the bathroom at least four times a day; has build ups of acid and fluid in his stomach and if that happens he has to go to the hospital. His doctor has advised him to refrain from travelling. The Second Appellant currently takes nine to ten tablets in the morning and three in the afternoon and evening for the cirrhosis of his liver; he was unable to identify what the medication was. He attends the doctors/hospital every two to three months and has an appointment coming up for an endoscopy.
15. In terms of the Second Appellant’s alcoholism, he stated that he relapsed in 2022 or 2023 and was given tablets for detoxification; following which he abstained from alcohol for about a week and then went back. He was advised in June 2024 or 2025 when he was discharged from hospital that he if drinks again he could lose his life and he is not currently drinking alcohol. His wife is very strict with him about it.
Documentary evidence
16. The bundle includes a large quantity of documentary evidence, not all of which needs to be referred to individually or is relevant to the issues remaining in the appeal. These include, but are not limited to identity documentation, letters of support (all of which were submitted to the First-tier Tribunal and none of the authors attended the hearing), and marriage certificate.
17. One letter of support in the bundle from Mahboob Miah (undated but submitted to the First-tier Tribunal) includes the statement ‘When he does require any financial help, I am able to help’, when writing about the Second Appellant.
18. The medical evidence for the First Appellant consists primarily of her GP records up to June 2023, which at that time referred to pernicious anaemia from 2019 and shows at that date prescriptions for this and vitamin D3 (for 7 weeks followed by over the counter equivalent). No specific reference was made to any part of these records during the hearing, save for a brief reference from January 2023 that the First Appellant has stopped taking her medication for depression.
19. The medical evidence for the Second Appellant includes reference to a hospital admission and sick note relating to April and May 2025; various appointment letters for scans and check ups; references to diagnosis of liver cirrhosis, haemorrhoids, and hyperthyroidism; investigation for hypoglycaemia; prescription forms (dating between 2017 and 2022); patient report forms and GP records up to May/June 2023. The majority of the medical documents date from 2023 and earlier.
20. The most recent summary of the Second Appellant’s medical conditions appears in a letter from the Hepatology Clinic dated 30 November 2023 which refers to diagnosis if ArLD cirrhosis and hypothyroidism; and medication of thyroxine, thiamine, vitamin B and acamprosate.
21. As to background country evidence, this included the Respondent’s Country Information Note “India: Medical and healthcare provision”, April 2023 and the Respondent’s CPIN “India: Religious minorities and Scheduled Castes and Tribes”, April 2024 states in relation to inter-faith and inter-caste marriages:
“3.10.1 In general, persons in or entering inter-faith and inter-cast marriages are unlikely to be subject to treatment by state and/or non-state actors that is sufficiently serious, by its nature and/or repetition, to amount to persecution or serious harm. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
3.10.2 Inter-faith and inter-cast marriages are legal in most states. However, many Indian families still prefer marriages arranged within their own religious group and caste. Around 10% of all marriages in India take place between different castes … According to research by Pew between late 2019 and early 2020, there is less objection to inter-caste marriages in South and Northeast India compared to other areas. Persons entering inter-faith marriages may, in some cases, be subject to disapproval from their families, discrimination, societal exclusion or family or communal violence. There are examples of high-profile interfaith marriages …”
22. The passages quote above are consistent with the information in section 10.2 on treatment of inter-faith and inter-caste married couples and the DFAT Country Information Report, India, 2023; which is quoted therein, in particular the section beginning in paragraph 3.136.
Submissions
23. In closing on behalf of the Respondent, Mr Dellar relied on the reasons for refusal letter and in summary, he emphasised the public interest in removal of those here without lawful leave to remain and who can not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules (which these Appellants do not) and having taken into account all of their circumstances, the balance falls in the Respondent’s favour that the public interest outweighs this. That follows consideration of the Second Appellant’s health conditions, the cost and availability of treatment in India, as well as availability of accommodation and support available there. In relation the Appellants’ marriage, there is nothing to suggest either is in danger as a result in India even if their families were hostile, as shown by them living there for five years as a married couple before coming to the United Kingdom.
24. In closing on behalf of the Appellants, Ms Gherman relied on her skeleton argument and made oral submissions. In terms of the Appellants, she submitted that both were credible and honest witnesses, who have given consistent evidence without embellishment and the lack of any cross-examination of the First Appellant shows that her evidence should be given substantial weight as it was unchallenged.
25. On return to India, Ms Gherman submitted that there were three obstacles to their reintegration, first, their inter-caste marriage; secondly, their medical conditions and finally the lack of support available to them on return.
26. In relation to the marriage, the Appellants claim that the First Appellant was pressured daily to leave the marriage and the Second Appellant was threatened with violence and only left the home with protection. There is a fear of forced marriage and violence on return, which is consistent with background country evidence in the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”). The Appellants would also face hardship and discrimination in employment and would have no support from family or friends on return.
27. In relation to medical conditions, Ms Gherman relied on the relevant CPIN as to healthcare in India. She confirmed that there was no specific medical report or summary available for either Appellant as to their current conditions or diagnosis. There was no summary at all for the First Appellant and her reliance on poor mental health is based on her evidence only and no current diagnosis of depression (for which she had previously been prescribed medication but had stopped by 2023) or any other condition. For the Second Appellant, the best summary was in a letter from December 2023. In these circumstances, Ms Gherman could only rely on general and systemic problems with healthcare in India (with specific references to the CPIN “India: Medical and healthcare provision” April 2023 set out in her skeleton argument) rather than the lack of any specific healthcare being available or accessible to the Appellants. However, she maintained a submission that the Appellants were of modest means without any family support and therefore access to healthcare could be a barrier for financial reasons; even though the treatment required and its cost/availability, had not been identified in evidence. The Appellants’ situation was described as a “situation approaching destitution” with reference to the grant of a fee waiver for the application.
28. Overall, Ms Gherman submitted that there were very significant obstacles to reintegration in India for both Appellants such that the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules were met. In any event, their removal would be a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private and family life; particularly taking into account their fear on return and unjustifiably harsh consequences they would face on return.
Findings and reasons
29. There are two issues in this appeal to be determined, first whether the Appellants meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds, and secondly, whether their removal would be a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is important to note that the Appellants have not appealed on protection grounds in relation to their claims about risk on return due to their inter-faith marriage (nor has the Respondent in any event consented to any such claim as a new matter) and have not done so expressly on the basis that there would be a sufficiency of protection available to them in India. Further, the Appellants have not relied on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the medical aspects of their claim relied upon and were clearly right not to do so as on its face their claim is not sufficiently evidenced to establish that Article 3 is even engaged on this basis further to the decision in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 64, nor that the high threshold set out therein could even arguably be met.
30. I deal first with the issue in relation to the Immigration Rules. The relevant provision in the Immigration Rules relied upon by the Appellants is that contained in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) which refers to an applicant who has lived in the United Kingdom for less than 20 years and “there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country of return”. Integration was explained in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 as follows:
“14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he would be deported … is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal to simply direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
31. The very significant obstacles requirement was considered by the Court of Appeal in Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, who in paragraph 9 held:
“9. … It is fair enough to observe that the words “very significant” connote an “elevated” threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by “mere inconvenience or upheaval”. But I am not sure that saying that “mere” hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not “generally” suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
32. The Appellants rely on three specific matters which they say cumulatively amount to very significant obstacles to their reintegration which I deal with in turn. First, the Appellants claim that they are at risk on return, primarily from family members who disapprove of their inter-caste marriage, with a fear of violence or forced re-marriage for the First Appellant in particular. They also claim that their marriage would also mean they face hardship and discrimination in employment with no alternative support from friends or family on return to India.
33. The Appellants claim to have married without their families consent or knowledge and although in some parts of the evidence they state they would have to continue to hide it from their families, it appears clear that their families knew about the marriage soon after and that at least the Second Appellant’s mother offered some support at a later date; albeit there has not been any contact with her for several years. The First Appellant states that there was pressure from her family to remarry; but nothing to suggest any contact with them since she left India in 2009 and no recent or continuing pressure or threats of any other kind have been claimed by either Appellant.
34. The Appellants were able to live in India as a married couple for five years between 2004 and 2009 and were asked for examples of any adverse treatment during that period. At its highest, as above, the First Appellant referred to the pressure to remarry within her caste. The Second Appellant stated for the first time at the hearing that he feared violence from gangs within the First Appellant’s caste and only went out with friends for protection and/or he was threatened by the police. I attach very little weight to those claims given the extreme lateness of when they were made, still with little or no detail to support it and apparently without any knowledge or awareness of the First Appellant about it at the time or since. There is in any event nothing to suggest any harm resulted from such a circumstances or that there is any risk of repetition or harm in the future.
35. In considering the claimed fear on return, I find that there is no basis upon which any members of either of the Appellants’ family would even know if they returned to India. The vague assertion by the First Appellant that her family would find out is entirely unsupported and I do not accept there is any real risk of this, particularly taking into account the vast population in geographical size of India. I further take into account the Appellants’ acceptance that there is in any event sufficiency of protection on return to India and had previously moved as a couple of a different area.
36. Although there is some evidence in the background country evidence of discrimination towards inter-caste couples, the Appellants themselves did not claim to have suffered any such discrimination between 2004 and 2009 when they lived in India as a married couple. For example, there is nothing to suggest that they had difficulty obtaining employment or accommodation during that time, nor that they suffered any social stigma or discrimination outside of their immediate family.
37. Overall, whilst it may be a possibility that the Appellants face some stigma or discrimination on return to India, there is nothing to suggest it would cause a significant obstacle to their ability to reintegrate, in either their ability to form new social relationships, find accommodation or employment. It is noted that some areas of India are more tolerant of inter-caste marriages and they would be less likely to face any possible discrimination in those areas. In addition, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that either Appellant would be at any more specific risk from family members who they are no longer in touch with and would not be able to locate them on return to India.
38. The second matter relied upon as an obstacle to reintegration is the Appellants’ health and a claim that they would not be able to access appropriate medical care on return to India, including for financial reasons. Whilst I accept, as has the Respondent in the past, that the Appellants have and to some extent still do suffer from particular health conditions, the evidence before me of their current state of health is very limited.
39. In relation to the First Appellant, the most recent medical evidence is now some three and a half years old and even that only shows that she suffers from pernicious anaemia with limited treatment by way of vitamins B12 and D. It is entirely unknown as to whether she still has this diagnosis or any specific medical treatment for it. Although there is reference to mental health problems, there is nothing self-evident on the First Appellant’s medical records to show any historic diagnosis and at its highest, there is a record in 2023 that she no longer takes any medication for mental health. As such, there is nothing to suggest that at the date of hearing the Appellant has any mental or physical health problems at all; nor that she is in receipt of or in any future need of any medical treatment at all. In the absence of such evidence, it is impossible to conclude that any treatment would be required on return to India or if it was, to assess whether it is available or accessible. I find that there are no medical reasons that would give rise to any obstacles to reintegration at all in relation to the First Appellant.
40. In relation to the Second Appellant, there is again a lack of up-to-date medical evidence, with the vast majority of health records pre-dating June 2023 in relation to him. The more recent evidence includes some appointments, a hospital admission in April 2025 and a diagnosis of haemorrhoids and confirmation from his GP in September 2025 that he has a history of chronic liver disease and is being investigated for hypoglycaemia; and due to both he struggles with long commutes due to weakness. There is no medical report or detailed statement as to the Second Appellant’s current medical conditions/diagnosis; what treatment he is currently receiving (beyond his own rather vague reference in oral evidence to the number of tablets he takes each day, but not what any of them are) and what future treatment he is likely to require. Nor is there any information at all as to the possible impact on the Second Appellant if some or all of this treatment was not available to him in India.
41. Whilst I accept that the Second Appellant has long-term health conditions for which future treatment is likely to be needed, it is simply unknown what that treatment is. In the absence of such evidence, it is also impossible to conclude that any specific treatment that he may require to continue with in India would not be available or accessible to him. The Second Appellant expressly stated that he has made no inquiries as to healthcare in India on the basis that it would not be of the same standard as available in the United Kingdom. To the contrary, the Respondent has set out in her decision letter medical facilities and treatment that is available and can do no more in terms of any specific treatment given that none has been identified. Whilst the standard of healthcare and availability of public medical treatment may not be the same as that in the United Kingdom, but that is not the relevant consideration. It is not sufficient to rely on generic, broad brush background evidence as to difficulties in the healthcare system in India without it being identified how this would specifically affect the Second Appellant.
42. For these reasons, there is insufficient evidence before me to find that any medical treatment the Second Appellant requires is either not available or not accessible in India. In the absence of identification of specific treatment or medication, it is impossible to identity whether this is available within the public health system or if not, what the cost of it would be privately. The fact that the Appellants may be of limited financial means does not of itself establish that any treatment or medication would be unaffordable.
43. The final issue relied upon by the Appellants is their lack of support on return to India. At the hearing before me, the Respondent did not directly challenge the Appellants’ claims as to the hostility towards them from family in India due to their inter-caste marriage and save for the one point above about the Second Appellant’s claim not to be able to leave the house without protection, I have no reason to doubt the Appellants’ credibility in relation to the lack of family support in India. Whilst it may be possible that the Second Appellant’s mother could provide some support if asked, I accept the Appellants are not likely to approach her now and in any event, any support would likely be limited at best.
44. However, the Appellants have been supported in the United Kingdom for many years by friends and family (although no actual relatives have been identified here) and in their application they claim to receive £600 a month here. There is nothing to suggest that some or all of that financial support would not continue to be available to them in India, at least in the short-term to help them re-establish themselves and at least one friend here has previously said he would offer financial support, without geographical limitation. In addition, the Respondent’s review identifies possible financial support through the scheme for voluntary returns for the Appellants to establish themselves on return. In these circumstances, there is no reason why family support in India would be required by the Appellants in addition and I do not therefore find that a lack of this particular type of support would amount to an obstacle to their reintegration.
45. I have further considered the other aspects of the Appellants’ circumstances relevant to their integration, including that they have spent the majority of their lives in India and whilst they have been in the United Kingdom for over 16 years, I do not accept that they have lost all knowledge of life and society in India such that they would not, very quickly on return, be enough of an insider to establish themselves and integrate there. The Appellants both speak Hindi which is widely spoken in India and would assist in their integration. Whilst the Second Appellant has medical conditions which are said to affect his ability to undertake long travel and cause weakness, there is no medical evidence or assessment as to his capacity to work in the future and nothing at all to suggest the First Appellant would be unable to work for any reason. There is little information as to the Appellants’ education and employment background, but it can be inferred that the First Appellant at least has a relatively high level of education because of her entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a student and that in the absence of family support between 2004 and 2009 at least one, if not both of them were likely to have been employed in India to support themselves.
46. Overall, taking into account all of the Appellants’ circumstances, whilst I accept that both are likely to find the transition back to India and reintegration there difficult, with some initial obstacles in terms of finding accommodation, employment and medical care; these are not individually nor cumulatively sufficient to amount to very significant obstacles to their reintegration. As such, the Appellants do not meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds.
47. The second issue in this appeal is whether in any event the Appellants’ removal would be a disproportionate interference with their respect for private and/or family life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I consider this in accordance with the five stage test in the case of Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27, with reference to the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”) when considering the public interest as part of the proportionality balancing exercise.
48. Although there is reference in their initial application form and covering letter to the Appellants having family in the United Kingdom (and in particular family who financially support them) there was no further detail and they have not, at the time of the hearing before me, relied on any family relationships in the United Kingdom which could engage Article 8. The Appellants have family life with each other as a married couple, but they would be removed to India together and this would not therefore entail any interference with that relationship which they could continue as they always have done.
49. The focus of the human rights claim is therefore in the Appellants’ private life. There is very little, if any detail as to a claimed private life established in the United Kingdom during their time here. At its highest, the Appellants rely on the length of residence in the United Kingdom since 2009, some 16 and a half years now and assertions that they have become accustomed to a British way of life with friendships established here. There are a limited number of brief letters of support from friends in the United Kingdom. I also take into account that the First Appellant arrived here on a student visa and although no detail is given about her study, I accept that she is likely to have received some education in the past which may form part of her private life.
50. There is no other information from the Appellants as to any specific private life in the United Kingdom relied upon, for example, there is no evidence that either have ever worked in the United Kingdom nor that they have any particular involvement in any community activities or broader social activity, no property or other roots here. From the information before the Tribunal, the Appellants’ greatest engagement in the United Kingdom appears to be with health and support services, for medical treatment.
51. At its highest, the Appellants have not established anything more than a very limited private life in the United Kingdom primarily through their length of time here and without any real depth or quality.
52. The Appellants removal from the United Kingdom would be an interference with their limited private life and it would be in accordance with the law given that they have no lawful status in the United Kingdom and do not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave on any basis.
53. The final assessment is a proportionality balancing exercise of the public interest on the one hand and the interference with the Appellants’ private life on the other.
54. As to the public interest, I take into account the factors in section 117B of the 2002 Act. The Appellants’ removal is in the public interest to maintain effective immigration control. Neither Appellant having has had leave to remain in the United Kingdom for most of the time they have remained here, with very little attempt by them to regularise their stay following the expiry of their leave as a student and dependent in 2011.
55. As to whether the Appellants can speak English, there was little evidence before me either way, with both using an interpreter to give oral evidence (which is not in itself indicative of not being able to speak English) and that historically, the First Appellant is likely to have needed to satisfy a certain level of English language for her entry clearance as a student when she first arrived in the United Kingdom. On balance, the Appellants are likely to have some English language ability, however at most this is a neutral factor.
56. In relation to financial independence, the Appellants state that they are supported financially by friends and family in the United Kingdom (in the sum of £600 per month), neither is employed and neither has permission to work. There is nothing to suggest that they are in receipt of any state benefits. There is however evidence of significant use of public resources by way of NHS treatment, with extensive NHS health records over many years for both Appellants and despite a letter in the bundle requesting evidence of their entitlement to free treatment, nothing to suggest they were so entitled nor that they have paid for any treatment. In these circumstances, I do not find the Appellants have established that they are financially independent without the use of public resources, such that this factor counts towards the public interest.
57. Finally in accordance with section 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, little weight should be given to a private lift established by a person at a time when they were in the United Kingdom unlawfully and/or when their immigration status is precarious. The Appellants time in the United Kingdom was initially precarious with limited leave to remain as a student and dependent and then unlawfully since 2011.
58. On the Appellants’ side of the balancing exercise, I take into account their length of residence in the United Kingdom and limited private life established here (as set out above). I also take into account the findings above as to their medical conditions and likely circumstances on return to India, which I accept will be difficult for them to adjust and re-establish themselves, even if not sufficient to establish very significant obstacles to reintegration.
59. In circumstances where the Appellants have only a limited private life established in the United Kingdom, to which I can only attach little weight in accordance with section 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act and where there is a strong public interest in their removal, as set out above, I find that the public interest significantly outweighs any interference with the Appellants’ private life. They have lived the majority of their lives in India, would be able to reintegrate there even with some likely challenges due to their inter-caste marriage and health conditions and there is nothing to suggest that those who currently support them, financially and otherwise would not continue to do so on their return to India, at least in the short-term. As such, the Appellants’ removal would not be a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out in the annexed decision, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it was necessary to set aside the decision.
The appeals are remade as follows:
The appeals are dismissed on human rights grounds.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th February 2026

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001347
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64204/2023
Case No: UI-2025-001348

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64207/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

FEMINA RAJANKUMAR BHATT
RAJANKUMAR JANAKKUMAR BHATT
(NO ANONYMITY ORDERS MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr P Duffy of Counsel, instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hosie promulgated on 10 February 2025, in which the appeal against the decision to refuse a human rights claim dated 30 November 2023 was allowed. For ease we continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, with Femina Rajankumar Bhatt and Rajankumar Janakkumar Bhatt as the First and Second Appellants and the Secretary of State as the Respondent.
2. The Appellants are a married couple and are both nationals of India, born on 4 September 1984 and 3 August 1980 respectively. They married in India in 2004 and sought entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a Tier 4 student and dependent respectively on 1 July 2009. That application was granted on 8 July 2009, with a visa issued valid from 28 August 2009 to 1 September 2011. The Appellants entered the United Kingdom on 28 August 2009. On 4 August 2011, a further application for leave to remain as a student made on 3 July 2011 was rejected. The Appellants were served notices as overstayers on 24 January 2017, following which they made an application for leave to remain on human rights grounds on 21 February 2017. That application was refused on 4 April 2017. A subsequent application, following a successful fee waiver application, was made on private life grounds on 31 August 2022.
3. The Respondent refused the applications on the basis that the Appellants did not meet any of the requirements in paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds. In particular, there were no very significant obstacles to their reintegration on return to India. Further, there would be no breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on medical grounds as treatment would be available for their conditions (including pneumonia, anxiety, depression and alcoholism) on return to India. Overall, there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules.
4. Judge Hosie allowed the appeals in a decision promulgated on 10 February 2025 finding that the Appellants would face very significant obstacles to reintegration to India such that they met the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules and in any event, their removal would be a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. No separate Article 3 claim on medical grounds was pursued and no asylum claim has been made.
5. The First-tier Tribunal decision states that there were three material facts not substantially disputed, including at paragraph 11(b) that “there is a previous adverse Tribunal decision dated 2019 regarding the First Appellant’ and the Second Appellant which constitutes a Devaseelan point…” (sic).
6. The First-tier Tribunal decision refers to the Appellants having grown up in India, being educated there and them speaking the language and knowing the culture, albeit they have become distanced from it due to 15 years’ residence in the United Kingdom, with likely limited, if any contacts there. In the United Kingdom, the Appellants do voluntary work for which they receive modest payment and their income is supplemented by friends.
7. In paragraphs 20 to 24, there is consideration of the Appellants being in an inter-caste marriage, which was a love marriage rather than one approved of by their families, albeit the First Appellant’s mother1 relented to some limited extent. This included reference to the Respondent’s CPIN ‘India: religious minorities and scheduled castes and tribes’, version 3, November 2021 and a DFAT country report from 20202 with examples of practical difficulties for such couples, including from families themselves. From these references, the First-tier Tribunal concludes that although one mother was supportive to some extent, the situation may be different on return due to societal disapproval as well from wider family members and the other family of a higher caste are unlikely to be supportive.
8. The key findings then follow in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the decision as follows:
25. The Appellants will be returning with a lack of accommodation or family support and limited finance. They will lead to continue medical treatment for their health conditions and there is a risk of relapse for the second appellant who has only recently rehabilitated from alcohol dependence. Both Appellants have anxiety and depression. Whilst it is clear that there is medical treatment available for them in India, they would almost certainly have to pay for it and they may be unable to afford optimum treatment if they are unable to work due to their various health conditions. I have taken into account the case of MA (prove destitution) Jamaica [2005] UKIAT 13. Albeit this may be a situation of ‘something approaching destitution’, UTJ Earnes made it clear that even though the standard of proof is a low one whether someone faces destitution or something approaching destitution must be made out by unmistakeable evidence.
26. The Appellants friends have confirmed that they would be unable to continue supporting the Appellants of the returned to India and certainly not on an ongoing basis. I find that the appellant’s cumulative problems on return least of which is there inter-caste manage, their mental health problems, their physical health problems, their lack of family support, their lack of accommodation and a lack of finance. Given the fact that they have been in the UK for 15 years, even if healthy, they are likely to find it difficult obtaining employment given their own fact specific set of circumstances. They are unlikely to have maintained friendship links which in any event may have dissipated due to the nature of their inter-caste marriage. They may well find discrimination in employment and in attempting to obtain accommodation due to the inter-caste marriage. Claim they have been in the UK for so long that they have no ties in India either family or social and that they would have no accommodation or support there. They ought to be able to obtain accommodation if they obtain employment and they could use the opportunity to reconnect with extended family or friendships from their youth. They may even be able to rely on the contacts and family of their friends in the UK who are providing them with financial support. No evidence has been provided to indicate that the friends who are supporting the Appellants in the UK would not do so should the Appellants return to India, at least in the initial stages of reintegration there3.
9. In paragraph 28, the First-tier Tribunal concludes that applying a broad evaluative judgment, there are very significant obstacles to the Appellants’ reintegration to India for the cumulative reasons outlined, not least of which is the inter-caste marriage, physical and mental health conditions and risk of relapse for the Second Appellant.
10. On the basis that the Appellants have been in the United Kingdom for approximately 15 years without being removed by the Respondent and in light of their physical and mental health conditions, the First-tier Tribunal found that there were exceptional circumstances for considering the claim outside of the Immigration Rules and weighing these matters (together with the maintenance of immigration control being in the public interest and that the Appellants speak English as a neutral factor) it was found that the refusal of leave to remain would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences and therefore a breach of Article 8.
The appeal
11. The Respondent appeals on two grounds. First, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in its assessment of whether the Appellants would face very significant obstacles on return to India; which included inconsistent findings on relevant matters, a failure to consider that the Appellants lived together as a married couple in India previously for five years without any evidence of difficulties during that period from their inter-caste marriage, and findings being reached without evidential foundation. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal referred to a previous 2019 First-tier Tribunal decision and stated that the principles in Devaseelan should apply, but failed to go on to do so.
12. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Respondent, Ms Isherwood relied on the grounds of appeal, highlighting the Appellant’s background and familiarity with India and gave specific examples of matters not considered in the First-tier Tribunal decision, findings made without any evidential basis, out of date references and inconsistent findings.
13. Ms Isherwood referred to the First-tier Tribunal’s failure to take into account the Appellants’ five years’ residence in India as a married couple prior to their arrival in the United Kingdom which is particularly important given the lack of any evidence at all before the First-tier Tribunal of any difficulties they faced as an inter-caste married couple during that time.
14. The First-tier Tribunal referred, as did the Appellants’ skeleton argument, to the Respondent’s CPIN from November 2021, which refers therein to a DFAT report from 2020 (which does not appear to have been separately before the First-tier Tribunal) but not to the much more recent background country information in the updated CPIN from April 2024 and DFAT report from September 2023. Ms Isherwood did however acknowledge that this point was not specifically relied upon in the grounds of appeal and that the contents were similar, referring still to only one example of an inter-caste marriage causing housing difficulties.
15. In relation to inconsistencies, the focus of the appeal was on paragraph 26 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision which makes directly inconsistent and contradictory findings as to whether the Appellants would continue to receive financial support from friends in the United Kingdom; whether contacts would remain or be re-established in India; whether the Appellants would be able to obtain accommodation and employment.
16. There were findings in relation to medical conditions, risk of relapse and access to treatment on return which did not have any evidential foundation in the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
17. Overall, there was a failure of the First-tier Tribunal to make clear findings on the relevant issues in dispute and to give adequate reasons for the conclusion that the Appellants met the elevated threshold of very significant obstacles to reintegration on return to India. Further, the very limited consideration of Article 8, which focused primarily on the Appellants’ length of residence and fact they had not previously been removed; was infected by the earlier failure to make proper findings on the Appellants’ circumstances.
18. As to the second ground of appeal, Ms Isherwood had been unable to locate any previous First-tier Tribunal decision in respect of these Appellants but did confirm that the earlier 2017 refusal decision contained only an out of country right of appeal. The Appellants had also been unable to confirm whether there was a previous decision and even if there was not, it was an error for the First-tier Tribunal to have referred to one.
19. On behalf of the Appellants, Mr Duffy submitted in essence that, reading the decision as a whole, there were sufficiently clear findings on all material matters that were open to the First-tier Tribunal to make. In relation to paragraph 26, the second half of that paragraph can simply be discounted against the remainder of the decision either as a misplaced record of the Respondent’s submissions or as a copy and paste error. Mr Duffy submitted that this clearly did not fit with the remainder of the decision and did not disclose a material error of law affecting the determination as a whole.
20. Mr Duffy suggested that the remainder of the first ground of appeal, expanded upon significantly in oral submissions, was in essence a disguised perversity challenge to the First-tier Tribunal findings but that the issues raised failed to meet that high threshold of error. In particular, he relied on little of the Appellants’ evidence having been challenged and some matters being minor (such as whether the First-tier Tribunal got the hierarchy of castes in India correct and as to which version of the CPIN was referred to as there was no material difference). Mr Duffy was unable to point to any further specific evidence before the First-tier Tribunal on matter such as financial support from friends, what ongoing medical treatment was required or its cost or any specific risks.
21. As to the second ground of appeal, Mr Duffy was unaware of any earlier appeal decision but in any event submitted that this could not be material given that no copy had been produced and no reliance had been placed on any findings from it relevant to the current appeal by the Respondent, even in the decision letter under appeal.
Findings and reasons
60. We find that there is a material error of law on the first ground of appeal in that the First-tier Tribunal made findings which were fundamentally inconsistent with each other and reached findings which were not just unsupported by the evidence before them, but directly contrary to it.
61. The key inconsistent findings are to be found in paragraph 26 of the decision, set out above. We can not accept Mr Duffy’s suggestion that this was merely a copy and paste error of some sort and when the decision is read as a whole, the second part of paragraph 26 could and should simply be ignored. That is particularly so in circumstances where a number of the points relied upon in the first half of paragraph 26 have no evidential foundation from the material before the First-tier Tribunal or lack any reasons for the findings.
62. For example, in paragraph 26 it is both said that the Appellants’ friends have confirmed that they would be unable to continue supporting them on return to India and, contrary to that, that there is no evidence that friends who are currently supporting them would not continue to do so, at least initially, if they returned to India. Neither of the Appellants’ written statements deal with this point and there is nothing to suggest their oral evidence did either. The bundle before the First-tier Tribunal included a number of letters of support from people in the United Kingdom, only one of which made any reference to financial support and in doing so stated that when the Appellant “does require any financial help, I am able to help him.” There is nothing that qualified that statement relating it to when the Appellants were in the United Kingdom, nor any indication that such support would cease if the Appellants returned to India. There was no oral witness evidence from the authors of any of these letters or anyone else beyond the Appellants themselves. In these circumstances, the last sentence in paragraph 26 was the more accurate one on this point.
63. A further example is in relation to employment and accommodation. Although the Appellants’ claim was on the basis that they would have neither on return to India, no reasons were given at all for the finding that they would not be able to obtain either. It is noted that the Appellants were found to be in voluntary employment in the United Kingdom (for which they received some remuneration in the United Kingdom) and the only potentially relevant medical evidence in relation to the Appellants’ ability to find work is that the Second Appellant had previously stopped working in a warehouse because of alcoholism; which he has subsequently addressed (albeit there was general acceptance of a risk of relapse even absent specific evidence on such a risk). The latter was not a point relied upon by the first-tier Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal has failed to give reasons on either contradictory statement in paragraph 26 as to whether the Appellants would face difficulties with finding employment or accommodation, such that it is impossible to conclude that the first reference was the correct one and the second merely a typographical error.
64. There is also very little in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision in the way of findings as to the Appellants’ mental or physical health. Although the medical evidence was not disputed, there is no more than a statement of diagnosis for each Appellant and reference to a risk of relapse for the Second Appellant. There are no findings as to what, if any, current treatment the Appellants are receiving or would require on return to India; nor of its accessibility or cost (only a completely unexplained and unevidenced reference in paragraph 25 to the possibility that the Appellants would not be able to afford ‘optimum treatment’ without identifying what that means or stating why not). There are no findings as to the impact on any of these conditions on the Appellants’ ability to find employment, accommodation or more generally reintegrate on return to India.
65. Finally, there are also only limited reasons for the reliance on the inter-caste marriage as an obstacle to reintegration and without any consideration at all of the Appellants’ five years’ of marriage in India before their arrival in the United Kingdom. There is a factual error as to which was the higher caste in India, which whilst not material (the important point being that the caste was different) shows a lack of attention to the detail and actual evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and although not raised in the grounds of appeal, reliance placed on out of date background country information without any detailed assessment of the same (as shown by incorrect paragraph numbers to different reports).
66. In these circumstances, we find that there are no clear findings, supported by sufficient evidence before the First-tier Tribunal or reasons for them to support the overall conclusion that there were very significant obstacles to reintegration on return to India such that the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules were met. The further findings given in the alternative in relation to Article 8 which rely on the same earlier factual findings are infected by these errors such that the decision must be set aside in its entirety and the appeals heard de novo.
67. As to the second ground of appeal, it appears to us more likely than not that there was no previous appeal decision relevant to these Appellants and the reference to one from 2019 by the First-tier Tribunal was entirely erroneous. The earlier 2017 refusal by the Respondent did not even carry with it an in-country right of appeal and no reference has ever been made by either party previously to any decision. As such, it can not be a material error of law by the First-tier Tribunal not to apply the principles in Devaseelan on the facts of these appeals as they were simply not relevant; but the reference to a non-existent decision does raise serious concerns about the attention given to the writing up of this decision referring to something as not being in dispute between the parties which did not even exist, nor was there any such agreement between the parties. Given the range of other difficulties in the decision, including numerous typographical errors and confusion/inconsistency as to which Appellant was which, we are concerned that these appeals did not get the anxious scrutiny they deserved in the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.

We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Listing Directions

1. The appeal to be re-listed for a face to face hearing on the first available date from 1 August 2025 before UTJ Jackson with a time estimate of 3 hours. The Appellants to confirm if an interpreter is required as soon as possible, and if so, in what language.

2. The Appellants may file and serve any further evidence upon which they wish to rely no later than 14 days before the re-listed hearing. Any person who intends to give oral evidence at the hearing must file and serve a written statement (or updated written statement), signed, dated and accompanied by a statement of truth; to stand as their evidence in chief.

3. The Respondent may file and serve any further evidence upon which she wishes to rely no later than 7 days before the re-listed hearing.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30th June 2025