Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001349

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54435/2021
IA/13329/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 1 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

RMW
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Malik, instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 30 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge at the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) who dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his further submissions made in support of his claim for international protection and/or leave to remain in the United Kingdom on any other basis.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq who entered the United Kingdom on 8 November 2018, claiming asylum the same day. That application was refused and the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal dismissed by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 11 December 2019. The Appellant made his further submissions on 3 November 2020.
3. The Judge was clearly aware of the issues in the appeal which are referred to from [6] of the decision under challenge.
4. The Judge notes the existence of the earlier determination and correctly applied the Devaseelan principle to the assessment of the evidence as a whole. The Judge was well aware that the earlier determination was the starting point and that she needed, in addition, to assess the merits of the appeal on the basis of the evidence made available since the earlier determination was handed down.
5. The Judge sets out the correct legal framework at [12] and we find no merit in the suggestion in Ground 7 [11] that the Judge applied too high a standard of proof. The fact the Appellant may disagree with the Judge’s findings and outcome does not mean an incorrect burden or standard of proof was applied.
6. The Judge’s findings commence from [13]. The Appellant challenged the Judge’s decision on eight grounds.
7. Advocates should not need reminding that overly long grounds do not assist the appeal process, with far more being gained from shorter more focussed grounds concentrating upon an appellant’s best points, rather than trying to raise every small point they think they may be able to build a case around, even though some are totally without merit.
8. A perfect example of this is Ground 1 in which the Appellant asserts the Judge had a predetermined mind, which is akin to submitting the Judge was bias. There is absolutely no basis for making such an assertion on the facts of this appeal. The fact the Judge worked through the evidence and came to a conclusion that led to the appeal being dismissed does not mean the Judge had a closed mind. It is a disingenuous submission that bears no relationship to the appeal as a whole and is totally unsupported by any of the evidence.
9. In any event, the grant of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal was limited. The operative part of the grant reads:

2. The grounds assert that the judge erred in having a “pre-determined mind” before hearing all the evidence and argument by finding the Appellant had opened his Facebook account after his asylum claim was refused; made no finding as to objective evidence; misdirected herself as to the threats to the Appellant; erred in applying XX(PJAK – sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2002] UKUT 00023 (IAC) which is relevant to Iran as though it were equally applicable to Iraq; erred in her approach to various aspects of the evidence; and erred in her approach to re-documentation on return to Iraq.
3. The judge recorded the Appellant’s evidence that he opened the Facebook account after his claim was refused. This is not having a pre-determined mind, but taking an accurate note of the evidence. The judge then made findings as to the likely motivation for opening the account, which were cogently reasoned and open to them on the evidence, although the judge also accepted the Appellant had been politically active in Iraq. The judge also made cogently reasoned findings as to re-documentation, including an adverse credibility finding against the Appellant, again which were open to her on the evidence. These grounds disclose no arguable errors material to the outcome of the appeal.
4. The judge took care to note that whilst some aspects of XX referred to Iran, it also provides “general guidance on the assessment of Facebook evidence” which is the part applicable here. However the judge then went on to apply part of the XX guidance which is specifically related only to Iran, to this case, which is about Iraq. XX sets out that “The evidence fails to show it is reasonably likely that the 20 Iranian authorities are able to monitor, on a large scale, Facebook accounts” (my emphasis.) The judge in this case set out that “Following what is said in XX the available evidence does not show that it is reasonably likely that the authorities are able to monitor, on a large scale, Facebook accounts.” This is an arguable error material to the outcome of the appeal, because it goes to risk on return.
5. The judge found that a letter which stated the Appellant was responsible for organising demonstrations was inconsistent with his evidence he was not a member of a political party. This is arguably a finding not supported by the evidence – as the grounds set out: a person can organise a demonstration without being a member of a political party. The judge also found that letter will be similar to many others its author had written, though from the Decision it is not clear what evidence informed that finding. These are also arguable errors material to the outcome of the appeal.
6. The grounds therefore disclose arguable errors of law material to the outcome of the appeal, and so permission is granted.

10. An issue that arose in relation to the grant is that it does not specify in the clearest terms which of the grounds permission to appeal has been granted on. This necessitated discussion at the outset to enable the parties to understand what it was that was in issue before us. Eventually it was concluded that anything not specifically ruled out had to be treated as being a live issue, and we proceeded on that basis.
11. Ground 1 in relation to a predetermined mind was one of those issues ruled out in the grant of permission. As was the fact the Judge made cogently reasoned findings as to the re-documentation process which were found to be reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence - see Grounds at [3].

Discussion and analysis

12. The Appellant asserts the Judge made no findings as to the objective evidence but such assertion is without merit. Judges of the First-tier Tribunal are recognised experts in the field of immigration and asylum law and are taken to understood and apply the law unless it is proved otherwise.
13. Similarly, the current practice before the First-tier Tribunal is for its judges to write shorter more succinct issue focused decisions. They are actively discouraged from writing long paragraphs setting out statements of the law and country information as occurred in the past.
14. This Ground is based upon a re-occurring theme in the submissions made by Mr Malik, but when he was asked specifically to refer us to country material that may support the submission he made in relation to the point of criticism of the Judge, he was unable to do so.
15. It was clear listening to the submissions that a lot of what was being raised was disagreement with the Judge’s findings and an attempt to undermine the weight the Judge gave to the evidence, when weight was a matter for the Judge. Mere disagreement is not sufficient per se.
16. The simple point is that there was insufficient evidence before the Judge to support what was being said by Mr Malik, that there was evidence the Judge should have taken into account which shows the authorities in Iraq had the ability to monitor large scale social media such as Facebook that originated in the UK. The submissions showing the authorities monitor mobile phones may be so, but there was nothing to show that mobile phones if in UK could be monitored i.e. by a UK network provider, as opposed to monitoring mobile telephones in the IKR or other parts of Iraq.
17. No legal error material to the decision to dismiss the appeal is made out in relation to Ground 2 as our attention was not drawn to any specific evidence the Judge failed to consider.
18. Grounds 3 asserting the Judge misdirected herself as to the threats the Appellant claimed is without merit.
19. At [22] the Judge wrote:

22. The Appellant claims that he has received threats from two individuals, Ali Benasy and Husman Muhamad, in response to his Facebook posts. The Appellant does not know these people but based on images taken from their Facebook accounts he identifies them as Asayish. It is not possible to verify the authenticity of the messages said to have been sent to the Appellant. The Appellant has not provided access to his own Facebook account to enable the messages to be checked. The Appellant’s Facebook posts are much the same as hundreds of thousands of similar posts on many thousands of other accounts of disaffected Iraqi citizens at home or abroad. The evidence does not establish that the Appellant is of any particular interest to the Kurdish authorities. The Appellant is only one of many people who make anti-establishment posts on Facebook. The evidence does not show that it is reasonably likely that Appellant has been identified as a person of particular interest.

20. Proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal are litigious with judges being entitled to assume that the parties had put before them all the evidence on which they were seeking to rely. To give the parties the opportunity to do so directions are issued containing appropriate timescales. The finding by the Judge that the Appellant had not provided access to his Facebook account is a factually correct finding. It cannot be said the Judge erred if the Secretary of State failed to seek access as it is not for the Secretary of State to make out the Appellant’s case for him. The Appellant was making assertions relating to risk based upon the content of his Facebook posts, amongst other things, and the Judge properly refers to the Upper Tribunal guidance in XX (PJAK) which dealt with Facebook and social media and provides clear guidance as to what is required in a case where Facebook or other social media evidence is being relied upon.
21. At [23] the Judge wrote:

23. The country guidance case, XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), considers the surveillance of social media by the Iranian authorities and provides general guidance on the assessment of Facebook evidence which is applicable in the present case. The Appellant has provided screenshots from his Facebook account which show photos of him at demonstrations, attending meetings and ant-government material. Following the guidance in XX, I find that the production of only a part of the Appellant’s Facebook account is of limited evidential value. It is all too easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data.

22. In light of the failure to comply with the guidance found in XX the Judge was entitled to place the weight on the evidence that was placed upon it in the determination. There is no merit in the assertion or submissions made that the Judge only took into account generic evidence as the Judge considered not only the generic evidence but also specific evidence and, more importantly, commented upon shortfalls in the evidence, which the Judge was properly and lawfully entitled to do.
23. We find no legal error material to the decision made out in relation to the manner in which the Judge assessed the question of the threats the Appellant claimed to have received, or the manner of the assessment or weight given to the Appellant’s Facebook evidence. In relation to the claim the Judge failed to consider paragraph 339 K of the Immigration Rules, that has to be considered in light of the earlier adverse credibility findings in the initial decision and the Judge’s determination as a whole in which was found the current claim lacks credibility. It is not made out paragraph 339 K would warrant any different decision being made even if it had been a live issue before the Judge.
24. We comment at this stage upon the documentation as a whole. The Judge properly assessed the weight that could be given to the documents in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 reminding herself that the question is whether the documents are ones upon which reliance could properly be placed, when considering the evidence as a whole. We find that is precisely what the Judge did.
25. We find no legal error material to the decision to dismiss the appeal made out in relation to Ground 3.
26. Ground 4 asserts the Judge made a misdirection in law, claiming the Judge erred when considering XX (PJAK) in finding the evidence did not show the authorities can monitor large-scale Facebook accounts, arguing it is not a one size fits all approach where monitoring from one country such as Iran as compared to monitoring from another country like Iraq. That comment may be so in isolation, but ignores the point that the Appellant claimed that the authorities in Iraq have the ability to undertake large-scale monitoring of Facebook accounts. Whilst it was claimed the Appellant provided hundreds of pages of objective evidence postdating XX (PJAK) when Mr Malik was asked to refer us to specific evidence within that bundle that was available to the Judge that shows the authorities in Iraq were able to undertake large-scale monitoring Facebook accounts for those in the UK, he was unable to do so. The Judge’s finding there was nothing in the background evidence showing large-scale monitoring of Facebook accounts by the Iraqi authorities is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
27. Ground 4 is disagreement with the Judge’s findings but does not establish material legal error.
28. Ground 5 asserts the Judge erred in the manner in which the documents were considered by reference to [26 – 29] of the decision. Within those paragraphs the Judge considered the documentary evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny. The criticism of the Judge in finding at [27] that the Appellant was not a member of any political party in Iraq and that he is not a member of any political party in the UK, which is said not to run counter to his evidence as one can be a volunteer for a party without joining them and be allowed to organise demonstrations, is disagreement with the Judge’s findings and does not establish legal error. The point being considered by the Judge in accordance with country guidance and the case law was whether, or whatever label is placed upon him, the Appellant had shown that he had a profile that would place him at risk on return from the authorities in Iraq. The Judges finding that on the evidence considered as a whole he had not, is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the judge on the evidence. The ground does not focus on the point actually being considered by the Judge but rather tries to nitpick a point that the Appellant thinks may be of benefit to him.
29. Similarly, at [9] the Appellant asserts the Judge has made legal error at [28] where the Judge writes “it will be similar terms to many other such letters he has written” the grounds assert the Judge’s finding is flawed as the Judge had not seen “many letters” and is based on assumption that any letters written by Mr Jamal are similar in nature.
30. The Ground is without merit and does not establish legal error material in the decision to dismiss the appeal. The Judge would no doubt have seen a large number of letters written in the course of her sittings in similar terms to that produced by the Appellant in this appeal. This ground also cherry picks elements of [28] in an attempt to build an argument that the Judge had erred in law around it. It is important to consider [28] as a whole in which the Judge wrote:

28. Mr Jamal did not attend the hearing so it was not possible for the Respondent to challenge his evidence. It seems apparent that Mr Jamal does not know the Appellant very well, if at all. Mr Jamal makes general statements about the situation in Iraq and he is only able to say that the Appellant would be at risk based on what the Appellant has told him. I give little weight to Mr Jamal’s letter which will be in similar terms to many other such letters he has written. It does not assist me to answer the question of whether the Appellant is likely to be of adverse interest to the authorities in Iraq.

31. The Judge does not place the weight upon this evidence that she did as a result of the comparator to other evidence that may have been received in another case of which the parties are unaware, although the Judge would have been entitled to make a comment based upon judicial notice if the same was relevant. The Judge makes a number of specific findings that (i) the witness did not attend the hearing which meant the evidence in the letter could not be challenged, (ii) the witness clearly did not know the Appellant very well and (iii) that the part of the letter in relation to alleged risk was based upon want the Appellant had told the author. The Judge’s finding that the letter did not assist her to answer the question of whether the Appellant is likely to be of adverse interest to authorities in Iraq is a finding which reflects the weight the Judge gave to that evidence which is within the range of those the Judge was perfectly entitled to make.
32. Ground 6 asserts the Judge failed to consider the interview that the Appellant had undertaken but this is clearly another example of a weight challenge. The Judge made specific reference to the interview in the determination but finds there was no evidence to show it had been shown in Iraq or that anything had happened with the recording of the interview such as would create a real risk for the Appellant on return. This is, again, an example of the Judge being criticised for not making a finding on the basis of something which clearly does not exist, i.e. country evidence or proof from another source establishing that what the Appellant was claiming was credible. Posing the question about how the judge could gauge the level and value of the newsfeed in interview without empirical data to make this finding poses a question but does not identify any legal error. The Judge evaluated the claim on the basis of the evidence that had been made available but found that evidence lacking. That, again, is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
33. We find no legal error material to the decision made out in relation to Ground 6.
34. Ground 7 assert the Judge erred in considering the evidence of the witnesses and within this is the assertion the Judge applied too high a standard of proof. We set out our observations above in relation to the issue of the standard and burden of proof and find no merit in the suggestion the Judge erred by applying an incorrect burden or standard of proof. The Judge assessed the witness evidence in the round together with all the other evidence and whilst the Appellant disagrees with the conclusions the Judge reaches the Grounds fail to establish that the Judge has erred in law in a manner material to the decision to dismiss the appeal on the basis of the witness evidence.
35. The Court of Appeal have provided guidance to appellant judges, the upshot of which is that they should not interfere with a decision of a judge below unless it is ‘plainly wrong’.
36. Expressing disagreement with the findings made by the Judge, suggesting alternative findings more favourable to the Appellant, claiming the Judge should have given greater weight to evidence in the Appellant’s favour, or other complaints set out in the Grounds, do not demonstrate that the Judge’s conclusions on the particular points and finding that the appeal should be dismissed is ‘plainly wrong’.
37. The Judge’s findings are in accordance with the evidence and supported by adequate reasons. The Appellant has not established they are rationally objectionable. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
38. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 June 2025