Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001352

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53055/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

F B
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Panagiotopolou, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is an Albanian citizen. Her claim for asylum had been refused by the Respondent on 17 May 2023 and the First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal on Convention and human rights grounds in a decision promulgated on 2 December 2024.

2. The Appellant appealed this decision and Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Sills found there was an arguable error of law for the following reasons:

“2. It is arguable that the Judge acted in a procedurally unfair manner by making adverse findings against the Appellant at [31] concerning the assistance she received from her uncle without these being put to the Appellant at any point.

3. It is arguable that the Judge made impermissible adverse credibility findings made on the basis of plausibility concerning the Appellant’s claim to have been forced to work as a prostitute. I find the following passage at [27] to be particularly concerning and arguably going beyond what was rationally open to the Judge:

She claimed she was disgusted by the idea of marrying a man of 30, so the likely clientele of the brothel must have revolted her. It was unlikely that she would have been able to satisfy such depraved tastes, let alone engage in sexual activity each day as she claimed.”

3. The appeal was listed for a hearing before myself on the above date.

SUBMISSIONS

4. Ms Panagiotopoulou continued to rely on her detailed grounds of appeal and submitted the Appellant had two fears namely the risk posed to her by (a) her father and (b) the fact she had given birth to an illegitimate child.

5. The FTT had summarised at paragraph [22] Counsel’s submissions as being,

“There would be no sufficiency of protection in her case and internal relocation, e.g., to Tirana, was not viable. She had no support network, which was essential in Albania. The Appellant would face stigma as a single woman with a child. That stigma made it difficult to seek help, as well as to integrate.”

6. Ms Panagiotopoulou submitted no findings were made on this core issue and this infected the FTT’s findings when assessing risk on return.

7. The FTT had erred because the Appellant believed her father would reject her because of both her relationship and because she had given birth to an illegitimate child which went contrary to what the background evidence suggested.

8. The second ground of appeal related to the FTT’s assessment of the background evidence including sufficiency of protection. The FTT found Albania was a safe state which meant in general there was no risk to people who resided there. The starting point for trafficked victims was to assess each claimant’s case individually. Even if the findings about what happened in Albania were open to the FTT that still left the position of the illegitimate child. The CPIN says existing case law (TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT 92) still needs to be followed and young single mother’s continued to face real difficulties. The finding in paragraph [38] was not consistent with what the CPIN said and consequently the FTT’s acceptance of what the Respondent said about sufficiency of protection was flawed. The finding in paragraph [39] did not consider her fear from having an illegitimate child and her general vulnerabilities. Finally, Ms Panagiotopoulou submitted the FTT failed to have regard to the Appellant’s age when assessing her credibility.

9. Ms Panagiotopoulou highlighted factual errors in the decision. She submitted the findings in paragraph [24] were factually incorrect and the FTT erred by overlooking the fact that her sister did what she wanted and her other sisters were too young to make decisions. The finding at paragraph [25] was wrong as the Appellant claimed she was forced to leave not that she voluntarily left. At paragraphs [27] and [28] the FTT made findings not open on the evidence and they go to the core issue namely her trafficking experience. The FTT said she must have been aware prostitution was wrong and demeaning and the type of clientele would revolt her. This finding was simply not open to the FTT. Ms Panagiotopoulou adopted the grant of permission on this issue.

10. The second reason for permission is covered in paragraph [9] of grounds of appeal. No questions were asked of the Appellant and it was not raised in the refusal letter and there was no presenting officer. This should have been put to the Appellant and a failure to do so was procedurally unfair. The Appellant had been trafficked in Albania albeit not trafficked to the United Kingdom and the findings at paragraph [32] are unsafe.

11. Mr Hulme argued there was no material error in law. The Tribunal at paragraphs [32] and [35] treated the claim at its highest or in the alternative. The points on credibility therefore had no basis.

12. In assessing the case the FTT said at paragraph [35] “Nor is there any information in the ASYLOS reports which differs materially from the CPIN reports, as the Appellant’s counsel confirmed in submissions.” The reports say sufficient protection and relocation is available (pages 83, 85, 85, 199, 207, 209, 254, 259 of the composite bundle). The FTT found there was sufficiency of protection even taken at its highest.

13. Mr Hulme submitted the FTT referred to the case law and clearly had regard to it and then considered sufficiency of protection and reintegration. The FTT found she could find work and she accepted she could work. Ms Panagiotopoulou’s submissions were a mere disagreement.

14. The FTT was aware of the child and the Respondent had addressed the child in her review. At paragraph [39] the FTT considered internal relocation and whether the former partner or father could locate her and the FTT rejected this claim. The Respondent’s review addressed the issue of registration in paragraphs [9] and [10] and rejected the claim there was automatic notification as alleged.

15. The FTT can accept what was written in the decision letter as long as it demonstrated it had made its own mind up on the facts.

16. As regards the Appellant’s age there was nothing to suggest the FTT was unaware of her age either at the time or at the hearing. The CPIN says there is sufficiency of protection from re-trafficking.

17. As regards ground 3 of the grounds of appeal the FTT did treat the claim at its highest in the decision so regardless of what was written the FTT still found the she would be safe.

18. In response Ms Panagiotopoulou submitted the wording, set out in ground 3, used by the FTT was not appropriate. The July 2024 CPIN was before the FTT and submissions made at the hearing were not reflected in the decision.

19. Ms Panagiotopoulou referred to section 7.1.13-7.1.16 of the CPIN which showed the framework to address trafficking has yet to be implemented by the authorities. Sections 10.3.7, 10.5.2, 10.5.9, 10.6.10 dealt with deficiencies of the police and show the Respondent’s review is wrong.

20. Ms Panagiotopoulou reiterated there had been no assessment of the risk factors set out in caselaw. The only reference to the child was in the article 8 assessment and this did not address the risk on return. Section 13.2.7 dealt with single mothers and reintegration problems and set out problems they would face and these were not engaged with.

DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

21. Following an oral hearing I reserved my decision. For the reasons hereinafter set out I found there was no error in law.

22. Permission was given for the reason set out above in paragraph [2] although the oral submissions addressed the wider written grounds of the appeal. Mr Hulme’s response to the grounds was that they were a mere disagreement or the FTT considered the evidence at its highest and still rejected it.

23. The FTT in paragraph [23] of the decision adopted the reasons provided in the decision letter and justified that position with reference to inconsistencies and anomalies. Ms Panagiotopoulou has highlighted what she perceived to be errors in law and submitted that because of those errors the FTT’s reasoning was flawed. The decision was further challenged as she argued the FTT had not adequately considered all of her arguments that had been made at that hearing.

24. The Appellant’s evidence was summarised by the FTT between paragraphs [8] and [11] & [13] and [19]. The respective written and oral submissions were contained in paragraphs [21] and [22] and the remainder of the decision, namely paragraphs [23] to [39], contained the FTT’s findings on the Convention claim.

25. Significantly the FTT made the following finding at paragraph [39]:

“The Tribunal thus finds on its alternative analysis that the Appellant’s fears of return are subjective only, at best.

The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that the Appellant’s father has neither the means nor the motive to locate her. (The Appellant had no evidence that Ervis had any police connections, merely a comment from her friend which was vague and insubstantial.)

The Tribunal accordingly finds that the Appellant has failed to prove to the required standard of reasonable likelihood that she has an objectively well founded Refugee Convention reason for fearing to return to Albania. Accordingly, her asylum appeal is dismissed.”

26. Ms Panagiotopoulou addressed me at length about the FTT’s decision but I am satisfied the FTT’s decision demonstrated a clear engagement with complicated issues.

27. Ms Panagiotopoulou challenged, for example, what was contained in paragraph [24] and argued the findings in paragraph [24] were factually incorrect. I am satisfied that the FTT provided reasons that were clearly open to it concluding it was not credible the Appellant would be forced to marry an older man. The FTT’s assessment about her family’s claim to not being aware she was seeing E and to it not being reasonably likely she would have been living with E were findings open to the FTT on the evidence. It is the FTT’s role to assess the written and oral evidence and reach conclusions.

28. Ms Panagiotopoulou’s submissions about the FTT’s assessment of the evidence are based on her interpretation of the evidence which was an interpretation rejected by the FTT.

29. The FTT considered the Appellant’s claim about her time as a prostitute and concluded her claim was implausible and the FTT gave detailed reasoning for reaching those conclusions. Whilst Ms Panagiotopoulou now challenges those findings I am satisfied that her challenges are mere disagreements with the FTT’s findings.

30. In granting permission Judge Sills raise concerns about what the FTT said in paragraph [31] but even if Ms Panagiotopoulou’s submissions had merit the FTT then expressly considered the claim on the basis it was accepted. At paragraph [32] the FTT specifically considered the appeal at its highest but nevertheless concluded it still did not demonstrate she was trafficked to this country with the FTT making the point she travelled under her steam to this country with a friend.

31. Ms Panagiotopoulou argued the FTT’s approach to the issue of trafficking was flawed and whilst the CPIN referred to the fact the amendments to the Criminal Code had not been implemented there was nevertheless sufficient evidence in the CPIN to enable the FTT to conclude there had been positive developments and a consolidated practice of legal initiatives regulated the protection of specific categories albeit the implementation of this legislation in an effective manner remained a challenge. The FTT placed weight on the Single Competent Authority’s decision which considered the trafficking issue on the balance of probabilities. The FTT found based on the evidence it was hardly surprising that the Single Competent Authority rejected her claim.

32. Ms Panagiotopoulou’s arguments before me were on the face of it the same arguments advanced before the FTT. The FTT had considered this issue and for detailed reasons rejected her submissions. It is not the Upper Tribunal’s role to interfere in such a situation.

33. The second reason for granting leave centred around the FTT’s findings in paragraph [27]. Whilst some of the FTT’s wording may have provided a reason for granting permission to appeal it is important to look at the decision as a whole. The Tribunal considered at paragraph [35] the risks posed on return if the account was correct.

34. Ms Panagiotopoulou correctly identified the issues for this Tribunal namely the risk posed to her by (a) her father and (b) the fact she had given birth to an illegitimate child. She argued the FTT did not make findings on these issues but that submission overlooked the fact the FTT clearly had regard to all the facts of the Appellant’s claims and circumstances and referred to all relevant evidence including the Respondent’s review. The FTT did not find the Appellant to be a credible witness but even so went on to consider the claim at its highest.

35. I accept that if the FTT had not considered the claim at its highest then the reasons given in the grant of permission may well have identified an error in law but as Mr Hulme stressed in his oral submissions the FTT considered the case at its highest including the issue of internal relocation for the Appellant and her child.

36. The material findings made about the Appellant’s claims were open to the FTT and Ms Panagiotopoulou’s submissions do not demonstrate a material error in law.

Notice of Decision

There was no error in law and the decision of the FTT shall stand.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Alis

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 May 2025