Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001356

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/61515/2023
LP/04839/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

XH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

DECIDED WITHOUT A HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 34 OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (UPPER TRIBUNAL) RULES 2008

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision dated 20 December 2024 but set aside in part by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 15 August 2025. The decision of 15 August 2025 is included as an annex below.
2. In summary, the appellant is a citizen of the Hong Kong SAR of China. It is the unchallenged finding of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) that she played a role in creating a series of books that criticised the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese authorities. It has never been in dispute that the Hong Kong authorities publicly denounced the books as seditious and prosecuted and imprisoned others involved in the publication of the books on sedition charges. It is also the unchallenged finding of the FTT that the appellant continued to be involved in creating similar books after fleeing to the UK.
3. In the decision of 15 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal set aside the FTT’s finding that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution for this political activity on return to Hong Kong and reserved the appeal for remaking on the issues of whether the appellant’s political activities have been motivated by genuine belief and whether she would be at risk of persecution in Hong Kong on return. At the same time, the respondent was directed to clarify her position in the appeal in light of the preserved findings as to the political activity the appellant had engaged in.
4. On 27 August 2025, the respondent replied, stating:
“The Secretary of State, upon careful consideration of the evidence, and in light of the extensive, preserved findings as highlighted in the Error of Law decision at [15] and the country situation in Hong Kong accepts that the appellant would face a real risk of persecution upon return to Hong Kong.
“As such, the Secretary of State invites the tribunal to allow the appeal on asylum grounds.”
5. I issued further directions on 4 September 2025, indicating my preliminary view that as there was no longer any dispute between the parties as to whether the appeal should be allowed, it would be in accordance with the overriding objective to allow the appeal without a further hearing. I directed the parties to inform the Tribunal within 21 days (that is, by 25 September 2025) whether they objected to this course of action.
6. On 17 September 2025, the appellant informed the Tribunal that she did not object. There has been no further communication from the respondent, but none was needed, as it was the respondent’s proposal that the appeal be allowed.
7. I consider that there are two remaining issues before me. The first is whether the appellant’s political activities have been motivated by genuine belief. As summarised in the error of law decision, the appellant’s evidence that she has been motivated by genuine belief consists of:
(i) The appellant’s appeal statement, at [7] (“I continue to [work on] these books in the UK […] because it serves and supports the voice of the 5 executive members that were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.”)
(ii) The appellant’s 2021 witness statement, in which she explained that the organisation was formed in order to “actively response [sic] to a number of unjustified law and regulations by the Hong Kong government since 2019” and that the purpose of the books was to “talk about the political hardship face by Hong Kong citizens” and that she was a “supporter” of the organisation.
(iii) The appellant’s answers at her substantive interview, in which she described the message of the books in her own words and explained that she was attracted to engaging in political expression through children’s literature, rather than through street demonstrations (“I thought it was the right thing to do and was very meaningful. Not a lot of people did something like this”).
(iv) Text messages exchanged at the time the books were created, in which the appellant told one of the executive members that she was “happy” to have done the work and expressed the “Hope the picture books can help more children understand what’s happening in Hong Kong. It’s all meaningful.”
(v) The accepted fact that she has helped create similar books since arriving in the UK.
(vi) A letter from an NGO in the UK written in April 2024, confirming that she had attended three demonstrations in the UK and engaged in important volunteer work.
(vii) The statement of Ms A, who gave evidence before the FTT and was found credible. She helped organise the original production and publication of the books in Hong Kong and now lives lawfully in the UK. She explained in a letter in support of the appellant’s claim that she had approached the appellant to work on the books because she was inspired by her previous published work “about the injustice of political incidents happening in Hong Kong since 2019.” This is positive evidence that those who knew the appellant in Hong Kong considered her to be motivated by genuine belief.
8. I also take into account the content of the books, which was uncompromisingly critical of the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese authorities, and the appellant’s specific role in creating them, which was not merely technical. I consider that helping parents explain contentious recent events to their children from a particular political standpoint is an intensely political act. I conclude on the basis of this evidence that it is reasonably likely that the appellant’s political beliefs are genuinely held.
9. The respondent now accepts that the appellant would be at real risk of persecution on return to Hong Kong. I consider that this acceptance accords with the weight of the independent country evidence before me.
Conclusion
10. For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has been a refugee as defined by Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention since she left Hong Kong and that her removal from the UK would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
11. The harm the appellant fears would also rise to a violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
12. The appellant does not appeal on article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, with reference to article 3 ECHR.

Order under Rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
As I have allowed the appeal, I have considered making an order for the respondent to pay the appellant’s appeal fee, as provided for by Rule 9(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. As no fee was paid, however, I make no fee award.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 September 2025

ANNEX
(Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001356

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/61515/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

XH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. J. Lanigan, instructed by Howe & Co.
For the Respondent: Mr. J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

The appellant is to be known as XH.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of the Hong Kong SAR of China. It is the unchallenged finding of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) that she played a role in creating a series of children’s books that narrated recent political developments in Hong Kong in terms that were harshly critical of the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese authorities. It is not in dispute that the Hong Kong authorities have publicly denounced the books as seditious and that the leaders of the organisation that published the books have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment on sedition charges.
2. The issue before us is whether the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“FTTJ”) who dismissed the appellant’s asylum appeal erred in finding that the appellant would not herself be at risk of persecution if she returned to Hong Kong.
3. For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that he did err, and that parts of his decision must be set aside and remade.
4. The FTT granted the appellant anonymity order on the grounds that the UK’s discharge of its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighed the public interest in open justice in this case. We agree. We have also concluded that the high profile of the books in question requires that particular care be taken to avoid deductive disclosure of the appellant’s identity. With the agreement of the parties, we have changed the initials by which the appellant is known and will avoid as far as possible referring to any other details that could compromise the appellant’s anonymity.
Background
5. The appellant arrived in the UK from Hong Kong in 2021 and claimed asylum at the airport. The respondent interviewed the appellant on 3 November 2023, and on 8 November 2023 she refused her asylum claim. The appellant appealed to the FTT, and in a decision dated 20 December 2024 the FTT dismissed her appeal.
6. The appellant’s application to the FTT for permission to appeal was unsuccessful, but on 12 May 2025 the Upper Tribunal granted the appellant permission to appeal on all grounds.
The grounds of appeal
7. The appellant appeals on four grounds, although some, unhelpfully, encompass a range of diverse points.
8. Ground One: The FTTJ had failed to give reasons as required by MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC). The main target of this ground was the FTTJ’s finding at [40] that the appellant did not hold genuine political opinions. A second argument was raised under the general rubric of failure to give reasons, which was that the FTTJ “fails to consider the likely view that the authorities would take of her activities”.
9. Ground Two: The FTTJ misinterpreted the country evidence and imposed his own assumptions about how the Hong Kong authorities would behave, contrary to the principles set out in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [29]-[30] and Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 at [27]. In particular, there was no basis for the FTTJ to infer that the appellant was not of adverse interest to the authorities because her family had not been harassed, no public action had yet been taken against her, and she had not been named in newspaper reports about the books.
10. Ground Three: The grounds do not identify a specific error of law under the heading of Ground Three. They criticise the FTTJ for concluding that the appellant would not be at risk on return partly on the basis that another person who has also been involved in creating the books, whom we refer to as “P”, has remained in Hong Kong and has not been persecuted. It is said P has a different profile from the appellant and that the FTTJ was wrong to state that the books were available online in Hong Kong (the implication appears to be that they were not, and that this could have reduced the risk to P). The appellant also complains here that the FTTJ did not consider the risks that might arise once the appellant returned to Hong Kong and the authorities had access to her phone and laptop.
11. Ground Four: The FTTJ failed to apply the framework set out in HJ Iran v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 when assessing the risk to the appellant on return.
The hearing
12. We are grateful to both representatives for their thoughtful submissions at the hearing before us. We have taken those submissions into account in making our decision, and we will refer to them as necessary in the discussion below.
13. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision, which we now give with our reasons.
Discussion
14. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
15. We begin by setting out the FTT findings that have not been challenged by either side:
(i) The appellant had played the role she claimed to have played in the creation of three books published in Hong Kong in 2020 and 2021, and in creating three further books “whilst residing in the UK”. The appellant’s evidence on this point was “internally consistent, [… and] consistent with the evidence of her two supporting witnesses and the documentary evidence that she has provided”: [27]
(ii) The appellant’s two witness, whom we will call Ms A and Mr B, were “reliable, consistent and credible witnesses”: [22]
(iii) In either July 2020 or July 2021, the appellant had been paid for her work in creating the books published in those years: [33]-[34].
(iv) The appellant has used a pseudonym in connection with her work on the books: [37]
(v) Five “executive members” of the organisation that published the books “were arrested by the Hong Kong authorities […], detained, put on trial and imprisoned for publishing the books, which were found to be seditious by the court”: [11]. See also: [26] and [28].
(vi) The appellant “has not received any threats from the Hong Kong authorities since leaving in 2021 and […] her family had not experienced any difficulties.”: [30]
16. The FTT declined to make a finding as to whether the appellant had engaged in other political activity in the UK as she claimed: [41].
17. As noted above, Ground One is primarily a challenge to the FTTJ’s reasons for finding that it was not reasonably likely that the appellant held any genuine political opinions. This finding was set out at [40]:
“The appellant states that she is a supporter of the [organisation that published the books]. She does not claim to be a member or to have been involved in any other activist activity on its behalf in Hong Kong or in the UK other than [… her work in creating the books]. The work she did in Hong Kong was carried out as a commercial transaction for which she was paid. In her asylum interview the appellant said that she did not have any idea that the books would have drawn the adverse attention of the authorities, and she has not claimed to have taken part in ant [sic] meetings or protests in support of the aims of [the organisation]. There is no evidence of any political activity by her in Hong Kong beyond the [… work] for which she was paid. I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated, even to the low standard requires [sic] in a protection claim, that she holds a genuine political opinion in support of the [organisation].”
18. The appellant says that this conclusion is not adequately reasoned because the FTTJ has failed to engage with any of the evidence that points towards the appellant holding genuine political opinions. This includes:
(i) The appellant’s appeal statement, at [7] (“I continue to [work on] these books in the UK […] because it serves and supports the voice of the 5 executive members that were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.”)
(ii) The appellant’s 2021 witness statement, in which she explained that the organisation was formed in order to “actively response [sic] to a number of unjustified law and regulations by the Hong Kong government since 2019” and that the purpose of the books was to “talk about the political hardship face by Hong Kong citizens” and that she was a “supporter” of the organisation.
(iii) Text messages exchanged at the time the books were created, in which the appellant told one of the executive members that she was “happy” to have done the work and expressed the “Hope the picture books can help more children understand what’s happening in Hong Kong. It’s all meaningful.”
(iv) The accepted fact that she has helped create three further books since arriving in the UK.
(v) A letter from an NGO in the UK written in April 2024, confirming that she had attended three demonstrations in the UK and engaged in important volunteer work.
(vi) The statement of Ms A (whom the FTTJ found credible) who explained that she had approached the appellant to work on the books because she was inspired by her previous published work “about the injustice of political incidents happening in Hong Kong since 2019.”
(vii) The appellant’s answers at her substantive interview, in particular to questions 29, 40, 44 and 65, explaining briefly how she expressed her political beliefs.
19. We also find that the FTTJ has not properly explained why the fact that the appellant was paid for her work in Hong Kong weighs against her having had a political motivation at the same time. We note that the books were deliberately intended to help parents explain recent political developments in Hong Kong in the starkest anti-regime terms. The people of Hong Kong are depicted as innocent and peace-loving (but entitled to use force to defend themselves) and the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese authorities as violent, deceitful and dirty. The books cannot rationally be perceived as having anything other than an intensely political purpose, and they were so perceived by the Hong Kong authorities. In the context of the increasing crackdown on freedom of expression in Hong Kong since 2019, it is difficult to understand how agreeing to work on such an explicitly political project could be found to be a purely “commercial transaction” without any evidence of that other than the fact of payment.
20. At the hearing before us, Mr Nappey drew our attention to the cogent reasons the FTTJ had given for finding that the appellant had no genuine political beliefs: the payment, her surprise at the government’s reaction to the book, and her failure to participate in any “meetings or protests” in Hong Kong. However, he acknowledged that none of the evidence pointing towards the genuineness of the appellant’s political belief had been taken into account and that for this reason, the finding was “insufficiently reasoned”.
21. We agree. We are keenly aware of the potential that a losing party will try to present a disagreement with an FTTJ’s conclusions in the guise of a failure to give adequate reasons. See: Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [41]-[43]. We have reminded ourselves of the scope of the duty to give reasons as set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph. Citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605, the Upper Tribunal reiterated in Joseph at [43] that:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.”
22. Applying those principles here, we have taken into account that the FTTJ accepted the core elements of the appellant’s claim and made no explicit adverse credibility findings (although noting that her account of the demonstrations she had attended in the UK was “very vague”), and accepted the credibility of her supporting witnesses. He had before him detailed extracts from the books and numerous accounts from independent sources of how they were perceived by the Hong Kong authorities. We have also taken into account that the standard of proof in this claim was a reasonable degree of likelihood. While we of course accept that a finding that someone has given credible evidence on one matter does not mean that they must be found to have been credible in relation to all matters, we find that in this context, it was incumbent on the FTTJ to explain why he rejected the appellant’s and Ms A’s evidence that she held genuine political beliefs.
23. It was accepted by both parties at the hearing before us that Ground Four was parasitic on Ground One. If the FTTJ’s finding that the appellant has no genuine political beliefs had been sustainable, there would have been no need for him to consider whether she would choose to continue to express those beliefs on return to Hong Kong and if not, why not, in accordance with HJ (Iran): see KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 130 (IAC) at [542]. As Mr Nappey accepted, however, in the absence of a sustainable finding that the appellant’s accepted activities were not motivated by genuine belief, the FTT was required to ask itself the HJ (Iran) questions, which it did not do. Mr Nappey was also able to consult the hearing note of the Presenting Officer before the FTT and helpfully confirmed that HJ (Iran) had been raised in submissions. Ground Four is therefore made out.
24. We consider that Ground Two is also made out. The FTTJ had before him more than 90 pages of independent country evidence adduced by the appellant, including from such reliable sources as the US Department of State (in 2024), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the UK Foreign Office, as well as the respondent’s relevant Country Policy and Information Notes. He nonetheless explicitly assessed the risk to the appellant at [32] on the basis of what he “assume[d]” about the investigatory practices of the Hong Kong authorities and “judicial notice of the concerns at the growing authoritarianism of the Hong Kong government”, rather than on the basis of the evidence before him. On the basis of this assumption and judicial notice, the FTTJ then made a series of quite specific findings: the Chinese authorities would have identified the appellant when they arrested the executive members of the organisation and if she was of adverse interest to them as a result, they would have contacted her directly or her name would have appeared in news reports. There is also a persistent assumption running through the reasoning that if the authorities have not acted against the appellant while she was in the UK, it is not reasonably likely that they would act against her on her return. Such specific findings about the likely behaviour of foreign authorities must be based in evidence, not on assumptions and judicial notice described at a very general level. See: HK v SSHD and Y v SSHD.
25. For the sake of completeness, we note that Ms Lanigan did not pursue Ground Three with any vigour before us, and she was right not to do so. She accepted that the submissions about P amounted to nothing more than a re-argument, and that the submissions about the Chinese authorities having access to the appellant’s phone and laptop after her return had not been made below. Ground Three is therefore not made out.
26. For these reasons, the decision of the FTT involved material errors of law requiring it to be set aside. In accordance with the guidance in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), we preserve the unchallenged findings set out in [16] above.
27. We have taken into account the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and the general principle that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. We consider that neither of the exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) of the relevant Practice Statement apply in this case. There is no challenge to the fairness of the proceedings below, and the need for further fact-finding is limited. It is therefore appropriate for the appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 20 December 2024 dismissing the appellant’s appeal is set aside in part for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
There has been no challenge to the findings set out at [16], and they are preserved.
Directions
1) The appeal is adjourned to be re-made in the Upper Tribunal at a face-to-face hearing, on a date to be fixed, with a time estimate of three hours.
2) We understand that the core of the respondent’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that the appellant was not credible and had not been involved in creating the books as she claimed. It would be of considerable assistance to the Tribunal to understand the respondent’s position in light of the preserved findings that the appellant has in fact been involved in creating six books, as she claims. The respondent is therefore directed to file a position statement setting out her position in light of the preserved findings within 28 days of these directions being sent. This should include specific reference to any independent country evidence on which she seeks to rely.
3) If either party wishes to adduce any further evidence, this must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 10 working days before the next hearing, accompanied by an application made pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
4) If the appellant or any other witness wishes to give oral evidence, they must provide a witness statement capable of standing as evidence in chief, to be served in accordance with direction (3) above, and must state if an interpreter is required, and if so in which language.
5) Any skeleton arguments must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 5 working days before the next hearing.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2025