Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001385

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62904/2023
LH/04697/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MOHAMMAD ABDUL LATIF
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Mazumder, legal representative, instructed by Wildan Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, who is a national of Bangladesh, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wolfson (“the judge”) promulgated on 2 January 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 24 October 2023 refusing his application for settlement on long residence grounds.
2. For the reasons set out below, I have found that the judge did not make a material error of law in her decision.
Background
3. The appellant was born in Bangladesh in 1980. Following a successful appeal against a decision to refuse him a student visa, the appellant entered the UK on 20 July 2009. He obtained extensions of his visa in 2011, 2013 and, lastly, in 2016 as a Tier 2 (Skilled Worker) General Migrant valid until 16 October 2019. However, the appellant’s visa was subsequently curtailed to 27 January 2018.
4. On 26 January 2018, the appellant applied for three months’ discretionary leave to enable him time to obtain a certificate of sponsorship (“CoS”) from a new employer. As that application was made before his previous grant of leave expired, that leave was extended under s.3C of the Immigration Act 1971 pending a decision by the respondent on that application. However, the appellant subsequently applied to vary that application on the following dates:
a. 30 April 2018: the appellant applied for three months’ discretionary leave to enable him time to obtain a confirmation of acceptance for studies from an educational institution.
b. 22 August 2018: the appellant applied for leave to remain on family and private life grounds.
5. On 19 September 2018, the respondent made a decision refusing the appellant’s “human rights claim made on 26 January 2018” and certified it was clearly unfounded under s.94(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. In a pre-action letter dated 26 September 2018, the appellant complained that the respondent had decided his original application dated 26 January 2018 rather than the varied application dated 22 August 2018 and threatened to bring judicial review proceedings unless the respondent set aside her decision of 19 September 2018 and considered the correct application. It appears to me that assertion was incorrect as the 19 September decision was clearly concerned with a family and private life claim and not with the request for three months’ discretionary leave to enable the appellant to obtain a CoS. But, in any event, the respondent acquiesced and issued a new decision on 18 December 2018. That decision also stated that the appellant’s “human rights claim made on 26 January 2018 is refused”. The decision was again certified as clearly unfounded which meant that the appellant could only exercise his right of appeal after he left the UK.
6. In an application dated 31 December 2018 but logged by the respondent as having been received on 2 January 2019, the appellant again sought three months’ discretionary leave to remain to allow him time to obtain a CoS from a potential employer. As with the previous year’s applications, the appellant subsequently sought to vary that application on the following occasions:
a. 14 February 2019: the appellant applied for leave to remain on private life grounds.
b. 30 July 2019: the appellant applied for further leave to remain based on his long residence.
c. 13 August 2019: the appellant applied for settlement based on his long residence.
7. In a decision dated 24 August 2020, the respondent refused the appellant and his dependents indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”) with no right of appeal. Although there are no papers before me, it appears that the appellant sought to challenge that decision and, consequently, the respondent agreed to reconsider his application. On 24 October 2023, the respondent wrote to the appellant to notify him that his “Settlement and human rights claim made on 02/01/2019 has been reconsidered and refused”. This time he was granted a right of appeal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
8. The appellant’s appeal took place on 28 November 2024. In her decision promulgated on 2 January 2025, the judge made the following findings:
a. The appellant was not entitled to ILR under para 276B of the Immigration Rules because he could not demonstrate 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK.
b. While the appellant and his daughter both suffered from health problems, they could receive treatment in Bangladesh even if the standard was below the level to which they had been accustomed to in the UK.
c. The appellant’s children spoke Bengali and would have their parents and their extended families to help them integrate into Bangladesh.
d. While the respondent had not dealt with the appellant’s applications in a timely manner, there was no pattern or unfair or unjust treatment.
e. Weighing the public interest factors against those in favour of the appellant and his family’s Article 8 ECHR life, their removal would not be disproportionate.
f. There would be no breach of Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant subsequently applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal raising the following grounds:
a. The judge made a material error of law in her assessment of whether the appellant met the continuous lawful residence requirements of paragraph 276B of the Rules by failing to consider the effect of paragraph 39E of the Rules.
b. The judge failed to properly consider Article 8 ECHR by (i) failing to give weight to the best interests of the appellant’s children, particularly his daughter, N, who has a hearing impairment and requires specialist care; and (ii) failing to fully consider the appellant’s private and family life in accordance with the test in Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27.
c. The judge failed to properly consider the impact of the historical injustices created by the respondent because of her procedural errors and delays in considering the appellant’s applications.
d. The judge failed to properly consider the medical evidence provided in support of the Article 3 ECHR medical claim, including by failing to apply the test in N v the UK and failing to consider the appellant’s reliance on ongoing cognitive behavioural therapy (“CBT”) and other specialist mental health treatment, which would not be available in Bangladesh.
10. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 14 May 2025.
The legal framework
11. Section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended) sets out the circumstances in which a person’s leave to enter or remain will continue pending the outcome of an applicant to vary their leave:
3C Continuation of leave pending variation decision

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person who has limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom applies to the Secretary of State for variation of the leave,
(b) the application for variation is made before the leave expires, and

(c) the leave expires without the application for variation having been decided.

(2) The leave is extended by virtue of this section during any period when—

(a) the application for variation is neither decided nor withdrawn,

(b) an appeal under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 could be brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom against the decision on the application for variation (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission),

(c) an appeal under that section against that decision brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, is pending (within the meaning of section 104 of that Act)

(ca) an appeal could be brought under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”), while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, against the decision on the application for variation (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission),

(cb) an appeal under the 2020 Regulations against that decision, brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, is pending (within the meaning of those Regulations), or

(d) an administrative review of the decision on the application for variation—

(i)could be sought, or

(ii)is pending.

[…]

(4) A person may not make an application for variation of his leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom while that leave is extended by virtue of this section.

(5) But subsection (4) does not prevent the variation of the application mentioned in subsection (1)(a).

[…].
12. The relevant passages of the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) in force at the date of the respondent’s decision are set out below.
13. Paragraph 34BB of the Rules sets out the circumstances in which an application for leave to enter or remain will be varied by a subsequent application:
34BB. Except where one or more applications have been made under Appendix EU (see paragraph EU10 of Appendix EU):

(1) Where an applicant has an outstanding application for entry clearance or permission to stay which has not been decided (“the previous application”), any further application for entry clearance or permission to stay will be treated as an application to vary the previous application and only the most recent application will be considered.

(2) An application to vary a previous application must comply with the requirements of paragraph 34, or the validity requirements for the route applied for or, subject to paragraph 34B, the application to vary will be invalid and will not be considered.

(3) Any valid application to vary a previous application will be decided in accordance with the immigration rules in force at the date the application to vary is made.

(4) Where an application to vary a previous application has been made, the Secretary of State will contact the applicant to notify them that the application is being treated as an application to vary and that any previous application will have been varied.

(5) Where more than one application to vary has been made, or where it is not clear which is the most recent application, the Secretary of State will request that the applicant confirm which application they want to be considered.

(6) If the applicant does not provide confirmation within 14 days of the request, the most recent application will be considered and any other applications will be treated as varied, unless it is not clear which is the most recent application, in which case all applications will be treated as invalid.

(7) Where a human rights claim is made as part of an application and a subsequent application is made which varies that application under paragraph 34BB(1), if the applicant is then granted entry clearance or permission to stay, any outstanding human rights claim will be treated as withdrawn, but where any subsequent application is refused, the human rights claim, if not already decided, remains outstanding and will be considered at a time decided by the Secretary of State.
14. Paragraph 39E of the Rules sets out exceptions for certain overstayers:
39E. This paragraph applies where:

(1) the application was made within 14 days of the applicant’s leave expiring and the Secretary of State considers that there was a good reason beyond the control of the applicant or their representative, provided in or with the application, why the application could not be made in-time; or

(2) the application was made:

(a) following the refusal or rejection of a previous application for leave which was made in-time; and

(b) within 14 days of:

(i) the refusal or rejection of the previous application for leave; or
(ii) the expiry of any leave extended by section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971; or
(iii) the expiry of the time-limit for making an in-time application for administrative review or appeal in relation to the previous application (where applicable); or
(iv) any such administrative review or appeal being concluded, withdrawn, abandoned or lapsing; or

(3) the period of overstaying was between 24 January and 31 August 2020; or

(4) where the applicant has, or had, permission on the Hong Kong BN(O) route, and the period of overstaying was between 1 July 2020 and 31 January 2021.
15. The requirements for indefinite leave to remain on the ground of long residence in the United Kingdom were set out at paragraph 276B of the Rules:
276B. The requirements to be met by an applicant for indefinite leave to remain on the ground of long residence in the United Kingdom are that:

(i)(a) he has had at least 10 years continuous lawful residence in the United Kingdom.

[…]

(v) the applicant must not be in the UK in breach of immigration laws, except that, where paragraph 39E of these Rules applies, any current period of overstaying will be disregarded. Any previous period of overstaying between periods of leave will also be disregarded where–

(a) the previous application was made before 24 November 2016 and within 28 days of the expiry of leave; or

(b) the further application was made on or after 24 November 2016 and paragraph 39E of these Rules applied.
The hearing
16. I had before me the 993-page composite hearing bundle lodged by the appellant.
17. Mr Mazumder relied upon the grounds of appeal and Mr Wain relied upon the respondent’s rule 24 response dated 21 May 2025. Their submissions are set out in the record of proceedings and are not rehearsed here except where it is necessary to do so.
Findings – Error of Law
Ground 1: Continuous long residence under the Rules
18. At the hearing, Mr Mazumder advanced an argument that can be summarised in the following way:
a. Under paragraph 34BB(1) of the Rules, where a person has an outstanding application for permission to stay which has not been decided, any further application will be treated as an application to vary the previous application and only the most recent application will be considered.
b. However, paragraph 34BB(4) provides a mandatory requirement that means where an application to vary a previous application has been made, the respondent will contact the applicant to notify them that the application is being treated as a variation of the previous application.
c. In the present case, the respondent did not comply with paragraph 34BB(4) after the appellant submitted his 30 April 2018 and 22 August 2018 applications.
d. Furthermore, the decision of 18 December 2018 purported to consider the first application, i.e. the one dated 26 January 2018, and not the most recent application, dated 22 August 2018.
e. As the respondent had not treated the April and August 2018 applications as variations of the January 2018 application, those two applications are still pending and, consequently, the appellant still enjoyed the leave under s.3C of the Immigration Act 1971 that arose when he made his 26 January 2018 application.
f. As a consequence, by the time the respondent made her decision dated 24 October 2023, the appellant had, through the operation of s.3C, accrued more than 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK for the purposes of the Rules, but the respondent failed to appreciate this.
g. Furthermore, the judge made an error of law by also not finding that the appellant had accrued more than 10 years’ continuous lawful residence by the date of the 24 October 2023 decision.
19. However, as Mr Wain correctly submitted, that is not how the appellant argued his case before the First-tier Tribunal and this was not a Robinson obvious point that the judge could reasonably have been expected to pick up on. Moreover, this is not how the appellant pleaded Ground 1 in his grounds of appeal. No formal application had been made to rely on this new ground and any such application would have been out-of-time. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it was not open to the appellant to argue this point before me.
20. I would however make some brief observations as to why I believe the argument raised by Mr Mazumder would not have succeeded. First, while Mr Mazumder is correct that paragraph 34BB(4) is couched in mandatory terms (“the Secretary of State will contact the applicant…”), so is subparagraph (1) (“any further application for entry clearance or permission to stay will be treated as an application to vary the previous application and only the most recent application will be considered”). I do not therefore accept that the respondent’s purported failure to comply with subparagraph (4) means that the respondent was barred from applying subparagraph (1). That is especially the case here, where the covering letters to the appellant’s April and August 2018 applications expressly stated in capitalised bold letters contained in a box at the top of the first page that they were a variation of their precursor. Furthermore, the pre-action letter dated 26 September 2018 was argued on the basis that the April and then August 2018 applications had superseded the January 2018 application. It cannot therefore be suggested that the appellant was under any impression other than that the April and then August applications were variations of the first: that was precisely what he intended. (I would also add that because this argument was not raised until the hearing, Mr Wain was unable to confirm whether the respondent had in fact complied with paragraph 34BB(4).)
21. Second, the appellant cannot have it both ways. If the appellant argues that the respondent failed to treat his April and August 2018 applications as variations of his January 2018 application, then he cannot in my view also claim that the April and August applications extended his Tier 2 leave under s.3C. As the January 2018 application was the only application made prior to the expiry of the appellant’s Tier 2 leave, that would have been the only application capable of engaging s.3C(1)(b). Separate applications made after the date on which the Tier 2 leave was due to expire which, as the appellant contends, did not vary the initial in-time application cannot in my view be capable of further extending the s.3C leave after the initial application for further leave to remain is refused.
22. Third, and most importantly, contrary to Mr Mazumder’s submissions, it is clear from reading the 18 December 2018 decision that it did consider the appellant’s most recent (i.e. the August 2018) application, which was made on family and private life grounds. The 18 December 2018 did not consider the January 2018 application, which sought three months’ discretionary leave to remain so that the appellant could obtain a CoS. While the 18 December 2018 decision does refer to the appellant’s 26 January 2018 application as having been refused, I find it more likely than not that is because the August 2018 was a variation of the application made on that date. It therefore logical that the respondent would continue to refer to 26 January 2016 as the date of application. I am therefore satisfied that the April and August 2018 applications do not remain outstanding. The April application was superseded by the August 2018, which was decided on 18 December 2018, bringing an end to the appellant’s s.3C leave.
23. I therefore proceed to consider Ground 1 as it was pleaded in the grounds of appeal on which the appellant was granted permission.
24. As is clear from reading section 3.1 of the appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant’s case in relation to 10 years’ continuous lawful residence was advanced on the basis that the while the appellant was refused leave to remain on 18 December 2018, he submitted a new application for leave to remain within 14 days, i.e. on 31 December 2018 (although the Home Office records the date of application as 2 January 2019). The appellant argued that paragraph 39E of the Rules provided that any periods of overstaying will be disregarded where a new application is made within the 14-day grace period thus “preserving his lawful status”. Therefore, according to the appellant, by the time his application for ILR had been decided by the respondent, he had accrued 10 years’ continuous lawful residence and the respondent should have granted his application under paragraph 276B of the Rules.
25. The judge considered this argument at [12] to [16] but found at [17] that the appellant’s s.3C leave had expired on 18 December 2018 and he could not therefore demonstrate 10 years’ continuous lawful residence. The judge made no error of law in making that finding. The appellant’s argument that paragraph 39E preserved his section 3C leave or otherwise preserved his “lawful status” because he made a new application within 14 days of the previous refusal is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Afzal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 46. In Afzal, Lord Sales (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Kitchen, Lord Burrows and Lord Stephens agreed) held that paragraph 39E provides that where an applicant has two bookended periods of leave to remain, so long as in the middle of those two periods they made an application within 14 days of their previous leave expiring, any period during which they held no leave to remain would be disregarded when calculating their period of continuous residence under paragraph 276B(i)(a) and (v): see [66] to [68]. However, a period of unlawful residence subject to paragraph 39E does not count towards the calculation of the length of a person’s lawful residence and the Supreme Court did not find, as the appellant in the present case suggests, that paragraph 39E extends a person’s s.3C leave.
26. A further difficulty the appellant faces is that he does not have two bookended periods of leave to remain because following the expiry of his s.3C leave on 18 December 2018, his subsequent application of 31 December 2018, as varied in February, July and August 2019, was refused by the respondent on 24 October 2023.
27. For these reasons, the judge was right to find that the appellant could not demonstrate 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK for the purposes of the Rules.
Ground 2: Consideration of Article 8 ECHR
28. The appellant argues that the judge failed to give proper weight to the best interests of his daughter, N, who has a hearing impairment and requires ongoing specialist medical care in the UK.
29. I am satisfied that this ground discloses no error of law in the judge’s decision. The judge acknowledged that N has hearing problems which have caused speech delay at [20]. At [21], the judge considered the evidence that N receives special care from her school alongside supervision from her doctor and a social worker who visited her at school every three months to assess her hearing. However, the judge went on to find that the Country Policy Information Note on medical treatment and healthcare (Version 2.0; July 2022) indicated that “there are facilities for paediatric audiometry and speech and language development needs” in Bangladesh. The judge acknowledged that this might not be to same standard as N received in the UK, but healthcare was nevertheless available to her. At [25], the judge went on to consider the best interest of the appellant’s children. The judge repeated that she was satisfied that healthcare would be available to N in Bangladesh; that the appellant’s children were young enough to adapt to life in Bangladesh; that they speak and understand Bengali; and that they would have the support of their wider family in Bangladesh. The judge acknowledged that while the appellant and his wife would prefer for their children to remain in the UK, it would not negatively impact the welfare of the children for them to return to Bangladesh with their parents. The judge then carried out the Article 8 balancing exercise, utilising the balance sheet approach, at [28]. The public interest factors were set out at [28(a)] and the neutral factors at [28(b)]. At [28(c)], the judge listed the factors that weighed in favour of the appellant and his family. This acknowledged at sub-subparagraph (iii) that the appellant’s children were born in the UK; that N had been in the UK for almost seven years; and that she has hearing difficulties. Having weighed both sides of the scale, at [29], the judge found that the appellant and his family’s removal to Bangladesh would not be disproportionate.
30. I would add that at one point during the hearing, Mr Mazumder suggested that the judge had not carried out an adequate best interests assessment because she had failed to consider that the appellant has another wife and child living in Bangladesh. Mr Mazumder’s submissions were unclear as to whether he was suggesting that the judge should have taken into account the best interests of the child living in Bangladesh, and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction, or whether he was suggesting that it would be contrary to the best interests of the appellant’s UK-based children to go to Bangladesh because the appellant would have to return and live with his other family. In any event, there is no merit to Mr Mazumder’s submission. It is clear from reading the appellant’s skeleton argument from the First-tier Tribunal and his witness statement that at no point was this raised before the judge. Neither was this a point raised in the grounds of appeal upon which permission was granted.
31. I am satisfied that when the decision is read holistically, the judge had proper regard to N’s best interests. It is trite law that the best interests of a child are a primary consideration, but they are not paramount: see Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74. The judge was rationally entitled to find that that N’s removal along with her parents and sibling would not be disproportionate for the reasons she gave at [21] and [25].
32. Furthermore, to the extent that the grounds argue that the respondent failed to fully consider the appellants’ private and family life in the UK and whether removal would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the family, and that the judge failed to carry out a balancing exercise, there is no merit to those assertions. The judge considered the appellant and his family’s circumstances, including the appellant’s mental health issues, at [18] to [27]. Furthermore, it is patently clear that the judge did carry out a balancing exercise at [28] to [29] and was rationally entitled to conclude that removal would not be disproportionate.
Ground 3: Failure to consider historical injustice
33. The appellant argues that the judge failed to properly consider the historical injustices that he has been subjected to by the respondent. The grounds of appeal fail to detail these injustices, but section 5 of the appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal refers to the appellant’s initial application for a student visa being refused and only granted on appeal and this having “set a pattern of unfair treatment, as the SSHD continued to mishandle and delay decisions in relation to his leave applications”. The appellant also deals with this at paragraphs 16 to 23 of his witness statement dated 26 September 2024.
34. In Ahmed (historical injustice explained) [2023] UKUT 00165 (IAC), the Presidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal held that unless an appellant can establish that there has been a wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions there will not have been any historical injustice. Furthermore, an appellant must also show how they have suffered because of that wrongful operation. In Ahmed, the appellant complained that the injustice he faced was the failure to grant him a right of appeal against the refusal of his application for an EEA residence card. In fact, following a change in the case law, Mr Ahmed should have been entitled to a right of appeal, but this realisation came too late for him. Following an unsuccessful application for asylum, he then applied for leave to remain based on 10 years’ continuous residence. That application was refused. At his appeal against that decision, Mr Ahmed argued that but for the failure to grant him a right of appeal against the EEA decision, he would have accrued the necessary period of lawful residence and that this was a factor that reduced the weight to be attached to the public interest consideration in the proportionality balance. However, the Presidential Panel found that there had been no wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions and, even if there had been, Mr Ahmed had not suffered as a result because there was no realistic prospect that he would have succeeded with his case had he been given a right of appeal: see [38] to [45]. The Presidential Panel also held at [46] that even if a person could demonstrate the existence of a historical injustice, it does not necessarily follow that there should be a significant, or any, reduction in the weight given to the public interest in effective immigration controls.
35. In the present case, the judge did consider the issue of delay at [26]. She found that while the respondent had “not dealt with the appellant’s applications in a timely manner”, she did not accept that “there was any pattern of unfair or unjust treatment” and she pointed out that the appellant was able to appeal the respondent’s decision.
36. In my view, the judge was entitled to find that there had been no historical injustice in the appellant’s case. Mr Mazumder relied on the fact that the appellant’s initial application for leave to enter as a student was refused and he only obtained his visa on appeal. That, however, is not evidence of the wrongful operation of the respondent’s immigration functions. Sometimes, decision-makers simply make mistakes. Other times, appellants disclose important evidence before the tribunal that was not available to the decision-maker. Neither does the delay of a few months in issuing the appellant his student visa amount to conduct indicative of a wrongful operation of immigration functions. It is not reasonable to expect a department to immediately issue new decisions following successful asylum appeals and, furthermore, the appellant failed to explain at paragraph 16 of his witness statement why this delay was “critical” save for complaining that it delayed the start of his studies. As explained above, it does not appear to me that the respondent did consider the incorrect application in her 19 September 2018 decision. But, in any event, the appellant lost no benefit because his s.3C leave continued until that decision was reconsidered on 18 December 2018. Mr Mazumder referred to their being various delays in processing the appellant’s applications. The only obviously lengthy delay is the one in deciding the appellant’s 31 December 2018 application (subsequently varied on three occasions) where the decision was not served until 24 October 2023. While to be deprecated, it is unclear how this is evidence of the wrongful operation of the respondent’s immigration functions. Furthermore, it is unclear how the appellant has suffered as a result: for example, he has not lost an immigration benefit. I am therefore satisfied that the judge made no error of law in her finding that delay was of no material relevance to the Article 8 claim.
Ground 4: Failure to consider Article 3 ECHR
37. The appellant argues that the judge failed to properly consider the evidence before her regarding his depression.
38. However, the judge clearly considered this at [18] and [19]. The judge found that while the appellant claimed in his witness statement to take various medications for his mental health, in oral evidence he only claimed to take sleeping tablets and used apps to help him sleep. The judge took into account the psychologist’s report relied upon by the appellant but attached little weight to it on the basis that the psychologist had only met the appellant twice for video consultations and the report contained inconsistencies and overstatements on points that he would not have been able to determine. The question of how much weight to attach to that report was a matter for the judge and there is no challenge to this aspect of her decision. The judge went on to find that the objective evidence before the tribunal showed that mental healthcare treatment was available in Bangladesh even if it was to a lower standard than that available in the UK.
39. While the grounds of appeal argue that the judge failed to take into account the appellant’s “ongoing reliance on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT)”, the evidence before the judge did not show that the appellant did have an “ongoing reliance” on CBT. The psychologist’s report recommended at paragraph 10.4 that it was “advisable” for the appellant to undergo CBT; and the appellant’s witness statement at paragraph 26 simply repeats that the psychologist has recommended that he undergo CBT. However, there appears to have been no evidence before the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant was undergoing, or had even sought out, CBT at the date of the hearing. Consequently, I am satisfied that the judge did not make a material error of law by failing to have regard to CBT.
40. At the hearing, Mr Mazumder argued that the judge failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant would be unable to access medical treatment that was available in Bangladesh. However, the appellant has failed to point to any evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal that would have supported such an assertion. Furthermore, at the hearing before me, Mr Mazumder conceded that there was no evidence before the judge to prove that even if the treatment (which the judge found to consist only of sleeping pills) is inaccessible, the appellant would face a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in her life expectancy were he to be removed to Bangladesh. It is therefore plain that the appellant could not meet the high threshold required in Article 3 medical cases.
41. Mr Mazumder also submitted that the judge failed to consider N as part of the Article 3 assessment. This was not a point raised in the grounds of appeal upon which permission was granted. In any event, as is clear from reading the appellant’s skeleton argument, it was not argued before the First-tier Tribunal that Article 3 was engaged in N’s case. As with the appellant, Mr Mazumder conceded that there was no evidence before the judge that N would face a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in her life expectancy were she to be removed to Bangladesh. Consequently, with or without permission, this point takes the appellant’s case nowhere.
42. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the judge properly considered the medical evidence that was before her and that she gave adequate and rational reasons for finding that Article 3 was not engaged in the appellant’s case.
Notice of Decision
There is no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th July 2025