Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001393

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01102/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

Sadi Ul Huqq Sadi
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Ms A Bachu, counsel instructed by Cartwright King Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 18 July 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. On 15 September 2023 he was convicted at Birmingham Crown Court of sexual activity with a female under the age of 18. He was sentenced to a term of two years and six months imprisonment. On 29 November 2023 the respondent notified the appellant that section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 places a duty on the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against him unless he can demonstrate that one or more of the specified exceptions set out in section 33 of that Act apply. Representations were made on the appellant’s behalf on 22 December 2023 and 28 December 2023.
2. On 9 May 2024 the appellant was served with a decision made by the respondent refuse his human rights claim. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Chapman (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 25 February 2025.
3. The appellant claims the decision of the judge is vitiated by material errors of law for reasons set out in Grounds of Appeal dated 6 March 2025. In summary, the appellant advances two grounds of appeal. First, the judge failed “to reconcile evidence on material matters and/or overlooked evidence”. Second, the “judge erred in the duty to give reasons for the decision; applying MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641.”
4. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Tozzi on 18 March 2025.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
5. Ms Bachu adopt the grounds of appeal. In the grounds of appeal, the appellant refers to the evidence before the FtT from an independent social worker, Angeline Seymour (“ISW”). He claims the judge failed to properly engage with the evidence that the appellant’s wife would struggle to raise four young children as a single parent and that would have a negative impact on the children, putting them at risk of abuse and exploitation. The appellant refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sicwebu v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 550 and claims that a clear distinction should be made between a family’s circumstances whilst an appellant is in prison, and what they will be if the appellant is deported but the family remains in the UK. The appellant claims that the continuation of regular direct contact between the appellant and children whilst he is in prison needed to be assessed against how the appellant’s wife and children would be impacted by his long-term absence and that direct contact ceasing altogether. Furthermore the judge did not properly engage with the evidence regarding the difficulties the appellant’s wife would face in parenting the children alone, and the impact of the absence of the appellant on the children. The emotional harm on the appellant’s eldest child, who is the only child aware of the appellant being in prison was not addressed by the judge. Similarly, the judge failed to factor in the role and responsibilities that the eldest child has been required to undertake that would not ordinarily have fallen upon him. The appellant claims these were all factors relevant to the assessment of whether the effect of the appellant’s deportation on his wife and children would be unduly harsh. The judge was under a duty to give reasons for the decision and failed to do so.
6. Ms Bachu submits the judge recorded at paragraph [50] of the decision that during the appellant’s absence whilst serving the sentence of imprisonment, the appellant’s wife has had to maintain family life, effectively as a single parent. She has had to do many of the things the appellant used to do. If the appellant is deported there will be long-term separation. The ISW spoke to the appellant’s eldest child about his relationship with his father as set out in page 9 of her report and the judge failed to engage with what had been said by the eldest child. At page 16 of her report the ISW said that in her professional opinion, the separation of the family by removing the appellant would negatively impact on the four children’s developing confidence, stability and emotional well-being and prevent them from reaching their full potential. At page 17 of her report the ISW said that the appellant’s wife is struggling in her role as a single parent and that she relies on the appellant for the most basic tasks such as translation, shopping, driving and taking the older children to school. She is struggling without his support and presents as isolated, relying on individuals from her community. The ISW said she observed an unidentified male in the household sitting with the children and she questions who the appellant’s wife is approaching to assist her, which will be putting the children at risk. The judge failed to engage with the evidence and failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision.
7. In reply, Ms Arif submits the judge properly identified the issues in the appeal at paragraph [20] of the decision. The central issue in the appeal before me the judge’s assessment of whether the effect of the appellant’s removal to Bangladesh would be unduly harsh on his wife and children. The judge set out the legal framework and at paragraph [31] of the decision the judge confirmed that he has carefully considered the documentary evidence and everything said whether specifically referred to or not. At paragraphs [46] and [58] the judge referred to the correct test. Thee judge was not under an obligation to address each point made by the ISW in her report. The judge considered the circumstances, including the best interests of the children, in the round, and reached a decision that was open to him.
Decision
8. It is now well established that the reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.; TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC).
9. Part 5A of the 2002 Act provides that, when a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and, as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the HRA 1998, the court, in considering the public interest question, must (in particular) have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B and, additionally, in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C. Section 117C specifically deals with the weight to be attached to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals and provides a structure for conducting the necessary balancing exercise, dependent in part, on the length of sentence imposed.
10. The judge set out the appellant’s immigration history and information about his conviction and sentence at paragraphs [1] to [7] of the decision. He noted the appellant was released from the custodial part of his sentence on 4 February 2025 but remains in immigration detention. His licence and sentence end date is 6 May 2026. He is the subject of a sexual harm prevention order for life. He has been placed on the sex offenders register for life and is the subject of a restraining order for 5 years.
11. It is uncontroversial that the appellant is a ‘foreign criminal’ as defined in s117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). The essential question which lay beneath the judge’s analysis was whether the removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
12. The judge refers to the appellant’s family at paragraphs [8] to [12] of the decision. The appellant married his wife in Bangladesh on 11 October 2010 and their eldest child was born in Bangladesh in 2011. The appellant’s wife and their eldest child joined him in the UK on 26 December 2012. There are three other children, all of whom were born in the UK and are now aged 10, 4 and 2. The judge noted, at 11], that the appellant’s wife and his three eldest children were granted leave to remain in the UK on 11 July 2024 and there is an outstanding application as far as the youngest child is concerned. The judge said:
“12. The Appellant was initially prevented from contact with his children whilst in prison but this restriction was removed in May 2024 and he has had contact with his wife and children in prison since then. They have visited him frequently and also communicated via social media and telephone calls. At the hearing, I was told that his eldest child is aware that he is in prison, but the younger children believe him to be studying at an educational establishment.”
13. Having identified the evidence before the Tribunal and the issues in the appeal the judge recorded that he heard evidence from the appellant and his wife, mother, father and brother. The judge identified the relevant legal framework at paragraphs [24] to [30] of the decision. As Ms Arif submits, the judge said at paragraph [31] that in considering the issues he has carefully considered the documentary evidence and everything said at the hearing whether specifically referred to or not.
14. The judge noted, at [32], that the appellant first arrived in the UK in 2006, aged 20 and that he is now 38. He had returned to Bangladesh in 2007, 2008 and 2010. The judge accepted he has not returned to Bangladesh since 2010, and that he has integrated into British society. The Judge had regard to the evidence of the appellant’s activities in the UK and his association with the Bangladeshi community. He concluded that the appellant has not established that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Bangladesh. He found it likely that those with whom the appellant has associated in the UK are likely to have their own contacts in Bangladesh who could provide some support the appellant. The appellant’s evidence was that most of his family and that of his wife no longer live in Bangladesh. However the appellant still has two aunts there and his wife has two brothers and a sister there. These are people who the judge said, could also provide support to the appellant on return.
15. The judge addressed whether the effect of the appellant’s deportation on his wife and children would be unduly harsh at paragraphs [43] to [59] of the decision, and noted the fact specific consideration required. At paragraphs [43] to [47] the judge properly directed himself as to the authorities relevant to the issue he was considering. Neither party had referred the judge to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sicwebu v SSHD, but the judge nevertheless properly referred to it at paragraph [47] of his decision. The judge set out the facts and his finding specific to this decision at paragraphs [48] to [58] of the decision.
16. The judge found that it must have come as a shock to the appellant’s wife to have learned of his criminality and that it must have been difficult for her to adapt to the appellant’s conviction and sentence, and to life without him in the family unit. The judge noted that “There is nothing to suggest that he was anything other than a caring and attentive father who played a full role in the lives of his children, and in family life. The judge noted the appellant had continued to play as full a role as possible whilst in prison, through direct visits by his wife and children and through social media. The judge noted, at [50], that in the meantime, the appellant’s wife has had to maintain family life, effectively as a single parent, having to undertake herself many of the things the appellant used to do, for example, helping with homework, taking the second child to school or arranging for a neighbour to do so, taking the children to appointments for their medical conditions, applying their ointment, and managing the finances.
17. The judge plainly had the report of the ISW in mind. He said:
“51. His active role within the family are also confirmed in the findings made by Ms Angeline Seymour, Social Worker in her Social Circumstances Report dated 31 October 2024. What she was told is consistent with the other evidence I have before me. Whilst Ms Seymour confirms that the Appellant’s wife and the children have missed the Appellant and have found his absence difficult in both practical and emotional terms, she notes that the Appellant’s wife has been doing her best for the children, and that she has been able to do this because she does not work. The Appellant’s wife, being on benefits, has been the main source of income for the family which has not changed and will not change should he be deported.
52. Ms Seymour noted that the Appellant’s wife did not report any of the trauma which research shows can be faced by wives facing the deportation of their husbands. She confirmed that the children continue to meet their educational and developmental milestones and that she found no reports to the contrary. Ms Seymour does not say that the medical conditions suffered by the children have been, or are likely in the future to be impacted by the Appellant’s absence and there is no medical evidence to this effect or to say that they cannot travel should that become necessary.
53. In Ms Seymour’s opinion the best interests of the children are for the Appellant to remain in the country. I agree. However, this is not the same as saying that it would be unduly harsh for them should the Appellant have to leave.”
18. The judge accepted that the appellant’s wife and children have “only had what they consider to be a temporary period of separation whilst the Appellant is in prison and that they are hoping for his return whereupon they can reset and resume life in the family unit”. The judge found that the family had managed to continue their lives notwithstanding the disruption caused by the appellant’s absence. The judge saw no reason why that would not continue and said that the appellant’s wife has shown resilience and fortitude in managing. It would likely be a setback if the appellant is removed, but the judge found that the appellant’s wife would not be prevented from doing what she has done for some time. The judge said the appellant can continue to provide practical and emotional support from abroad through the type of communications he has been using from prison. The judge accepted that is not the same as being present on a day-to-day basis, but it would not prevent the appellant to continuing to play a significant role. The judge acknowledged that finances may prevent frequent visits to Bangladesh but said that nevertheless with support from family members and others, they remain a possibility. Although removal would be a significant interference with family life, the judge said it need not end family life. The judge went on to say:
“56. The Appellant’s wife has had limited support from the family members who gave evidence at the hearing because they live in London, but she also has a sister who visits from Birmingham. Although the Appellant and his wife were silent about other support which might be available, I have already noted the wide range of community ties above. I note that Ms Seymour also referred to connections with other families and that many families have called to see where the Appellant has been. I find it likely that there would be a wide range of support from the wider community to whom the Appellant and his family are well known.
57. Having regard to these factors, I acknowledge that the Appellant’s removal is likely to be distressing for his wife, children and other family members, and likely to create practical and emotional difficulties which have not encountered before if they have to become accustomed to a more long-term separation. However, the Appellant’s wife will remain the primary carer of the four children as she has been since the Appellant went to prison.
58. The test I have to apply is not whether the Appellant’s deportation will cause hardship, but whether it would be unduly harsh in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. Taking into account all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the threshold of undue harshness is met in this appeal with regard to the Appellant’s wife or his children.”
19. It was for the judge to make an informed assessment of the effect of deportation on the appellant’s wife and children and to make an evaluative judgment as to whether the elevated standard has been met. It is clear from a careful reading of the decision as a whole that the judge had regard to the long-term impact of the appellant’s removal from the UK on the family. The judge referred to the close relationship the appellant has with his children, and clearly noted that the appellant’s wife has had to undertake many of the things the appellant used to do. The judge referred to the report of the ISW and was not required to expressly address what had been said by the appellant’s eldest son to the ISW. What is recorded in the report formed part of her enquiries for the purposes of the report. The judge noted that in the opinion of the ISW the best interest of the children are for the appellant to remain in the UK. The judge agreed, but went on to properly note that that is not the same as to say it would be ‘unduly harsh’ for the children should the appellant have to leave. It is well established the best interests of a child are “a primary consideration”, which, is not the same as “the primary consideration”, still less “the paramount consideration”.
20. I have read the report of the ISW, and considered the opinions expressed. I am quite satisfied that the judge had adequate regard to the report in reaching his decision. The judge acknowledged the impact of the appellant’s absence on the family dynamic both in the short-term whilst the appellant was serving a sentence of imprisonment, and in the long-term in the event that the appellant is removed from the UK. In her closing paragraphs, the ISW refers to an “unidentified male in the household sitting with the children”, but reading the report as a whole there is no proper evidential basis for concluding that the appellant’s wife has exposed the children to risks of abuse or exploitation. To the contrary, the evidence is that she has done her best for them in what she might consider to be challenging circumstances.
21. The requirement to give adequate reasons means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection.
22. Here, the decision of the FtT judge must be read as a whole. The judge gives adequate reasons for the findings made and conclusion reached. A fact-sensitive analysis was required. The findings and conclusions reached by the judge were neither irrational nor unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, or findings and conclusions that were wholly unsupported by the evidence. I reject the overall claim that the judge failed to have regard to relevant evidence. The conclusion reached by the judge was based on the particular facts and circumstances of this appeal and the evidence before the Tribunal.
23. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own analysis and discretion for that of the Judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables it to claim that the Judge misdirected themselves. In my judgment, the grounds of appeal do not disclose a material error of law capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal.
24. It follows that I dismiss the appeal
Notice of Decision
25. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
26. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chapman promulgated on 25 February 2025 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 October 2025