Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001424

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/68736/2023
LP/09117/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

LR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel, instructed by Wildan Legal Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 17 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant seeks to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s decision promulgated on 3rd February 2025 and in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 19th December 2023.
2. I have maintained the anonymity order in respect of the Appellant. I consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection, are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, who entered the UK as a student in July 2010. The Appellant made a number of extension applications and was granted leave in the same category until his leave was curtailed on 23rd June 2014 as a result of his Sponsor’s licence - as an educational institution - being revoked. On 12th October 2016, the Appellant applied to the Respondent for compassionate leave outside of the Immigration Rules but this application was not successful. On 23rd November 2017, the Appellant claimed asylum and that claim was refused by the Respondent on 19th December 2023. In summary, the Appellant has claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of political opinion and he pursued his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal on that basis.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. In dismissing the appeal and insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) At [32]-[34], the Judge considered the country and background evidence concerning the political conditions in Bangladesh following the recent change in government and concluded at [35] that “(t)aking account of the background evidence, whilst Bangladesh remains in a state of some unrest, I find that the country situation is not such that persons who support BNP are at real risk of persecution or serious harm for reason of political opinion”;
(b) The Judge then considered the contents of the expert report relied upon by the Appellant from Md Solaiman Tushar, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh dated 10th October 2024, finding at [38] that only limited weight could be placed on this report. The Judge’s reasons, as set out at [38]-[39], included that the expert’s conclusions were not always reasoned or related to source material, the expert’s assessment of risk was couched in highly general terms and there was no analysis as to whether or not the Awami League have or are likely to have any awareness of the Appellant’s online activity. The Judge added that the expert did not engage in real detail or analysis as to the changes in country situation with the interim government now in place;
(c) At [40]-[45], the Judge considered background evidence relevant to the issuing of documents in Bangladesh as well as the Appellant’s own expert and other evidence with regards to verification of case documents against court registers;
(d) At [46]-[56], the Judge considered the Appellant’s evidence of physical and mental health conditions concluding at [56] that there is no basis on which to find that the Appellant suffers from manic depression or any other discrete mental health condition. The Judge accepted (as had the Respondent) that the Appellant suffers from physical health conditions, namely thyroid and stomach problems. The Judge also accepted that continuing pain as a result would likely negatively affect his mood and mental health in general terms;
(e) Following a consideration of the relevant factors under s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’) at [57]-[59], the Judge found that s.8(5) and 8(6) were engaged but the Judge reminded themselves that, pursuant to relevant case-law, the Judge must look at the evidence as a whole when assessing credibility. The Judge confirmed at [59] that they placed weight on these circumstances as damaging to the Appellant’s credibility in the overall assessment made of the Appellant’s evidence in the round;
(f) Concerning the Appellant’s claim to fear persecution as a result of his blogging activity, the Judge considered this at [60]-[69] but found at [69] that the material produced by the Appellant was of limited evidential value given the guidance in the authority of XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). The posts relied upon, taken with the other evidence available, did not reliably demonstrate the Appellant has any particular online profile or one that he has significant reach and influence such that the authorities are likely to take notice. The Judge also considered that in so far as the concern relates to the Awami League, the country situation had changed such that this past activity of the Appellant and any ongoing online criticism of his did not give rise to the same potential risks in any event;
(g) Specifically in relation to the Appellant’s documentary evidence of having received threats by e-mail (considered at [70]-[71]), the Judge concluded at [72] that in all the circumstances including the features of the emails themselves, the timing of their production and the lack of any corroboration as to their authenticity or provenance, reliance could not be placed on this evidence as evidence of any adverse interest in the Appellant by the stated agencies;
(h) The Judge considered the Appellant’s own evidence of the threats and the claimed case brought against him in Bangladesh at [73]-[92], together with the other documentary and expert evidence on the same and concluded at [93] as follows:
“I concluded having considered everything in the round that the appellant had not demonstrated that reliance could be place on the information contained in the case documents. There is no real evidence on which I am prepared to place any weight to support that the appellant has been subject to any specific threats or that there has been or is any adverse interest in him due online activity. I have rejected his evidence that there is any adverse interest or attention on him from the AL government which has now been overturned or other government agencies and/or any particular terrorist group or that he would be perceived as any form of threat. The appellant has not demonstrated substantial grounds to believe that he will face arrest on return to Bangladesh resulting in imprisonment and a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment.”
5. The Judge went on to consider the Appellant’s claim raised under Article 8 ECHR at [97]-[115] finding against the Appellant, with many findings having been brought forward from the Judge’s earlier consideration of the Appellant’s state of health and protection claim.
6. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The Appellant put forward seven grounds of appeal in support of his application for permission to appeal but only secured permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal on his last four grounds, namely grounds 4-7. In respect of grounds 4 and 5, the First-tier Tribunal when granting permission noted that whilst a judge did not have to set out each and every aspect of the evidence in a case, it was arguable that the Judge erred in not addressing the claimed genuineness of the email addresses – these having been relied upon in support of the Appellant’s claim to have received threats by email. Similarly, in relation to the assault the Appellant claims to have suffered in Bangladesh, the Judge granting permission considered that there was nothing to suggest that the FtT had considered the newspaper articles, particularly noting that these documents had been specifically raised in the appeal skeleton argument. It was arguable therefore that, given the importance of past harm to the consideration of risk, this was an error.
8. As to ground 6, it was also found to be arguable that the Judge had not made clear findings as to the genuineness of the Appellant’s beliefs and had not assessed any risk that might arise if he maintains his activities upon return. The Judge granting permission noted that one might have considerable sympathy with the FtT given the vast number of documents provided but that these matters were nonetheless arguable. Permission was also granted in relation to the Appellant’s remaining seventh ground of appeal.
9. The Appellant did seek to renew his application for permission to appeal directly to this Tribunal, reiterating that his first three grounds were also arguable. It transpired however that the renewal application was out of time and for the reasons given by the Upper Tribunal in the decision of 13th May 2025, this Tribunal did not grant an extension of time and did not consider that the remaining grounds had merit in any event. The Appellant’s renewed application was therefore not admitted and the only grounds that carry permission to appeal are the Appellant’s original grounds 4, 5, 6 and 7.
10. In response, the Respondent did not seek to file and serve a reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
11. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Ms Ahmed, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
12. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and Conclusions
13. For ease of reference, I continue to refer to the Appellant’s grounds of appeal in the order that they were first pleaded before the FtT and with the numbering that I addressed and summarised above.
The Appellant’s fourth ground of appeal – paras 13-15 of the Appellant’s grounds dated 13th February 2025
14. In this ground, the Appellant argues the Judge’s reasons are inadequate for rejecting the Appellant’s evidence of having received direct threats by e-mail. It is submitted that the Judge erred in requiring corroboration and has “cherry-picked” a few e-mails raising concerns about these. It is also submitted that the Judge erred in failing to deal with the most important features of these e-mails, which was that the e-mails appear to have been sent from “official e-mail addresses” indicated by the use of ‘@dgfi.org’, ‘@police.gov.bd’ and ‘@dgfi.gov.bd’. It succinctly argued that the Judge did not engage with how emails from such official email addresses could have otherwise been received by the Appellant.
15. Mr Karim emphasised, on behalf of the Appellant that it had been raised in the skeleton argument before the FtT at para 13(vii) that the threats received by email had come from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (‘DGFI’) and the Bangladesh Police, and had been sent from official email accounts.
16. I consider however that Ms Ahmed is correct in her submission that the Judge does not need to engage with each piece of evidence submitted, and indeed with each aspect of the evidence in question. At [70], the Judge has recorded in detail some of the submissions made by the Respondent raising concerns with the authenticity of the e-mails and at [71] the Appellant’s oral evidence of the same e-mails given in cross-examination. At [72], the Judge set out their conclusions on the e-mails as follows:
“72. In all the circumstances including the features of the emails themselves, the timing of their production and the lack of any corroboration as to their authenticity or provenance, I concluded that reliance could not be placed on this evidence as evidence of any adverse interest in the appellant by the stated agencies. In addition, I note that a curious feature of the email purportedly from the Bangladesh police is the reference to a one-time warning and bringing cases coupled with the absence of any indication of awareness of the appellant as not only already subject to ongoing cases but also conviction and arrest warrants.”
17. It is important to note that the Judge’s reference to the timing of the e-mails’ production follows a detailed consideration at [63]-[64] of when the Appellant produced the evidence that he sought to rely on as part of his protection claim and subsequent appeal. The Judge found that this had not been produced until the Appellant’s appeal bundle uploaded in January 2025, after the Respondent’s review had been conducted and this was despite the Appellant referring to evidence being available in his asylum interview. The Judge had also considered in detail at [41]-[45] the background evidence concerning the prevalence of corruption in Bangladesh and this invariably impacting on the reliability of documents issued in Bangladesh.
18. In light of the above, it is clear in my view that the Judge has engaged with the e-mails in detail and considered the reliability of the e-mail evidence in the round, as they were required to and gave sufficient and adequate reasons at [72] for their conclusion. This is particularly so when reading the decision as whole and the more detailed considerations of the wider context, which was of clear relevance here, as briefly summarised above at para 17. The Judge had also determined that the expert report of Mr Tushar only carried limited weight and the Appellant has not been granted permission to argue that the Judge erred in this respect. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Judge has not erred as pleaded under the Appellant’s (original) fourth ground of appeal.
The Appellant’s fifth ground of appeal – paras 16-18
19. This ground concerns the Judge’s finding at [62] that there was nothing in the evidence that established the cause of the Appellant’s claimed assault and this being linked to the Awami League and/or due to the Appellant’s online activity. The Appellant argues that the Judge overlooked the newspaper articles contained in the bundle of evidence before the FtT, accompanied by official translations and which stated that the attack was from “miscreants of Chatra League” (the student wing of the Awami League).
20. The Appellant argues therefore that this shows a lack of anxious scrutiny and the error is plainly material since the previous attack is relevant in the context of para 339K of the Immigration Rules, which states that past persecution or serious harm will be regarded as a serious indication of a person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to believe that the persecution/serious harm will not be repeated. The Appellant adds that the Judge has not adequately, or at all, addressed the risk on return, especially with respect to the increasing Islamist threat as well as the risk from the police and security services in light of what was argued in the Appellant’s skeleton argument at paras 21 to 24 in particular.
21. Ms Ahmed very fairly accepted that the Judge does not appear from the decision to have considered the newspaper articles, which in itself may not be an error in light of there not being a need to set out each piece of evidence concerned, particularly when in this case the evidence was voluminous. However, Ms Ahmed candidly accepted that the Judge made an error when stating that there was no link between the claimed attack and the Awami League since the newspaper articles appeared to support this link.
22. However, Ms Ahmed maintained that the error was not material and I accept that submission. The primary reason for this is that the articles were not capable of affecting the outcome of the Appellant’s protection appeal as a result of the detailed reasons given by the Judge concerning both the expert evidence (which the Appellant does not have permission to challenge), the country conditions and the Appellant’s subjective and documentary evidence, including the Judge’s analysis at [64]-[67] which I have already been referred to.
23. I also agree with Ms Ahmed that in the alternative, the past harm that the Appellant was subjected to took place in 2009, now approximately 16 years ago and where presently, the Judge found at [35] that whilst Bangladesh remains in a state of some unrest, the country situation is not such that persons who support the BNP are at real risk of persecution or serious harm for reason of political opinion. For the same reasons, the second part of ground 5 is not made out either. It is clear that the Judge considered the risks generally in their analysis of the country conditions at [32]-[35] and that they did not limit themselves to risk emanating from the Awami League members and supporters. In addition, the Appellant does not have permission to appeal against the Judge’s findings on the expert evidence.
24. I acknowledge that, as Mr Karim submitted, the threshold for materiality is a high one - the test under ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 is whether any court would have been bound to have reached the same decision – but for the reasons above, I do not find that the error in this instance is material.
The Appellant’s sixth ground of appeal – para 19
25. This ground argues that the Judge did not assess and apply the principles established in RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 (25 July 2012), namely whether the Appellant would continue openly writing against the police, Islamist organisations, political parties and others on return to Bangladesh and if so, what the impact may be. Mr Karim stressed that the Appellant’s online political activities had been accepted by the Respondent.
26. I address this ground fairly swiftly since my conclusions above relating to the Judge’s findings on the current country conditions apply and it was not necessary therefore in light of those findings, for the Judge to go through the HJ (Iran)/RT (Zimbabwe) questions.
The Appellant’s seventh and final ground of appeal – paras 20-22
27. Mr Karim first focused his submissions on the purported failure of the Judge to consider the principles established by the House of Lords in EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41 when assessing the delay in decision-making by the Respondent at [65]. I do not consider that there is any error on the part of the Judge in this respect. It is clear that the Judge found that at least part of the delay was attributable to the Appellant’s own unwillingness and/or inability to attend the asylum interview, which the Judge considered in more detail at [5].
28. In particular, the chronology includes the Appellant claiming asylum in November 2017 but following several exchanges between the Respondent and the Appellant’s solicitors, the asylum interview and the Appellant’s attendance at the same was discussed on several occasions and the date was re-scheduled a number of times. As a result of this, and the likely impact of the Covid-19 pandemic impacting from March 2020, the interview did not take place until November 2021, some four years later. In those circumstances and with a decision from the Respondent being issued in November 2023, it cannot be argued in my view that the principles contained in EB (Kosovo) fell to be considered.
29. With regards to the Appellant’s wider challenge to the Judge’s findings under the ‘very significant obstacles’, the Judge gave detailed reasons at [97]-[98] and considered relevant guidance from the cases of Parveen v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30 and Kamara v Home Office [2016] 4 WLR 152 at [99]-[101]. The Judge went on to consider the case more widely under Article 8 and conducted a careful and comprehensive balancing exercise at [102]-[115]. For these reasons, this ground does not succeed either.
30. It follows from the above that the Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be dismissed on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of material errors of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

08.07.2025