Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001426
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63271/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

AMAS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Not represented
For the respondent: Ms. S. Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 3 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (the “Judge”), dated 18 October 2024, in which she dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection claim. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh who claimed protection due to fearing the family of a man killed by his uncle.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam in a decision dated 15 April 2025 as follows:
“2. The grounds are in the main a disagreement with the findings of the judge. At para 9 it is said that the judge did not give due weight to the evidence. This is a bare assertion. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the evidence of the appellant’s uncle upon which the appellant relied and to conclude from it that the influence of the people that the appellant fears is not as great as he claims (see [43]) and that the uncle’s evidence contradicts that of the appellant. The appellant was represented and should have been aware of internal inconsistencies in the evidence that he advanced.
3. With respect to para 10 of the grounds, it is not arguable that the judge did not consider the documents (see [ 45]).
4. At para 12 of the grounds it is said that there was no proper consideration of art. 8 ECHR. This is unarguable. The judge considered the appellant’s appeal under art 8 at [55]-[58}. The appellant relied on private life. The assessment of article 8 does not disclose arguable error. The appellant lived in Bangladesh for 16 years and he has family living there. The judge rationally concluded that there are no very significant obstacles to integration. The judge considered proportionally taking into account relevant matters including. The grounds do not identify an arguable error of law in respect of the assessment under article 8.
5. Paras 10, 11 and 13 are arguable in so far as they relate to the “expert” evidence. Unhelpfully the grounds do not identify the expert evidence. The judge said that there was a supplementary bundle. This was uploaded onto CMS on 9 October 2024 and before the judge. It is arguable that the judge did not take into account the report said to be from an expert at pp1-35 of the supplementary bundle”.
3. There was no Rule 24 response.
The hearing
4. The appellant attended the hearing. He was assisted by the interpreter, who confirmed that they fully understood each other. The language used was Bengali (Sylheti).
5. The appellant is no longer represented, although the grounds of appeal had been prepared by his previous solicitors. He said that he had not seen the grounds (page 15) although he had given instructions to his representatives to challenge the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. A copy was provided to the interpreter, who translated it for the appellant. It was explained to the appellant that the hearing was concerned with whether the Judge had made a mistake in law for the reasons as set out in the grounds.
6. The grant of permission states that the grant is limited. However, with reference to the case of EH (PTA: limited grounds; Cart JR) Bangladesh [2021] UKUT 0117 (IAC) we stated that we were of the view that all grounds were arguable. The grant of permission does not contain a direction limiting the grounds. EH states at headnote (2):
“(2) Rule 22(2)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 has the effect that in the absence of any direction limiting the grounds which may be argued before the Upper Tribunal, the grounds contained in the application for permission are the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, even if permission is stated to have been granted on limited grounds.”
7. Ms. Simbi agreed and had prepared for the appeal on the basis that all the grounds could be argued.
8. Ms. Simbi made oral submissions which were translated for the appellant. He responded to them.
9. At the hearing we stated that the decision did not involve the making of a material error of law, and summarised the reasons for our decision. We set out our full decision and reasons below.
Error of law
10. The grounds challenge the Judge’s consideration of the evidence. At [10] it is asserted that the Judge appeared to rely heavily on the appellant’s uncle’s evidence. At [14] it is asserted that the Judge failed to carefully consider “the evidence, the explanation, and the appellant’s credibility”.
11. The Judge was entitled to give weight to the appellant’s uncle’s evidence given that he was involved in the incident which the appellant claims puts him at risk. The Judge set out the evidence of the appellant and his uncle from [12] to [30] of her decision. At the start of her findings, she set out the basis of the appellant’s claim [39], and there has been no challenge on the basis that her understanding was incorrect. In her findings from [40] to [47] she gives reasons for not finding the appellant’s evidence credible, due to inconsistencies and implausibilities in his evidence, and due to inconsistencies between his evidence and that of his uncle. She noted that the appellant was only five years old at the time of the incident, and so could not be considered to have been involved. She did not find it credible that he would be charged with a crime committed by one of his uncles because they had not been caught, when he was only five years old at the time.
12. In relation to the evidence of his uncle, at [44] and [45] the Judge states:
“The appellant’s asylum interview and his statement detail all the problems that he and his father and family have had because of this incident. However, the one major inconsistency in all of this evidence came from his uncle Aman, who said quite clearly that contrary to the appellant’s claim, that his father was involved in the incident, his father took no part whatsoever because he was in Kuwait at the time and did not return to Bangladesh until 5-6 years ago, which was after the appellant fled Bangladesh in 2016.
If the uncle’s evidence is accepted and, given that the appellant’s father’s name is not mentioned in any of the documents produced by the appellant, including the FIR and the newspaper article, I see no reason not to accept it, the appellant’s evidence that his father took him to an unknown place quite far from Dhaka to live after the incident (q6), that he last saw his father when he left Bangladesh in March 2016 (q9), that his father was involved in the quarrel and was scared (q30, 31) and that his father and brothers wanted to go to Golapganj police station to report the matter (q50) cannot be correct. Equally his statement at paragraph 14 in which he said that his father was present at the incident cannot be correct. These major inconsistencies severely damage his credibility.”
13. The Judge found significant inconsistencies between the evidence of the appellant and that of his uncle. At [45] she states that she accepts the uncle’s evidence, in part due to the fact that it is consistent with the documents produced by the appellant, including the FIR and the newspaper article which do not refer to the appellant’s father. The weight to be given to any piece of evidence is a matter for the Judge. She has given reasons for accepting the evidence of the appellant’s uncle and for giving weight to that evidence. She was entitled to find that these major inconsistencies damaged the appellant’s credibility, and was entitled to give less weight to the appellant’s evidence as a result.
14. At [46] she found that there were further inconsistencies between the evidence of the appellant and his uncle as to the whereabouts of the uncles who were involved in the incident. At [47] she states:
“I am satisfied that, at the time of the incident, the appellant had no involvement because of his age and neither did his father because he was not even in the country. I can accept that the other brothers may have felt the need to flee but I do not understand why the appellant and his family fled given that they had no involvement and it would have been perfectly clear to those from the madrassa that that was the case. I do not accept that living in the joint family system would mean that the appellant and his family had to flee as he claims and nor do I accept that the involvement of the uncles in this matter means that if he goes back, his involvement is automatically assumed just because he lived with them in a joint family system to him because no court would ever convict him of involvement given that he was 5 years old at the time.”
15. She further states at [50]:
“In summary the core of the appellant’s claim has been severely damaged by the evidence given by his uncle which flatly contradicts a lot of what the appellant has said about the involvement of his father and his risk as a result of his link to his uncles. His claim that, if he returns, he will be the ‘fall guy’ for his uncle, Koyes crime is frankly neither credible nor plausible. The fact that all his uncles have managed to evade these influential people from the madrassa over the past 19 years demonstrates that they do not have the power or the reach which the appellant claims that they have.”
16. These findings were open to her on the basis of the evidence before her. She has given reasons for her findings and for attaching weight to the evidence of the appellant’s uncle. There is no error in her consideration of this evidence. Of course, when considering the appellant’s claim in the round and before concluding, she should also have considered the expert evidence, which we deal with below.
17. It was further submitted by Ms. Simbi that the Judge had assessed the appellant’s credibility fairly, as shown by [48] where she declined to accept the respondent’s assertion that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by behaviour falling under section 8 of the 2004 Act. We find that this demonstrates that the Judge had a balanced and fair approach to the evidence before her.
18. In relation to the expert evidence, there is nothing to indicate in the decision that the Judge considered the expert report found in the appellant’s supplementary bundle. At [10] she refers to having the supplementary bundle before her. While this was only provided two days prior to the hearing, it appears from the reference to it at [10] that it was admitted as evidence. However, there is no further reference to it in her decision. We find that this is an error of law because on the face of it the expert purported to consider the plausibility of the appellant’s account and whether he would be able to obtain protection in Bangladesh. We note the skeleton argument referred (very briefly) to the expert report, arguing that this demonstrated his fear of persecution (see paragraph 23). The Judge should have considered it.
19. Ms. Simbi submitted that it was not a material error. She submitted that no updated skeleton argument had been provided along with the expert report which set out the relevance of the report or its findings. Its relevance was unclear. Secondly, she submitted that the author did not have the necessary qualifications and experience to give an opinion e.g. on internal relocation, or on mental health provision in Bangladesh ([38], [43] to [57]). It was further not clear why he had been asked to give an opinion on whether the appellant would be able to meet his basic and essential needs ([40] to [42]). She submitted that it was a generic report and that it was unclear how it could have led the Judge to come to a different decision.
20. We have carefully considered the report. We find that it is generic and vague at best. The author of the report is “Md Solaiman (Tushar), Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh and Head of Chambers”. He says he has been instructed to “verify the authenticity of the following case document” at [1] but he does not explain what document he has been asked to verify and the rest of the report does not purport to verify any case document. He says that he has based his report on the account set out at [2] to [7]. He states at [6] that the appellant “believes that if he returns to Bangladesh, his life will be in grave danger. The relatives of the murdered teacher, the local community, and the students of the Madrassa still pose a significant threat to the Appellant”.
21. The expert states that he is aware of his duty to the court and sets out the basis on which he has written his report from [8] to [16]. At [17] he sets out his profile and qualifications. He states that he is “recognised as an independent authority on subjects concerning Bangladesh’s political landscape, media, police, administrative structures, and criminal justice system”. He then sets out his experience in the courts as an advocate before stating at [19] that he operates as a freelance journalist. At [22] he states that he possesses comprehensive knowledge and experience about various aspects of Bangladesh “including but not limited to its political structure, media landscape, law enforcement mechanisms, family dispute, Muslim Law, healthcare system, and the entire criminal justice system”. He then sets out articles and publications he has authored. While this list includes a couple of opinion pieces on mental health, he does not have any qualification which would lead to him having a “comprehensive knowledge” of the healthcare system.
22. From [31] onwards he sets out his opinion and reasons. The first question he addresses is “Does the Appellant have a real threat from the members (sic) of the deceased teacher?” There then follow four paragraphs where he describes murders of four unconnected individuals in Bangladesh, the relevance of which is not explained. He then states at [35]:
“In my opinion, when someone is killed in Bangladesh, there is a bond between the families. Family and social antagonisms exist in the case of murder, as a result of one murder incident, future murders, family feuds, and even disputes spread throughout the area. Law enforcement agencies often play the role of silent spectators. Since the appellant's uncle killed a teacher, the life of the appellant and other members of his family were threatened by the family members of the deceased teacher. In the context of Bangladesh, Madrasa teachers and Maulana have acceptance and influence in the society. Since the appellant's uncle killed a Maulana, and madrasa teacher, the risk to the life of the appellant and his family members is a little higher.”
23. There is no evidence cited for his opinion that there would be a “bond” between the families when someone is killed, nor for his statement that “law enforcement agencies often play the role of silent spectators”. The newspaper articles he has cited simply do not show this. Further, he has accepted the appellant’s evidence that he was threatened by the family members of the deceased teacher, but this is not something which has been accepted by the Judge. At [41] of her decision she states:
“I do not accept that he was found by Asad in 2015 because I consider it highly unlikely that this person would know what he looked like some 10 years after the event, given that he was only 5 years old at the time and obviously would have altered in appearance a great deal over that period of time.”
24. The expert next turns to answer the question of whether the appellant can get protection if the “members of the deceased teacher” attack him. He states that the prospects of the appellant securing justice if subjected to harm by the family members of the deceased teacher are “rather slim”.
“It is doubtful that he could avail protection from the government or the police, given that the law enforcement agencies, including the police and Army, fall under the direct control of the government and operate with limited accountability and independence. These authorities typically demonstrate hesitation and delay in intervening in matters construed as “political”.”
25. There is nothing in the appellant’s account, either that which has been accepted by the Judge, nor that which is set out by the expert himself at the start of his report, to suggest that there is a political element to the appellant’s claim, or to the incident which resulted in the death of the teacher.
26. The next question addressed by the expert is “Can the Appellant relocate to another part of Bangladesh to avoid harm?” However, the following paragraph does not address internal relocation in any detail. It states that the appellant comes from a rural area and that the danger of persecution is higher there than in the city or in urban areas. It goes on to describe how it is more difficult to be anonymous in rural and suburban areas as security is lower and streetlights are few. It states that this renders the appellant prone to attacks by the family members of the deceased teacher. “If law enforcement agencies get involved, they are likely to side with the teacher’s family members. Due to the unitary form of government and central police force, internal relocation will not be a full-proof protection.” There is no reference here to the fact that the appellant was five years old at the time and why, in that situation, if the family members of the deceased teacher attacked the appellant, law enforcement agencies would side with them.
27. The next question addressed by the expert is whether the uncle’s case “can affect the appellant”. The expert states that based on the documents he has been given “I can comment that the appellant’s uncle, and family members have a security threat in Bangladesh”.
“In this situation, as the Appellant's uncle has a legal dispute with the family members of the deceased madrasa teacher, his return may carry a significant risk. Murder is a serious crime in Bangladesh. The police can question or arrest anyone for the purpose of investigating a criminal offence. Since the Appellant's uncle had killed a teacher, the police could interrogate or arrest the Appellant at any time. Therefore, the Appellant could be subject to harassment, arrest, and threat by law enforcement forces.”
28. This is generic and vague. The expert has not explained why the police would want to interrogate the appellant given that he was only five years old at the time that the incident took place.
29. The expert then considers whether the appellant will be able to meet his basic and essential needs on return [40]. From [43] onwards he considers whether there would be mental health support available in Bangladesh for the appellant. We find that the expert does not have the relevant expertise to comment on the availability of mental health support. Secondly, while the expert states that the appellant said in his witness statement dated 6 June 2024 that he was currently experiencing depression which greatly impacted his cognitive functioning, the Judge states at [58]:
“I note that he claims to suffer from depression but has admitted in evidence that he has not been to see his doctor about this and there are no medical notes nor evidence of any mental health medication or any medication at all being prescribed to him.”
30. There is no evidence to suggest that the expert had any medical evidence before him.
31. Taking into account all of the above, we find that the expert report does not add anything to the appellant’s account. We find that, even had the Judge considered it in more detail, she could not have attached any weight to it for the reasons we have set out above. In addition to our concerns about the expert’s lack of expertise, it is a vague and generic report. Significantly, it is based on an account which was not accepted by the Judge. She did not accept that the appellant would be of any interest to anyone, either family members of the deceased, or the authorities, due to a murder committed by his uncle when he was five years old. The expert report does not give any evidence to suggest that the Judge’s conclusion, with particular reference to her findings at [46] and [50], is incorrect. Despite what the sub-headings in the report might suggest, the expert has not in fact considered the general plausibility of the appellant’s position, nor has not set out any evidence which could lead to a conclusion that someone in the appellant’s situation would be at risk.
32. We have found that the Judge was entitled to make her findings of fact. On the basis of those facts, we find that it would not have been possible for any judge to come to a different decision as a result of considering this expert report. We therefore find that any error of law in failing to consider the expert report is not material.
33. The grounds further set out at [13] that the Judge did not carry out a proper consideration of the appellant’s private life under Article 8, nor give sufficient reasons for her findings in this regard.
34. We find that this is not made out. The Judge considered the appellant’s private life from [55] to [59], including consideration of whether there were any exceptional circumstances which warranted a grant of leave outside of the immigration rules. She found that he had family living in Bangladesh to whom he could return. She was entitled to find, having rejected his protection claim, that there was no evidence to suggest he would not be able to reintegrate on return. She found at [58] that there was no evidence of any mental health issues nor that he was prescribed any medication. Given her findings in relation to his protection claim, we find that there is no error in her consideration of his Article 8 private life claim.
35. While we find that the Judge erred by not considering the expert report, we find that this was not a material error. Accordingly, as explained to the appellant, we do not set the decision aside.
Notice of Decision
36. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
37. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of a material error of law.
38. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 August 2026