The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001427

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68592/2023

LP/09068/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

PY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Mughal, Legal representative instructed by AMB Advocates
For the Respondent: Ms R. Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge dated 10 February 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge had dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection claim.
2. The appellant is a Congolese national aged 60 and entered the UK on 6 November 2021 to attend the COP26 conference in Glasgow and subsequently claimed asylum on 10 January 2022, which was refused by the respondent on 14 October 2023.
3. The sole issue before the First Tier Tribunal was whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of her political opinion such as to fall within the terms of the Refugee Convention.
4. The appellant’s claim was based on her membership of Action For Change (APC), a small NGO which was established to promote social justice and to a change in the government. The appellant acted as a treasurer and distributed leaflets on its behalf to attract attendance for its demonstrations and in particular did so between 1 and 4 November 2021 to promote an anti-government rally on 16 November 2021.
5. The appellant further claimed that the APC sponsored the appellant to attend the COP26 conference for the period between 30 October and 6 November, producing a letter from another NGO, ADAC in support and she arrived in the UK on 6 November 2021. The appellant was notified by her husband the following day that the authorities had visited her home where they had beaten him and terrorised her children. This happened again when the authorities returned on 14 November. The appellant’s last contact with her family was on 21 November 2021 and she contacted the APC on 10 January 2022 who informed her that they could not provide assistance and that her return to the DRC would be at her own risk. The appellant then made an asylum claim on 10 January 2022.
6. Whilst in the UK the appellant became a member of the Alliance of Patriots for the Refoundation of the Congo (APARECO) and claimed to have attended demonstrations and canvassed on their behalf.
7. The judge dismissed the appeal finding that there were a number of inconsistences with the appellant’s evidence. In addition, the judge found her involvement with the APC to be ‘low and minimal’ and found no reliable evidence of her attendance at demonstrations. Furthermore, the judge applied s8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 given the appellant’s failure to claim asylum sooner which further damaged her credibility. So far as the sur place activities were concerned the judge found that her activities did not amount to having a ‘significant and prominent’ profile with APARECO and applying PO (DRC) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (DRC – Post 2018 Elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 117, the appellant would not be at risk of persecution on return to her home country.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by First Tier judge Gumsley on 28 March 2025 on the following basis:
‘As to the substantive grounds, they are vague and lacking in specificity in places.
However, taken as a whole they appear to assert that the FtT Judge failed to make clear and adequate findings on a number of matters of significance. Whilst it is not necessary for a Judge to set out and analyse each individual aspect of the evidence , I consider that (on the basis of the accuracy of the assertions made in the grounds) that it is arguable that the Judge erred in failing to raise and afford the opportunity to the parties to address matters which were of concern; failed to give adequate reasons for finding that she was not wanted in the DRC; failed to give adequate reasons for finding as to the involvement and genuineness of her ‘political’ activities; failed to properly assess whether she would continue these activities and any risk that might therefore arise upon return.
Given the grounds are essentially interlinked all may be argued’.
Preliminary Matters
9. We note that no consolidated bundle was produced for this hearing by the appellant’s legal representatives in accordance with the standard directions and a subsequent email from this Tribunal. Ms Mughal apologised and accepted that the directions had not been complied with and was unable to give any explanation for the failure to do so. On this occasion we have decided not to make a Hamid direction but we will refer the matter to the Upper Tribunal judge responsible for such matters so that any future failure by AMB Advocates to comply with the Tribunal’s directions can be appropriately dealt with.
10. We referred to the documentation which was available to the First-tier judge being a bundle headed “Upper Tribunal Bundle” consisting of 280 pages and “Index of Appellant’s Bundle” consisting of 21 pages. Ms Mughal confirmed that there were no other documents which were relevant to the appeal and Ms Tariq confirmed that she had access to all the relevant documentation and was content to proceed.
Submissions
11. Ms Mughal relied on her grounds of appeal which accompanied the request for the permission to appeal. The first ground was that the judge had failed to properly take into account the APC letter at paragraphs 16 and 19 and submitted that if the judge had concerns about its authenticity or relevance it should have been raised during the hearing so that the appellant was given an opportunity to address any concerns.
12. On the second ground, Ms Mughal referred to three paragraphs of the decision which she submitted, overlapping with her first ground, were instances where the judge should have given the appellant an opportunity to provide additional information to clear any confusion or doubt before drawing adverse inferences. These were paragraph 13 relating to the number of the appellant's siblings; paragraph 16 on the level of the appellant’s involvement with the ADAC and the links between it and the APC and paragraph 19 relating to the authenticity and relevance of the letter from the APC.
13. The third ground is that the judge failed to provide a “full assessment of the appellant’s involvement with the APC” in paragraph 23 dealing with his findings on the credibility of the appellant. In particular the judge did not give sufficient weight to the fact that she had worked as a treasurer and that her role had not been confined to the distribution of leaflets notwithstanding, as Ms Mughal had conceded, the appellant’s witness statement stated the authorities’ actions were motivated by her distribution of leaflets.
14. The fourth ground is that the judge’s conclusions in paragraph 24 on her evidence not being reliable about the danger of persecution on any return to the DRC were inadequately reasoned and there was no rational basis for the judge to have concluded as he did.
15. The final ground relating to the treatment by the judge of the appellant’s sur place activities was withdrawn by Ms Mughal and consequently not a matter for this appeal. Ms Mughal confirmed that the final paragraph of the grounds did not refer to any additional issues which had not been raised in the previous submissions.
16. Ms Tariq submitted that the entirety of the grounds for appeal were no more than a disagreement with the judge’s decision and did not raise any material errors of law. In relation to the treatment of the APC letter she referred us to QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC) relating to the verification of documents which confirmed previous case law that it was for the judge to determine whether the document can be regarded as reliable. This the judge did in the present case having regard to the evidence put before him. On the second ground, paragraph 13 – at the First-tier hearing the judge had on re-examination of the appellant attempted to clarify the number of siblings but even so he remained unclear on the answer and so identified this in the decision.
17. The role of the appellant as a treasurer of the APC was not raised as a material issue at the First tier, with no mention of it in the skeleton argument. In any event, the judge had noted the appellant’s evidence that she worked as a treasurer for the APC in paragraph 14 and that he expressly stated in paragraph 10 that he was taking a ‘holistic’ approach to the evidence and had taken account of all the evidence before him whether or not he had expressly referenced it in any particular conclusion.
18. On the final ground, the judge’s reasoning as to the issue of risk for the appellant on her return to the DRC had been clearly set out in paragraphs 27 and 28 which dealt with not only with her sur place activities but that her low-level activities in the DRC would not be sufficient to endanger her on return.
Analysis
19. In order for us to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, we have to find that the judge made one or more errors of law and that such errors were material – in other words that, had such errors not been made, the outcome of the decision may well have been different. Having heard from Ms Mughal and Ms Tariq, we indicated at the hearing that there was no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and that we would provide in writing our full reasons for that conclusion which we now turn to do.
20. On the treatment of the APC letter by the judge the grounds states if the judge is in doubt regarding core issues he should “have sought to have the matter clarified in oral evidence”. This is not a correct statement of law and ignores that the burden of proof, albeit on the lower standard as the judge correctly identified in paragraph 5, is on the appellant to establish her case. No doubt, the judge will raise any questions that he has during the course of the hearing, but it is not for him to seek out evidence to support the appellant’s case. That is for the appellant alone and QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China specifically made it clear that it is for the judge to determine the issue of authenticity based on the evidence he is presented with. Paragraph 19 clearly identifies the basis for his conclusion on the letter in absence of any evidence surrounding its production and link between the APC and the ADAC, the sponsor of the appellant’s trip to COP26 (paragraph 16). Further the judge remarked on the apparent inconsistency between the appellant’s witness statement where she stated that the authorities had raided her house and brutalised her family on 7th November 2021 and the APC letter which suggested that it was following the demonstration in the DRC on 16 November, 2021 that the authorities became interested in the appellant and her home ransacked. No doubt the judge also had in mind the inconsistency between the ADAC letter indicating sponsorship for the appellant’s attendance at COP26 between 30 October and 6 November 2021 and the appellant’s witness statement that she distributed leaflets in the DRC between 1 and 4 November 2021 and only arrived in the UK on 6 November 2021.
21. The second ground is similarly based on a misunderstanding of the appellant’s need to discharge the burden of proof to establish her protection claim. On paragraph 13 relating to the number of the appellant’s siblings it seems apparent, having heard from Ms Tariq, that the judge did attempt to clarify the position but still did not get a clear understanding. In any event, he made no material findings which could be said to have been influenced by this issue one way or another. The other two paragraphs 16 and 19 are largely covered in the first ground relating to matters in which no evidence was produced for the judge to conclude other than as he did.
22. The third ground is essentially that the judge failed to take full account of the fact that the appellant had acted in the treasury function of the APC when concluding that her involvement was ‘low and minimal’ and had assumed her only involvement was the distribution of leaflets. There is no merit in this submission. The judge had expressly noted at paragraph 14 the appellant’s treasury role and implicitly concluded when looking at the evidence in the round that such a position was not of such importance that it would bring her to the attention of the authorities. Indeed, in the appellant’s witness statements there are no suggestion that the authorities were interested in her because of her treasury role and that it was only her distribution of leaflets for the demonstration to be held on 16 November 2021 that did so. Similarly, the skeleton argument before the judge does not make mention of it in the chronology of events or anywhere else. Accordingly, there is no basis to suggest that the judge did not accord the proper weight to the appellant’s treasury role when there was no evidence put before him to suggest he should have given it greater weight.
23. The final ground is based on the judge’s inadequacy of reasoning for his conclusions set out in paragraph 24 regarding the appellant not being at risk on return to the DRC. In order for this to amount to an error of law there has to be a failure by the judge to explain his critical reasons for his conclusions. It is not necessary for him to explain every step in his thought process, but he has to make clear his basis for his conclusions on material points. The judge’s reasoning is clearly set out. It is based, at paragraph 24, on his view of the reliability of the appellant’s evidence taking into account the inconsistences previously noted and his obligation to apply s8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2008 since he did not accept the appellant’s explanation for not making an asylum claim earlier. In addition, in paragraph 28 he explained, on a holistic view and applying the lower standard of proof:
‘In my judgement, the appellant will not face a real risk of persecution on return to DRC on account of the appellant’s low level political activities in Congo or in combination with the appellant’s current sur place activities with APARECO’
That is a summary of the conclusions drawn in the previous paragraphs concerning the appellant’s support for the APC coupled with her sur place activities. Accordingly, the judge’s reasons for concluding that the appellant would not be at risk on return to the DRC were clear.
24. As a final matter we would direct the appellant’s legal representatives to the recent decision of this Tribunal in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 which emphasised the importance of identifying the error of law adequately and succinctly with the appropriate supporting evidence. The grounds of appeal, which Ms Mughal relied on in her submissions, as the grant of permission identified were ‘vague and lacking in specificity in places’ and did not clearly set out errors of law. We encourage the appellant’s representatives to ensure that, going forwards, the guidance set out in Rai and DAM is followed.
25. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
There is no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld with the consequence that the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.


Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May. 2025