Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001445

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00211/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

Nicholas Cleveland Hinds
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Mackenzie KC, counsel instructed by Wilsons LLP
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 3 February 2025, allowing the appellant’s appeal against a decision to refuse to revoke a deportation order.
2. Following an error of law hearing which took place on 12 August 2025, that decision was set aside with no preserved findings. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
Anonymity
3. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. Having considered the principle of open justice, there is no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is a national of Jamaica now aged forty-five. Having met a British citizen in Jamaica (‘P1’) in 2003, he arrived in the United Kingdom in 2008 on a fiancé visa. The appellant and P1 married and he was, on 16 October 2012, granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The appellant and P1 have two children, C1 who was born in 2010 and C2 who was born in 2015. The appellant also has two children with a different partner who were born in Jamaica in 2007 and 2009.
5. The appellant is currently in a long-distance relationship with a British citizen (‘P2’), with whom he has a daughter (‘C3’) who is now aged three.
6. The appellant was convicted of grievous bodily harm with intent on 7 November 2016 and subsequently sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment with a restraining order imposed to protect the victim from harassment. The victim was in a romantic relationship with the appellant at the time of the attack in October 2016.
7. A deportation order was signed on 26 April 2018.
8. The appellant appealed, on Article 8 grounds, against the deportation order. The appeal was dismissed on 29 November 2018 with the judge concluding that the Exceptions to deportation did not apply. The appellant was refused permission to appeal against that decision.
9. On 13 November 2019, the appellant applied for asylum, raised an Article 3 ECHR medical claim as well as an Article 8 claim based on family life.
10. On 11 November 2020, a decision was made to refuse his protection and human rights claims and to refuse to revoke the deportation order. The claim was certified which led to the appellant’s deportation to Jamaica on 2 December 2020. It is this decision which is the subject of this appeal.
11. The appellant appealed against the decision of 11 November 2020 and his protection appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 28 October 2021. That decision was set aside by the Upper Tribunal with the findings relating to section 72, humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR preserved and the appeal was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was once more dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 17 August 2023. That decision was set also aside by the Upper Tribunal and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing. The appellant succeeded at that hearing however, this is the decision which has now been set aside for remaking before the Upper Tribunal.
The remaking hearing
12. In advance of the hearing, evidence was submitted on the appellant’s behalf including a supplementary bundle, a bundle of medical evidence and a skeleton argument. An email from an independent social worker, Mr Peter Horrocks to the appellant’s solicitors stated that he had reviewed the new material and that it did not affect his previous conclusions. The 2599-page consolidated bundle filed by the respondent for the error of law hearing was also available.
13. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. P1 and P2 gave evidence remotely and Mr Horrocks, appeared in person. The appellant was unable to give evidence as permission could not be obtained from the Jamaican authorities for him to do so. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
14. At the conclusion of the hearing, the decision was reserved.
Discussion
15. The appellant claims that the refusal to revoke the deportation order is disproportionate when the interference with his family life and that of his children is balanced against the public interest. He particularly relies upon the effect of his continued deportation on the emotions and behaviour of C1 and C2.
9. Part 13 of the Immigration Rules sets out the Secretary of State’s policy in relation to deportation where the procedure for deportation set out in section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971 applies. Paragraphs 390 to 392 of the Rules address the revocation of a deportation order, relevant paragraphs of which appear below:
390. An application for revocation of a deportation order will be considered in the light of all the circumstances including the following:
(i) the grounds on which the order was made;
(ii) any representations made in support of revocation;
(iii) the interests of the community, including the maintenance of an effective immigration control;
(iv) the interests of the applicant, including any compassionate circumstances. 352 390A. Where paragraph 398 applies the Secretary of State will consider whether paragraph 399 or 399A applies and, if it does not, it will only be in exceptional circumstances that the public interest in maintaining the deportation order will be outweighed by other factors.
391. In the case of a person who has been deported following conviction for a criminal offence, the continuation of a deportation order against that person will be the proper course:
(a) in the case of a conviction for an offence for which the person was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than 4 years, unless 10 years have elapsed since the making of the deportation order when, if an application for revocation is received, consideration will be given on a case by case basis to whether the deportation order should be maintained, or
(b) in the case of a conviction for an offence for which the person was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 4 years, at any time,

Unless, in either case, the continuation would be contrary to the Human Rights Convention or the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, or there are other exceptional circumstances that mean the continuation is outweighed by compelling factors.
16. S.117C applies in cases involving applications for revocation of deportation orders from abroad, just as in cases concerning those not yet deported and as such it matters not that the appellant has been deported after the decision in question, applying headnote 7 of Binaku (s.11 TCEA; s.117C NIAA; para. 399D) [2021] UKUT 00034 (IAC).
17. The appellant was sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment, and as such falls within s.117C(6) NIAA 2002 and must demonstrate not just that the effect of his deportation on his children is ‘unduly harsh’, as in Exception 2, but that there are ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above’ such an effect.
18. Close to eight years have elapsed since the deportation order was made. Applying MR (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1598, there is a public interest in maintaining a deportation order. In EYF (Turkey) [2019] EWCA Civ 592 it was said that if less than ten years have elapsed since the order was made there is a presumption that it will be maintained, but no presumption to the contrary.
19. Section 117C (6) requires a balancing assessment weighing the interference with the Article 8 rights of the appellant and his family against the public interest in his deportation. The test under Section 117C (6) involves an appropriately high threshold, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them. In NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662 at [33], it was held that there is no exceptionality test but considered that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be ‘rare.’ Relevant to the appellant’s case is what was said at [30] of NA:
In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an Article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2", whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of Article 8.
20. In HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22, it was emphasised that all the relevant circumstances of the case must be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. In relation to rehabilitation, the Court said at [58]:
‘(i)n a case where the only evidence of rehabilitation is the fact that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance.’
21. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights continues to be relevant to the factors which must be considered, with reference to the cases of Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24, Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands.
22. The relevant factors are as follows:
(a) Nature and seriousness of the offence(s) committed by the intended deportee.
(b) Length of time that the intended deportee has remained in the UK.
(c) Time elapsed since the offending and conduct in that period.
(d) Nationalities of those affected by the decision.
(e) The family circumstances of the intended deportee.
(f) Whether a spousal relationship was formed at a time when the spouse was aware of the offending.
(g) Whether there are children of the marriage and their ages.
(h) Seriousness of the difficulties faced by the intended deportee in the country to which he/she would be expelled.
(i) Best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which they would face in the country to which the intended deportee would be expelled.
(j) Extent of the intended deportee’s social, cultural and family ties with the host country and country of destination.
23. I am guided by the principles in Zoumbas [2013] UKSC 74, including the need to consider firstly the best interests of the children affected by the outcome in this case, the need to clearly evaluate the children’s circumstances before deciding that they are outweighed, that emotional as well as physical harm is relevant and that the children must not be blamed for the conduct of the appellant.
24. When considering the meaning of unduly harsh, I am further guided by what is said in MK (Sierra Leone) [2015] INLR 563, cited with approval in HA that:
‘Unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.
25. In relation to the term ‘very compelling circumstances, at [28] of Garzon [2018] EWCA Civ 1225, it was said that ‘very’ imports a very high threshold and ‘compelling’ means circumstances which have a ‘powerful, irresistible and convincing effect.’
26. In NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662 the very compelling circumstances was described as an extremely demanding test requiring a wide-ranging exercise so as to ensure a result compatible with Article 8. An holistic evaluation of all relevant factors is required including those which might have already been assessed in the context of the Exceptions to deportation and must include an application of the principles in the Strasbourg authorities.
27. Applying Devaseelan* [2002] UKIAT 00702, the starting point is the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 29 November 2018 in which the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds against the decision to deport him was dismissed. At that stage the appellant had yet to be removed from the United Kingdom. The judge accepted that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C1 and C2 and that as British Citizens they should not be required to leave the United Kingdom but concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for them to either go to Jamaica with the appellant or remain here without him.
28. In the 2018 decision, there was documentary and witness evidence before the judge of the effects as to the emotional state of both children caused by the appellant’s absence from the family during his prison sentence. The judge concluded at [22] that it was open to the children’s mother to seek help and intervention from agencies to help the children transition and to cope with what they had already had to deal with. At [32] the judge comments on the evidence in an OASys report dated 1 August 2018 in which the appellant disputed details of the prosecution case, blamed the victim, minimised his role and was not willing to address his offending behaviour. The judge concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances.
29. I accept that the findings of the previous Tribunal are not binding and that it is open to me to depart from them for the following reasons. The facts in this case have moved on in that the appellant has been in Jamaica since 2019, the children are now much older, there are now several reports from an independent social worker as well as evidence from P1 as to the effects on the children of the appellant’s deportation and how modern methods of communication have been working in practice. I do not disturb the finding that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with C1 and C2.
30. The social work evidence now available consists of a series of reports authored by Mr Horrocks dating from 2021 until 2024. It is not in dispute that Mr Horrocks is appropriately qualified and experienced to provide his expert opinion. I have taken into account that Mr Pugh had some criticism of the accuracy of the facts therein, but I nonetheless accord significant weight to those highly detailed reports.
31. The conclusions reached by Mr Horrocks in his report of 5 July 2023 are set out below and did not materially differ from the conclusions in the report dated 21 July 2021.
4.14 (iv) Please comment on the affect that prolonged and permanent separation would have on our client’s children;

4.15 In terms of C1, the evidence indicates that since his father’s removal from the UK, there has been an ongoing deterioration in his overall behaviour and functioning. The current situation appears to be heading in one direction and without further 137 15 intervention, the inevitable outcome appears to be increased levels of dissatisfaction with his education, leading to permanent exclusion. Outside of school, there is likely to be an increase in anti-social behaviour, he is vaping at the age of 12, and his father believes that he may be smoking cigarettes or drugs. He has started coming into contact with the police at a very young age and that will only head in one direction and lead to criminal sanctions of one form or the other. The downward spiral in terms of his behaviour and functioning is ongoing and severe, whereby prolonged and permanent separation from his father will only serve to reinforce this downward spiral. C1 is displaying behaviours that often lead to criminal offending and there is a significant risk that, without appropriate intervention, he faces a future of crime and in all likelihood prison.

4.16 (C2) is still a young child, but the impact of her father’s absence is already visible in terms of her comfort eating. Her eating has become a habit, which her mother appears unable to influence in any way. Not least because (P1) is preoccupied with her own difficulties and challenges, trying to provide for and parent these children. A further concern relates to the lack of adequate supervision for (C2) in particular, given her age. Prolonged and permanent separation from her father will only serve to ingrain her comfort eating, to the extent that this will become a lifelong problem and has the potential to shorten her life, but also to make all aspects of her physical functioning a major challenge.
32. The most recent report of 26 November 2024 gives the following summary of the concerns relating to C1 and C2.
4.8 In my response to the previous questions, I have highlighted areas of significant difficulty faced by these children, which appear to be connected with their father’s absence. [C1] presents with anger outbursts at home and at school and there are concerns about his academic development. His eneurisis is ongoing. His eating problems have improved somewhat. He is aged 14, an age described by his mother as a very scary age and she worries about the deteriorating gang violence in the local area, when she cannot monitor his whereabouts and what he is doing. He has tried cannabis. He was recently chased by a large group of boys, when he went to a location, he should not have visited. In terms of [C1], the key areas of difficulty linked to a prolonged and permanent separation from his father, would be the emotional stress and trauma he suffers because of his father’s absence, which is not compensated for by other means of communication. This in turn leads to anger outbursts and behavioural difficulties impacting on his overall development, his educational development, his social development and his emotional development. He is at a stage in life, where the wrong choices, whether mixing with the wrong crowd of people or his inability to focus and concentrate can have long term harmful consequences for the rest of his life. He faces the risks of long-term mental health difficulties, a failure in academic achievement and association with the gang subculture, which in turn can lead to drug misuse, violence and criminality/imprisonment.

4.9 [C2] also suffers from anger management difficulties and this together with her learning difficulties are having a major negative impact on her educational development and there appears to be a close link between those difficulties and her father’s absence. She is at risk of those difficulties undermining her potential to achieve and progress to the best of her abilities. Equally her eating habits appear to be ongoing and given her age and stage of development, will have long term, if not permanent harmful consequences for her physical and mental health, unless appropriate intervention is identif[i]ed as a matter of urgency.

4.10 In my professional opinion, the concerns highlighted above will be compounded by a prolonged and permanent separation from their father, as well as being directly linked to his absence. Efforts to address and resolve these difficulties are less likely to succeed, if their father remains ph[y]sically absent from their lives
33. At the end of the 2024 report, Mr Horrocks ‘strongly’ recommends that it would be in the children’s best interests for the appellant to be granted legal status to return to the UK.
34. As mentioned above, Mr Horrocks has seen the additional evidence provided, primarily relating to the children’s schooling, and maintains his opinion as to the extent of the negative impact on their lives of the appellant remaining in Jamaica. That additional evidence is summarised below.
35. Educational records were provided in respect of C1 and C2. It is apparent that both children have poor attendance at their respective schools including a significant amount of unauthorised attendance.
36. In terms of conduct and progress, C1’s has been variable between 2021 to date, however overall, his conduct has worsened as of December 2025. In October 2025 he was placed on an Individual Support Plan (ISP) on the grounds of his ‘Social, Emotional & Mental Health.’ The ISP notes that C1 has no medical needs, that he is not on free school meals and that his areas of development include that he struggles to take responsibility, has a poor attitude, is easily distracted and disrupts lessons. On the plus side, the ISP describes C1 as sociable, wanting to succeed, that his punctuality has improved, that he has started engaging more and is slowly adapting his attitude to learning. The overall summary was that C1 is a ‘confident student’ making slow progress owing to his attitude to learning.
37. There is reference in the school material to an occasion where the school received a report that C1’ blamed the victim of the appellant’s crime for the appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom. Otherwise, there are several records of P1 having contacted the school with concerns regarding C1’s mental health owing to his father being deported. There was also reference to the deaths of three male family members. P1 told the school that C1 had witnessed the appellant speaking rudely to P1 as well as their arguments.
38. A report in May 2022 refers to C1 having a meltdown regarding which P1 informed the school that there was distress over whether P2 would take C1 and C2 to see the appellant in Jamaica. A further matter which P1 told the school during 2021 was that the appellant was simultaneously expecting two babies with two different women and this had led to C1 being approached by a relative of one of the women. Thereafter C1 had avoided speaking to the appellant and ultimately there were cross words between them; with the appellant reportedly telling C1, ‘I don’t want you in my life either, I won’t bother again.’ There has been no mention of a sixth child in the papers, however it is fair to say that the family composition considered by Mr Horrocks in all his reports was limited to the appellant, P1 and their children and did not include P2 and C3 nor the children in Jamaica.
39. The only clear incident in the records involving C1 being aggressive occurred in 2021 and appeared to coincide with one of the appellant’s previous appeals according to communications between P1 and the school.
40. As for C2, she has no ECHP and her school reports have been overwhelmingly positive, other than for attendance, which was described in the most recent report as a cause for concern.
41. Medical evidence has been provided for C1, C2, and P1. The most recent evidence in relation to C1, dating from September 2024, refers to a history of nocturnal enuresis and a recent flare up. Otherwise, there are references to behaviour issues and fleeting medical conditions such as colds and high temperatures. C2’s medical records indicate that the most recent consultation in June 2024 concerned acute tonsilitis. The remainder of the recent records refer to colds and sore throats. There is no reference to any issues with her weight or disordered eating.
42. During a call to C1’s school, P1 referred to undergoing chemotherapy and her oral evidence was that she was medically unable to take the children to Jamaica to see the appellant. I have therefore considered her medical records with particular care. Those records show a consultation regarding a chest infection in September 2024 and a cough in October 2024. Prior to that she was urgently referred for breast cancer screening in August 2024, albeit there is no indication of the outcome of that referral. The only other serious physical condition referred to in the medical records is a diagnosis of haemochromatosis in 2020 following which P1 was prescribed medication and underwent a series of venesections. The most recent consultant letter dating from June 2023 described P1 reporting that she felt well, referred to her starting medication and that no further venesections had been arranged. Lastly, there is a reference to P1 experiencing anxiety with depression in 2019, linked to the appellant’s imprisonment, and which was treated with medication and counselling. The notes state that P1’s mental health raised no risk of harm to herself or others and that there were no safeguarding concerns.
43. In his oral evidence, Mr Horrocks interpreted the most recent educational evidence as suggesting that C1 is having significant problems with learning and presentation owing to psychological problems rather than developmental delay. He stated that the ECHP indicated that C1 may have additional needs, noting P1’s evidence regarding C1’s lack of self-confidence which he put down to the appellant’s absence. Mr Horrocks stated that C1 went through a similar phase when the appellant was imprisoned and had improved in the period after the appellant was released, prior to his deportation. He also acknowledged that there was no formal diagnosis of any condition in relation to C1, that P1 had made ‘significant efforts’ with him and that there had been some improvement in his enuresis following medical treatment.
44. On the other hand, Mr Horrocks felt that it was too late for the ISP to have a major impact on C1’s behaviour. He put C2’s comfort eating down to the appellant’s absence. Overall, Mr Horrocks felt that the school material confirmed his expectations for C1.
45. In relation to help being sought from Child Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) or Children’s Services, Mr Horrocks stated that neither child met the criteria to come within their remit as these services were limited to more serious behaviour. He accepted that the appellant’s return to the United Kingdom would not turn the children into ‘model citizens’ but would be beneficial.
46. Mr Horrocks further accepted that his prediction that C1 would become involved in crime had not come to pass but he considered that the risk had not evaporated. Mr Horrocks confirmed that he had last spoken to the appellant in September 2024. When asked about what impact the appellant, were he to return to the United Kingdom, would have on the children while living at a distance, Mr Horrocks said that he thought the appellant would want to play a role in their lives.
47. As indicated above I have placed weight on Mr Horrocks’ evidence. While I note Mr Pugh’s submission that the predictions of C1 becoming involved in gang violence had (mercifully) abated, this does not undermine Mr Horrocks expert opinion.
48. P1 attended the hearing remotely to give evidence. Her evidence echoed the content of the school records and ISW reports. She added, while C2 had no diagnosis, someone at the school had said that C2 might have “a bit of autism,” but that there was no ECHP at this stage. When asked in cross-examination about the record of C1 blaming the victim of the appellant’s offence, P1 became quite heated, referring to the victim as “that woman,” adding that P1 was not surprised when the appellant “flipped.”
49. P1 denied that she and the appellant had disagreed in front of the children but admitted that the appellant had told her to “shut up” and this had been inadvertently witnessed by C1. P1 said that she could not travel on long haul flights because she was at high risk of heart attacks, strokes and blood clots, and therefore she could not take the children to see the appellant in Jamaica. She did not believe that P2 could cope with taking C1 and C2 to Jamaica. P1 stated that she got on well with P2 but that they had yet to meet up with the children and P1 did not drive. The plan was for the appellant, should he return to the United Kingdom, to see C1 and C2 on a weekly basis as he would be living in a different town, around 50 miles away from P1 and their children.
50. I am satisfied that, in the main, P1 was a witness of truth, apart from her explanation for not taking the children to Jamaica, which was not supported by her medical records and which I am inclined to believe was exaggerated. I accept that P1’s evidence in support of the appellant’s case is solely motivated by concern for her children.
51. P2 also gave evidence which was supportive of the appellant seeing C1 and C2 if he returns to the United Kingdom. There was no challenge to her testimony. I am satisfied that she is a witness of truth.
52. There was no up to date evidence directly from C1 and C2 postdating Mr Horrocks’ September 2024 report, although I accept that P1 accurately reported their desire to see their father.
53. The appellant provided an up-to-date witness statement in which he states that P2 and C3 have visited him in Jamaica three times since his previous statement which he made in November 2024. He also described speaking to P2 and C3 daily by video calls. By contrast, he speaks to C1 and C2 “as often as he can,” with the last occasion being two weeks before the witness statement was prepared. The frequency of telephone contact was an issue in the appellant’s earlier witness statements, in that the appellant had not been able to speak to C1 and C2 as often as he would like.
54. Currently, the appellant states that he thinks C1 is using cannabis and is concerned that he will get into trouble. His plan for seeing the children if he returns to the United Kingdom would be to live with P2 in one town, see C1 and C2 frequently and that the children would stay with him from “time to time.” In earlier witness statements he criticises P1 over her parenting of the children, but this feature is not repeated in his most recent statement.
55. I accept, on balance, that the best interests of all three of the appellant’s children in the United Kingdom is to have regular face to face contact with the appellant. Mr Pugh made detailed submissions regarding the best interests of the children, with reference to the account of C1 blaming the victim for the appellant’s deportation. In light of P1’s intemperate oral evidence in relation to the victim, I am not satisfied that the appellant is solely responsible for this behaviour in C1.
56. In light of Kapikanya [2025] EWCA Civ 987, at [42-44], I firstly consider whether the Exceptions to deportation in section 117C are met before considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above them.
57. In this case, only Exception 2 in relation to C1 and C2 is argued. I have taken into consideration that the respondent accepts that it would be unduly harsh for C1 and C2 to reside in Jamaica with the appellant. The respondent’s argument is that the stay scenario would not be unduly harsh on the children. I accept the expert evidence that C1 and C2’s separation from the appellant has, most likely, had a negative impact on their respective emotional states and behaviour.
58. In making the following findings, I have had in mind Mr Mackenzie’s submission, with reference to JG (Jamaica) [2019] EWCA Civ 982, that psychological or emotional difficulties, must not be minimised and may be capable of meeting the threshold in s.117C(6). In JG, the Court upheld the finding that it would be unduly harsh for the child affected to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant.
59. I observe that in JG, in contrast to this case, the child was under the care of CAMHS which, along with the local NHS Trust, provided reports, and that his psychological damage resulted in behaviour including ‘threats of self-harming.’
60. It is set out in the appellant’s earlier witness statements, that he left the matrimonial household in December 2012, shortly after being granted settlement and when C1 was around two years old. The appellant did not resume cohabitation with P1 even after C2 was born. After the appellant was released from prison in 2019, he continued to live elsewhere and indeed he was required to by the terms of an injunction. I accept that the appellant developed a parental relationship with C1 and C2 while he was still in the United Kingdom and that maintaining that relationship by remote means from Jamaica has not been without challenges.
61. Given the evidence of C1’s behaviour at school, and C2’s overeating, I have no hesitation in accepting that the effect on them of the appellant’s deportation has been harsh. I further accept that remote contact between the appellant and C1 and C2 may not be easy or as frequent as he would like. Yet, I am not persuaded that the harshness involved in this case goes beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent, applying KO (Nigeria) at [23].
62. The evidence relied upon shows that neither child has been diagnosed with a mental health or a developmental disorder. Both children are generally in good physical health. The expectation of Mr Horrocks that C1 would become involved in crime has not happened. Rather, P1’s latest statement raises concerns that C1 is gaming from the safety of his own home. Both before and after the appellant’s deportation, P1 has coped as a single parent with occasional support from her own and the appellant’s family members and without a referral being required to social services.
63. As I indicated above, I am not satisfied that P1 has any current significant health concerns which would affect her ability to care for the children. Nor do I accept that there is no prospect of C1 and C2 visiting the appellant in Jamaica given that P1 is in employment, and I have found that there is no evidence before me to suggest that her health precludes her from flying.
64. The evidence of Mr Horrocks was that the return of the appellant to the United Kingdom was unlikely to turn things around. This was a realistic assessment, given the duration of C1’s behaviour issues at school, together with the fact that the appellant plans to be living in a different town some distance away with his new family unit. While P1 stated that the appellant is the disciplinarian and that C1 is likely to do what he says, it must be borne in mind that owing to the geographical distance the appellant would be unable to immediately respond to poor behaviour or to take any effective steps to discipline him.
65. Having carefully considered all the evidence before me, even where not expressly mentioned, I find that the appellant does not meet Exception 2 to deportation. That is, I do not accept that the effect of the appellant’s deportation on C1 and C2 is unduly harsh. At this point I should emphasise that no case was put that the appellant’s deportation is unduly harsh on C3.
66. Notwithstanding my finding on Exception 2, I have considered whether the appellant may, nonetheless, be able to establish that there are very compelling circumstances which outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
67. In doing so, I start with the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the appellant. The assault on his previous partner was sufficiently serious to result in a 6-year sentence of imprisonment despite a guilty plea, as well as a restraining order prohibiting him from contacting the victim, attempting to contact her or being within 100m of any address where the appellant knew her to live. That order was to remain in place, until further order. There is no suggestion that there has been any such further order.
68. The sentencing judge’s remarks reveal that the appellant carried out a ‘violent and terrifying’ attack on his former partner, driven by ‘jealousy,’ ‘humiliation and embarrassment.’ According to the said remarks, the attack on the victim continued for 30 minutes involving strangulation with hands and with clothing, punching, stamping and striking with a household object. The appellant woke the victim from unconsciousness by throwing water over her to continue the assault. The judge states that the victim was ‘beaten black and blue,’ referring to the photographs of the victim in the ambulance which were before the Crown Court. While the appellant refers, in his 2021 witness statement, to his mental health at the time of the offence, the sentencing judge was of the view that there was no requirement for a psychiatric report. The judge accepted that the appellant was ‘very remorseful’ by the time of the sentencing hearing, considered that he had no prior convictions and was in his thirties at the time of the offence.
69. While the appellant was deported over five years ago, it is to his credit that he arrived in the United Kingdom lawfully in December 2008 and was granted indefinite leave to remain in October 2012 owing to his marriage to P1. Thereafter he remained in the UK until his deportation to Jamaica in December 2020 which amounts to a total of twelve years.
70. In the ten years which have elapsed since the offence took place in 2016, there is no indication of any further offending either in the United Kingdom or Jamaica.
71. Affected by this decision are the appellant’s three British children aged 15, 10 and 3 years old, his current British partner, P2 and his previous British partner P1. The appellant’s family circumstances are that he has two children in Jamaica who, at the time he came to reside in the United Kingdom were very young but are now adults or close to adulthood. As set out above, the appellant separated from P1 in 2012 but has remained involved in the lives of their children C1 and C2 both before and after his deportation. Since his deportation, the appellant has formed a new relationship with P2 and they have a young child, C3. P2 entered into a relationship with the appellant in full awareness of his offending and while she says in her statement that she is desperate for the appellant to return to the UK, little emphasis has been placed on this relationship or their child in these proceedings.
72. The appellant previously raised difficulties with the safety of his removal to Jamaica however he no longer pursues that claim. Indeed, he has been living in Jamaica for over five years since his deportation and he previously resided there for the first twenty-five years of his life. As indicated above, the best interests of the children are to have face to face contact with the appellant.
73. There was no credible evidence of any difficulty with the children visiting the appellant in Jamaica. It is not suggested that as British citizens the children should relocate there. P2 has visited the appellant with their daughter on many occasions, three times in the past twelve months alone. I was not told of any obstacles to the appellant’s family life with P2 and C3 taking place in Jamaica however that was not the focus of the appeal.
74. The appellant has also clearly developed family ties in the United Kingdom with his previous partner P1, his current partner P2 and his British children. There is also evidence of an aunt, a male cousin and other relatives of the appellant residing in the United Kingdom. In Jamaica, the appellant has his mother with whom he resides and his eldest two children.
75. I have while mindful that evidence of rehabilitation is likely to be deserving of little or no material weight, considered the various references in the evidence to the appellant being remorseful. It was not argued that the appellant’s was a case where the issue of rehabilitation could make a significant contribution to the assessment of very compelling circumstances.
76. I am required to take into consideration the matters set out in section 117C when considering appeals involving foreign criminals. Therefore, it is the case that the deportation of the appellant, as a foreign criminal was in the public interest and his continued exclusion remains in the public interest. The offence committed by the appellant was particularly serious and I have regard to the consideration that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation.
77. The public interest requires deportation, unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions. I have kept in mind the seriousness of the appellant’s criminal offending as well as the great weight which must attach to the public interest in deporting foreign national criminals.
78. I recognise that the public interest must be approached flexibly, recognising that there will, unusually, be cases where the person's circumstances outweigh the strong public interest in removal, applying Akinyemi [2019] EWCA Civ 2098. Nonetheless, I conclude that this is not one of those cases.
79. Having considered all the evidence and submissions made, I conclude that there are no very compelling circumstances which outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s continued expulsion from the United Kingdom pursuant to the deportation order made in 2018.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 February 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email