Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001447

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56455/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

ZB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Lams, Counsel instructed by TNA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Hoe Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the appellant’s appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordon-Lennox (the Judge) dated 23 January 2025. In that decision the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The Judge made an anonymity direction and lest anything is said or done in these proceedings that gives rise to a risk to the appellant, I maintain that order.
Background
2. The appellant is 38 years old. He is a citizen of Pakistan and until he came to the United Kingdom had always lived in Sialkot City. He is married and his wife, son and daughter remain in Pakistan. He studied in the United Kingdom between August 2010 and November 2011. In February 2014 he returned to the United Kingdom having been granted a six month visit visa. He did not leave when that visa expired however and instead remained in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
3. In July 2019 the appellant was arrested by Immigration Officers and having been detained for the purpose of removal, he claimed asylum asserting that he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted by his father who had accused him of dishonouring his family. As part of his claim he said that while in Pakistan he had been ill-treated by his father who was a drug dealer and who forced the appellant to complete criminal activities on his behalf. In the light of this claim the appellant was referred to the Single Competent Authority who decided on balance that the appellant had been the victim of modern slavery between 2005 and February 2014.
4. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim in a decision dated 5 September 2023. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been subjected to harm by his father in the past and that he feared his father. The respondent did not however accept that the appellant’s father was a powerful and influential person and concluded that the appellant would be protected from his father in Pakistan by state authorities or alternatively that he could relocate within Pakistan to avoid ill-treatment by his father. The respondent concluded therefore that the appellant did not meet the definition of a refugee was not entitled to humanitarian protection and that his removal to Pakistan would not breach his right to respect for his private and family life.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and his appeal was heard by the Judge on 8 January 2025. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing. He also provided documentary evidence including a report from a psychiatrist Dr Galappathie who diagnosed the appellant as having mild depression, generalised anxiety disorder and PTSD, a report from a barrister in Pakistan: Asad Ali Khan about conditions in Pakistan, and three documents relating to a conviction which the appellant said had been recorded against him in his absence. the Judge heard submissions from the representatives for both parties. On 23 January 2025 the Judge issued his decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal.
The Judge’s decision
6. In his decision the Judge found that the appellant’s father ran a wood business while also conducting a criminal drugs business and that prior to coming to the United Kingdom the appellant had been forced to be involved in that criminal business ([37]). The Judge found that the appellant’s explanations for why he came to the United Kingdom were inconsistent and that this undermined his credibility ([39]). The Judge found that the appellant’s father had threatened to kill the appellant when he did not return to Pakistan following the death of his mother in 2019 ([40]). The Judge did not accept that the threats from the appellant’s father were the result of an honour based issue but instead found that they were “the approach of a vindictive, abusive and bullying individual who is used to getting what he wants” ([41]).
7. The Judge found that following the death of the appellant’s mother, his wife and children had moved out of the family home to live “in the mountains near the city of Jhelum” where they had not been located by the appellant’s father ([42] and [44]). The Judge found that the appellant’s account of his father’s influence had evolved and been embellished during the life of his claim and concluded that the appellant had fabricated details in his account about his father’s connections to politicians ([46]). Having considered the evidence from Mr Khan the Judge concluded at [52]:
Overall, I consider that it is reasonably likely that the appellant's father has routinely bribed the police in and around his home area given the nature of his criminal enterprise which I have accepted above. However, I am not satisfied that the appellant has sufficiently demonstrated that his father has power and influence more widely beyond the police in his home area or through politicians. In respect of the latter I have found that the appellant has embellished and fabricated detail which I consider he had done to bolster his asylum claim. This undermines the credibility of his claim.
8. Given the time when the documents were obtained and the absence of an explanation for how they were obtained, the Judge found that the documents relating to a criminal prosecution of the appellant in Pakistan were unreliable and concluded that they had been fabricated for the purpose of bolstering the appellant’s asylum claim ([55] and [56]).
9. The Judge then considered the sufficiency of the protection available to the appellant in Pakistan. The Judge considered the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note Pakistan: Actors of Protection dated July 2024 and the report by Mr Khan. The Judge also brought forward his factual finding that the appellant’s father has routinely bribed the police in his home area. In the light of this evidence the Judge concluded that the appellant could not avail himself of state protection from his father in his home area ([58] – [60]).
10. The Judge then considered internal relocation, referring to the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note Pakistan: Internal Relocation, dated July 2024 and the report by Mr Khan. The Judge determined that the appellant could re-join his wife and children where they are living “near Jhelum city” if he was required to do so ([62]). The Judge then assessed three explanations the appellant had given for why he claimed that relocating in this way would not be possible. First the Judge concluded that the appellant’s poor mental health would not prevent him from relocating. In reaching that conclusion the Judge commented that “In m (sic) view it is likely that some aspects of the Appellant’s mental health would benefit from the certainty in relation to his asylum claim. He would be returning to his family who would be able to help support him.” ([64] – [65]). Second the Judge concluded that economic factors would not prevent the appellant from relocating, noting that the appellant’s wife and children already have accommodation and that the appellant could work in the city and provide for himself ([66]). Third the Judge concluded that the appellant would not be likely to be traced by his father who was not actively pursuing the appellant or his family. The Judge stated: “That being the case, I do not consider that the concerns raised about being tracked through his digital footprint or when obtaining identification are reasonably likely to occur” ([67]). Accordingly the Judge recorded his conclusion that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to relocate within Pakistan.
11. In the following section of his decision, which he entitled “Conclusion on risk” the Judge stated his conclusion that the appellant had been credible about the core elements of his claim, namely that he had been ill-treated by his father who had threatened him following the death of his mother and that on this basis the appellant was at risk from his father if he returned to Pakistan ([72] and [73]), that the appellant could not avail himself of state protection from that risk but that he could internally relocate within Pakistan to avoid the risk ([74]). On this basis the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim.
12. The Judge proceeded to consider the appellant’s human rights claim. AT [77] – [83] the Judge explains his conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan. The Judge then conducted the necessary balancing exercise weighing the public interest in the appellant’s removal against the private life the appellant has formed in the United Kingdom before concluding that the public interest outweighed the appellant’s private interests (84] – [86]) and therefore that the respondent’s decision was not unlawful under the Human Rights Act. Accordingly he also dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his human rights claim.
The Grounds of Appeal
13. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on three grounds. The first ground asserts that the Judge erred when concluding that the appellant was not at risk from an honour crime and there that he did not fear persecution for a Convention reason. The second ground asserts that the Judge misdirected himself on the issue of internal relocation, misunderstood the appellant’s evidence and failed to make findings of fact on this subject. The third ground asserts that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusion that the appellant’s father did not have the necessary power and influence to locate the appellant in Pakistan. There was no challenge to the Judge’s decision to dismiss the appellant’s human rights appeal.
14. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Lams maintained all three grounds of appeal during the hearing before me, although he focused primarily on the second ground which attacks the Judge’s assessment of internal relocation, and asserted that the Judge’s decision contained an error of law such that it had to be set aside. Although no written response to the appeal had been provided by the respondent in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules, Mr Terrell contested each of the grounds of appeal and invited me to maintain the Judge’s decision.
Analysis
15. By virtue of section 12(1) and (2) of the Tribunal Court and Enforcement Act 2007 the decision of the Judge can only be set aside if it is found to have involved the making of an error on a point of law. The question for me therefore is whether the grounds of appeal identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision.
16. Mr Lams acknowledged that grounds two and three overlap with both involving a challenge to the adequacy of the Judge’s reasons for his conclusion on internal relocation. Mr Lams therefore took both these grounds together in his submissions. Likewise, I begin my analysis with consideration of grounds two and three and the complaints they contain about the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant could avoid the risk ill-treatment from his father by relocating within Pakistan.
Grounds 2 and 3
17. Although a single ground of appeal, ground two raises a number of distinct complaints about the Judge’s assessment that the appellant could relocate within Pakistan without being located by his father, and in particular his finding that the appellant could relocate from his home city of Sialkot and live with his wife and children “near Jhelum city”. In his submissions Mr Lams split these complaints into two aspects (i) consideration of whether the appellant could relocate without being found by his father and (ii) whether it would be unduly harsh for him to do so. I follow that approach when considering these grounds of appeal.
The conclusion the appellant could relocate without being found by his father
18. It is suggested in the grounds that the Judge “misunderstood” the appellant’s evidence about where his wife and children are living and his ability to live with them. The grounds state that the appellant “wishes to clarify that the mountainous area where his wife and children are living is around 100km from Jhelum, as the mountains (the Himalayas?) are not near Jhelum” before suggesting that, because the appellant’s evidence was that he would have to go to a city to find work, the effect of his evidence was that he would not be able to live with his wife and children and be able to work.
19. The evidence before the Judge however was not that the appellant’s wife and children are living hundreds of miles from Jhelum city. In his asylum interview the appellant was asked (Q28-33) where is wife and children are staying in Pakistan and he replied saying they are living in a house in Jhelum City, that he pays the rent for the house, that his children are attending school while his wife stays at home and that they are safe. In his witness statement the appellant said that his wife and children “are currently in Jhelum, in the mountains.” The Judge’s finding of fact that the appellant’s wife and children are living in the mountains near the city of Jhelum was not a misunderstanding of the appellant's evidence but was entirely consistent with that evidence.
20. The contradictory account that the appellant’s wife and children are living in mountains 100km away from Jhelum that the grounds seek to introduce by way of “clarification” was not before the Judge and therefore cannot identify an error in the Judge’s decision or a misunderstanding of the appellant’s evidence. Instead it amounts to an impermissible attempt to introduce new evidence, the provenance of which remains unknown, in an belated and misguided attempt to suggest the Judge made an error. The Judge’s conclusion that the appellant could relocate to live with his wife and children in the house in Jhelum city that he had described in his interview, and that having done so he could work in Jhelum city, was not based on a misunderstanding of the evidence but was a reasonable conclusion for the Judge to reach on the basis of the evidence that was presented before him.
21. In his oral submissions Mr Lams focused on the Judge’s finding that the appellant would not be found by his father if he lived with his wife and children. Mr Lams argued that this finding was inadequately reasoned. Mr Lams submitted that the fact the appellant’s wife and children have been safe in their new location does not mean that the appellant’s has not been looking for them. Mr Lams further submitted that the Judge had failed to adequately explain why the appellant’s father, who the evidence establishes to be a murderous psychopath, would not try to find the appellant. Finally Mr Lams submitted that the Judge had failed to adequately explain why, in the event that he did try to trace the appellant, the appellant’s father, would not be able to locate the appellant arguing that the Judge’s reasons failed to adequately engage with the report by Mr Khan and the suggestion in that report that the appellant’s father would be able to trace the appellant through the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).
22. In reply Mr Terrell argued that the attack on the Judge’s decision addressed a different point to the one made by the Judge. Mr Terrell submitted that the Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant’s father was not seeking the appellant or his family and that the Judge adequately explained this conclusion. The Judge was not therefore saying that the appellant cannot be located by his father but that the evidence was that his father was not actively seeking to do so. This, Mr Terrell submitted, adequately explained the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant could safely live with his wife and children and that it was not necessary to tackle the suggestion in Mr Khan’s report that the appellant could be located through the NADRA. With regards to the assertion in ground three, Mr Terrell submitted that the ground did not engage with the Judge’s finding that the appellant had fabricated and embellished his account and that the Judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s father had no connections beyond his local area.
23. As this is a challenge to the Judge’s reasons, I remind myself that the requirement for adequate reasons is no more or less than that, it is not a counsel of perfection and it is not an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting. The purpose of the duty to give reasons is, in part, to enable the losing party to know why he has lost and also to enable an appellate court or tribunal to examine them for an error of approach (see the judgment of Singh LJ in MD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958 at [26]).
24. I also remind myself of the need to exercise caution before interfering with factual findings made by Judges, per Lord Hoffman in Biogen v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1:
“The need for appellate caution in reversing the judges evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of impression as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la verite est dans une nuance), Of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judges overall evaluation….”
25. Contrary to the assertion made in ground three, the Judge gave clear and detailed reasons for his conclusion at [52] that notwithstanding the fact the appellant’s father has routinely bribed the police in and around his home area, the appellant’s father had no wider influence or power beyond that local area. The reasons for this conclusion included the appellant’s evolving and inconsistent account ([45] and [46]), unreliable documents being adduced without explanation ([47] and [48]), the failure to provide evidence that would be reasonably available to the appellant if his account were true ([50]), and the absence of supporting evidence ([51]). The Judge’s finding that the appellant’s father’s influence did not extend beyond his local area was one that was reasonably open to him and was adequately explained.
26. The Judge’s expressed reasoning for finding that the appellant would be safe in Jhelum with his wife and children is similarly tolerably clear from his decision. The Judge was not satisfied on the evidence before him that the appellant’s account that his father is looking for him and his family was true. This finding was stated explicitly at [44] of the Judge’s decision. It was a finding reached in the context of the Judge’s other findings that the appellant had fabricated documents suggesting a criminal prosecution and fabricated a claim that his father had connections to powerful politicians. It was a finding that was rooted in the appellant’s evidence that his wife and children have been living safely and without incident in Jhelum since 2019. There has been no suggestion that this was an irrational finding for the Judge to make and in my judgment it was unquestionably one which the Judge was entitled to reach on the evidence.
27. There is no indication that the Judge lost sight of the vindictive and abusive past behaviour from the appellant’s father when making the finding that the appellant’s father was not pursuing him now, and there is no reason to presume that the Judge did so. The reality is that having heard and demonstrably considered all the evidence the Judge reached the rational conclusion that, despite his past vindictiveness and his criminality, the appellant’s father had not shown an inclination to locate the appellant or his family during the five years following the last time the appellant and his father had contact.
28. It was in those circumstances the Judge said at [67] that he was satisfied it was not reasonably likely the appellant would be located through his “digital footprint” or when obtaining identification. Having rationally found that the appellant’s father had not shown any inclination to locate the appellant or his family, it was not necessary for the Judge to evaluate whether it was possible for the appellant’s father to do so if he wanted to. Specifically the Judge was not required to assess whether the appellant’s father could trace the appellant through the NADRA when the Judge had already rationally concluded that the appellant’s father had shown no intention of doing so.
29. Despite what is said in the grounds of appeal and Mr Lams oral arguments therefore, having considered the relevant principles and analysed the Judge’s decision, I am satisfied that the Judge’s reasoning for his conclusion that the appellant could safely live with his wife and children was adequate. I find therefore that there was no error of law involved in the Judge’s finding that the appellant could safely live with his wife and children in Jhelum.
Ground two – would it be unduly harsh for the appellant to relocate and live with his wife and children?
30. The written grounds contend that the Judge “failed to make any specific, (as opposed to general) findings on whether A could relocate within Pakistan” (original emphasis). This complaint is unsustainable in the light of [63] – [67] of the Judge’s decision. In those paragraphs the Judge specifically identifies the three reasons the appellant gave as to why he could not relocate and then analyses each, before reaching conclusions on each of them. Contrary to what was said in the written grounds, this was unquestionably a specific assessment of the appellant’s circumstances and whether he could in those circumstances relocate without suffering unduly harsh consequences.
31. The fact that the Judge did in fact engage with the appellant’s specific circumstances is acknowledged later in the grounds, which go on to complain about the Judge’s assessment of the specific evidence given by Dr Galappathie about the appellant’s mental health. Those complaints were taken up by Mr Lams in his oral submissions, in which he said that the Judge failed to recognise the re-traumatisation that the appellant would face returning to Pakistan or to acknowledge that the appellant’s improved mental health was predicated on him not returning to Pakistan. Mr Lams also maintained the criticism in the written grounds of the Judge’s assessment that “it is likely that some aspects of the Appellant’s mental health would benefit from the certainty in relation to his asylum claim. He would be returning to his family who would be able to support him.” arguing that when reaching this conclusion the Judge had relied on his own view with no specialised knowledge of mental health.
32. Mr Terrell argued that the Judge had correctly identified from the reports of Dr Galappathie that some of the appellant’s anxiety had come from the asylum process and from dealing with the Home Office. Mr Terrell submitted that the Judge was entitled to conclude that having certainty about his future and living with his wife and children would be factors that would be beneficial to the appellant. He argued that these were uncontroversial observations which did not involve an error of law. Mr Terrell pointed to the Judge’s assessment that there is mental health provision available in Pakistan and argued that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s mental health would not prevent him from relocating in Pakistan was one he weas entitled to reach.
33. I am satisfied that the Judge’s assessment of Dr Galappathie’s evidence about the appellant’s mental health did not involve an error of law. There was no requirement for the Judge to set out everything in the report and there is no reason to presume that the Judge had disregarded Dr Galappathie’s comment at [110] of that report about the appellant experiencing re-traumatisation on return to Pakistan. That is especially the case when the Judge has repeatedly made reference to the history of abuse suffered by the appellant and explicitly said that he gives weight to the reports of Dr Galappathie. Those reports also included repeated reference to the appellant’s wife and children being stabilising factors for the appellant, as well as repeated references to the appellant’s uncertain immigration status being a cause of stress and anxiety for him. In the light of that evidence, the Judge’s reference to the appellant’s mental health benefitting from certainty about his claim and his suggestion that the appellants wife and children support the appellant was not an expression of the Judge’s own view but a reflection of the evidence that was presented before him.
34. The Judge was equally entitled to recognise and rely upon Dr Galappathie’s evidence that there had been a general amelioration in the appellant’s condition as well as the fact that Dr Galappathie referred in his most recent report to the appellant being able to worker as a carer and the positive effect that working has had on his mental health. These were relevant considerations for the Judge particularly when assessing the appellant’s ability to work on return to Pakistan.
35. The Judge expressed his ultimate conclusion about the effect the appellant’s mental health would have on his ability to relocate to live with his wife and children, at the end of [65] of his decision. That conclusion was: “While I accept that the Appellant’s mental health may deteriorate I am not persuaded that the Appellant has shown that his mental health is such that it would prevent him from relocating due to lack of provision in Pakistan.” This was a conclusion the Judge was entitled to reach and was adequately explained by the Judge in the preceding paragraphs notwithstanding the fact he does not explicitly refer to re-traumatisation. The Judge went on to state his ultimate conclusion on whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh on the appellant at [68] of the decision stating: “I do not consider that it would be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to internally relocate in Pakistan”. Again this was a conclusion the Judged was entitled to reach on the evidence and despite the appellant’s arguments it was adequately explained.
36. Overall, although the appellant may disagree with the Judge’s assessment of internal relocation and the conclusions reached, they involved no error of law.
Ground 1
37. Little was said during the hearing about ground one. This is unsurprising since the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant could internally relocate within Pakistan meant that any error in his assessment of whether the appellant formed part of a Particular Social Group for the purpose of the Refugee Convention was immaterial. For this reason alone ground one fails to identify a material error of law.
38. In any event, having considered the Judge’s decision with care I am satisfied that there was no error in the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant fears persecution for reason of his membership of a particular social group. As the grounds identify, the judge found at [29] – [32] that males at risk of honour based crime share a common background that cannot be changed and as such form a particular social group. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds however, that conclusion was not inconsistent with the Judge’s later assessment at [41] that the ill-treatment of the appellant by his father was the result of his father being “a vindictive, abusive and bullying individual” rather than the ill-treatment arising from the appellant’s father being dishonoured. In these circumstances the Judge’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear for reason of his membership of a particular social group was inevitable. As Mr Terrell argued in his submissions, the reason the appellant fears his father is not because of a characteristic he shares with a class of people, but is because of his relationship with his father, and his father’s abusive and bullying attitude towards his son.
Conclusion
39. The grounds of appeal and Mr Lams’ capable submissions do not identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Judge gave adequate reasons to explain his conclusion that the appellant can safely relocate within Pakistan to avoid ill-treatment from his father. That conclusion was fatal to the appellant’s protection claim.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordon-Lennox does not contain and error of law and shall stand

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2025