Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Case No: UI-2025-001470

(First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/55652/2024
LP/13261/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

N Z
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Nadeem, Legal Representative, Allison Wells Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard remotely by CVP on 21 October 2025 (Field House)

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with the permission of the Upper Tribunal against a decision, dated 27 January 2025, of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal sitting remotely in the ‘Virtual Region’ (“the Judge”) dismissing her appeal against a decision of the Respondent, dated 23 February 2024, refusing her protection and human rights claims.
2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order because this is a protection appeal. I continue that order because the risk of harm outweighs the usual requirement for open justice. As such I am satisfied, having had regard to the guidance in the Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013: Anonymity Orders, that it would be appropriate to make an order in accordance with Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in the following terms:

“Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, or the Appellant’s protection claim is finally determined, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her, any of her witnesses or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.”
The factual background and First-tier Tribunal decision
3. The Appellant is accepted as being a member of the Sabian Mandaean community of Iran and also an Ahwazi Arab. She claimed to have left Iran in 2017 due to fear of the authorities, her husband and her family. She claimed she had been a victim of domestic abuse and, in 2010, her husband had tried to kill her with a knife, leaving her with scars. In 2017, she was detained by the authorities because of how she was dressed but released with only a warning. After five months, she left Iran illegally. She spent a year in Turkey and then two years in Greece, where she claimed asylum. She stayed a further 11 months in Germany, where she also claimed and was refused asylum, before travelling to France. From there she made her way to the United Kingdom by boat. She claimed asylum here on 16 November 2022. As such, the provisions of sections 30 to 39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.
4. In the reasons for refusal letter, dated 23 February 2024, the Respondent accepted the treatment which the Appellant claimed to fear from the authorities because of her illegal exit and also from her husband would, if true, amount to persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. She would not be able to obtain protection from the state and she could not safely relocate internally.
5. However, the Respondent rejected the Appellant’s account of any ongoing interest from the authorities, from her husband and from her family as not credible. It was not considered the authorities had any interest in her because she had been released with only a warning and had remained in Iran for five months after the incident. She claimed to fear her family because she had left her husband, but she had been able to receive money from her father while she was in Turkey and she said she spoke to her mother regularly. She had not provided medical evidence of her injuries from the attack by her husband and she had had no further contact with him since she left Iran. Her failure to claim asylum in France, a safe country, damaged her credibility in accordance with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The CPIN Iran: Christians and Christian Converts, version 7.0, stated that Christians were not in general at a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state, although some faced discrimination. Illegal exit without more would not give rise to a real risk of persecution or serious harm: SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) and the CPIN Iran: Illegal Exit, version 6.0.
6. At the beginning of the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, the Judge noted the agreed issues were broadly-speaking (i) whether the Appellant’s account of coming to the adverse attention of the authorities and her account concerning her husband and family were credible, and (ii) whether returning her to Iran would breach Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the Human Rights Convention. It was clarified that the Appellant did not advance her case on Article 3 health grounds or Article 8 family and private life grounds.
7. At [32] the Judge accepted that the Appellant was a member of minorities as a Sabian-Mandaean and an Ahwazi Arab. However, she did not accept the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities, her husband or her family or that any adverse interest would continue on return to Iran. Her reasons commence at [33], where she notes the Appellant had been released after her detention and able to remain in Iran for a further five months without difficulty. At [34] she noted that the appellant’s husband had agreed to divorce her. At [35] she noted the appellant remained in contact with her family and was financially supported by them.
8. The grounds seeking permission to appeal did not persuade the First-tier Tribunal to grant permission to appeal. The Decision noted the grounds raised Article 8 when this had not been pursued at the hearing and also referred to an expert report, which had not been any part of the evidence in the First-tier Tribunal.
9. The grounds seeking permission to appeal on renewal to the Upper Tribunal argue in summary as follows:
(i) The Judge failed to assess the credibility of the account properly by considering the totality of the evidence, placing undue emphasis on the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France and ignoring key parts of the evidence, such as the threat from her husband;
(ii) The Judge failed to apply the correct test to the assessment of a real risk by failing to have regard to her religion and ethnicity and incorrectly finding there was no objective evidence of risks to minorities in Iran;
(iii) The Judge failed to consider internal relocation;
(iv) The Judge misapplied the legal standard for protection under Articles 2 and 3 by failing to assess the risk of harm;
(v) The Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the background evidence.
10. Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien granted permission to appeal on all grounds. He noted:
“2. The judge found at [20] that the appellant’s credibility was damaged pursuant to s8. However, the judge does not make clear whether the following evidence at [23] was accepted or rejected (my emphasis):
“With respect to the issues raised by the respondent in the decision the appellant submits first, she suffered domestic violence at the hands of her husband and that as an Arab Ahwazi Mandean woman in Iran her identity places her at significant risk due to the intersection of her ethnicity and faith making her vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation. Second, the incident in 2017 when she was approached by the Iranian forces because of her dress code left the appellant shaken with a profound sense of injustice and a reminder of the challenges she faced as a woman navigating the complexities of her identity in a restrictive environment. The appellant does not like being forced to dress in a way against her will and was able to remain in Iran for around 5 months after this incident because she was not living a free or normal life. Third, the appellant’s family are pressurising her to return to her husband when she does not want to do so due to the abuse that she has faced from him.”
3. In short, there is an arguable failure to reach a decision on the appellant’s claim that she altered her behaviour in order to avoid religious persecution. Whilst some of the other grounds appear to be disagreement with permissible conclusions, I take a pragmatic approach and grant permission on all grounds.”
11. The Respondent has not filed a Rule 24 Response opposing the appeal. However, Mr Hulme confirmed the appeal was opposed.
The submissions
12. The hearing took place by means of CVP video link. The connection worked well and I was not told of any issues as regards the ability of the parties to participate in the hearing fully.
13. Mr Nadeem largely abandoned the written grounds, as drafted, and emphasised the point raised by UTJ O’Brien when granting permission to appeal. He relied on the principle established in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 that no one should have to conceal or lie about an immutable characteristic in order to avoid persecution. He argued the Appellant’s behaviour had been profoundly shaped by the event in 2017, when she was detained. He took me to the Appellant’s evidence that she was unable to live a free and normal life after that incident because she felt constant fear and anxiety. He argued that, without making a finding on the point, the Decision could not be sustained.
14. Mr Nadeem continued that the Judge had also erred at [20] in her application of section 8 of the 2004 Act by treating the Appellant’s delay in leaving Iran as undermining her credibility.
15. Mr Nadeem argued that paragraphs [32] and [33] showed the Judge had failed to apply anxious scrutiny to the claim. She had ignored the CPINs and she had overlooked the fact the Appellant is not a Farsi-speaker, which was an additional risk factor. The Judge’s assessment of protection and internal flight were flawed because they failed to take account of the Appellant’s language.
16. Mr Hulme argued the Judge had reached a sustainable conclusion after taking everything into account. Her credibility findings were open to her to make on the evidence. The grounds were mere disagreement with the Judge’s reasons. He pointed out the issue raised by UTJ O’Brien had not formed part of the grounds seeking permission to appeal.

Decision on error of law
17. Having heard the parties’ submissions, I announced that I would reserve my decision.
18. The grounds in this case have not been drafted with the requisite level of precision or expertise such that Mr Nadeem struggled to defend them. I shall deal with them swiftly before moving on to the salient point in this appeal, which was identified for the first time by UTJ O’Brien.
19. The Judge’s adverse credibility finding was sufficiently well-reasoned and based on the evidence. In short, she was entitled to reject the Appellant’s account. The Judge does not refer at all to the pre-departure delay in [20]. She refers to it at [33] as a separate credibility point. The ground is wholly misconceived. The Judge was plainly entitled to place weight on the Appellant’s history after she left Iran. She applied section 8 of the 2004 Act correctly and she made her findings in the context of the CPINs to which she was referred. She was not provided with an expert report or any specific background evidence about the appellant’s community and its situation in Iran. The Judge gave sustainable reasons for not placing weight on the supporting letters provided by the Appellant. It is far from clear whether the fact the Appellant does not speak Farsi was advanced as a relevant factor to the Judge, although I accept the Appellant had disclosed it in her evidence.
20. I have set out above paragraph [20] of the Decision and UTJ O’Brien has highlighted the issue of the Appellant’s reluctance to adhere to the Islamic dress code demanded in Iran.
21. The following paragraphs of the Judge’s Decision are relevant:
“32. It is not in dispute, and I am satisfied that the appellant as a female member of the Sabean-Mandaean community and an Ahwazi Arab and so is in a minority in Iran. However, looking at the evidence before me holistically I am not satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the appellant has come to the adverse attention of the authorities, her husband or her family and that this adverse attention would continue on return to Iran.
33. I say this because, first, the evidence before me is that the appellant was released with a warning regarding her clothing and was able to remain in Iran for around 5 months without difficulty following this. As such I do not find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant will be of ongoing interest to the authorities for this reason or by reason of her illegal exit from Iran. While I accept that the appellant may be vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation, I do not find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant with be subject to treatment which amounts to persecution. I make this finding in reliance on the Country Policy and information before me regarding women, and members of the Ahwazi Arab Sabean-Mandaean community.”
22. As UTJ O’Brien observed, these paragraphs do not make clear whether the Judge, notwithstanding her overall adverse credibility finding, accepted or rejected the Appellant’s account of her brief entanglement with the authorities and her concern about the dress code during the five months before she left Iran. In fact, as I pointed out at the hearing, there is an inconsistency between the two paragraphs. At [32] the Judge states she is not satisfied the Appellant came to the attention of the authorities and she finds it is not reasonably likely that she would come to any adverse attention on return. At [33] she reasons that the Appellant will not come to the adverse attention of the authorities because she was released with a warning regarding her clothing and was able to remain in Iran for five months without difficulty, which implies she had accepted the incident with the police had taken place.
23. If the Judge had intended to mean in [32] that the Appellant had not received any further adverse attention during the five months which followed her initial brush with the law, she could have said so. As paragraph [32] stands, it is not what it means.
24. A failure to make a finding on a material matter or to make inconsistent findings on such a central issue in the appeal could amount to an error requiring the Decision to be set aside. I have therefore carefully considered whether any error could be material to the outcome. I shall first set out the evidence on the point and then consider the legal principles in play.
25. The Appellant mentioned the encounter with the authorities (Sepah) at her interview at Q29, which records, “once I was wearing a scarf and I was seen by a police woman and she took my fingerprints and said if I see you again and you’re the same person with inappropriate clothing I will put you in prison with 15 lashes”. At Q30 she denied attending protests against women having to cover up. At Q48 she provided further details. She said she was walking with her sister in the market “wearing our normal clothes”. They were asked why they were “not wearing full hijab”? After getting copies of their ID cards from their younger sister, they were allowed to go with a warning. They were fingerprinted in the police car.
26. I pause to note that her answer to Q29 would make more sense if she had said “once I was not wearing a scarf”, but I cannot see that this correction was ever made.
27. The only statement the Appellant appears to have made for her appeal is described as the “Appellant’s Response Statement”. It does not meet the requirements of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal of 1 November 2024.
28. Under the heading “Dress Code” is this: “After being approached by Iranian forces because of my dress code, I experienced a whirlwind of emotions. Initially, I felt a surge of fear and anxiety. The suddenness of the situation left me feeling vulnerable and exposed, as if my identity and autonomy had been stripped away in an instant. When they questioned me and scrutinised my appearance, I felt a deep sense of shame and humiliation. Being judged for my clothing – an expression of my individuality – made me acutely aware of the limitations placed on me as a woman in this society. The feeling of being targeted for something so personal was both unsettling and angering. After this incident in 2017, I felt a mix of relief and lingering fear. The experience left me shaken. I worried about what might happen next and how this incident could affect my daily life. The fear of further harassment or repercussions loomed over me, making me question my choices and how I present myself in public. Ultimately, I felt a profound sense of injustice. It was a stark reminder of the challenges I face as a woman navigating the complexities of my identity in a restrictive environment.”
29. This is unhelpful inasmuch as the Appellant does not describe what she was actually wearing and how that was viewed as breaching the Islamic dress code which the authorities were seeking to enforce.
30. Under the heading “Clothing”, the Appellant says: “Please note that a woman being forced to live in a restrictive environment is against my fundamental human rights, I am a human I want to show my hair and dress in a way I choose. My faith doesn’t prohibit me but my nationality does as Iranian regime is dictatorship … I don’t like being forced to dress in a way against my will.”
31. Under the heading “Remaining in Iran”, the Appellant states: “I did remain in Iran for 5 months after this occurred with no further issues with the Iranian authorities because I was not living a free or normal life. It was a life of contact (sic) fear. Many women to this day have been arrested from their homes and on the street by the authority for the choice of dress. At any time the authorities could decide to come and detain me as I have had my fingerprints taken by them and on the system they have a mark against me”.
32. Under the heading “Current situation”, the Appellant states: “I just want my mere basic human rights with nothing else. I want to wear what I want, believe what I want and speak the language I want without being forced by the government or any person”.
33. I remind myself of the well-known guidance of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) (Lord Rodgers):

“The approach to be followed by tribunals

82. When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of nationality.

If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality.

If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were returned to that country.

If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he could avoid the risk by living “discreetly”.

If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so.

If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution and the Convention does not offer protection against them. Such a person has no well-founded fear of persecution because, for reasons that have nothing to do with any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted because he is gay.

If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution. To reject his application on the ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution. By admitting him to asylum and allowing him to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution, the receiving state gives effect to that right by affording the applicant a surrogate for the protection from persecution which his country of nationality should have afforded him.”
34. The same principle has been extended to the situation in which a person is forced to lie about their political beliefs: RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38; their religion: MN and others (Ahmadis – country conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 00389(IAC); or an innate characteristic such as gender identity: Mx M (gender identity – HJ (Iran) - terminology) El Salvador [2020] UKUT 00313 (IAC).
35. However, the principle has its limitations. As Lord Hope explained in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon):
…Persecution apart, the Convention was not directed to reforming the level of rights prevailing in the country of origin. Its purpose is to provide the protection that is not available in the country of nationality where there is a well-founded fear of persecution, not to guarantee to asylum-seekers when they are returned all the freedoms that are available in the country where they seek refuge. It does not guarantee universal human rights. So the conditions that prevail in the country in which asylum is sought have no part to play, as matter of legal obligation binding on all states parties to the Convention, in deciding whether the applicant is entitled to seek asylum in that country: Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 AC 426, paras 16, 46. As Laws LJ said in Amare v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1600, [2006] Imm AR 217 para 31:

"The Convention is not there to safeguard or protect potentially affected persons from having to live in regimes where pluralist liberal values are less respected, even much less respected, than they are here. It is there to secure international protection to the extent agreed by the contracting states."
36. The point was made by the Upper Tribunal in YMKA and Ors (‘westernisation’) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00016 (IAC) that the Refugee Convention does not offer protection from social conservatism per se and there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. On the other hand, the Refugee Convention may be engaged where a ‘westernised’ lifestyle reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief; or where there is a real risk that the individual concerned would be unable to mask their westernisation, and where actors of persecution would therefore impute such protected characteristics to them.
37. The issue is clearly fact-sensitive. One the one hand, it could reasonably be said that the Appellant failed to formulate her account with sufficient clarity or detail to show her claim is capable of falling within the HJ (Iran) principle. On the other hand, the Appellant’s statement is capable of being read – or having been intended to read – as an account of the Appellant objecting to the restrictions on women imposed by the Islamic regime, a situation exacerbated by her belonging to a minority faith group and minority ethnic group. The Appellant at least implies that her objection to wearing the hijab is in part based on her religious beliefs. Therefore, taking the claim at its highest, it is possible to say that the Appellant put before the Judge a claim that she had had her fundamental liberties curtailed as a result of her fear of persecution. If she transgressed again, she feared she would face a harsh penalty, such as lashing. There cannot be any argument about such a penalty being persecutory.
38. If the Appellant made that claim, then the Judge should have determined it. I conclude therefore that the Judge’s error in failing to come to a coherent conclusion about whether she accepted the 2017 incident or not was a material error.
39. I invited submissions on how to proceed with the re-hearing of the appeal. Mr Nadeem favoured a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Hulme argued the point on which evidence would need to be called was narrow and therefore the appeal should be retained by the Upper Tribunal.
40. Bearing in mind the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 (see also MM (Unfairness; ER) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC) and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC)), I decided that a significant amount of evidence will need to be called from the Appellant, which the Respondent will no doubt wish to test. The parties should consider whether this could be achieved more easily and fairly in a face-to-face hearing. The factual issues will have to be decided in the context of up to date background evidence on the Iranian authorities’ implementation of the Islamic dress code and the risk for women who do not follow it.
41. The appeal is therefore remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard again by a different judge.
42. It is common ground that the Appellant is a member of the Sabian Mandaean community of Iran and also an Ahwazi Arab. The Appellant’s claims regarding risks from her husband and family have been dismissed and the Judge’s findings are preserved. The issues to be determined will likely focus on the following:
(1) Whether currently there is a real risk that, in general, women who does not modify their dress in accordance with the Islamic dress code would face persecution;
(2) The impact of the Appellant’s membership of a minority faith group and or ethnic group, if any;
(3) Whether as a matter of fact the Appellant was briefly detained by Sepah before being released with a warning in 2017;
(4) If she was detained, how she was dressed at the time;
(5) If she was detained, how her sister was dressed and what, if any consequences, there have been for her;
(6) If she was detained, whether the Appellant had any further encounters with the authorities;
(7) How she conducted herself during the five months before she left Iran;
(8) If she modified her behaviour in any way, her reasons for doing so; and
(9) How she would conduct herself on return to Iran and, if she would modify her behaviour in any way, her reasons for doing so.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.

The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard again on the issues described above.

Signed

N Froom

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date 31 October 2025