Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001472

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51373/2024
LP/07298/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

SM (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L King, counsel instructed by Asylum Justice
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. SM is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, aged 32, who appeals with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) dated 1 December 2024 (“the decision”) to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 28 December 2023 to refuse his further submissions protection claim (“the refusal letter”).
2. The Appellant says, inter alia, that he fears persecution in Iraq on the basis of “honour”-related violence due to threats said to have been made to him by the family of a girl (“N”). He says he left Iraq by air to Turkey on 7 April 2017, remaining there for 23 days, before going to Italy by sea. He claimed asylum in Italy on 9 May 2017 according to Home Office records. He travelled to France by lorry and remained there until he came to the UK clandestinely in the back of a lorry. He was arrested here on 23 May 2017 and claimed asylum the next day. SM’s application was first refused by the Respondent on 30 October 2019, on credibility grounds. SM appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on 15 December 2020 (“the 2020 decision”).
3. In the 2020 decision the FTT found the Appellant not to have given credible evidence. Provided with that appeal, but given no weight by the FTT, was a “support letter” which purported to emanate from the police (which was summarised by the FTT at paragraph 13) and a report from Dr Kaveh Ghobadi authenticating it. SM applied for permission to appeal to the UT, but permission was refused by the FTT on 2 February 2021, and by the UT on 2 March 2021, at which point SM became appeal rights exhausted.
4. SM lodged further submissions on 29 November 2021, which were refused on 23 September 2022. Another set of further submissions were lodged on 3 July 2023, which were refused in the refusal letter dated 28 December 2023; and SM appealed to the FTT. Within SM’s further submissions was an addendum report from Dr Ghobadi seeking to address the issues raised in respect of his report by the previous FTJ. There was also a country expert report by Dr Kawa Morad dated 20 June 2023 which dealt with “honour”-related violence in Iraq as well as, inter alia, mental healthcare in Iraq. Also served was a medico-legal psychiatric report from Dr Syed Zia Ali dated 30 June 2023.
5. In the FTT decision of 2024 the FTJ decided not to depart from the 2020 decision, regarding the risk of harm in respect of the fear of “honour”-based violence, or family support in Iraq, or the ability to redocument. The FTJ noted the evidence from Dr Ghobadi but found it lacked credibility and he could not place weight on it. The FTJ noted the report of Dr Ali but did not accept that his conclusions at paragraph 58, as to how SM’s mental health would deteriorate on return to Iraq, were reliable because they were based on the account being true, and because of other shortcomings highlighted. The FTJ accepted that the Appellant did need some mental health assistance, but he did not accept as reliable the conclusions of Dr Morad as to the availability of healthcare in Iraq, and found that there was adequate healthcare available, and the Appellant had sufficient insight into his mental health issues that he could access healthcare.
Grounds of appeal and submissions
6. The application for permission, at Ground 1, argues that the FTJ materially erred in his assessment of Dr Ali’s psychiatric report. It is said that the FTJ unfairly critiqued Dr Ali for implicitly accepting SM’s narrative, “putting the cart before the horse” in terms of having already rejected credibility before consideration of the expert evidence, and thus falling into the legal “heresy” set out in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367. At paragraph 27 of the decision, the FTJ stated:
“27. The conclusions at paragraph 58 are wholly unreliable as they are again predicated and prefaced on the account being relied upon by the appellant being accepted to be true which it is not. In any event, Dr Ali is not a country expert re healthcare in Iraq, he cannot foresee what is going to happen and the opinion he provides reads as an almost fait accompli that the appellant will not access healthcare and will not engage. This is beyond the remit of the author’s knowledge and expertise. He concludes and opines that the mental health and personality disorders stem from the incidents in Iraq however given that Judge Page did not accept that they happened, given than the Home Office did not accept that they happened (on multiple occasions) it may have been more prudent and helpful to assess in greater and more insightful detail whether the appellant was feigning his illness for example or gilding the lily or whether, given the significant intake of high energy drinks, there was another explanation for his behaviour and impulsivity. Sadly, none of the those [sic] matters were explored.”
7. It is argued that this undermined “too flippantly” the expert’s findings, who had all of the Appellant’s medical records before him, and who was not commenting upon the healthcare systems in Iraq, but rather the ability of the Appellant to engage with them.
8. At paragraph 58 of his report Dr Ali stated:
“58. [SM] considers Iraq to be a place where he is marked for death due to the nature of the local customs and culture. He escaped Iraq in order to save himself from this. If he were to be returned to Iraq, he would see and experience this as his fears coming to fruition, which will have a significantly dangerous impact on his already fragile and traumatised mind. He fears death in Iraq, where it seems he will have no support from any family or friends because of the nature of the charges against him. If he is back in Iraq, his mental state will certainly collapse, and he will be unable to take stock of his situation nor rationally assess it. He is very unlikely even to be able to approach or contact any medical services, as he will be in a state of acute stress: a primal survival instinct will have kicked in and in this heightened state of stress, which is referred to as ‘fight or flight’, his only focus will be to escape. Having failed to do this, he will be compelled to react in the way he has been doing until now, when faced with stressors. His usual response has been to have an explosive and impulsive emotional behaviour, in the form of threats or attempts to kill himself. In such a dire situation, he will no longer be threatening but will likely be acting on these thoughts, as this will be, in his mind, the best or only course of action to save himself from any reprisals that would await him.”
9. It is argued that Dr Ali did consider alternative reasons for the Appellant’s mental health at paragraph 45, and that this consideration was adequate:
“45. He has a complex presentation, where he can appear to be contrite but sometimes fails to give appropriate answers to questions, responding with either a curt ‘no’ or ‘I can’t remember’. This raises the possibility that he may be malingering, but I am of the view that these responses are a feature of his Borderline Personality Disorder, which means he experiences repeated questioning as being demeaning and anger-provoking. This can lead to him feeling or becoming suicidal, and/or experiencing explosive and destructive outbursts of anger. I am of the opinion that he is not malingering.”
10. It is argued that the FTJ’s reference to the possibility of SM’s mental health being influenced by his “significant intake of high energy drinks” was something beyond the FTJ’s expertise, and not appropriate given the lack of information as to the extent of SM’s consumption of these drinks.
11. It was also argued in the grounds that the FTJ fell into error in his assessment of the medico-legal report at paragraph 25, where he stated:
“25. The report of Dr Ali provides that the appellant has a number of extant health problems against a backdrop of a suggested or possible personality disorder. As highlighted in the report of Dr Ali, the appellant resorts to threats of harm when challenged or does not achieve that which he believes is his right or his entitlement. The Dr indicates that such instability couple with the anger management issues leads him to be at risk of harm in stressful or challenging situations. I note also that the similar occurrences are displayed and highlighted in the medical report. The entry at 20.1.23 is indicative of the problems encountered by the appellant and it is described as a reaction to things not being done for him and he later regrets his outburst. He has not self harmed at that stage. There are no details of the claimed attempts on his life which are highlighted at para 16 of Dr Ali’s report.”
12. It is argued that the FTJ was wrong to say there were no details of the suicidal ideation and there were references to self-harm and attempts on the Appellant’s life with the Appellant’s medical records as well as the medico-legal report by Dr Ali. It is argued that some of these are set out at paragraphs 13-14 of the grounds.
13. In ground 2 the Appellant argues that inadequate reasoning was given for not giving weight to the addendum report of Dr Ghobadi, regarding the police document. Complaint is made regarding the contents of paragraph 21 of the FTJ’s determination:
“21. Turning next to the evidence of Dr Ghobadi. This, sadly, is of such little credibility one cannot place any reliable on it. Firstly, why has it taken over 3 years for these errors to be remedied and a further statement provided? Dr Ghobadi makes no attempt to explain that aspect. Secondly, he does not explain how his memory is such that he can recall the documents in question, what they were and how they were genuine some three years later. There is no statement from the assistant who is now, it appears, in the KRI and no mention of referring to any notes or documents. The claim that the expert provided a draft is, sadly, not credible. Why would a draft contain such comprehensively inaccurate information? Again, no explanation is provided. It gives me no pleasure at all when referring to an expert report to say I place no weight or reliance upon it and find it to be contrived and not capable of belief give the paucity of detail.”
14. It is argued that the reason Dr Ghobadi had not remedied his errors in three years was due to the fact that the Appellant had made a further submissions application and only when instructed to reassess the matter, did he need to do so from his perspective. It is argued that his memory would have been refreshed by the document being sent to him again to compile his addendum report.
15. The Respondent argues that the grounds are mere disagreement with findings that were within the range of findings reasonably open to the FTJ on the material before him.
16. The Respondent also argues that this appeal was different to that in Mibanga, because the Appellant had previously been found to be not credible in the 2020 decision and thus the principles in Devaseelan [2022] UKIAT 702 applied. The Respondent says that, in these circumstances, and given there was evidence in the medical reports of the Appellant trying to “get his own way” and trying to compel the authorities in the UK to act in a certain manner on account of his claimed mental health, the Judge was justifiably entitled to critique Dr Ali for not assessing in greater detail the issue of whether the Appellant was feigning or exaggerating his mental health issues.
17. The FTJ was entitled, the Respondent says, to bring up the issue of the energy drinks, given Dr Ali had raised it himself. The Respondent contends the appeal failed because FTJ found that adequate treatment for the Appellant’s mental health issues was available and accessible in Iraq with family support – a finding that had not been challenged in the grounds appended to the IAUT1 form.
18. Lastly, the Respondent argues that the FTJ was rationally entitled to place no weight on Dr Ghobadi’s report given what is said to be his failure to adequately address the issues previously raised in the 2020 decision.
Legal principles
19. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
20. At paragraph 55 of QY (Vietnam) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 607, Dingemans LJ said:
“It was also common ground that appeal courts should not interfere with judgments by trial judges just because the appellate court takes a different view of the facts. Findings of fact made by primary fact finders should not be set aside by the appellate court, unless the appellate court is bound to act. The trial judge should "give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties, and if need be [the appellate court] the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision", see Fage at paragraph 115. There is no duty to refer to every argument of counsel, and the mere fact that a judge does not mention a piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it, see Volpi at paragraph 57. These principles apply to the FTT and Upper Tribunal, see generally Terzaghi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm AR 461, particularly given that rights of appeal from the FTT to the Upper Tribunal are limited to errors of law. Findings of fact made by FTT judges should not readily be set aside.”
21. I remind myself that Courts and Tribunals have adopted the guidance of Cresswell J on an expert’s duties in The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68, which are:
1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.
2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an advocate.
3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumption on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion.
4) An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.
5) If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one. In cases where an expert witness who has prepared a report could not assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be stated in the report.
6) If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material matter having read the other side’s expert’s report or for any other reason, such change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court.
7) Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, analyses, measurements, survey reports or other similar documents, these must be provided to the opposite party at the same time as the exchange of reports.
22. In Kennedy v. Cordia (Services) Ltd [2016] UKSC 6 it was stated at [48]
“48. An expert must explain the basis of his or her evidence when it is not personal observation or sensation; mere assertion or “bare ipse dixit” carries little weight, as the Lord President (Cooper) famously stated in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34, 40. If anything, the suggestion that an unsubstantiated ipse dixit carries little weight is understated; in our view such evidence is worthless. Wessels JA stated the matter well in the Supreme Court of South Africa (Appellate Division) in Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung mbH 1976 (3) SA 352, 371:
“[A]n expert’s opinion represents his reasoned conclusion based on certain facts or data, which are either common cause, or established by his own evidence or that of some other competent witness. Except possibly where it is not controverted, an expert’s bald statement of his opinion is not of any real assistance. Proper evaluation of the opinion can only be undertaken if the process of reasoning which led to the conclusion, including the premises from which the reasoning proceeds, are disclosed by the expert.””
23. Their Lordships also approved the statement of Lord Prosser in Dingley v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SC 548, 604: “As with judicial or other opinions, what carries weight is the reasoning, not the conclusion.”
24. In the case of Virjon B [2002] EWHC 1469 (Admin), the Administrative Court was called upon to consider the following finding by an adjudicator:
'The medical reports of [the psychiatrists] refer to the clinical depression and post traumatic stress disorder of both applicants resulting from the rape incident. However, these reports were based upon the evidence which the appellant and his wife gave the doctors. I therefore attach little weight to the reports bearing in mind that I have found both the appellant and his wife to be without credibility.'
Forbes J commented that:
“It goes without saying that the Adjudicator was not bound to accept the medical evidence without question. However, if the medical evidence was to be rejected by her, it had to be rejected on a reasoned and proper basis. Moreover, in my view, it is clear from the authorities that the evidence in question should have formed part of the overall material to be taken into account by the Adjudicator when considering the credibility of the claimant and his wife, before any final conclusion was reached by the Adjudicator as to the truth of their claims.”
25. He accepted that the adjudicator had erred in dismissing the psychiatric evidence on 'a peremptory and unreasoned basis', and concluded that:
“It is clear to me that the Adjudicator used her adverse findings of credibility with regard to the claimant and his wife as the means whereby to reject the important and significant evidence of [the psychiatrists]. That was putting the cart before the horse. [Their] evidence... was strongly corroborative of the truth of the account given by the claimant and his wife about the serious rape that was suffered by the wife. It was therefore necessary for the Adjudicator to take that evidence into account as part of her consideration of all the evidence, before coming to any conclusion as to the credibility of the claimant and his wife.”
26. In Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of considering medical evidence relevant to credibility as part of the process of reaching a conclusion as to credibility. Buxton LJ said that
“Where, as in this case, complaint is made of the reasoning of an adjudicator in respect of a question of fact (that is to say credibility), particular care is necessary to ensure that the criticism is as to the fundamental approach of the adjudicator, and does not merely reflect a feeling on the part of the appellate tribunal that it might itself have taken a different view of the matter from that that appealed to the adjudicator....
[T]his case does meet that criterion. The adjudicator's failing was that she artificially separated the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence and reached conclusions as to credibility without reference to that medical evidence; and then, no doubt inevitably on that premise, found that the medical evidence was of no assistance to her. That was a structural failing, not just an error of appreciation... (para 29-30)
27. The Upper Tribunal held in BN (psychiatric evidence – discrepancies) Albania [2010] UKUT 279 (IAC) that while a judge is entitled to reject a clinical diagnosis supported by expert evidence they "must give clear reasons for doing so which engage adequately with a medical opinion representing the judgment or a professional psychiatrist on what he has seen of the appellant".
28. Underhill LJ in MN v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1746, noted that Wilson J's judgment in Mibanga about the need to take the doctor's evidence fully into account did not exclude the 'the doctor's opinion about the applicant's veracity, based on his presentation and the way he gave his history' (at [109]). After surveying the authorities in detail, Underhill LJ gave the following general guidance on expert evidence from doctors (at [121]):
“In our view the law … (so far as relevant to the issues in these appeals) can be summarised as follows:
(1) The decision whether the account given by an applicant is in the essential respects truthful has to be taken by the tribunal … (for short, the decision-maker) on the totality of the evidence, viewed holistically – Mibanga.
(2) Where a doctor's opinion, properly understood, goes no further than a finding of "mere consistency" with the applicant's account it is, necessarily, neutral on the question whether that account is truthful – see HE (DRC), but the point is in truth obvious.
(3) However, it is open to a doctor to express an opinion to the effect that his or her findings are positively supportive of the truthfulness of an applicant's account (i.e. an opinion going beyond "mere consistency"); and where they do so that opinion should in principle be taken into account – HK; MO (Algeria); and indeed, though less explicitly, Mibanga. In so far as Keene LJ said in HH (Ethiopia) that the doctor in that case should not have expressed such an opinion (see para. 117 (1) above), that cannot be read as expressing a general rule to that effect.
(4) Such an opinion may be based on physical findings (such as specially characteristic scarring). But it may also be based on an assessment of the applicant's reported symptoms, including symptoms of mental ill-health, and/or of their overall presentation and history. Such evidence is equally in principle admissible: there is no rule that doctors are disabled by their professional role from considering critically the truthfulness of what they are told – Minani; HK; MO (Algeria); SS (Sri Lanka). We would add that in the context of a decision taken by the CA on a wholly paper basis, a doctor's assessment of the truthfulness of the applicant may (subject to point (5) below) be of particular value.
(5) The weight to be given to any such expression of opinion will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. It can never be determinative, and the decision-maker will have to decide in each case to what extent its value has to be discounted for reasons of the kind given by Ouseley J at para. 18 of his judgment in HE (DRC).
(6) One factor bearing on the weight to be given to an expression of opinion by a doctor that the applicant's reported symptoms support their case that they were persecuted or trafficked (as the case may be) is whether there are other possible causes of those symptoms. For the reasons explained by Ouseley J (loc. cit.), there may very well be obvious other potential causes in cases of this kind. If the expert has not considered that question that does not justify excluding it altogether: SS (Sri Lanka). It may diminish the value that can be put on their opinion, but the extent to which that is so will depend on the likelihood of such other causes operating in the particular case and producing the symptoms in question.”
29. I remind myself that in BK (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 1358, the Court of Appeal (per Rose LJ) summarised the Devaseelan [2002] UKAIT 702 guidelines as follows:
"(1) The first adjudicator's determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant's status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.
(2) Facts happening since the first adjudicator's determination can always be taken into account by the second adjudicator.
(3) Facts happening before the first adjudicator's determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second adjudicator.
(4) Facts personal to the Appellant that were not brought to the attention of the first adjudicator, although they were relevant to the issues before him, should be treated by the second adjudicator with the greatest circumspection.
(5) Evidence of other facts, for example country evidence, may not suffer from the same concerns as to credibility, but should be treated with caution.
(6) If before the second adjudicator the Appellant relies on facts that are not materially different from those put to the first adjudicator, the second adjudicator should regard the issues as settled by the first adjudicator's determination and make his findings in line with that determination rather than allowing the matter to be re-litigated.
(7) The force of the reasoning underlying guidelines (4) and (6) is greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the Appellant's failure to adduce relevant evidence before the first adjudicator should not be, as it were, held against him. Such reasons will be rare.
(8) The foregoing does not cover every possibility. By covering the major categories into which second appeals fall, the guidance is intended to indicate the principles for dealing with such appeals. It will be for the second adjudicator to decide which of them is or are appropriate in any given case." (Paragraph 32).
30. It was reiterated in AL (Albania) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 950 at [25] that, following the Devaseelan guidelines, not only is the earlier determination the starting point, it should be followed, unless there is a very good reason not to do so.
Analysis
31. In my judgment, neither at [27] or elsewhere did the FTJ “put the cart before the horse” in his credibility assessment. It is plain from paragraphs 17-20 of his determination that he was well aware of the relevant jurisprudence under Devaseelan and elsewhere and was considering all relevant matters in the round, but with the necessary “starting point” in mind. The FTJ correctly identified that SM had not been found credible in the 2020 decision and his claim had failed at that point in time for a number of reasons. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the FTT in that appeal concluded (inter alia) that:
(i) SM’s account of the threat from N’s family and the entire account was invented;
(ii) there was a lack of plausibility to the account particularly regarding N’s family being bothered about SM who had never had sex with her or been in a relationship with her;
(iii) SM had given evidence that if he had gone to an uncle’s house in a different town in Iraq, he would have been safe;
(iv) it lacked plausibility that N would accuse SM of sexually attacking her if she wanted to marry him;
(v) SM’s account was confusing, and he said he feared his own family and the family of the other girl he had been going out with (“S”);
(vi) it lacked plausibility that SM had been informed that N’s family demanded that he return to the IKR to marry her before N disappeared;
(vii) regardless of the credibility of the authentication by the expert, the document purporting to be the “letter of support” from the Police could only have been created and obtained some two years after SM left Iraq, to assist with the asylum claim and not to record the matter for police operational purposes;
(viii) if SM really was at risk in Iraq he would have remained in Italy to pursue his protection claim there, or claimed asylum in France.
32. I remind myself that in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), it was held at Parts 1-3 of the headnote:
“(1) Where an expert report concerns the mental health of an individual, the Tribunal will be particularly reliant upon the author fully complying with their obligations as an expert, as well as upon their adherence to the standards and principles of the expert's professional regulator. When doctors are acting as witnesses in legal proceedings they should adhere to the relevant GMC Guidance.
(2) Although the duties of an expert giving evidence about an individual's mental health will be the same as those of an expert giving evidence about any other matter, the former must at all times be aware of the particular position they hold, in giving evidence about a condition which cannot be seen by the naked eye, X-rayed, scanned or measured in a test tube; and which therefore relies particularly heavily on the individual clinician's opinion.
(3) It is trite that a psychiatrist possesses expertise that a general practitioner may not have. A psychiatrist may well be in a position to diagnose a variety of mental illnesses, including PTSD, following face-to-face consultation with the individual concerned. In the case of human rights and protection appeals, however, it would be naïve to discount the possibility that an individual facing removal from the United Kingdom might wish to fabricate or exaggerate symptoms of mental illness, in order to defeat the respondent's attempts at removal. A meeting between a psychiatrist, who is to be an expert witness, and the individual who is appealing an adverse decision of the respondent in the immigration field will necessarily be directly concerned with the individual's attempt to remain in the United Kingdom on human rights grounds. …”
In my judgment, in circumstances where Dr Ali did not opine in his report that the mental health issues the Appellant had could have accounted for the flaws in SM’s account highlighted in 2020, it was not unreasonable or improper for the FTJ to identify that Dr Ali had proceeded on the basis that the whole of SM’s narrative was correct, (when it had previously been held not to be). That is what Dr Ali did. The FTJ was (i) right to observe that that had to make a difference when it came to assessing the reliability of the conclusions at paragraph 58 of Dr Ali’s report, and (ii) entitled to regard that it would have been better for Dr Ali at the very least to make an alternative assessment, and consider in greater detail the possibility of alternative hypotheses for the Appellant’s presentation.
33. Leaving aside Dr Ali’s acceptance that there would be a lack of family support in Iraq, I consider that the FTJ was also entitled to critique Dr Ali’s report as “an almost fait accompli that the appellant will not access healthcare and will not engage”, in circumstances where there was a considerable amount of evidence in SM’s medical records (which was before Dr Ali, it would appear), which pointed the other way – i.e. to SM being capable, even at times of heightened emotional disturbance, of making contact with mental health services on multiple occasions, and stating his case and what he felt his needs were.
34. Ms King argued that the FTJ’s suggestion, that Dr Ali should have considered alternative reasons for SM’s mental health, (including SM’s energy drink consumption and the possibility of feigning his mental health), was not appropriate in circumstances where Dr Ali did discount the possibility of malingering at paragraph 45 of his report. However, the FTJ was not accusing Dr Ali of not considering malingering at all, rather that it was not assessed in sufficient detail or properly reasoned. Given that there were previous adverse credibility findings made against the Appellant in the 2020 decision, which were before Dr Ali, as well as frequent examples in the wider medical evidence of the Appellant forcefully, and at times aggressively, raising his mental health to make demands of the authorities, Dr Ali’s discounting of the possibility of SM exaggerating or feigning his mental health problems at paragraph 45 of his report was in my judgment very brief and the FTJ was entitled to regarding it as being little more than a “bare ipse dixit”, (even if he did not use those words).
35. It is relevant that SM’s diagnosis from Dr Ali was that he was suffering from severe depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Borderline Personality Disorder. It was documented in the report that SM was drinking energy drinks during the remote assessment on 26 April 2023; something which Dr Ali himself deemed sufficiently noteworthy to question SM about, to include in his assessment of the current presentation of SM, at paragraphs 21 and 29, recording in his report that SM said he drank between 6-7 of these drinks per day. Caffeine is a central nervous system stimulant and a psychoactive substance which can affect mood. Given that Dr Ali’s report itself set out, in the Appendix, the importance, in the context of making a diagnosis of other specified depressive disorders, of being able to rule out that the symptoms and behaviours were not due to the effect of a substance or medication on the central nervous system, including withdrawal effects (see page 286 of the 298 page bundle), it was reasonable for the FTJ make an observation on the absence of any assessment of how this might, or might not, have affected SM’s mood. That does not mean that the FTJ was making a finding that this definitively was an alternative cause; rather he was remarking that a specific feature of SM’s presentation, might have been something that a Practice Direction compliant expert report ought to have assessed (once it had been observed) as being an alternative explanation or cause, or a contributory factor.
36. In my judgement the FTJ was rationally entitled to consider that Dr Ali’s report drifted beyond his area of expertise into the issue of what healthcare would be accessible to the Appellant. Dr Ali could and should have added a clear caveat at paragraph 58 that he was not an expert in healthcare systems in Iraq and thus could not say whether there were adequate and accessible mechanisms for reducing the risk of suicide in Iraq, but did not.
37. The grounds of appeal and skeleton argument complain that the FTJ fell into error by stating at [25] that there were no details of SM’s attempts on his life, when there were references to self-harm and attempts on his life contained within the medical records and the report of Dr Ali. Paragraph 13 of the grounds cites two references, on 15 July 2021 and 14 October 2021 in which detail was recorded in the medical evidence. However when read as a whole I am satisfied that the FTJ at [25] was not ignoring relevant evidence. What the FTJ said at paragraph 25 was anchored to paragraph 16 of Dr Ali’s report, which stated:
“[SM] states that he did sometimes experience outbursts of anger in the past, but never any as violent or severe as those he has experienced in the UK. He is unable to control himself during these outbursts. He states that he has attempted suicide in the UK five to seven times but does not recall the details or dates of these attempts. He says he becomes agitated whenever he is forced to deal with the Home Office and even just seeing a Home Office logo can be enough to trigger an outburst of anger.”
That part of Dr Ali’s report highlighted that SM did not give detail on his claimed suicide attempts. In circumstances where there was documented evidence of SM forcefully raising mental health issues in order to make demands of the authorities, for example regarding the adequacy of the accommodation provided to him, and those mental health issues were only documented after the second appeal (the first references come in early 2021), the fact that SM himself failed to give detail regarding his suicidal ideation when this was being explored by his own expert was something which the FTJ was entitled to observe. That does not mean that the FTJ was ignoring the detail elsewhere in the evidence; for example regarding the cuts to the Appellant’s abdomen on 17 February 2023 or the attempted hanging on 15 July 2021, or the threats to hang himself on 14 October 2021.
38. Stepping back and looking at things more broadly, the FTJ’s approach was in my judgment consistent with the guidance in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC) and the other jurisprudence above, and contained no material error of law.
39. Turning to Ground 2, I am satisfied that the FTJ was entitled to make the comments and findings he did regarding the shortcomings of Dr Ghobadi’s evidence at paragraph 21. The FTJ was rationally entitled to query the ease with which Dr Ghobadi had recalled the document in question and had altered his earlier report, despite the passage of time. Dr Ghobadi admitted using a template for his earlier report (which was what the 2020 decision of the FTT had surmised and concluded) and said that he mistakenly submitted the incomplete version of the report rather than the final draft, because he had forgotten to delete the folder where he kept the draft. In my judgement the FTJ was entitled to reject Dr Ghobadi’s conclusions as lacking in credibility, because this points to a troubling lack of care which continues to undermine his conclusions. As to the other issues raised, namely (i) the lack of any detailed reference to any notes or documents, and the general lack of detail and (ii) the lack of evidence from Mr Karwan Osman, the PhD student from Exeter University, those evidential lacunas remained unresolved. Dr Ghobadi in a footnote to his report (see page 220 of the 298-page bundle) said that Mr Osman was currently based in the KRI. Given the lack of a statement from him was specifically raised as an issue in the 2020 decision, the continued absence of that evidence was something which the FTJ was entitled to consider led to no weight being given to the addendum report.
40. Even if I am wrong about that, I cannot see how the complaint about the assessment of Dr Ghobadi’s evidence means that an error of law in that regard was material to the outcome of the appeal. The substance of the document purporting to emanate from the police stated: “We support the citizen [SM] that on 14/10/2019 he was threatened to be killed for a family matter, he was also attacked for a number of occasions and therefore he fled from Kurdistan. Legal action was taken ...”. The FTJ said that there was nothing which caused him to depart from the FTT decision of 2020; which had found (at paragraph 19) that whether the document was genuine or unreliable, it assisted the Respondent’s case either way. Leaving aside the remarkable lack of detail in the document, it was if genuine based on a report to the police some time after the event as set out above. Either SM had genuinely been offered help by the police, (which supported the argument that there would be sufficiency of protection), or the claim was supported by an unreliable document.
41. Looking at the FTJ’s decision as a whole, I am satisfied that he considered all relevant matters in the round, properly assessed the expert reports, and did not improperly “put the cart before the horse” in the Mibanga sense. The new evidence put forward with the fresh claim and appeal was such that the FTJ was entitled to conclude that nothing had been produced that would lead him to depart from the conclusions in the 2020 decision; which included alternative findings about sufficiency of protection and internal relocation to live with family members.
42. Ms King acknowledged that the findings made by the FTJ in 2024, regarding the evidence from Dr Morad, (at paragraphs 22-24), were not challenged in the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, nor was there a challenge to the FTJ’s findings that there were sources of mental healthcare assistance in Iraq as detailed in the relevant CPIN. I find that the FTJ was rationally entitled to conclude that the Appellant did not face a real risk of persecution or intentionally inflicted serious harm, and that there was family support available, to help him redocument and access healthcare. Even if I am wrong and the FTJ should have more readily accepted the conclusions at paragraph 58 of Dr Ali’s report, that would not in my judgement have affected his other findings in relation to the general credibility of the wider protection claim based on a fear of intentionally inflicted serious harm. The evidence before the FTJ did not come close to amounting to “very good reasons” to depart from the findings of the 2020 decision regarding the lack of plausibility and credibility of the protection claim and risk on return. The FTJ therefore accepted that it was open to SM to return to Iraq safely to live with family members, whom the FTT in 2020 found lived at a number of different locations, and that there was sufficiency of protection even if there were a risk from the girl’s family. The family support network available to SM upon return, together with SM’s historic ability to understand his mental health issues and seek mental health support when he felt he needed it, meant that there were sufficient safeguards to reduce any risk of suicide. Therefore, even if the FTJ erred by not giving adequate reasoning for rejecting some of the psychiatric report, that error was not material to the outcome of the appeal, given his other findings, which were reasonably open to him on the evidence.

Notice of Decision
The decision does not contain a material error of law.
The appeal is dismissed.

RSinger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
4.12.25