Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001478

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62643/2023
LP/13959/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

WJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Norman, Counsel instructed by Corbin & Hassan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

The parties may apply on notice to vary this Order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. On 24 November 2022 the Single Competent Authority (SCA) found in its conclusive grounds decision that, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery in the United Kingdom (UK) during 2017-2018 for the purposes of sexual exploitation. She was granted discretionary leave to remain in the UK as a victim of trafficking until 30 May 2024.
2. The Appellant had appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 6 November 2023 to refuse her international protection claims made on 4 July 2019. Her claim extends to her dependent daughter, SZ, a citizen of the United States of America.
3. In a decision which was promulgated on 11 February 2025, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 23 January 2025, Judge Dyer (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal (‘the Decision’).
4. On 1 April 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Cartin granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
5. We consider that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal in light of the circumstances of the Appellant’s protection claims. No party asked for it to be set aside.
Background
6. The Appellant married SZ’s father in China in November 2015, and they were divorced by February 2016. In March 2016 she discovered she was pregnant. On 20 July 2016, she flew to the United States of America to give birth to SZ who was born on 27 September 2016. They flew back to China together on 13 October 2016. The Appellant claims that she would have been unable to register SZ’s birth with the Chinese authorities because she is a single mother.
7. Around this time, the Appellant claims she borrowed RMB2 million from a man called Brother Ming (‘the loan shark’) for cancer treatment for her mother. He charged her RMB1 million in interest. He told her that he could provide her access to well-paid work in Ireland in a restaurant. As she was unable to pay him back the money she owed, and he was threatening her and her daughter, the Appellant felt she had no choice but to accept his offer.
8. On 18 June 2017, when SZ was aged nine months, the Appellant left her daughter with her brother in China and flew to Ireland. She was imprisoned and beaten and, when she refused to work, she was raped by three men.
9. The Appellant was taken by car to the United Kingdom (UK). She was forced into sexual exploitation and only complied out of fear of her own and SZ’s safety. On 14 September 2018 she was found by immigration enforcement working illegally in a brothel and was arrested by the police. No charges were brought against her.
10. Prior to the Appellant’s arrest in September 2018, SZ had been brought to the UK by the Appellant’s brother to live with the Appellant. However, upon hearing of the Appellant’s arrest, her brother took SZ back to China.
11. Following her arrest, the Appellant moved in with a customer from the brothel who was also a friend, and she has resided with him since then.
12. On 9 June 2019, the Appellant’s brother brought SZ back to the UK to live with the Appellant. The Appellant claims that her brother has received visits or threats from the loan shark in China, most recently in December 2024.
13. The Appellant claims that she and SZ are at risk in China from the loan shark and persons working for him. She claims that she also is at risk and that her debt has never been repaid, or it is not acknowledged as paid, despite the sexual exploitation she suffered at the hands of the loan shark and persons who work for him.
First-tier Tribunal decision
14. The Judge did not go behind the SCA decision that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery in the UK during 2017-2018 for the purposes of sexual exploitation (at [16], [25]).
15. The Judge was unable to accept, even to the lower standard, the Appellant’s account that she borrowed money for her mother’s medical treatment from a loan shark, had been trafficked to Ireland and then the UK, and that she owed a debt. The Appellant gave inconsistent dates of when she got into debt and did not provide evidence that would have reasonably been available to her to show that her mother was ill and had medical treatment (at [24]).
16. The Judge found that the Appellant, “a person who travelled to give birth to her child overseas to secure for her the benefits of a US citizenship, is someone with more than a passing understanding of the system of emigration and immigration”. (at [25]). She had arranged to travel and give birth to SZ in the US and had made around half a dozen visitor and business visa applications to the UK, many of which were refused, following the end of her first marriage and before her re-entry (via Ireland) in June 2017 (at [25]). The Judge found it “was very unlikely that the people whom she fears would have waited for her to finish weaning her baby before sending her to the UK.” The Appellant “did not leave China until she was ready to leave.” She made the decision to leave “for the purpose of bettering her and her daughter’s lives.” (at [25]).
17. The Judge found it was quite possible that after leaving China for economic reasons, the Appellant “was duped into working in a different environment” from what she had envisaged. The “fact that she intended to bring her three-year old daughter to live with her in the UK whilst she was still working in the brothel for the people whom she owed money to and who, she claims, were threatening the safety and wellbeing of her daughter, is not consistent with the picture that has been painted of her as a victim of modern slavery through forced labour and sexual exploitation (at [25]. The Appellant described the people who brought her to the UK “as bosses of an international prostitution and trafficking group and that she was locked in a room and beaten and deprived of food and that when she refused to work, they called three men to rape her.” The Judge found that “it is extremely unlikely that any mother would risk bringing her child anywhere near people of that nature, even if they intended to escape from them “(at [25]).
18. The Judge did not find the Appellant “to be a credible witness with regards to her claim and there is insufficient evidence to establish to the lower standard that she borrowed money from any loan sharks or that she is at risk on return from anyone, whether connected to the brothel or otherwise .”(at [26]).
19. The Judge found that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason and that she does not face a real risk of serious harm (at [27].
20. The Judge found that if she were wrong in relation to her findings in relation to the Appellant’s risk of persecution and real risk of serious harm, “someone of [her] resourcefulness would be able to relocate with her daughter ... to another part of China without there being a real risk of [the loan shark] or anyone else connected with him finding her.” The Judge was satisfied that the Appellant “could reasonably relocate without this being unduly harsh.” (at [28]). The Judge dismissed the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
21. With regards to the circumstances of the Appellant and her daughter, SZ, under Article 8 ECHR, the Judge found that SZ lived in China in her early years, she has immediate family there, and she travelled in and out of China at least twice without issue. SZ “would adapt to the new environment and pick up the language and adjust over time.” The Appellant has either one or two brothers who reside in China. The Appellant lived most of her life in China and speaks the language. The Judge did not accept on the evidence available that SZ cannot return to China. Their family life has been established with each other, and they would remain together if returned to China. Neither had entered the UK on a basis that would give them the expectation that they had the right to remain (at [29]).
22. The Judge noted that SZ is 8 years old and has only spent around 5-6 years in the UK. She found that SZ is not a qualifying child under s 117B(6) NIAA 2002. The best interests of SZ are served by her remaining with her mother, and the refusal of the appeal would not interfere with that arrangement (at [29]).
Permission to appeal to Upper Tribunal
23. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
24. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on the following ground:
1. The Judge erred in failing to consider the general risk of re-trafficking for the Appellant, as a former victim of trafficking. The Judge did not specifically list this to be a matter in issue between the parties. However, the issues are referred to in fairly vague terms. It was said that it was in dispute ‘to what extent she faces a risk on return for a Convention reason and the sufficiency of protection on return’.
2. The Appellant placed reliance on the general risk of re-trafficking (ASA [22] to [26]). Submissions were made to the Judge regarding the risk to the Appellant of being re-trafficked as a victim of trafficking. It is arguable, that the Judge, having rejected the primary claim that she was at risk from loan sharks, has neglected to deal with the broader claim of general re-trafficking risk.
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
25. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. We had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant.
26. We heard submissions from Ms Norman for the Appellant and Mr Ojo for the Respondent, which we have fully taken into account.
Appellant
27. The Appellant made submissions to the Judge on the risk of her being re-trafficked more generally by persons other than the loan shark and his associates which were not adequately dealt with in the Decision. The Judge made no reference to HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027 (‘HC & RC’) or the Country policy and information note: China: modern slavery October 2024 (‘CPIN’) and he made no finding of the risk of re-trafficking faced by someone with the Appellant’s profile as a single woman with a child. The Judge considered some of the relevant factors relevant to the generalised risk of re-trafficking, but this was in the context of his Article 8 assessment and the reasonableness of the Appellant relocating within China. The Judge did not carefully consider whether the Appellant would receive effective protection. This inadequate consideration by the Judge of the Appellant’s claim to be at risk of re-trafficking amounts to a material error of law.
Respondent
28. The Judge properly assessed the credibility of the Appellant’s account and concluded that her asylum narrative was not credible in relation to her having borrowed money from a loan shark to pay for her mother’s medical expenses and incurring a significant debt.
29. While the Judge did not explicitly consider the risk more generally of the Appellant being re-trafficked, her reasons indicate that she did have that risk in mind. She considered the Appellant’s circumstances with reference to the relevant parts of the guidance in HC & RC. The Judge findings that the Appellant left China at a time of her choosing, that she is a resourceful woman who can work, and she has the support of her family indicate that she had regard to the guidance in para (h) of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) (‘TD and AD’) which details the characteristics of women at risk of trafficking and are applicable to other nationalities.
Decision on error of law
30. Having carefully considered the oral submissions made to the Tribunal and the relevant parts of the Decision, we have concluded for the reasons that follow that the Decision does not contain a material error of law and shall stand.
31. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
32. We remind ourselves of the limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge, who saw and heard the Appellant give her evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
33. The Judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal turned on her assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s asylum narrative that she borrowed money from a loan shark to pay for her mother’s medical expenses and incurred a significant debt. She found this account not to be credible due to inconsistencies in the dates when the Appellant got into debt and her not providing evidence that would have reasonably been available to her to show that her mother was ill and had medical treatment.
34. The Judge listened to the Appellant give her oral evidence, including under cross-examination, and we accord due deference to her findings, including in relation to the credibility of the Appellant’s account. In SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, Green LJ explained at [44]:
“All of this explains why first instance judges need carefully to assess credibility and why appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact finder who is experienced in sifting evidence of this sort. But it also explains why an appellate court needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it. “
35. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713 at [58], the Court of Appeal cited these observations with approval.
36. Having carefully considered the Decision, we find the Judge’s reasoning is intelligible and adequate to support her negative credibility findings and her rejection of the Appellant’s core account. The Decision contains cogent reasons based on the evidence for the overall conclusion the Judge reached that the claim put forward by the Appellant could not be believed to the lower standard of proof.
37. In HC & RC, the Upper Tribunal provided the following guidance in relation to trafficking of women and girls in China:
(1) Although the Chinese authorities are intent upon rescuing and rehabilitating women and girls trafficked for the purposes of prostitution, there are deficiencies in the measures they have taken to combat the problem of trafficking. The principal deficiencies are the lack of a determined effort to deal with the complicity of corrupt law enforcement officers and state officials and the failure to penalise as trafficking acts of forced labour, debt bondage, coercion, involuntary servitude or offences committed against male victims.
(2) Women and girls in China do not in general face a real risk of serious harm from traffickers. Where, however, it can be established in a given case that a woman or a girl does face a real risk of being forced or coerced into prostitution by traffickers, the issue of whether she will be able to receive effective protection from the authorities will need careful consideration in the light of background evidence highlighting significant deficiencies in the system of protection for victims of trafficking. But each case, however, must be judged on its own facts. China is a vast country and it may be, for example, that in a particular part of China the efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. If an appellant comes from such an area, or if she can relocate to such an area, there may be no real risk to her.
(3) The Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and will not allow their citizens to starve. Therefore a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution.
(4) Due to reforms of the Chinese household registration system known as the “hukou” system it is unlikely that a returned trafficked woman would be obliged to return to the place where she is registered. The reforms have made it relatively easy for ordinary migrant workers to get legal, albeit temporary, urban registration and there is no reason why this should not extend to returned trafficked women.”
38. In TD and AD, the Tribunal provided the following guidance in relation to trafficking of women from Albania and re-trafficking of women more generally:
“(g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.
(h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
39. The CPIN provides the following information about modern slavery in China and circumstances that may increase the risk of re-trafficking of women and girls once returned to China (at 4):
“Modern slavery affects men, young women and girls who are trafficked, within and outside China, for forced labour, and sexual exploitation. Modern slavery victims within the UK are typically lured by promises of a better life and higher wages but forced into labour, domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, or criminal exploitation. Victims who pay a smuggling fee can be forced into debt bondage by criminal gangs.
...
Victims of modern slavery, particularly those involved in sex trafficking, may experience discrimination or social stigma on return. However, in general, this is not sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition to reach the high threshold of persecution and/or serious harm. There is no evidence to suggest that re-trafficking is widespread and in general, it is unlikely that a person would be re-trafficked once returned to China. There are, however, certain circumstances which may increase the risk of a person being abused or re-trafficked such as the person being homeless, disabled, suffering from a mental illness or those with a lack of education.
In general, the state is able but not always willing to offer protection to those who are at risk of modern slavery.”
40. The Appellant’s challenge to how the Judge considered the evidence before her, the guidance provided in HC & RC and the background material in the CPIN amounts to the suggestion that she was bound to engage with certain parts of the evidence, and that her reasoning in rejecting the existence of risk was inadequate and therefore vitiated by unlawfulness.
41. The touchstone for considering adequacy of reasoning as an error of law is the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 192; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535. Brooke LJ emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached at [13]-[14]. It follows that reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning have been articulated.
42. We are satisfied that the Judge’s reasons were perfectly clear in setting out why she was not satisfied that the Appellant’s account lacked credibility, and why she reached the conclusion that there was a not a reasonable degree of likelihood or real risk that the Appellant would be persecuted or suffer serious harm on return to China. The Judge considered factors identified in HC & RC and TD and AD relevant to the risk of the Appellant being re-trafficked on return, including her access to family support, her health, age, education and social status, and her ability to obtain paid employment and access secure housing in her area of origin or elsewhere in China. This shows that the correct legal test and appropriate background material were properly considered by the Judge in coming to the decision that was reached that the Appellant is not at risk on return from anyone, whether connected to the loan shark or otherwise. (at [26]).
43. We conclude that there is no material error of law identified in respect of the Judge’s findings in the Decision. The authorities that we have cited make clear that mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision is not sufficient to enable us to do so. Whilst Ms Norman made submissions to us which were clear, we are unable to agree that such submissions show any discernible error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Judge was unarguably entitled to reach the decision which was reached.
44. We find that the ground of appeal does not reach the standard for interference with findings of fact and credibility outlined in Ullah and Volpi.

Notice of Decision
45. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 11 February 2025 did not involve the making of a material error of law and the Decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal shall therefore stand.

Linda Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 14 July 2025