Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001483
PA/66602/2023
LP/08408/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

AM (PAKISTAN)
Appellants
AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Moksud, IIAS
For the Respondent: Mrs Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on the 10 January 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan born in 1995. He appeals to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse to grant him leave to remain on human rights grounds.

Background and Matters in Issue

2. The core facts in this matter are not in dispute. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2012. He was then aged 17. He was with his mother and his younger brother, who for the purpose of this anonymised decision we shall refer to as ‘Z’. The Appellant’s mother sought protection on the basis that she and the children had escaped domestic violence at the hands of the boys’ father. Although neither party was able to furnish us with the details of that claim, or why it was unsuccessful, it is common ground that protection was refused on the 23 October 2012 and there was never any appeal.

3. The family overstayed. Mrs Newton informed us that they remained in continuous contact with the Home Office and various submissions were made over the years. Z was eventually granted leave to remain on private life grounds. Again, the reasons are opaque, but the parties before us agree that it was likely because he qualified under the rules as a person aged between 18 and 25 who had spent over half his life in the UK. We are told that the Appellant’s mother has attempted to make a ‘fresh claim’ for leave to remain on human rights and/or protection grounds, and that these submissions remain outstanding with the Home Office.

4. The Appellant claimed protection in his own right in December 2020 after the family were detained by the immigration service. The substance of his claim was that if he returned to Pakistan, he faced a real risk of serious harm at the hands of his father, who was a violent man with connections to organised crime and/or a far-right religious extremist group. His claim was refused by the Respondent in December 2023. The Appellant exercised his right of appeal, and on 31 January 2025 the matter came before the First-tier Tribunal.

5. By its decision dated 12 February 2025 the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The Tribunal accepted the Appellant’s evidence that his father had been drunken and abusive but rejected the claims that he was either a “gangster” or involved with any extremist Islamist organisation. It did not, for that reason, accept that the Appellant would be at any risk of harm from this man, whom he could simply avoid by moving elsewhere in Pakistan. The Tribunal noted the evidence adduced on appeal to the effect that the Appellant was suffering from significant mental health issues, but in a brief assessment of these matters, found neither Articles 3 nor 8 to be engaged.

6. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 23 May 2025. In his order of that date Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato agreed that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision in respect of Articles 3 and 8 had arguably been flawed. He refused permission to appeal against the Tribunal’s decision on protection, and so the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on that matter are preserved.

7. On 9 October 2025 the matter came before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hill, who found that the First-tier Tribunal’s analysis of the human rights claims had been flawed for material error of law. In respect of Article 3 it had failed to make a finding on whether the Appellant was a ‘seriously ill person’, or to properly consider the risk of suicide. These errors also infected the analysis of Article 8, which was further flawed for a failure to analyse the impact on the Appellant of separation from his mother, and importantly, brother in the UK.

8. Principal Resident Judge Blum made a transfer order on 17 November 2025 and so the matter now comes before us. At the outset of the hearing we agreed, with the consent of Mrs Newton, that the Appellant is to be treated as a vulnerable witness. He was not called to give evidence, but was present throughout the hearing, and confirmed that he understood what was happening and what the purpose of the hearing was. He was accompanied by his brother Z, who gave oral evidence. We heard the submissions of the parties and we reserved our decision, which we set out below.

The Evidence

Medical

9. It is accepted that the Appellant suffers from complex PTSD, depression, anxiety, and that he has at times suffered from both auditory and visual hallucinations.

10. The earliest evidence we have of this is a letter dated 24 April 2025 from Dr Usma Masud of the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Trust. Dr Masud writes that the Appellant had at that time already been subject to an “extended assessment by various professionals” and that in her opinion he requires complex treatment involving psychotropic medications and psychological therapy. She records that he is an individual who has suffered severe trauma in both childhood and adult life. In respect of the former she refers to the violence suffered at the hands of his father, and witnessing his father harming others, notably his mother. In respect of the latter Dr Masud identifies “the horrendous circumstances of his detention by the Home Office/SERCO” in 2020. The Appellant told her that on that occasion he was subject to interrogation for many hours whilst food and water were withheld. He was detained for several weeks, during which he became convinced that he would be removed to Pakistan, where he feared he would be killed by his father. We interpolate that in his oral evidence before us Z identified the Appellant’s arrest and detention as being the catalyst for the Appellant’s current mental health crisis. He told us that prior to that, they had both been affected by their childhood experiences, but that his brother had been “coping” and attending college. Since then, he has deteriorated markedly. Dr Masud continues by noting that the Appellant is dependent upon his brother for his care and financial needs, and opines that although treatment is available in Pakistan, there is no structured follow up system. She concludes that “he may not access appropriate treatment due to lack of insight and engagement”.

11. A collection of correspondence from the Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust follows. A discharge notice dated 12 November 2025 records that the Appellant was that day admitted to the Manchester Royal Infirmary suffering from paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations which he described to clinicians as “hearing his mother’s cries” when she was being tortured by his father. The Appellant had self-harmed by cutting his forearm and he told staff that he found that this calmed the voices. Z told staff on that occasion that his brother was not looking after himself and would not shower. A letter issued a few days later records that the Appellant had contacted the Mental Health Helpline on the 15 November 2025 expressing concerns about self-harm and thoughts of killing himself.

12. On the 2 December 2025 the Appellant was back at Manchester Royal Infirmary, having again injured himself by causing cuts to his forearms and neck. Staff recorded that he appeared unkempt and agitated; he had reduced appetite and was not speaking. He was suspicious of everyone and was once again suffering from auditory and visual hallucinations. Z told staff that his brother did not trust people; he was suffering from sleeplessness and flashbacks. This discharge notice noted that the Appellant has “good support from his family”, and that he is compliant with his prescription of 150mg of Sertraline and 15mg of Mirtazapine.

13. That was the latest medical evidence available. We were shown nothing from the Appellant’s GP. Upon our enquiry about why this was, Z explained to us that he has stopped taking his brother to the family GP because they had been spoken to very rudely by the practice manager there. He said the manager’s behaviour was “horrible”. The Appellant has refused to go back there. He said that because his brother was engaging directly with mental health services he did not consider it necessary to get a different GP.

Relationships

14. The Appellant lives with his mother and brother Z, who is now aged 25.

15. Before us Z adopted his witness statement and gave further oral evidence. Z told us that the family live on the allowance paid by the Home Office to his mother and brother, and his earnings. He does shift work as a security guard.

16. Z states that he is his brother’s primary carer. This involves coaxing him to eat, washing him and generally trying to get him to look after himself. Mostly it involves him reassuring the Appellant when he becomes overwhelmed with anxiety or paranoia. The Appellant often has nightmares, and “becomes very afraid in his sleep – he awakes shouting” which we understood to mean he has night terrors. Z said that sometimes these lead to the Appellant soiling himself in the night and when this happens it is Z who changes the bed and cleans him up. The Appellant is ashamed and upset when this happens and Z has to calm him down.

17. Z told us that on the advice of mental health professionals he has been trying to get the Appellant to engage with the outside world. If left to his own devices he will stay at home all the time and never venture out. When he does go out, he is always accompanied by Z, or by their mother. We were shown a laminated card that the Appellant has on a lanyard around his neck, which explains that he suffers from PTSD. It has Z’s name and phone number on it and a request to call him in an emergency. Z explained that he made this for this brother in order to try and persuade him that he could go out on his own. He has so far not been able to do this.

18. Z has always accompanied the Appellant to hospital. Sometimes this has been because he is afraid that the Appellant will hurt himself; other times it has been when the damage has already been done, and the Appellant had cut himself with a razor.

19. Z was asked about how his brother might cope if he had to return to Pakistan. He said that he did not know. He would not be able to work or look after himself properly. Z told us that since the family arrived in 2021, they have not had any contact with family members in Pakistan. He was unable to tell us where they had lived in Pakistan, pointing out that he was only 11 years old when they arrived in this country. Z agreed that he could send the Appellant money from his work as a security guard, but it would be so hard because there would be nobody there to look after him. Asked why his mother could not return with him to look after him, he said that she had an application pending herself. He agreed that sometimes she does help to look after the Appellant, but Z said that she is not very well herself. She has also been through a lot with his father and has her own mental health issues. She is “in herself” and does not really know how to cope with the Appellant.

20. Z said that he is the main carer for the Appellant because he knows how to act with him. He talks to him gently and tries to make him calm. His brother trusts him but sometimes he has to cajole or play with him to get him to do things. For instance, the Appellant never wants to go to the hospital, so Z tells him that they are going shopping and then once they are out of the house he says, “oh why don’t we just go into the hospital while we are out”. Z said that once his brother is “triggered” he becomes extremely agitated and it is very difficult to calm him down. Z therefore tries to avoid this if at all possible. We note that on two occasions during Z’s evidence the Appellant, who was sat next to him, became distressed and Z had to shortly break off his evidence to reassure him.

21. Z said that his material grandmother and uncle also live in the UK. They live together on the other side of Stockport. They do see them occasionally, but it is difficult to travel there.

22. In answer to the panel’s questions Z confirmed that his brother is still taking Sertraline and Mirtazapine, but he is also on 5mg of diazepam to help him sleep (we note that he gave us this information having checked in the bag of medications that the Appellant had brought with him to court). He told us that his brother was referred for talking therapy in January 2026.

Article 3

23. Before the First-tier Tribunal it was submitted on the Appellant’s behalf that if he is required to return to Pakistan, the UK will be in breach of its obligations under Article 3 ECHR because there will be a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering: AM (Art 3 health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 (IAC) applied. As we note above, it was partly as a result of the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of that issue that the matter is now before us.

24. That history notwithstanding, before us Mr Moksud accepted that it would be difficult for him to make out that case to the high standard required. Setting to one side the question of whether or not the Appellant is a “seriously ill person” (something put in issue by Mrs Newton for the Secretary of State) there was simply no evidence before us capable of discharging the burden of proof in respect of the other key issues to be resolved. Although Dr Masud expressed a concern about how the Appellant would cope in Pakistan, she stopped short of saying that she believed that there would be a “serious, rapid and irreversible” decline in his health upon arrival that would lead to “intense suffering”. Nor was there evidence before us capable of establishing substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would commit suicide if returned, or that his life expectancy would otherwise be curtailed. We acknowledge that he has self-harmed in the recent past, and that he has told mental health clinicians that he has had thoughts of suicide, but in the absence of a specific analysis of how he might cope with removal, we are not satisfied that this evidence is sufficient to discharge the burden of proof to the appropriate standard. We therefore dismiss the appeal on Article 3 grounds.

Article 8

25. The operative paragraph of the Rules at the time that the Appellant made his application, and at the date that it was refused by the Secretary of State, was the test for leave to remain on ‘private life’ grounds, set out in what was then paragraph 276ADE. This has since been superseded by the provisions in Appendix Private Life, but the test remains materially the same. The Appellant will qualify for leave to remain if he can show that there are “very significant obstacles to his integration” in Pakistan.

26. The meaning of those words was considered by the Court of Appeal in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813, there in the context of the deportation of a foreign criminal. In a formulation since approved by the Supreme Court, Lord Justice Sales said this [at §14]:

"In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's 'integration' into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported … is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of 'integration' calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life."

27. In this broad evaluation we must therefore be concerned with the practical but also the emotional aspects of the claimant’s life in the proposed country of return. The ability to make a living for oneself, and to secure basic requirements such as food, shelter and medicine are certainly important, but this provision is also fundamentally concerned with the ability to build relationships with other humans. In her published guidance to caseworkers ‘Private Life’ (v6.0) 30 December 2025 the Secretary of State highlights the interaction between those two considerations. She emphasises the nature of the right:

Very significant obstacles will exist where the applicant demonstrates that they would be unable to establish a private life in the country of return, or if establishing a private life in the country of return would entail very serious hardship for the applicant.

28. But simultaneously recognises that for some classes of claimant, the practical obstacles that they will face on return may be particularly potent inhibitors to the establishment of the human relationships that underpin the Article 8 right:

Assessing very significant obstacles into the country of return if the applicant arrived in the UK as a child If the applicant is over 18 but arrived in the UK as a child (and does not meet the half of life in the UK test) then an assessment of whether there are very significant obstacles to integration in the country in which they might have to live if required to leave the UK will be necessary. In these cases, you must consider if the individual has lived in that country as an adult which will mean spending a period of employment or study in that country, or other activities consistent with living there as an adult.

29. It is therefore unfortunate that in this case the Secretary of State’s consideration of the test in her refusal letter was confined to the observation that the Appellant speaks Urdu, an official language of Pakistan.

30. We are satisfied that the Appellant remains familiar with the culture, religion and language of Pakistan. Although he left that country as a child, he has remained living with his Pakistani mother and brother and has continued contact with other members of the family and Pakistani community in Manchester. We think it unlikely that he will have lost his understanding of those matters, and indeed Mr Moksud did not attempt to persuade us otherwise. That said, we are concerned that there are a number of other obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Pakistan.

31. The most fundamental issue in this case is the Appellant’s current mental illness. Before we consider the possible effects of this if he is returned to Pakistan, and whether these could be mitigated we address the following matters raised in submissions by Mrs Newton.

32. We recognise that the evidence could have been better. In HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 the Tribunal emphasised the importance of GP records to support such claims. HA was a case which concerned the production of court reports by clinicians who have interacted with the subject only for the purpose of producing that evidence. Whilst the Tribunal recognised the inherent expertise of such clinicians to diagnose illnesses such as PTSD, there remained the possibility that a claimant, with much at stake, might cynically exaggerate or even invent his symptoms so as to fool the expert. The Tribunal held that for that reason, it would as a general matter be preferable for the court to have access to the full GP record of the individual concerned, so that claimed mental illnesses could be evaluated in the context of their long term interaction with the NHS, rather than simply the ‘snapshot’ provided by the expert. Mrs Newton reminded us of this authority, and pointed out that here, we do not have such records. We have had regard to that omission. We are however satisfied that in this case, little turns on it. That is because the evidence we do have is not from someone brought in simply to write a report. It is from the specialist services who have been providing the Appellant with care over what Dr Masud indicates to be a relatively lengthy period of time. Furthermore, the Secretary of State takes no issue with the diagnoses of complex PTSD, depression and anxiety; nor has she challenged the evidence that the Appellant has harmed himself, or that he has at times suffered from symptoms more commonly associated with psychosis, such as paranoia, auditory and visual hallucinations.

33. We also recognise that the Appellant’s condition may be temporary. Mrs Newton pointed out that when the Appellant was interviewed in connection with his asylum claim he said nothing about any mental illness. His brother confirmed that he was previously functioning relatively well and that in his view, this current bout of ill-health was precipitated by the family’s detention, and the Appellant becoming overwhelmed by a fear of being returned to Pakistan. It may be, and indeed it is to be hoped, that his condition will improve at some point in the future. That is not something that is going to be particularly significant in our assessment of the rule. We do not perceive that there is any requirement in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) that the “very significant obstacles” that the Appellant must face should be permanent. The question is whether, on the evidence before us, the Appellant would face such obstacles to his integration in Pakistan today. We read that as a requirement to consider the reasonably foreseeable future. We acknowledge that there may be a possibility that the Appellant’s malaise will lift if returned to the familiar environment of his childhood; we think it would however be impermissibly speculative to proceed on the basis that it would. We have to decide the appeal on the evidence before us, and at the moment the Appellant has a diagnosis of, amongst other things, complex PTSD which requires both psychotropic medications and talking therapies.

34. Finally Mrs Newton referred us to the Country Information Note Pakistan: Healthcare and medical treatment (v.3.0) July 2024. Annex A contains a non-exhaustive list of pharmaceuticals commonly available in Pakistan, and this list includes Sertraline. It does not mention Mirtazapine or Diazepam but in the absence of any evidence to the contrary – the burden of proof resting on the Appellant – we are prepared to infer that these other common drugs would also be available.

35. Having found that the drugs can be purchased in Pakistan, we must now consider whether the Appellant would be able not only to obtain them, but to take them in the structured way necessary to manage his conditions. In her letter Dr Masud indicated that to her knowledge, these drugs are indeed available in Pakistan; as she puts it, her concern is that “he may not access appropriate treatment due to lack of insight and engagement”.

36. Having observed the Appellant in court for ourselves, and having heard the broadly credible evidence of Z, that is certainly a concern that we share.

37. We are satisfied that Z was telling us the truth when he describes what life is currently like for his brother. The Appellant is highly withdrawn, suspicious of non-family members and reluctant to access medical care. When Z has managed to get him to the hospital, the Appellant has been reluctant and obstructive, and Z has had to cajole him, or even trick him, in order to persuade him to engage with services in this country. Z credibly described to us how distressed and agitated his brother can get when he is outside the family home, and this was borne out by the notes taken by staff who admitted the Appellant to the Manchester Royal Infirmary late last year. We accept that the Appellant is very largely dependent upon his brother not just to provide him with basic care (cooking his dinner, changing his soiled bedclothing) but to ensure that he complies with his treatment regime. We accept Z’s evidence that it is he who takes the Appellant to all of his appointments, ensures that he takes his medications, and soothes him when he is “triggered”. Even with this intense support, the medications, and the other support offered by mental health services, the evidence before us indicates that the Appellant can indeed still be “triggered” to act in ways that make his illness outwardly apparent. The evidence from Manchester Royal Infirmary establishes that the Appellant has self-harmed by cutting himself on at least two occasions in 2025, that he appears unkempt and agitated to staff.

38. This leads us to two findings. We are satisfied, on all of the evidence before us, that there is a real risk that the Appellant would fail to engage with any treatment services that are available in Pakistan. We think it likely that the Appellant would find it very difficult to engage with services there, since we know from Z’s evidence that he finds it difficult to engage with services here, and only does so with his intense support: he goes with Z to appointments because he trusts him. Furthermore, the Appellant’s recent history, narrated by Z and by the written evidence from mental health services, is that he remains visibly unwell even on his current regime of two SSRIs and a tranquillizer. He is therefore going to face some significant challenges to his integration, whether he is compliant with his drug regime or not.

39. It is difficult to imagine how the Appellant would cope upon arrival in Pakistan. As the Secretary of State has recognised in her policy, it is important to note that the Appellant left Pakistan as a child and has not returned there in 14 years. He may be an ‘insider’ in that he knows the language and religion, but he has never lived independently there, or had employment. He has no experience of ‘how things work’ in terms of getting a job, or house, or any other basic necessities that an adult might be expected to know. These difficulties are clearly going to be compounded by his present condition. His appearance and behaviour would, in our assessment, be a very significant obstacle to him obtaining employment, finding somewhere to live or making friends. Whilst there is not the evidence to say that the result would be rapid or irreversible “intense suffering”, we think it safe to say that the consequences for the Appellant would be bad. He would find himself incredibly isolated. He is already paranoid, and has experienced delusional thinking including hallucinations. We are unable to accept Mr Moksud’s assertion that “people would attack him in the street”, since there is no evidential basis for such a finding, but we can certainly accept that an individual in that state, knowing no one, having no idea of how to go about looking after himself, would be in a very precarious situation indeed.

40. The question remains: is there anything that might mitigate these difficulties?

41. Mrs Newton pointed out that the Appellant must still have family members, including his father in Pakistan. Whilst we found Z to be very compelling in his evidence about his brother, his response when asked about his family origins in Pakistan was less so. He told us that because he was so young when he left he could not even tell us what part of Pakistan he came from. Z was 11 when he arrived in the UK, and he has lived here with his mother, grandmother, uncle and other relatives. We find it hard to accept that an 11 year old would not know the name of his home town, or remember it has he grew older; we also find it difficult to accept that none of the adults in this family would have talked about Pakistan in the past 14 years.

42. Those doubts notwithstanding, we are satisfied that the Appellant does not currently have any meaningful family support in Pakistan. We proceed on the basis of the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that his father was an abusive drunk, and although it rejected the more extreme elements of the Appellant’s account, it remains the uncontested fact that the Appellant and his family came to this country in 2012 without his father. He has certainly not been back to see him since. We assume that the Secretary of State would have known if UKVI had issued this man with a visa at any point, so we proceed on the basis that he has not been here either. We are therefore prepared to accept that this relationship broke down a long time ago, and we acknowledge that the Appellant has, in his interactions with mental health services, made repeated references to his fear of his father. The trauma arising from that relationship is, by Dr Masud’s reckoning, a contributing factor to the Appellant’s complex PTSD. We therefore think it unlikely that the Appellant would seek or receive any meaningful support from his father or paternal family.

43. An alternative source of support for the Appellant, posited by Mrs Newton, was that the Appellant’s mother could return to Pakistan with him and take care of him there. It was striking that we did not hear from the Appellant’s mother. Mr Moksud’s case, in answer to Mrs Newton’s submission, was wholly unsatisfactory. The Appellant’s mother may well have “an application pending for leave to remain” but she is currently an overstayer who is liable to removal. Her situation is therefore distinguishable from that of her son Z, who has leave and whom, we accept, will never return to Pakistan. Why, asks Mrs Newton, can mother not return with son, and look after him there, if necessary supported by remittances from Z in the UK?

44. At first blush this seems like a reasonable point. Having given it careful consideration and having in particular regard to the evidence of Z, we are satisfied that in the unusual circumstances of the case, this is both unlikely to occur, and insufficient to address the difficulties that the Appellant will likely face in Pakistan. The evidence before us indicated that whilst it is the NHS who are currently providing the treatment, it is very specifically his brother who ensures that he complies and shoulders the bulk of the caring responsibilities. When Z was asked whether his mother is able or willing to help, he indicated that she can step in when he is not there – for instance if the Appellant awakes distressed while he is on a night shift – but she has neither the physical or mental strength to do what he does. She has her own mental health problems and is also reliant upon him. We have considered the possibility that this situation has been deliberately engineered for the purpose of this appeal: her absence from the hearing would certainly support that thesis. We do however note that the evidence from mental health services supports Z’s credible evidence on this point: Manchester Royal Infirmary confirm that it is Z who brings the Appellant to hospital, and it is Z whom Dr Masud describes as his “primary carer”. Were the Appellant’s mother able and willing to be looking after him we consider it likely that she would be doing it here, rather than leaving it all to his younger brother. Even if she were to be unsuccessful in her current attempt at regularising her status in the UK, and were to return to Pakistan, we are satisfied that she would be unable to mitigate the very serious obstacles that the Appellant will face in building any kind of life for himself there.

45. Having had regard to all of the evidence, we are satisfied that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to forming any kind of meaningful private life in Pakistan for the foreseeable future, and so his appeal falls to be allowed with reference to the Immigration Rules.

Decisions

46. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside to the limited extent set out above. The appeal was dismissed on protection grounds and that is upheld. We re-make the decision in respect of Article 8 ECHR by finding that the Appellant meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules and the appeal is allowed on that basis.

47. There is an order for anonymity because the Appellant is a vulnerable witness.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
2 March 2026