Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001484

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50762/2024 LP/11048/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

M H R
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Vokes, Counsel instructed by AB Legal Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr D Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. This follows Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia’s and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Burns’ (‘the panel’) earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds and was set aside because this contained material error(s) of law. The panel’s earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 29th July 2025 and a copy of this decision is annexed at the bottom of my decision.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on 16th September 2025.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
4. As was recorded at para 28 of the error of law decision, the focus for the re-making hearing in this Tribunal, and for my decision, is whether the Appellant will be at risk upon return on account of his support from the UNHCR when living in Iraq, and his sur place activities, if he is found to have a genuine political belief.
5. The panel also preserved the findings of the FtT and summarised these at para 29 of the error of law decision. For ease of reference these are as follows:
(i) The Appellant did not have any links with the Komala Party in Iran or Iraq as set out in paragraphs [31] and [32] of the decision.
(ii) The Etela’at did not raid his house at set out in paragraph [39] of the decision.
(iii) No weight can be attached to the contents of the letter from the Komala party as evidence of the Appellant's sur place activities, as set out in paragraph [42] of the decision.
(iv) The Appellant has joined no political parties in the UK as set out in paragraph [45] of the decision.
(v) The Appellant is a low-level participant in demonstrations outside the embassy as set out in paragraph [46] of the decision.
6. A detailed summary of the Appellant’s claims and relevant procedural history is also set out in the panel’s decision at [3]-[9] and so I do not rehearse this here.
7. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s claims is dated 22nd December 2023 and arises from the Appellant’s claim which he lodged in 2021. The provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how to assess protection claims and appeals do not therefore apply to this appeal.
The evidence
8. I had before me a composite bundle of evidence of 809 pages, which collated the parties’ respective evidence before the FtT and brought this up to date for the proceedings in the Upper Tribunal and the re-making hearing. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in this bundle.
The hearing
Relevant procedural history
9. Prior to the hearing, the Appellant’s solicitors applied for an adjournment of the hearing listed on 16th September 2025 and asking for this to be re-listed on a date after 6th October 2025. The reason given by the Appellant’s solicitors were that the Appellant had not been able to access his social media (Facebook) account, this being locked since 28th August 2025, and he wished to download its data and include this as further evidence in support of his appeal.
10. At the time that I considered this application on 11th September 2025, I did not have any information as to the Respondent’s position or indeed whether the Appellant had sought the Respondent’s consent to the above-proposed adjournment. Neither did I have any details as to why the most recent data from the Appellant’s social media account was needed so as to justify a delay in these proceedings being resolved. I considered that there was already considerable data included in the appeal bundles filed and served already from the Appellant and in the proceedings at first instance. In absence of that relevant information (including the Respondent’s position), I was not prepared to adjourn the hearing and confirmed so to both parties on the same date.
11. On 15th September 2025, Mr Lawson on behalf of the Respondent wrote to the Tribunal for my attention and the Appellant’s solicitors confirming that he was seeking an adjournment of the hearing on 16th September 2025. In summary, he stated that whilst the Appellant had not sought to renew their adjournment application after this was refused on 11th September 2025, Mr Lawson considered that the re-making would include consideration of the Appellant’s sur place activities, encompassing FaceBook entries. Mr Lawson added that the parties and the Tribunal would need confirmation from Facebook that only the Appellant or persons with his knowledge had uploaded items on the site and in light of the account being blocked, further enquiries needed to be made and documentation obtained.
12. I was able to indicate that same day that in light of the Respondent’s position being aligned with that of the Appellant’s as addressed on 11th September 2025, an adjournment would be granted. However, this decision was not actioned in time and the Appellant and his counsel both attended the hearing, which had also remained listed.
13. At the hearing, I addressed the above-summarised procedural history with both advocates as a pre-liminary issue. Mr Vokes confirmed that, on instructions, he was not seeking for the matter to be adjourned and he and the Appellant were ready to proceed with the appeal. He also confirmed that the Appellant had taken on board my reasons for initially refusing the adjournment application and he was content to rely on the Facebook evidence that was already before me – he was not of the view that any further update in this respect would assist me either way.
14. Mr Lawson confirmed following my enquiry that the Respondent was not proposing to conduct her own independent enquiries in respect of the Appellant’s own Facebook account and the updating information provided by him in support of his initial application. On this basis and in light of the Appellant’s position urging for his appeal to proceed, I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to do proceed with the hearing.
The oral evidence
15. The Appellant attended the hearing with his partner. The Appellant was the only witness to be called to give oral evidence. He was assisted by a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and confirmed the truth and accuracy of his witness statements dated 1st August 2024 and 21st August 2025. The Appellant was then cross-examined by Mr Lawson on behalf of the Respondent. There was one question in re-examination of the Appellant from Mr Vokes.
16. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from both advocates, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
The Appellant’s refugee support/recognition by UNHCR when in Iraq
17. The Appellant’s claim is that he was supported by the UNHCR in Iraq as a refugee until he left Iraq in 2021. This was as a result of him leaving Iran and registering with the Kurdistan Regional Government (‘KRG’) authorities as an Iranian refugee. The Appellant stated that he was then provided with a temporary ID allowing him to reside in the KRG. This did not permit him to access any support or accommodation. He was then advised to register with the UNHCR to consider his asylum claim and receive support from them (witness statement para 1 p.748 of the bundle). The Appellant left Iran for Iraq in 2004.
18. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is of Iranian nationality and of Kurdish ethnicity. The Respondent does not otherwise address the Appellant’s claim to have been supported by the UNHCR in her decision. This is despite the Appellant confirming in his screening interview (Q1.7 p. 771) that he had a photograph of a United Nations Refugee Card as evidence of his identity (in addition to a photograph of a birth certificate). At Q1.7, the Respondent’s officer entered the following information from the UN Refugee card or document referred to:
“UNHCR REG NO: 856-11C00180”
19. The Appellant also confirmed at Q3.3. in answer to the question “Have you claimed asylum in any other country?” that he “(w)as a refugee under cover of UN Iraq but has not claimed asylum recently”.
20. In the Appellant’s substantive asylum interview, the following question is of note:
23. Question (required)
Did you have any issues with the Iranian authorities when you were living in Iraq?
23. Response (required)
When in Iraq we were benefitted by the UN, we get some amount of money from them until 2021, then the situation was not good then and they raided my home. That's why I needed to leave Iraq
21. The above extracted question is the only question in the whole of the Appellant’s substantive interview that touches on the issue of the Appellant’s support and/or recognition from UNHCR in Iraq.
22. Mr Lawson submitted that the basis for which the Appellant was given support and/or recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR when in Iraq is not known. The events that the Appellant put forward in support of his protection claim, relating to events that are said to have happened pre-2004 and in the Appellant’s subsequent absence from Iran after 2004, were not accepted at first instance. Those findings have been preserved, as set out at para 5. However, I do not accept that those adverse credibility findings apply to the Appellant’s account of having been supported by the UNHCR while in Iraq. This is because the Appellant has been consistent in his account to have been so supported and this aspect of his account has not been disputed by the Respondent in any way. Mr Lawson did not seek to dispute this claim and instead, as summarised above, focused on the lack of information to explain why he was so supported. For this reason, I accept the Appellant’s evidence to have registered with UNHCR on or shortly after his arrival in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (‘the KRI’) and to have received support from the agency.
23. Nor do I consider it reasonably likely that the Appellant would have been able to provide information or evidence concerning the basis of this support because of the lengthy period of time that has since passed. The Appellant has however offered to the Respondent all of the information that he had, which included a registration number, which he states was issued to him by UNHCR. This featured on a UNHCR card, which he had a photograph of and which he clearly showed to the Respondent’s officer at interview. The Respondent has not responded to this evidence as already addressed at para 22 above.
24. I therefore do not hold the lack of information to explain why he was supported by the UNHCR against the Appellant and accept therefore that the Appellant was residing with temporary permission in the KRI and with support from the UNHCR, having registered with the agency on or shortly after his arrival there.
The Appellant’s sur place activities and whether these are in pursuit of a genuine political belief
25. I do not need to rehearse the level of activity and the nature of this activity, as far as the demonstrations are concerned, which the Appellant has attended in the UK. This is because the findings reached by the FtT on this have been preserved: the Appellant has joined no political parties in the UK, ([45] of FtT decision) and is a low-level participant in demonstrations outside the embassy ([46] of FtT decision).
26. The Appellant does not claim to have attended further demonstrations either since his appeal was considered by the FtT. He stated quite candidly in his evidence that he has been unable to attend any others because of where he lives, quite far from London - where the demonstrations take place - and in a rural area with limited public transport links. The Appellant also referred to the costs of travelling down to London being prohibitive and not within his limited means, even if he was able to manage the journey on public transport.
27. With regards to the Appellant’s other activities undertaken whilst in the UK, which he says support his claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of actual or imputed political opinion, the Appellant posts on Facebook. Mr Lawson submitted that we could not be sure that the posts exhibited in evidence can be attributed to the Appellant since his account has been locked.
28. Mr Lawson otherwise submitted that the Appellant is on the whole illiterate, that he does manage to read some Kurdish Sorani but does not read in English. When assessing the Appellant’s Facebook posts, I was asked to consider that many of these are in English and the Appellant would not have known what these meant. For these reasons, I was asked to find that the Appellant’s Facebook posts were effected in order to bolster the Appellant’s protection claim.
29. I have considered the Respondent’s position very carefully but do not consider that the fact that the Appellant’s account has recently been locked necessarily indicates that the posts he has exhibited were not done by the Appellant. The Appellant has been consistent in his evidence as to how he started his Facebook account, the reasons for this and how he posts. In this respect, I note the Appellant’s evidence before the FtT, as summarised by the Judge at [43] which was that any posts in English have to be read to him before he reposts them. The Appellant also admitted “that he cuts, copies and pastes posts, instead of writing his own”.
30. Similarly, the fact that the Appellant is not proficient in reading and writing, particularly in English, and the fact that he needs the assistance of others to effect some or many of his posts does not necessarily mean that the Appellant only posts on Facebook for reasons only related to strengthening his protection claim. Such a submission would otherwise mean that expressing an opinion in writing is only reserved for educated and literate persons, which is perverse and not a reality. I also consider this in light of the Appellant’s evidence addressing why he was no longer able to demonstrate in other ways, for example, in person at demonstrations and why therefore he focused on Facebook.
31. The Appellant has explained in his written evidence that he had not posted political material on Facebook in the past because he had always been worried that he could make things worse for his family if the Iranian authorities knew that he was continuing to be active against them (para 4, p.36). I accept his evidence that he now felt this to be necessary.
32. There are approximately 669 pages in the composite bundle of the Appellant’s data downloaded from Facebook (p.69-738). This data download is entitled ‘your posts, check ins, photos and videos’. As noted by the FtT, these pages contain content that is also not in English and there are no translations. The pages do also contain photographs, which were posted and feature the Appellant demonstrating in front of the Iranian Embassy.
33. The number of Facebook posts, whether composed or re-posting content generated by others, is considerable, as demonstrated by the significant number of pages in the bundle. The Appellant’s download of his activity log is in accordance with XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC).
34. From this content and after considering the Appellant’s evidence as to why he posts on Facebook, I am satisfied that the Appellant posts on Facebook and has attended demonstrations because he holds genuine beliefs, which are opposed to the Iranian authorities. Further, that these amount to a genuinely-held political opinion.
35. In assessing the Appellant’s evidence and its credibility, particularly with regard to his political beliefs, I have considered the adverse credibility findings of the FtT in relation to the Appellant’s pre-flight claim. In his evidence on his sur place activities, I found the Appellant to be a compelling and credible witness. He responded to all questions during Mr Lawson’s cross-examination with clarity and composure. Notably, the Appellant did not seek to exaggerate or embellish his involvement in real-world political activities. For instance, he candidly confirmed that he had not been one of the organisers of the demonstrations but that the point of him attending was to support the demonstration, to stand together against the Iranian regime, and to show a position against them. This is to his credit and I am not satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated that the Appellant’s evidence, as to why he posts on Facebook and the reasons why he holds the political beliefs that he does, cannot be relied upon or is not to be believed.
36. I also accept that the Appellant’s past attendance at demonstrations was also in pursuit of his genuine need or wish to demonstrate against the Iranian authorities and that he has not continued to do so only because of financial and travelling limitations.
Whether there is a real risk that the Appellant has already come to the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities
37. As per the preserved findings of the FtT, the Appellant has not been of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities for the reasons that he put forward in support of his protection claim relating to events prior to the Appellant coming to the UK.
38. I have to assess therefore whether the Appellant’s Facebook profile and posts mean that there is a real risk that the Appellant has since come to the authorities’ interest. Whilst I have significant evidence of the Appellant’s posts on Facebook, as considered above, the Appellant has not provided a download of his profile page to show that his profile is set to public. Neither does the activity log, considered above, indicate how many of his posts have been liked, shared or commented upon and not all of the posts are in English. The Appellant has not provided any detail commentary on his Facebook posts either in his witness statements. Whilst I have accepted that the Appellant has posted as claimed and that he does so as a result of genuinely held political beliefs, this lack of information and data does not assist me to assess whether or not the Appellant is at real risk of having come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities already.
39. I also note that this was the case before the FtT as recorded by the Judge at [43]. The Appellant has had ample time to collate this information in order to address this and whilst he has not been able to access his account, this was only since end of August 2025.
40. In light of the above, I first assess the evidence that the Appellant has relied upon against the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in XX, which is as follows (para 2 of head-note/para 122):
“The likelihood of Facebook material being available to the Iranian authorities is affected by whether the person is or has been at any material time a person of significant interest, because if so, they are, in general, reasonably likely to have been the subject of targeted Facebook surveillance. In the case of such a person, this would mean that any additional risks that have arisen by creating a Facebook account containing material critical of, or otherwise inimical to, the Iranian authorities would not be mitigated by the closure of that account, as there is a real risk that the person would already have been the subject of targeted on-line surveillance, which is likely to have made the material known.”
41. In light of the findings relating to the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and the implications of this and his Facebook activity, it cannot be said that the Appellant is or has been at any material time a person of significant interest. On this basis, I do not find that he is, in general, reasonably likely to have been the subject of targeted Facebook surveillance to date.
Whether the Appellant is a real risk of coming to the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities on return
42. I now turn to assess whether the Appellant is at a real risk on return, as a result of his actual political opinion, which I have found to be genuinely held.
43. I have reminded myself and taken into full consideration all of the Country Guidance authorities relating to Iran, in particular, XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC), HB (Kurds) Iran (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran (CG) [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) and BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC).
44. When determining whether the Appellant faces a risk, I have considered the factors set out at [64] of BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG, and kept in mind what is said at [92] and [95] of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG).
45. As per BA (para 3 of the headnote), the level of a person’s political profile and activism is the starting point for considering the likelihood of an individual coming to the attention of the authorities and the degree of interest the Iranian regime would have in identifying him.
46. The Upper Tribunal also identified in BA the relevant factors to be considered when assessing the level of a person’s political activism as follows [4 (i]):
can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime?
47. Pursuant to the FtT’s findings, preserved before me (see para 25 above), and my analysis at paras 37-38 and 41 above, I find that the Appellant was simply a member of the crowd in the two demonstrations that he attended. From the photographs that appear within his Facebook posts, I am satisfied that he was active in that he was carrying and displaying posters, that are in opposition to the Iranian regime and authorities and which is also in accordance with his motives, namely a genuinely held political belief that opposes the same regime and authorities.
48. As to other forms of engagement, whilst I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s Facebook profile and activities have to date been monitored by the Iranian authorities, I am satisfied that it is not reasonable to expect the Appellant to delete his account prior to leaving the UK. This is in line with the guidance from the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596 and its application in XX, where discussion is held there on the deletion of ‘contrived’ Facebook accounts.
49. I also address at this stage Mr Vokes’ submission that whilst the Appellant has not been successful in demonstrating that he supported the Komala party when working as a Kolbar in 2004, the Appellant has been in contact with the Komala party since he has been able to obtain letters from them. Mr Vokes submitted that this was information, namely his contact with the party, that the Appellant could not be expected to suppress. I do not consider that this submission takes the Appellant much further since I am satisfied that the Appellant’s expression of his political opinion since he has been in the UK is genuine.
50. The Upper Tribunal confirmed in XX that the cases of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG, SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG and HB (Kurds) Iran CG continue accurately to reflect the situation for returnees to Iran.
51. Applying the above country guidance to the Appellant’s circumstances, I am satisfied that the Appellant is at real risk of suffering persecution and/or serious harm on return. This is for the following reasons:
(a) The Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and Kurds in Iran face discrimination – the various CG authorities are clear that this is, in general, not to a level that amounts to persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment but it is a relevant consideration which increases the risk(s) that the Appellant faces – see HB para (5) of head-note. This is also confirmed at para 2.4.2 of the CPIN ‘Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups’, which Mr Vokes relied upon. It states that “Kurds in Iran face systematic discrimination and barriers which affects their access to basic services such as housing, political office, employment and education” – see also para 7.2 of the same CPIN;
(b) The Iranian authorities have become and continue to be increasingly suspicious of, and sensitive to, Kurdish political activity. Those of Kurdish ethnicity are thus regarded with even greater suspicion and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran – HB para (5);
(c) Other relevant factors pursuant to para (5) of the head-note in HB also apply to the Appellant;
(d) The first of such factors is a period of residence in the KRI by a Kurdish returnee, which is reasonably likely to result in additional questioning by the authorities on return. As per para (6) of HB, this is a factor that will be highly fact-specific and the degree of interest that such residence will excite will depend, non-exhaustively, on matters such as the length of residence in the KRI, what the person concerned was doing there and why they left.
In the Appellant’s case, this period of residence is very significant in length, namely 17 years. Pursuant to my findings above, the Appellant cannot be expected to lie about the support that he received from the UNHCR during this time and there is a real risk therefore that this will be perceived by the authorities as an indication that the Appellant sought refuge in the KRI from Iran for political reasons or at the very least for reasons that are not aligned with the Iranian authorities’ interests;
(e) The Appellant has expressed his political opinion, which is in opposition to the Iranian authorities, during demonstrations in the UK and on Facebook and the Appellant cannot be expected to lie about this or to conceal this;
(f) Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as that engaged by the Appellant, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. On my assessment, the materials posted by the Appellant, if discovered, are likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities as aligned with Kurdish politics and in opposition to the authorities.
52. In light of the above and the ‘hair-trigger’ approached, as described by the Upper Tribunal in HB at para 10 of the head-note, and in particular as a result of the Appellant’s lengthy residence in the KRI and subsequent residence in the UK where he has been politically active albeit to a low-level, I am satisfied that the Appellant is at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm contrary to the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR.
53. Iranians returning to Iran are screened on arrival. A returnee who meets the profile of an activist may be detained while searches of documentation are made. Students, particularly those who have known political profiles are likely to be questioned as well as those who have exited illegally – see BA para 2(a). One of the factors identified by the Upper Tribunal in BA also applies to the Appellant for triggering inquiry/action on return, namely his immigration history with his illegal exit from Iran and a lengthy period of residence in KRI as well as his residence in the UK since 2021. This is more likely to lead to inquiry and/or the Appellant being detained for more than a short period and ill-treated – see BA para 4(iii).
54. There is also a real risk that the Appellant will have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities, for the above reasons, prior to his return, as a result of the re-documentation process – see XX para 4 of the head-note.
55. I therefore conclude that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his actual or imputed political beliefs. The issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not arise since the Appellant’s fear is of the Iranian authorities.
56. For completeness, I address very briefly Mr Lawson’s submission that the Appellant would be safe in the KRI because he lived there for a period of 17 years. The difficulty with that submission is that the Respondent has not stated that she proposes to return the Appellant to the KRI in her decision and does not address this in any way in her decision or subsequently. This is contrary to SA (Removal destination; Iraq; undertakings) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00037 (IAC) – see para (iv) of head-note.

Notice of Decision
57. The decision of the FtT dated 11th February 2025 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the panel’s decision dated 29th July 2025.
58. I re-make the decision by allowing M H R’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 22nd December 2023 on Refugee Convention and Article 3 human rights grounds

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25.11.2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001484

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50762/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29/07/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNS

Between

MHR
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr Vokes of counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 15 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. He left Iran in 2004 and then lived in Iraq until 2021. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 8 November 2021 and claimed asylum. The claim was refused by the Respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 22 December 2023. The Appellant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (“the Judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 11 February 2025 (“the decision”).
2. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes on 1 April 2025.
The Background
3. There were three strands to the Appellant’s claim for international protection by the time of the hearing of his appeal.
4. Firstly, the Appellant claimed when he was living in Iran, he had supported the Komala Party (Witness statement 1 August 2024 paragraph [3]). He said that he had helped smuggle Komala Party members to Iran from Iraq in 2004. He said that this resulted in his home (in Iraq) being raided by Etela’at in 2021 – some 17 years later.
5. Secondly, the Appellant lived in Iraq as a refugee and was recognised by the UNHCR as being a refugee. The Appellant said that this was an additional factor to be considered when his risk on return fell to be determined.
6. Thirdly, the Appellant claimed he is at risk upon return because of his sur place activities which includes posting political material on Facebook, attending demonstrations (Witness statement 1 August 2024 paragraph [4]) and because of his links to the Komala Party (for which in part he relied on a letter from a Komala party representative dated 8 August 2024).
7. At paragraphs [31] and [32] of the decision, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s account that he had assisted the Komala Party while in Iran or Iraq and that those links were the cause of the Appellant leaving Iraq in 2021. The Judge found, at [35], that the Etela’at were not looking for, or found the Appellant in 2021. The Judge rejected, for reasons given at [36] to [ 39], the Appellant’s claim that his house had been raided by the Etela’at.
8. The Judge concluded, at [41], that the Appellant would not be at risk on return because of his activities as a Kolbar, or his claimed activities for Komala (which she had rejected in the earlier part of the decision). She said that his illegal exit and Kurdish ethnicity would not be sufficient to put him at risk on return.
9. The Judge made findings on the Appellant’s sur place activities at paragraphs [42] to -45]. She found that the Appellant was not a member of a political party, had attended only two demonstrations against the Iranian regime and had posted some anti-regime material on Facebook. The Judge concluded, at [46], that the Appellant was a low-level participant at demonstrations outside the embassy and that he could delete his Facebook account which would not have come to the attention of the Iranian Authorities.
The Grounds of Appeal
10. In summary the grounds of appeal assert that the Judge had made perverse findings on material matters, had given weight to immaterial matters and committed an irregularity which may have made a difference to the fairness of the proceedings. There then followed a list of 6 matters where it was said that the Judge’s decision fell into error of law.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge ID Boyes on 1 April 2025 on all matters raised with particular reference to the Komala letter.
The Hearing of the Appeal
12. Mr Vokes submits that the Judge had erred in law by not dealing adequately with the Appellant’s risk on return to Iran. He said that numbered paragraphs [3], [4] and [5] in the Grounds of Appeal would be argued. He very fairly conceded that he would not assert that the Judge had erred in dealing with her assessment of the Appellant’s links with the Komala party. He quite properly, in our judgement, conceded that the Judge had not accepted the Appellant’s account of his links with the Komala party and that his house was raided by Et’alaat as claimed, and confirmed that he would not seek to challenge those findings.
13. Mr Vokes submits there was no finding by the Judge about whether the UNHCR had recognised the Appellant as a refugee. He said that this was material because the Appellant could be questioned about this on return, and it would be an added factor which needed to be taken into account when assessing the risk on return.
14. Mr Vokes submits the Judge has not made adequate findings about material matters to properly inform her assessment about the risk on return. Mr Vokes did not look to go behind the Judge’s findings that the Komala party letter could be afforded no weight, but he submitted that the letter itself would be an added risk factor because the Appellant would say that he had received such a letter (i.e. he had been in touch with a Kurdish political party and had acquired a letter from them).
15. The main thrust of Mr Vokes’s submissions was that there was no finding about whether the Appellant held genuine political views which were contrary to those of the Iranian Authorities. He submitted that the Appellant should not be expected to lie about his genuinely held political beliefs per HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596.
16. In response, Mr Lawson conceded that the Judge had not made a finding that the political beliefs were genuine or not genuine, but he submits that this could perhaps be inferred given the Appellant’s limited political activity and his general lack of credibility. Mr Lawson submits that if this inference could not fairly be made then there would be an error of law and the appeal should be retained by the Upper Tribunal for a finding to be made on this narrow point.
Our Analysis
17. We find no error of law in relation to numbered paragraphs [1] and [2] of the Grounds of Appeal. The Judge gave extensive reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s account of his involvement with the Komala party in Iran, Iraq and the UK. We find, as conceded by Mr Vokes, that the Judge had made ample findings about why she attached no weight to the contents of the Komala Party letter.
18. We find that the Judge erred in law by not making adequate findings about the protection given to the Appellant by the UNHCR (paragraph 3 of the Grounds) and what if any relevance that could have to the risk on return. It was not disputed by the Respondent that the Appellant had been recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR, although the reasons why he had been recognised as a refugee were not clear. The Judge referred, at [34], to the fact that the Appellant “was supported by the UNHCR” but makes no finding about whether this would be relevant when assessing his risk on return.
19. There was no dispute that the Appellant lived in Iraq between 2004 and 2021 (see refusal letter at page 747) i.e. for a period of 17 years. We considered HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC) at headnote (6) and paragraph [86]: “a period of residence in the KRI by a Kurdish returnee is reasonably likely to result in additional questioning by the authorities on return. However, this is a factor that will be highly fact-specific and the degree of interest that such residence will excite will depend, non-exhaustively, on matters such as the length of residence in the KRI, what the person concerned was doing there and why they left”.
20. The grant of refugee status by the UNHCR could be a relevant consideration in the assessment of the risk on return. Further findings were required about whether the Appellant resided in the IKR or not for those 17 years. If so, what he was doing there and why he left as per headnote (6) of HB (Kurds) Iran.
21. As to Paragraph 4 of the Grounds of Appeal, at paragraph [34] of the decision, the Judge was addressing the Appellant’s claim that he was being sought by the Etela’at in 2021, 17 years after fleeing Iran. We accept the Judge speculated the Etela’at would have been able to find the Appellant before 2021 because he was being supported by the UNHCR of through his registration with the local mullah. However, we do not accept that this was a material error of law. It was a peripheral observation made by the Judge in her overall assessment of the claim that the Etela’at had raided the Appellant’s home in 2021. A Judge is not required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an Appellant, no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour the account may be. The Judge had taken considerable care in assessing the evidence in relation to this claim and set out at length why she found it not credible The Judge would have rejected the account that the Etela’at raided the Appellant’s house without speculating and there was no material error of law in the Judge’s finding that the Etela’at were not looking for, and found the Appellant in 2021 as he claimed.
22. We do however find that the Judge erred in law in not making a finding about whether or not the Appellant held and holds political beliefs contrary to the regime in Iran which are genuine or not as set out in paragraph [6] of the Grounds of Appeal. This was not disputed by the Respondent. This is relevant because if the Appellant held genuine political beliefs, then he cannot be expected to conceal these if questioned about them when questioned on return. HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. It was held that attention would have to be focussed on what the Applicant would actually do if he was returned to his country of nationality. The Judge erred in law in not adequately dealing with this.
23. If the Appellant held a genuine political belief that ran contrary to the Iranian regime, then he could be at risk on return. Headnote 7 of HB (Kurds) reads that “Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution…”. This needs to be considered in the context of the “‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By hair-trigger it means that the threshold for suspicion is low, and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme” (Headnote 10)
24. The point made by Mr Vokes that the Appellant when questioned on return would be forced to disclose that he had received a letter from Komala will stand or fall within the assessment of whether or not the Appellant holds genuine political beliefs.
25. In conclusion we accept that the Judge failed to make sufficient findings about the Appellant’s support from the UNHCR before 2021 which would include an assessment of where he was residing when he received that support, the basis upon which he was provided with that support and the extent of that support.
26. Further we accept that the Judge failed to make clear findings about whether the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, his Facebook activities in the UK and his commission and receipt of a letter from the Komala party represent a genuinely held political belief such that the Appellant may be at risk upon return, applying the test set out in HJ (Iran) such that the decision of the FtT must be set aside.
27. As to disposal, we have considered whether the proper course is to remit the appeal or to order that the decision be remade in the Upper Tribunal. Given the discrete issues to be determined, neither representative submitted that the appeal should be remitted to the FtT. There was no procedural unfairness before the FtT. We were satisfied that the appropriate course is for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
28. For the avoidance of any doubt the only issues to be decided when the decision is remade is whether the Appellant will be at risk upon return on account of his support from the UNHCR, and his sur place activities if he is found to have a genuine political belief.
29. The following findings made by the Judge are preserved:
i. The Appellant did not have any links with the Komala Party in Iran or Iraq as set out in paragraphs [31] and [32] of the decision.
ii. The Etela’at did not raid his house at set out in paragraph [39] of the decision.
iii. No weight can be attached to the contents of the letter from the Komala party as evidence of the Appellant’s sur place activities. As set out in paragraph [42] of the decision.
iv. The Appellant has joined no political parties in the UK as set out in paragraph [45] of the decision.
v. The Appellant is a low-level participant in demonstrations outside the embassy as set out in paragraph [46] of the decision.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of FtT Judge Hawden-Beal is set aside.
2. The findings made by FtT Judge Hawden-Beale as set out in paragraph [29] above are preserved.
3. The appeal is to be listed for further hearing for the decision to be remade in the Upper Tribunal on the first available date with a time estimate of 2½ hours.
4. The Tribunal will arrange for a Kurdish Sorani interpreter.
5. No less than 7 days before the hearing of the appeal before the Upper Tribunal, the Appellant’s representatives shall file and serve a Composite Bundle which complies with the Guidance on the Format of Electronic Bundles in the Upper Tribunal (IAC). The composite bundle must contain the following documents and must be structured in the following way:
Part A: The decision of the FtT which is under appeal
The grounds of appeal upon which permission to appeal was granted
The decision of the FtT or Upper Tribunal granting permission to appeal
This error of law decision
Any other decision or order of the Upper Tribunal in the appeal relevant to the appeal

Part B: All documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant before the FtT
Any further evidence relied upon by the Appellant limited to evidence relating to the discrete matters to be determined by the Upper Tribunal as set out in paragraph [25] and [26] of this decision

Part C: All documentary evidence relied upon by the Respondent before the FtT

C Burns
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Burns

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 July 2025