Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001489 & UI-2025-001490
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/60333/2023 & PA/60337/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

(1) AR (ALBANIA)
(2) AM (ALBANIA)
(Anonymity Order Made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Rule 34 Decision at Field House on 13 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the appellants against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their international protection and human rights appeals. The panel’s decision was sent to the parties on 17 January 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens by a decision sent to the parties on 23 June 2025. Judge Owens reasoned, inter alia, that it was clearly arguable that the panel erred in its approach to a screening interview, the purpose of which was primarily to provide details of identity and journey. Additionally, it was arguable that the panel erred by failing to take into account that the first appellant claimed to have been trafficked in Belgium. This evidence was conveyed in her statement of additional grounds which was submitted within a few days of the screening interview. Judge Owens also considered the appellants’ challenge to the approach adopted to their medical evidence to be arguable.
3. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response, dated 3 July 2025. She concedes the appeal in the Upper Tribunal and requests that this matter be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo.
4. By her response, the respondent observes, inter alia:
“The first ground is in relation to the Panel’s approach to the contents of the Screening Interview. Perusal of the determination reveals that the Panel in making negative credibility findings have repeatedly referred to what has or has not been stated in the Screening Interview.
The Tribunal in YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 has given guidance as to how the evidence in Screening Interviews should be approached. The Panel appear to emphasise the contents of the screening interview as a determinative strand of evidence. This is out with the guidance given in YL. The respondent accepts that there is merit in the first ground.
It is furthermore accepted that the Panel’s error as highlighted in ground 1 is likely to have affected and coloured their other findings made which are subjects of the ensuing grounds.
The evidence at the date of hearing was that the appellant AR had received a Reasonable Grounds decision from the NRM Competent Authority dated 5 July 2024 to the effect that she may be a victim of trafficking. By a letter of16 January 2025 the Single Competent Authority in a Positive Grounds decision concluded that AR was subjected to domestic servitude and forced prostitution in Belgium, approximately 2018-2020. This document was not in front of the Panel, and they cannot be criticised for not having regard to it.
Considering the accepted error in ground 1 and its reverberations in the Panel’s subsequent findings the respondent does not oppose the appellant’s application for permission to appeal. The respondent’s view is that this matter should be remitted back to the FTT for a de novo rehearing.
In response to UTJ Owens’s direction at [4] of her decision to grant permission to appeal the respondent is of the view that the decision of the competent authority of 16 January 2025 which concluded that the appellant was forced into prostitution in Belgium should be admitted to be considered with all the other evidence at that hearing.
It is further submitted that TD And AD (Trafficked Women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 00092 and the latest available CPIN on human trafficking Albania, currently July 2024, should be applied. It is trite law that a victim of trafficking cannot without more qualify as a refugee.”
Rule 34 Decision
5. In considering whether to proceed under rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I am mindful as to the circumstances when an oral hearing is to be held in order to comply with the common law duty of fairness and as to when a decision may appropriately be made consequent to a paper consideration: Osborn v The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] AC 1115 and JCWI v President of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2020] EWHC 3103 (Admin), at [6.1 - 6.14].
6. In the circumstances and being mindful of the importance of these proceedings to the appellants, the identified position of the parties, the expense to the parties of attending an oral hearing and the overriding objective that the Upper Tribunal deal with cases fairly and justly, I am satisfied that it is just and appropriate to proceed under rule 34.
Discussion
7. Having carefully considered the papers in this matter, I agree with the respondent as to the panel’s decisions being materially erroneous in law.
8. In reaching my decision, I am not required to engage with all nine grounds of appeal upon which permission to appeal has been granted. The material error identifiable in ground 1 has materially infected the decision as a whole.
9. As observed by the Court of Session in Guvenc v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] CSIH 3; 2022 S.L.T. 396, this Chamber must approach statement of evidence interviews with caution, recognising their purpose and limitation. Whilst tribunals cannot exclude such evidence, they have an obligation to consider carefully how much weight to attach to it, having regard to the circumstances in which it came into existence: JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 450; [2014] 1 WLR 4291.
10. At screening interviews, applicants seeking international protection are typically informed that they will be asked for a brief outline of why they are claiming asylum and that they will be asked for full details of their experienced and fears at a later interview. Screening interviews are not the place to explore the international protection claim in detail.
11. In YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 guidance was provided on the significance of discrepancies between screening interviews and further evidence by explaining the purpose and limitations of screening interviews, at paragraph 19:
“19. When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a ‘screening interview’ (called, perhaps rather confusingly a “Statement of Evidence Form – SEF Screening–). The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant’s case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated.”
12. A tribunal should be slow to draw adverse inferences from omissions or inconsistencies arising from screening interviews.
13. On several occasions the panel identified personal history relied upon as not having been advanced in the screening interview. Whilst this was not the determinative reason for making an adverse credibility finding as to the core of the first appellant’s case, it clearly was a strand in the assessment, and I conclude adversely infected it. In the circumstances, the only proper course is to set aside the decision in its entirety.
14. I observe the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 0046 (IAC). Consequent to the appeal being considered de novo and the likely extent of documentary evidence and examination of the first appellant at the remaking hearing, it is appropriate that this matter be remade by the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 17 January 2025 is set aside for material error of law, with no preserved findings of fact.
16. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Taylor House.
17. The anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal is reaffirmed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 April 2026