Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-001501
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/01041/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

CARLOS INDJAI
(Anonymity ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared as a litigant in person
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at the Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 8 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Portugal. In this matter I am remaking the decision following the Upper Tribunal concluding that there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
2. The hearing before me is to consider Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in connection with deportation matters. The Respondent had refused the Appellant’s human rights appeal by way of a decision dated 31 May 2024.
3. The Appellant was not legally represented. He had provided a skeleton argument dated Sunday 7 June 2026 (being the date before the hearing).
4. That skeleton argument been drafted by Mr Mikhael Puar of counsel. In an e-mail from Mr Puar’s clerk at 17.17 hours on Friday 5 June 2026 it was said:
“The intention was that Mr Puar would represent Mr Indjai at the resumed hearing on a Direct Access basis but no further payments have been made and no new retainer has been entered into with Carlos Indjai for the hearing on the 8th  June 2026.
Consequently, Mr Puar is not currently representing Mr Indjai.”
5. That e-mail additionally stated that in any event Mr Puar was due to appear in a different court on 8 June 2026.
6. Mr Puar’s skeleton argument had suggested that the Appellant might seek an adjournment of the hearing. It stated:
“The Appellant has had the benefit of legal representation (in one form or other) at every stage of his appeal. He understands the importance of legal representation and would prefer for the matter to be adjourned so that he is given time to instruct and secure the services of a competent legal representative to present his case.“
7. The Appellant was aware that his previous application for an adjournment had been refused on 5 June 2026 by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan on the papers
8. I checked with the Appellant whether he sought an adjournment of the hearing. He consulted with his family and considered matters and said he was not seeking an adjournment. He said he wished for the hearing to proceed.
9. I therefore proceeded with the hearing. I first explained the procedure to the Appellant. He said he was aware of the procedure beforehand, including because he had been through proceedings previously. The Appellant said that he would give oral evidence as would his mother (via a Portuguese interpreter) and so would his partner. Throughout the case I reminded myself of Equal Treatment Bench Book and assisted him the Appellant with his case including in closing submissions and during the evidence. The Appellant was also able sit in Court whilst I dealt with other matters and he observed the format for the hearing. I had vulnerability in mind, including in respect of the witnesses and I applied the Guidance when noting differences or inconsistencies in the evidence.
10. There was an Appellant’s bundle comprising 259 pages. The Appellant had failed to comply with the previous directions made, including by a Legal Officer of the Upper Tribunal, that there be an updated bundle. The Appellant had provided some further witness statements to the Respondent shortly before the hearing and which Mr Wain then provided to me.
The Issue For Me to Decide:
11. Mr Puar stated in his skeleton argument that the issue for me to decide is whether or not the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights appeal ought to be allowed.
12. On 5 January 2024 the Appellant was convicted after trial of an offence of Possession with Intent to Supply a Class A drug (cannabis) and driving without insurance. A 3 year sentence of imprisonment was imposed.
The Applicable Legal Principles
13. Section 117 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“s117 NIAA 2002”) is relevant and is referred to within numerous cases cited at the previous hearings of this matter and in Mr Puar’s skeleton argument.
14. More recently Lewis LJ has referred to the s117 NIAA 2002 in Secretary of State v Lewis [2026] EWCA Civ 879. That case has been cited in a case heard on the same day at the Court of Appeal and it has been cited subsequently. That case helpfully sets out the applicable legal principles in a succinct and clear manner. It is clear that is an additional reason why it is cited so frequently. Lewis LJ said:
8.  Section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act") provides that a person who is not a British citizen is liable to deportation from the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good. Section 32(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007 ("the 2007 Act") provides that "the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good". A foreign criminal is defined, so far as material to this appeal, as a person who is not a British citizen who is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of at least 12 months' imprisonment (see section 32 of the 2007 Act and section 117D(2) of the 2002 Act ).
9.  Section 32(5) of the 2007 Act imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to make a deportation order unless one of a number of stated exceptions apply. The relevant exception in the present case is where deportation would breach a person's Convention rights. Those are the rights defined in section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("the 1998 Act") and set out in Schedule 1 to that Act . Those rights include, amongst others, Article 8 of the Convention which provides that:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
Appeals to the First-Tier Tribunal
10. An individual may claim that deportation would be incompatible with his Convention rights. The Secretary of State will need to determine that human rights claim and, in doing so, section 6 of the 1998 Act provides that it would be unlawful for the Secretary of State to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
11.  Section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act provides, amongst other things, that a person may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal where the "Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim". Section 84(2) of the 2002 Act sets out the grounds of appeal and provides that an appeal against a refusal of a human rights claim must be brought on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act , that is the Secretary of State's decision is incompatible with the person's Convention rights.
12.  Part 5A of the 2002 Act applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life, and as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act . Section 117A of the 2002 Act provides as follows:
"117A Application of this Part
(1) This Part applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts—
(a) breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and
(b) as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 .
(2) In considering the public interest question, the court or tribunal must (in particular) have regard—
(a) in all cases, to the considerations listed in section 117B , and
(b) in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C .
(3) In subsection (2), "the public interest question" means the question of whether an interference with a person's right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2)."
13.  Section 117B of the 2002 Act sets out a series of considerations which are relevant to the assessment of the public interest in all cases where a court or tribunal is considering whether an interference with a person's right to respect for private or family life is justified under Article 8(2). These include the fact that the maintenance of effective immigration controls, and that a person is able to speak English and is financially independent, is in the public interest. Section 117B(4) and (5) provides that little weight should be accorded to a private life or a relationship entered into when the person was in the United Kingdom unlawfully or when his immigration status was precarious.
14.  Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out a series of additional consideration which must be taken into account in cases involving foreign criminals. Section 117C , in effect, sets out a statutory framework governing the assessment of whether deportation would be a justifiable interference with the right to respect for a person's private and family life. It provides as follows:
"117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted."
15. Exceptions 1 and 2 apply to, (among others) foreign criminals sentenced to between 1 and 4 years' imprisonment. They are generally referred to as medium offenders. Exception 1 concerns the impact of deportation on the foreign criminal's right to respect for private life. It sets out which foreign criminals may claim the benefit of the exception and when the public interest will not require the deportation of such foreign criminals. A foreign criminal may benefit from the exception if he has been in the United Kingdom lawfully for most of his life and is socially and cultural integrated here (if not he cannot benefit from the exception). The third requirement concerns the ability of the medium offender foreign criminal to re-integrate into his country of origin. If a foreign criminal has been lawfully here for most of his life, and is socially and culturally integrated, but would face "very significant obstacles" to re-integration, then deportation is not in the public interest.
16. Exception 2 concerns the right to respect for family life. It focusses on the impact of deportation on a foreign criminal's partner and children. They must be a qualifying child or partner (which is concerned with their status, or length of time, in the United Kingdom). If so, and if there is a genuine and subsisting relationship with the partner or child and it would be unduly harsh on the partner or child to deport the foreign criminal, then the public interest will not justify the deportation of a medium offender.
17. In NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 707, the Court of Appeal also held that a medium offender may also be able to rely on the provisions of section 117C(6) . The public interest will not require deportation if a foreign criminal who is a medium offender can demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in exceptions 1 and 2: see paragraphs 24 to 27 of the decision in NA (Pakistan). The way in which that subsection operates in relation to medium offenders is discussed at paragraph 32 to 36 of the judgment in NA (Pakistan).
18. A foreign criminal sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years or more (generally referred to as a serious offender) cannot benefit from exceptions 1 and 2. If a serious offender relies on the kind of circumstances described in exceptions 1 and 2 (that is the impact on the foreign criminal, and the impact on his partner or child, respectively), the public interest will still require deportation of the serious offender even if he would have met the requirements of the exception had it applied. The public interest would still require deportation, for example, even if the serious offender has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child, and it would be unduly harsh on the partner or child to deport the foreign criminal (subject to the operation of section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act ). In such cases, the public interest will require deportation of the serious offender unless there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". Such circumstances may outweigh the public interest in deportation (so that deportation would not be a justified interference with the right to respect for private or family life within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Convention): see section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act .
19. The operation of section 117C(6) was helpfully described in NA (Pakistan). The Court of Appeal said:
"37. In relation to a serious offender, it will often be sensible first to see whether his case involves circumstances of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, both because the circumstances so described set out particularly significant factors bearing upon respect for private life (Exception 1) and respect for family life (Exception 2) and because that may provide a helpful basis on which an assessment can be made whether there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2" as is required under section 117C(6) . It will then be necessary to look to see whether any of the factors falling within Exceptions 1 and 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factors not covered by the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, as to satisfy the test in section 117C(6) ."
20. That issue was considered again by the Court of Appeal in Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 . The Court emphasised that the First-tier Tribunal could not bypass the requirements in the exceptions and go straight to the question of very compelling circumstances, as that would "undermine the Parliamentary intent and deprive the phrase "over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 of much if not all of its meaning" (see per Bean LJ at paragraph 42 with whom Peter Jackson LJ and Baker LJ agreed). The Court in Kapikanya recognised that there may be cases where the circumstances are unconnected with the matters dealt with in exceptions 1 and 2 and, if they are very compelling circumstances, the public interest will not require deportation. An example given was of a couple with a teenage daughter with Down's syndrome and the father is sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment. By the time of his release, the mother may have died; the daughter may no longer be a child and the foreign national criminal may be the only person capable of caring for her. Exception 2 would not apply as the daughter would not be a child but it might be that the circumstances would be seen as very compelling and so the public interest may not apply: see paragraph 27 of the judgment.
21. One question raised in argument was whether the First-tier Tribunal was required as a matter of law to consider expressly whether a serious offender could or would fall within exception 1 or 2 (if they had applied) and then to identify the factors over and above that which amounted to very compelling circumstances. The answer is that a First-tier Tribunal is not required to do that as a matter of law: see Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626, at paragraph 59 to 65 .
22. In general, however, it is often sensible first to see whether a case involves circumstances of the kind described in exceptions 1 or 2, and then assess "whether any of the factors falling within Exception 1 or 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factor not covered by the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 or 2, as to satisfy the test in section 117C(6) ": see paragraph 37 of NA (Pakistan) . That will promote transparency and reduce the risk of error in applying the statutory framework. Whilst recognising that that was not a legal requirement, Underhill LJ encouraged such an approach: see paragraph 65 of his judgment in Yalcin . If a First-tier Tribunal does not, however, structure its reasoning in that way, it will need to ensure that it is possible to see that it has identified the relevant facts and has properly applied the statutory framework from the way in which it has expressed its decision.
23. Finally, it is right to remember that the factors identified in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have an important role to play. The factors may be relevant to things dealt with in the exceptions, such as whether deportation would be unduly harsh for a child, or in emphasising the great weight to be given to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals when considering whether there are very compelling circumstances: see paragraphs 37 and 38 of NA (Pakistan) ; and paragraph 51 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] 1 WLR 3784 . Many of those factors (but not all) will be part of the consideration of whether deportation would be unduly harsh or whether there would be very significant obstacles to the reintegration of the foreign criminal in his country of origin. The legislature has determined the way in which certain factors are to be assessed, or the weight to be given to them, in the context of whether deportation of a foreign criminal is justified within the meaning of Article 8(2). That is permissible, as recognised by Lord Reed in the Supreme Court in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4799 at paragraph 15 of his judgment, and by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) at paragraph 52.
15. I shall refer to the law and its application further below.
The Procedural History
16. The Appellant’s appeal had originally been heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by way of a decision dated 18 February 2025.
17. First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb had concluded in respect of Exceptions 1 and 2 as follows:
“47. To meet the first exception in section 117C an appellant must have lived most of their life lawfully in the UK. This is a quantitative question and means simply more than half: SC (Jamaica) [2017] EWCA 2112.
48. Based on my finding above the appellant has been resident in the UK lawfully as an EEA citizen in his own right or as a dependent on his mother the UK since 10 July 2010, a period of 14 years and 7 months at the date of the hearing. This is less than half the appellants life. The appellant therefore can not rely on the exception in section 117C(4) for that reason.
49. In assessing if the appellant is socially and culturally integrated into UK society, I have particular regard to the appellant’s upbringing, education, employment history, criminality, imprisonment, the relationships with others, and his lifestyle.
50. In his submissions Mr Longman asked me to find that those who commit crimes are not integrated into UK society and as a result the appellant should not be treated as integrated.
51. I reject that submission as too simplistic. However, the sentencing remarks of the Judge make clear that the appellant’s offending appeared to be the beginning of a criminal lifestyle that may adversely affect the appellant’s integration into UK society. I take that into account when assessing if the appellant is integrated into UK society.
52. Having considered my factual findings about his education, family and friendship ties in the UK, his history of employment and the effect of his early criminal lifestyle I find that the appellant is culturally and socially integrated into UK society.
53. Identifying if there are very significant obstacles to the appellants integration requires a broad evaluative assessment of whether he will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in the country of return is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.
54. The issue is not whether the appellant has made the UK their home but whether the appellant has become so estranged from Portugal that he would no longer be able to establish a meaningful life there.
55. I find there would be difficulties for the appellant on return to Portugal as he has not been in the country since he was 16 years old. However, he speaks and understands Portuguese and completed his education through to the first two years of high school there. He has gained useful education and work experience in the UK, including in the construction, retail and hospitality industries that would enable him, within a short time, to find employment and accommodation. 56. Applying a broad evaluative judgment and remembering the high threshold of the test, I find there are not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Portugal. For that reason, the appellant can not rely on the exception in section 117C(4).
57. The appellant has not shown to the required standard that his partner is qualifying partner. For that reason alone, the appellant can not rely on the exception in 117C(5).
58. In any event the effect of the deportation on the appellant’s partner would be either that the relationship would continue by way of calls, messages and visits, as it does now, accepting the visits would be less frequent, or would involve her moving to live in Portugal. I accept that would cause disruption to her private life in the UK, including her employment. However, I find neither of those outcomes can be described as unduly harsh for her. I find that for that reason the appellant can not rely on the exception on 117C(5).
59. As the appellant does not meet the exceptions, I go on to undertake a full proportionality assessment.”
18. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal against that decision. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Tozzi by way of a decision dated 26 March 2025. The Appellant had obtained legal assistance of counsel acting for him on a direct access basis.
19. An Error of Law Hearing then took place at the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant was represented by counsel at that hearing. In a decision sealed on 11 November 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara concluded:
“14. To avoid deportation the appellant is required to meet either Exception 1, Exception 2 or establish that there are very compelling circumstances which outweigh the public interest. At the time of the hearing, the appellant was unable to meet Exception 1 owing to the fact that he had not resided in the United Kingdom for more than half his life and owing to the absence of very significant obstacles to his integration. There is no challenge to the first of those findings.
15. Ground four contains a brief argument distinguishing the facts of this case from that of the claimant in Sanambar [2021] UKSC 30, however this is not a case where the judge found that the appellant could rely on support from his mother if he were removed to Portugal. It is also far from clear if the disability of the appellant’s mother formed any part of the evidence or submissions before the judge. Accordingly, ground four is not made out.
16. What is challenged is the judge’s finding that the appellant had not shown that his partner was a qualifying partner. Evidence has been provided post-hearing which indicates that the appellant’s partner is a British citizen. Mr Mullen conceded that the judge had erred in taking this point without raising it with the partner during her oral evidence. Nonetheless, Mr Mullen questioned the materiality of the error in the absence of any evidence that the appellant’s removal would be unduly harsh on the partner.
17. The evidence before the judge as to the effect of the appellant's removal is set out at [58] of the decision, in that the judge notes that the relationship would continue in much the same vein (calls, messages and visits) as it currently did as the couple did not live together, other than the appellant would be in Portugal or his partner would accompany him there. I was referred to no other evidence as to the effect of the appellant’s deportation on the partner whether she stayed behind or accompanied him to Portugal. 3 Appeal Number: UI-2025-001501
18. The evidence before the judge does not establish that there would be any degree of harshness caused by the separation or the relationship continuing in Portugal, let alone undue harshness. I therefore conclude that there was no material error in the judge’s conclusions in relation to Exception 2. That disposes of ground six.
19. I am prepared to accept that the judge materially erred in a number of respects in relation to his consideration of very compelling circumstances.
20. The grounds rightly note the absence of any engagement with the case law of the Supreme Court or the European Court, such as HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22, Boultif and Üner or Unuane.
21. I accept Mr Bedford’s submission that the judge fell into the same error as that of the Upper Tribunal in Otite v UK no. 18339/19 “[45.] Nonetheless, the Upper Tribunal did not conduct this balancing exercise by reference to the case-law of the Court. Insofar as it considered those factors identified by the Court in its Boultif and Üner judgments at all (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above), it did so without explicit reference to those judgments and solely within the framework provided by the Immigration Rules, with a view to determining whether 2 the impact of the applicant’s deportation on his wife and children would be “unduly harsh” and whether there existed any additional “very compelling circumstances” required in order for his appeal to succeed. As the Upper Tribunal did not conduct the balancing exercise as required by Article 8 of the Convention, it therefore falls to the Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, to give the final ruling on whether the applicant’s expulsion would be reconcilable with that Article 8 (see Unuane, cited above, § 85).”
22. There is no direct nor indirect reference to the aforementioned or any other relevant judgments in the First-tier decision. The materiality of this error is that there were matters which were not counted in the appellant’s favour such as his economic integration, his lengthy residence in the United Kingdom and the brevity of the period of his criminal offending. In addition, the factors identified in Boultif and Üner were not taken into consideration, relevant in this case as the appellant was a settled migrant who came to the United Kingdom while a minor.
23. Mr Bedford expanded upon a matter raised in the grounds as to the failure of the judge to consider the OASys report dating from July 2024. That report contained positive evidence of rehabilitation. He was unable to state whether this item was before the judge but had enclosed it in the composite bundle under Part B. He placed reliance on GM (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 1630 in relation to the said OASys report.
24. Given that I have detected errors in the judge’s decision as set out above, the judge’s inadvertent lack of consideration of the OASys report is a further reason to disturb his conclusions on very compelling circumstances. By itself this would not have sufficed to set aside the judge’s conclusions, applying Akter (appellate jurisdiction; E and R challenges) [2021] UKUT 00272 (IAC).
25. Grounds one to three contain a number of additional, meritorious points which I have not addressed as I consider that the judge’s conclusions as to very compelling circumstances were unsafe owing to the above material errors.”
20. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge ordered as follows:
“The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside solely in relation to the findings on very compelling circumstances.
The judge’s findings in relation to Exceptions 1 and 2 are preserved.
The matter will be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.”
21. The directions were that:
“The decision of First-tier Tribunal is set aside solely in relation to the judge’s findings on very compelling circumstances.
The appellant is not precluded from adducing new evidence which addresses the Exceptions which could not have been considered by the First-tier Tribunal.
The parties will be notified of a hearing date in due course.”
22. There followed some delays in listing the matter thereafter because the Appellant did not have legal representation. Ultimately the matter was listed on a date that the Appellant’s barrister was said to be available. The matter then came for hearing before me as I have stated above with a view to Mr Puar attending the hearing.
The Hearing Before Me
23. I had explained the procedure to the Appellant. He was aware of the procedure in view of the previous hearing. I heard evidence from the Appellant and from his two witnesses.
24. The Appellant relied on his written evidence. That includes the statement contained within the original bundle and which is handwritten. He said he had been released from prison on a date he could not recall which he said was either March or April 2024. He said was on licence until September 2026.
25. The Appellant was asked what he had done about his rehabilitation since the hearing in February 2025 in which it was said by the Judge that the Appellant’s rehabilitation was limited. The Appellant said he had done “every possible course” when he was detained. He said he had also undertaken different courses for life outside prison and he had undertaken mentoring cases. He said he worked on self awareness and the had done many courses and that he had understanding the impact on the public of his offending. The Appellant said he had stayed out of trouble since leaving prison. He said he had employment and had volunteered and mentored other people to stay out of trouble. He said he had been made homeless “because of the situation and that he had been working “pretty hard to rehabilitate and I stick to football”.
26. The Appellant was pressed on whether he had undertaken courses in respect of drugs. He said he had been recommended for courses by probation but he had not done any outside of prison. He said 5 or 6 courses had been proposed by probation.
27. The Appellant was asked again whether he addressed the things for which he had been convicted including the drugs and driving offences. The Appellant said he had stayed away from trouble. He said he to re retake his driving theory test. He said he had been through a ‘drug rehab course’. He said he got caught with the wrong people and so he is to seek to understand his actions and “what to do next and to move forward.” He said St Chards Centre continued to help him.
28. The Appellant was asked about the nature of his criminal offence. It was put to him that the police report showed he had been apprehended by the police with 3 deals of cocaine. Later a mobile phone showed evidence of dealing in Class A drugs. There was also a shoe box with items including 27 grip bags of cocaine which was found in the Appellant’s bedroom. The Appellant was arrested but he had denied these offences when he was in the car. Asked at the hearing before me if had admitted matters to the police, the Appellant said it was “more like of a panic mechanism” and that it was “more of like an impactful defensive mechanism” when he was in the car. He said he apologised and was regretful.
29. Asked if he pleaded guilty at trial, the Appellant said he did not. The Appellant said he had not produced documents with his insurance. He had been found guilty and then had to return to prison for motoring offences. He paused but said he could not explain. He said he felt guilty. He took time to answer. He said his time in custody was needed and that is when he had come to terms with “it”. He said it was lack of maturity. He said there was a low risk of re-offending and he had done “everything” whilst in custody.
30. I note that the sentencing remarks of the Crown Court Judge states:
“The Pre-Sentence Report though makes it clear that you do not acknowledge responsibility for this offence. It does say that you came to this country from Portugal when you were around 17 years old with your family, that your mother is partially blind, and that you are seen as the head of the household and a person who takes care of other family members. That in terms of employment, training and education, you attended Cathays High School, before going on to Sixth Form school, and then different college and university courses. Unfortunately, you did not complete your university course, dropping out in the second year as you were enjoying it [sic].”
31. The Appellant said that he is homeless in Cardiff. He said his partner, Ms Sowe, lives in Bristol. He said he had paid for the train travel himself. He said he worked as a labourer in the day and he named the restaurant where he worked in the evenings as a chef.
32. He said he had caused a lot of damage to himself and his family. He said he also caused a lot of damage to his partner’s family. He said he was out of custody on the early release scheme. He said he was on a tag and reporting every 2 weeks. He said, “I have been down but I have never let it get me down”. He referred to the therapy and he said that “even thought the crime is huge; I am a good person in the community”.
33. The next witness to give evidence was Ms Aminata Sowe. She relied on her undated witness statement which had been provided shortly before the hearing. Ms Sowe set out her role in the civil service and that she has an MBA in Marketing. She referred to being in relationship with the Appellant for 10 years. There was an issue in the previous hearing as to whether Ms Sowe was British, but Mr Wain said he had seen the supporting evidence showing that Ms Sowe is British. I was concerned to read that the proceedings had affected Ms Sowe’s mental health. She said this had experienced persistent low mood. She said it was not just sadness but a constant fear of what lies ahead. She said that her civil service job required her to focus and to make decisions but the stress had potential of losing the Appellant has impaired her ability to concentrate. She said she also feels physical problems such as fatigue and constant headaches. She said the Appellant had changed. She also said that removing the Appellant would not only punish him but would impose a severe and disproportionate hardship on her as a British based partner who has all her work, personal and family life here.
34. In cross examination Ms Sowe said she was not on any medication. She said her employer was in touch with her but she had not been referred to any doctors.
35. Asked by me what else she wished to say, Ms Sowe said that the matter had affected her as a person. She said it had caused anxiety and it had had a toll on her and that it had affected her personal life.
36. I also take into account Ms Sowe’s earlier statement of 29 August 2024.
37. The next witness to provide evidence was Ms Adja Sambu. She is the Appellant’s mother. She provided evidence via a Portuguese interpreter. She is Portuguese. She said she is also of “African” nationality. She is partially blind. She was supportive of her son and impressed me as someone who stands by her son and wants the best for him.
38. I also heard from others informally whilst they were in court. This included one of the Appellant’s sisters. There were several letters of support in the previous bundle from people who have known the Appellant, including those he has worked with or assisted, including in his love of football. A letter from a prison officer also states that the Appellant is compliant and, in effect, a nice person. The Appellant has been assisted coaching football and he himself was a talented football player. He played for Wales when aged 16. He is a talented sportsman. The more recent witness statements also speak of the Appellant with high regard.
39. The Appellant has been in the UK since 2010 (or 2011 as some of the Appellant’s documents say). He was aged 16. His mother had leave to remain as a Portuguese national who had fled her husband who was said to have been violent. The Appellant studied and worked in the UK. He had enrolled on a university course but did not complete it. He has been in the UK now for more than half of his life, albeit he did not quite meet that time requirement at the date of the hearing. It is fair that I take into account that the Appellant has been in the UK for more than half of his life.
Analysis and Consideration
40. I referred above to the legal principles and in particular to the judgment of Lewis LJ. The Appellant is what is called a “medium offender”. I therefore consider first the exceptions in s117 (4). Exception 1 is in respect of the time that the Appellant has spent in the UK. He arrived when he was aged 16 years and 10 months (or 16 years and 8 months according to some of the Appellant’s documents). He has now been in the UK for more than half of his life. Exception 1 therefore applies, even though it did not at the time of the hearing. I therefore carefully consider Exception 1 to assess whether the Appellant’s appeal can succeed under Exception 1.
41. That requires me to assess private life matters, including in respect of the European jurisprudence. In no particular order is the way in which the Appellant is well liked by friends, family and others. He is a keen sportsman. He has represented his country. He has helped others with football on Sundays. He has worked and studied in the UK. He speaks English. His siblings, his partner and his mother like him very much and he has nephews and nieces who like him too. He helps with some of their care, albeit there is little evidence of what that care is and how often. From what I saw and heard of the Appellant at the hearing, I myself thought he has a persuasive personality. The Appellant is integrated in that he has his own family and he has that of his partner and her family. He is not isolated and not living away from settled communities. He engages in voluntary and other work. He has undertaken various courses for which certificates have been provided. The OASys report states that there is low risk of re-offending. There are many positives.
42. I conclude though that the Appellant does not meet Exception 1 because of 3 main reasons. Firstly, despite being caught in effect “red handed”, the Appellant did not admit his guilt. There was a trial. The jury found the Appellant to be guilty. Whilst it is the Appellant’s fundamental right to ask the prosecution to prove its case, the Appellant’s approach does not show to me that the Appellant truly admitted fault.
43. Secondly, the Crown Court Judge’s sentencing remarks show and which I have referred to above, even then, the Appellant did not seem to accept fault at the sentencing stage of the proceedings. That was after a finding of guilt and when the Appellant spoke with a probation officer for the purposes of the pre-sentence report. The Appellant says it was some sort of panic mode that he was operating under. I can almost understand that being possible when he was arrested at the scene, but it does not explain why months later the Appellant did not then admit his guilt. Whether at the preliminary hearings in the Magistrates and Crown Court or then on the day of trial. I found the Appellant to be a person who seeks to present as someone who got caught up with wrong crowd or that it was just bad timing because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. I do not accept that. The Appellant was apprehended in a car he had purchased for the purposes of his offending with intent to supply Class A drugs. The search of his bedroom then also showed a box with paraphernalia including 27 wraps with Class A drugs. There was no ‘bad timing’ or ‘wrong crowd’ about the offending. The Appellant’s refusal to clearly accept his guilt speaks volumes to me.
44. Thirdly, added to that is the Appellant not having undertaken any real courses about the effect of the actual offending in respect of the supply of Class A drugs and their effect and in respect of his motoring offences. Whilst I accept he retook his driving theory test, that is not much. The failure to complete such courses adds to my concerns about the Appellant’s attitude to the offences he committed. I conclude that the Appellant has sought to minimis his offending. Even though he is a medium offender for the purposes of s117, it cannot be doubted that offences involving the supply of Class A drugs are always serious, especially when it leads to lengthy periods of imprisonment as is the case here. Class A drugs are illegal for a reason. They have a devasting effect on communities and on the general ripple effect of other offending which they cause.
45. In respect of Exception 1 whilst I accept that the Appellant has been resident in the UK for most of his life and he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, I do not accept that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Portugal. He speaks Portuguese and Creole. I accept he does not speak those languages perfectly, but he converses with his mother who gave evidence to me in Portuguese. The Appellant did go to Portugal once on his way to Africa too. Portugal is just as modern and sophisticated as the UK. Work for someone like the Appellant is an option, albeit he will have to find work whether in a restaurant or as a labourer, as he does now. It will not be easy, but there will not very significant obstacles. He spent the first 16 years of his life abroad, including in school in Portugal. In my judgment the Appellant’s endearing personality and desire to thrive will see him succeed quickly in Portugal.
46. I go on to consider Exception 2. The Appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with Ms Sowe. Whilst the evidence previously was unclear, I accept that Ms Sowe is British.
47. Again, in no particular order, the Appellant lives in Cardiff and Ms Sowe lives in Bristol, Ms Sowe’s mother’s witness statement refers to the Appellant visiting Bristol to see her daughter. Ms Sowe works full time as a civil servant. I accept she has been devasted by the convictions which led to the Appellant being imprisoned. I found Ms Sowe to be someone trying to assist me to understand matters from her viewpoint. She clearly loves the Appellant but is somewhat struggling to understand how the offending occurred and which offending is both serious and affects communities because it relates to the supply of Class A drugs. Whilst Ms Sowe referred to the effects on her of the potential separation if there was a deportation, Mr Wain correctly identified that there was no real new evidence since the previous hearing of the claimed difficulties that Ms Sowe is going through and what she might have to endure. It is for the Appellant to prove his case, even when a litigant in person. He knows full well what his case and it is for him to provide the necessary evidence. There have been many attempts at seeking the evidence from the Appellant when the directions had not been complied with. It is striking that there is no medication for Ms Sowe’s difficulties. That indicates the low level of them.
48. I found the Appellant’s mother to be very supportive of him. I found that the Appellant’s siblings to be impressively supportive of the Appellant. They clearly adore him. They are hard working and want the best for him. The Appellant is fortunate to have such a supportive family. In my judgment the Appellant’s mother, Portuguese herself, will be able to continue her relationship with the Appellant even if he is in Portugal. She deals with her difficulties with the partial blindness and has her other children to assist her. The visits to Portugal to continue the relationship with the Appellant will not be convenient and will cost money, but those difficulties are not such as to enable me to conclude that these relationships will be extinguished. They will not because they can also continue via e-mails and video calls. Those relationships did continue when the Appellant was imprisoned. It is the Appellant’s fault that his sister Mariana went through what she did when the Appellant was imprisoned. It shows me how Mariana is supportive of her brother, but they all are. I can see how they are so enamoured by him.
49. I conclude that whilst Ms Sowe will indeed feel a sense of loss if Appellant is deported, that will not be too dissimilar to the loss she felt when the Appellant was imprisoned. I accept that imprisonment was ‘temporary’ compared with being deported because there was release date in mind, but nonetheless, Ms Sowe managed. Ms Sowe continued to work and continued to have her family around her. She continues to live in Bristol and manages to keep in touch with the Appellant via electronic and similar means. As she will be able to do if the Appellant is in Portugal which obviously has all of the modern forms of communication that we have here in the UK. Similarly, the Appellant can continue his relationship with his friends in the same way.
50. Whilst I note the reference in the skeleton argument to the Appellant and Ms Sowe being Muslims and strictness keeps them apart; I do not accept that they will be prevented from carrying on with their relationship in the form that it takes now with Ms Sowe doing the travelling. Ms Sowe provided evidence before me with the Appellant’s mother at the hearing. The Appellant’s siblings were also present. I detected no difficulties or animosity from the Appellant’s relationship with Ms Sowe from his family.
51. It is for the couple to decide if they will continue their relationship with Ms Sowe staying in the UK and with the Appellant in Portugal. It is obvious that flights from Cardiff or Bristol or from other airports are possible on a daily basis. I accept that there will be a cost involved. I accept it will be inconvenient. I note though that even now the journey from Cardiff to Bristol is not convenient and comes at a financial cost. I also accept that Ms Sowe will be upset at having to work out if she will wish to leave her job in the UK and whether she will be able to let go of her own family who live in Bristol. It is a big step, but relationships and moving to be with a life partner always is. Decisions have to be made. They are difficult decisions.
52. Therefore, whilst the Appellant and Ms Sowe are in a genuine and subsisting relationship, its quality and frequency is such that I conclude it can continue even from the UK to Portugal or alternatively with Ms Sowe going to live in Portugal. The Appellant is clearly a hard working and enthusiastic man whom I do not doubt will wish to get involved with as many positive things in Portugal as he has done in the UK.
53. I remind myself of the meaning of ‘unduly harsh’ explained in MK (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] INLR 563:
"Unduly harsh" does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. 'Harsh' in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb "unduly" raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
54. I do not accept that it will be unduly harsh for the Appellant to be deported and for Ms Sowe to remain in the UK. In any event, I do not accept that Ms Sowe is unable to go to Portugal to live with the Appellant. Even if I am wrong and she cannot, the facts of this case, the relatively short flight from the UK to Portugal, albeit more expensive, will not be so different to what the couple do now with the Appellant living in Cardiff whilst Ms Sowe lives in Bristol. The video relationship can continue between the UK and Portugal come what may. The visits between the UK and Portugal can also take place; albeit they are likely to be more expensive and less frequent. The relationship is genuine but the couple do not live together in the UK. That is a factor I must take into account.
55. I note the preserved findings of Judge Webb’s decision which I must take into account, but even when updated with the new evidence, I am unable to see that there has been any evidence of actual substance to enable me to conclude that Exception 2 is satisfied. Whilst I accept that because of effluxion of time that Exception 1 can now be considered by me, the facts of this case do not show that the Appellant can succeed under Exception 1. Nor is Exception 2 satisfied.
56. I then go on to consider the Supreme Court’s judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] 1 WLR 3784 in undertaking a full proportionality assessment as to whether or not there are compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions. I refer to the judgment handed down by the Supreme Court at some length because of its importance and relevance to this case. Their Lordships said:
“46. Under section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act deportation may be avoided if it can be proved that there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'.
47. The difference in approach called for under section 117C(6) as opposed to 117C(5) was conveniently summarised by Underhill LJ at para 29 of his judgment as follows:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
"(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply—that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements—a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'.'
48. In Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4203, para 50 Sales LJ emphasised that the public interest 'requires' deportation unless very compelling circumstances are established and stated that the test 'provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them'.
49. As explained by Lord Reed JSC in his judgment in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4799, para 38 :
'great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders, but …it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed, as Laws LJ put it in the SS (Nigeria) case [2014] 1 WLR 998 . The countervailing considerations *3800 must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State."
50. How Exceptions 1 and 2 relate to the very compelling circumstances test was addressed by Jackson LJ in NA (Pakistan) [2017] 1 WLR 207 . In relation to serious offenders he stated as follows:
"30. In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute 'very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2', whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8 .'
In relation to medium offenders he stated:
'32. Similarly, in the case of a medium offender, if all he could advance in support of his article 8 claim was a 'near miss' case in which he fell short of bringing himself within either Exception 1 or Exception 2, it would not be possible to say that he had shown that there were 'very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'. He would need to have a far stronger case than that by reference to the interests protected by article 8 to bring himself within that fall back protection. But again, in principle there may be cases in which such an offender can say that features of his case of a kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 have such great force for article 8 purposes that they do constitute such very compelling circumstances, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to article 8 but not falling within the factors described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The decision-maker, be it the Secretary of State or a tribunal, must look at all the matters relied upon collectively, in order to determine whether they are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation.'
He also emphasised the high threshold which must be satisfied:
'33. Although there is no 'exceptionality' requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.'
51. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in *3801 deportation. As explained by Lord Reed JSC in Hesham Ali at paras 24-35, relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2020) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Uner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14 , summarised the relevant factors at paras 72-73 as comprising the following:
"• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct during that period;
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
• the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.'
52. The weight to be given to the relevant factors falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. As Lord Reed JSC explained in Hesham Ali at para 35:
"35. While the European court has provided guidance as to factors which should be taken into account, it has acknowledged that the weight to be attached to the competing considerations, in striking a fair balance, falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities, subject to supervision at the European level. The Convention on Human Rights can thus accommodate, within limits, the judgments made by national legislatures and governments in this area.'”
57. I am well aware that the Supreme Court confirmed in Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58 that the “little weight” provisions in s.117B(4)-(5) are not rigid or automatic rules. At [49]-[53], the Court made clear that a degree of flexibility remains and that compelling factual circumstances may justify the attachment of greater weight to family or private life. In my judgment there are no sufficient or even arguable compelling factual circumstances which justify the attachment of greater weight to the family life or private life in this case.
58. The offences were serious. They related to the supply of Class A drugs and motoring offences connected to those offences. As I have stated above, drugs and Class A drugs in particular have a devasting effect on our communities. The fact that there was a trial does not make the offences more serious, but it provides an insight into the Appellant’s view about his guilt. The Appellant has been in the UK since he was aged 16 and is now has been here for just over 16 years and so for more than most of his life. He has spent all of his adult life in the UK. He spent 16 ½ years abroad. These are important factors in his favour. The Appellant was released as part of an early release scheme in 2024 and he has not committed further offences. That is positive. It is a backdrop of him having undertaken courses in prison and since his release. Those are positive matters. The Crown Court Judge’s sentencing remarks have caused me to hesitate because the Appellant did not appear to admit fault and blamed matters on being with the ‘wrong crowd’ or that it was bad timing that he was caught that night by the police. In my judgment, Mr Wain is correct that there has been no substantial course undertaken to deal with the effect of supply of drug offences on the wider community. It is a positive though that the Appellant has been assessed as being at a low risk of re-offending.
59. The Appellant in a relationship with Ms Sowe. She is British. The Appellant has siblings and his mother. The siblings are all British. The Appellant’s mother is Portuguese. They all adore the Appellant and want him to stay in the UK. As I have stated above, Ms Sowe is depressed and wants the Appellant to be in the UK. She is in full time work. Ms Sowe has known of the offending, it would appear, only once the Appellant was arrested. The couple have known each other for some 10 years when they were at University together. As I have stated above, the relationship is one across cities because the Appellant lives in Cardiff and Ms Sowe lives in Bristol. The relationship is genuine and subsisting. There are no children of the relationship but the couple are said to want to settle down at some point.
60. I conclude that Ms Sowe is able to move to Portugal, another European country. I accept it will be difficult for her because she will have to leave her job and her own family in the UK. What she will gain is that she will be with the Appellant which she states she wants and which might therefore deal with the separation issues she refers to which she states are causing her anxiety and depression. None of the anxiety and depression has been properly evidenced in any event, btu even if I accept it, the fact that the couple will be together in Portugal will clearly ameliorate the anxiety and depression. Whilst I accept that it will lead to the Ms Sowe being worried about being in a new country and without a job, the Appellant’s engaging, enterprising and busy life with communities is something he can replicate in Portugal swiftly. In any event, even if I am wrong, Ms Sowe and the Appellant can continue their relationship between Portugal the UK as they do now in separate cities. That is because they do not currently live together in any event. They live in different cities some distance apart in Cardiff and Bristol. They can continue to do that and continue to have video calls and the like.
61. Even though I was not provided with medical evidence, if Ms Sowe is going through the difficulties she told me about, there is no evidence that such treatment would not be available in Portugal. Alternatively, if Ms Sowe stays in the UK, she will be able to seek any necessary treatment in the UK to assist her to cope with the difficulties she might have to deal with.
62. In my judgment the Appellant will quickly become familiar with Portugal again. He is estranged from his father, but his mother retains her Portuguese heritage. The Appellant speaks the languages used in Portugal. English is obviously widely spoken across Europe too. Portugal is a modern country. It requires a flight, but it is not so far from Bristol and Cardiff that the Appellant’s family and/or Ms Sowe could not visit. The s117B factors in this case are positive for the Appellant in that he speaks English and the relationship with Ms Sowe appears to have been entered into at a time when he was settled in the UK. The Appellant’s financial independence is less clear because he told me he is homeless, but I take into account he is working in the UK and that is a positive too.
63. Rehabilitation is not of itself sufficient to enable me to side step the important considerations on the Respondent’s side. Nor does the low risk of reoffending mean that this case can succeed without more. The Appellant’s crimes were serious and involving supply of Class A drugs. An important facet is deterrence. It should be known that commuting crimes can have the consequence of deportation. The public expects there to be consideration of its disapproval of the commission of offences leading to imprisonment by foreign nationals. Primary responsibility for the public interest rests with the Respondent. I must give that great weight.
64. Therefore, when considering matters as a whole, I conclude that the public interest requires the Appellant’s deportation. The Article 8 matters do not persuade me to conclude otherwise in this case.
Conclusion
65. I thank the Appellant’s family and Ms Sowe for their helpful written and oral evidence. I also take into account the supporting evidence of the well-wishers and friends. I also take into account Mr Puar’s skeleton argument. I am unable to agree that the appeal can succeed.
66. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside on Article 8 ECHR grounds at the Error of Law hearing.
I remake the decision in respect of Article 8 ECHR by dismissing it.

28 August 2026

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber