Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001507

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52032/2024
LP/09625/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

IUD
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr A Pipe, counsel instructed by Wright Justice Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 18 July 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
This appeal concerns a claim for international protection. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Pakistan who made a claim for international protection on 28 July 2022. There are two stands to the claim made by the appellant. First, he will be at risk upon return to Pakistan as someone who had been accused of sexual assault in the UK and second, because of a land dispute that his family are involved in.
2. The respondent accepted the appellant had been accused of sexual assault in the UK and that his family are involved in a land dispute. However, the respondent rejected the appellant’s claim that he has been threatened by his family because of the allegations of sexual assault made against him, and that the appellant’s father has any influence over the authorities in Pakistan. The respondent concluded that in any event, there would be sufficient protection available to the appellant in Pakistan, and he could relocate to Lahore, Faisalabad or Multan, in Pakistan.
3. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Young-Harry (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 7 February 2025. The appellant claims the judge heard evidence at the hearing of the appeal from the appellant and two witnesses. The witnesses called by the appellant supported his claim. The appellant claims the judge refers to the evidence of the two witnesses, very briefly at paragraphs [21] and [22] of the decision. She then states at paragraph [23] that as she did not accept the appellant’s account that his family seek to harm him based on allegations that have been discontinued in the UK, she attached no weight to the evidence of the two witnesses. The appellant claims the judge erred in her approach as to the assessment of the credibility of the appellant. The judge should have considered the evidence of the witnesses before reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of the appellant’s account. Furthermore, the appellant claimed the judge questions why the appellant’s brother would be willing to assist the appellant establish his protection claim by providing a copy of the FIR issued, if the appellant is at risk upon return from his brothers. Finally, the appellant claimed the judge failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusion that the appellant could internally relocate and there would be sufficient protection available to him, without considering the background evidence relating to honour killings.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Moon on the first ground of appeal only. FtT Judge Moon said:
“Permission to appeal is granted on Ground one. It is arguable that the reason given for rejecting the oral evidence of two witnesses set out at paragraph 23 is inadequate.”
5. Mr Pipe submits the credibility of the appellant was central to his claim for international protection. The two witnesses called by the appellant were important because they had each visited Pakistan, visited the village that the appellant lived in, and had met with his father. They gave evidence and were cross -examined. The judge said she attached no weight to the evidence of the witnesses. Mr Pipe submits the judge should have considered the evidence of the witnesses before reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of the appellant. The judge did not make the findings on the evidence in the round, and the approach adopted by the judge vitiates the decision as a whole. Mr Pipe submits the consideration of the evidence regarding sufficiency of protection and internal relocation cannot stand. The findings are based upon the appellant’s claim overall rather than background material.
6. In reply, Ms Arif submits there is no material error of law capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal. She submits the judge gave adequate reasons for finding that the appellant is not a credible witness. She submits the evidence of the witnesses called by the appellant does not undermine the adverse credibility findings made by the judge.
Decision
7. I have reminded myself of the important guidance handed down by the Court of Appeal that an appellate court must not interfere in a decision of a judge below without good reason. The power of the Upper Tribunal to set aside a decision of the FtT only arises in law if it is found that the tribunal below has made a genuine error of law that is material to the outcome of the appeal.
8. The assessment of credibility and the risk upon return in a claim for international protection is always a highly fact-sensitive task. In an appeal such as this where the respondent challenges the core of the appellant’s account, judges adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. A judge will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given by the appellant at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with other evidence relied upon in support of the claim, including the evidence of witnesses and background material, and (iii) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (iv), the overall plausibility of an appellant's account.
9. Here, the judge addressed the appellant’s international protection claim at paragraphs [15] to [24] of her decision. She found that the appellant’s account of how his family had discovered the allegations made against him of sexual assault to be inconsistent. She identified at least three areas of inconsistency at paragraphs [17], [18] and [19] of her decision. At paragraph [20] the judge said:
“I found the appellant’s evidence entirely lacking in credibility and inconsistent in many regards. I do not find the appellant to be a truthful witness.”
10. The judge then went on to refer to the evidence of the two witnesses called by the appellant at paragraphs [21] and [22] of the decision. The judge noted that each of those two witnesses had visited Pakistan and that they had spoken to the appellant’s father. At paragraph [23] the judge said:
“Given I do not accept the appellant’s account that his family seek to harm him based on allegations which have been discontinued in the UK, I attach no weight to the evidence of these two witnesses.”
11. At paragraph [24] of her decision the judge referred to the impact of s8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 and said that the appellant’s late asylum claim also damages his credibility. She went on to say:
“24. … I consider also that the appellant stated in his interview that he has lived here for 14 years, and he can be free to wear what he wants and have any haircut. I find this response reveals the appellant's true intentions.
12. The judge here plainly had concerns about the credibility of the appellant’s account and it was undoubtedly open to her to note there are several inconsistencies in the account provided by the appellant. I am however persuaded that she fell into error in her analysis of the credibility of the appellant and his account. Rather than consider the appellant’s account in isolation, the judge should have considered the appellant’s account against the wide canvass of evidence before the Tribunal before reaching a decision upon the credibility of the appellant and the account that he relies upon. Here, the judge said that she attached no weight to the evidence of the two witnesses “given I do not accept the appellant’s account”, without identifying any other reason why she was unable to attach any weight to that evidence. The judge should have considered the evidence of the witnesses in the round against all the other evidence before the Tribunal to see whether, and if so, to what extent, the evidence of the witnesses either supported or undermined the appellant’s claim.
13. Having considered the evidence before the Tribunal in the round, it would have been open to the judge to conclude that she did not find the appellant to be a credible witness because of the inconsistencies in his account, and that she could attach little or no weight to the evidence of the two witnesses, setting out her reasons, even briefly, for that conclusion. However here, the judge said she could attach no weight to the evidence of the witnesses simply because she does not accept the appellant’s account. She did not consider the evidence as a whole before reaching her conclusions as to the credibility of the appellant and the account he relies upon.
14. I accept there is a material error of law in the decision of the FtT and the decision must be set aside.
15. As to disposal, I am conscious of the Court of Appeal’s decision in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and §7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. Sub-paragraph (a) deals with where the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the FtT, whereas sub-paragraph (b) directs me to consider whether I am satisfied that the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
16. Having regard to the nature of the error of law I am satisfied as both parties urge that the appropriate course, in fairness to the appellant, is for the appeal to be remitted for rehearing before the FtT.
Notice of Decision
17. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Young-harry dated 7 February 2025 is set aside.
18. The appeal is remitted to the FtT for hearing afresh with no findings preserved.
19. The parties will be notified of a hearing date by the FtT in due course.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 October 2025