Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001508

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65709/2023
LP/10236/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

SA
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipe of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision dated 17 January 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulholland (“the FTTJ”) dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision dated 11 December 2023 by the respondent to refuse a protection claim.
2. The appeal comes before us to decide whether there is an error of law in the decision of the FTTJ. If we determine that the FTTJ’s decision does contain an error of law, we need then to decide whether to set aside the decision. If we set aside the decision, we must then decide whether this Tribunal should remake the decision or whether we should remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
The First-tier Tribunal Decision
3. It can be seen that in the decision the FTTJ records the following:
• The appellant had been given a positive conclusive grounds decision that she is the victim of modern slavery – the FTTJ says he has taken this into account: see paragraph 3 of the decision.
• The appellant is a vulnerable witness on account of the mental health issues as described in the medial records and reports: see paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision.
• It is accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic abuse as a child bride between 1990 and 1994: see paragraph 14 of the decision.
4. The FTTJ gives her findings on credibility and risk on return between paragraphs 14 and 31 of the decision. She sets out a number of reasons why the claims made by the appellant regarding current risk from her husband and also from her former trafficker, Abbas, lack credibility and finds she is not satisfied the appellant has demonstrated she is at real risk of serious harm from either.
5. At paragraphs 32 to 40 of the decision the FTTJ goes on to make findings in the alternative about sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. On the evidence in the appeal the FTTJ finds it is not demonstrated that there is a lack of sufficient protection available to the appellant. Further, the FTTJ finds that, on the evidence produced including the medical evidence, it is reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Nepal.
6. The FTTJ goes on to make findings on Article 8, which we shall not detail as they are not the subject of any of the grounds of appeal before us.
The grounds of appeal & First-tier Tribunal’s Grant of permission to appeal
7. Mr Pipe for the appellant drafted grounds of appeal dated 28 February 2025, identifying at paragraph 5(a) to (g) of the grounds various errors of law which it is submitted the FTTJ made in his decision.
8. In the decision dated 3 April 2025 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Turner found the appellant identified arguable errors of law at points (a) to (d) of paragraph 5 and granted permission to appeal on those grounds only.
9. Accordingly, we set out in summary only the appellant’s grounds of appeal at paragraph 5(a) to (d), which we will henceforward refer to as grounds (a) to (d).
10. In ground (a) it is submitted that when assessing credibility and pointing out factors undermining credibility the FTTJ errs by failing to take into account as a starting point that the respondent, as well as the competent authority in the NRM claim, accepts the appellant has been telling the truth about core facts in her claim.
11. In ground (b) it is submitted that when assessing the issue of delay, despite noting the appellant has poor mental health and is vulnerable, the FTTJ errs when finding that this does not excuse her delay as she made a human rights claim. It is said that the FTTJ fails to consider material matters. Moreover, the FTTJ’s finding is irrational as the fact that the appellant is a vulnerable victim of trafficking with enduring mental health problems may well excuse her delay in claiming asylum.
12. In ground (c) it is submitted that the FTTJ errs when relying on the appellant withdrawing her asylum claim as damaging credibility. It is evident from the chronology that the initial withdrawal was in order for the appellant’s indefinite leave to remain application to be considered by the respondent and was not a renunciation by the appellant of her fear of persecution.
13. In ground (d) it is submitted that the judge has failed to address the appellant’s claim on the basis that she is an acknowledged victim of repeated trauma and this is likely to have influenced the appellant’s behaviour. The appellant in the skeleton argument had cited in support of her case paragraphs 18 and 32 from The Queen (TVN) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 3019 (Admin).
Application by appellant to the Upper Tribunal
14. On 10 April 2025 the appellant submitted an IAUT1 application form to which was attached the 28 February 2025 grounds drafted by Mr Pipe. The matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. The judge, while noting it was not actually said in the application, assumed that the intention of the appellant’s solicitors was to renew the application for permission to appeal on the grounds which Judge Turner did not consider to be arguable.
15. Judge Blundell considered that the only grounds before him were those before Judge Turner and found there was nothing to suggest the Judge Turner was wrong to refuse permission on the grounds in question. Judge Blundell agreed with the refusal of permission on the grounds in question for the reasons given by Judge Turner and refused the unparticularised renewal of those grounds.
The Upper Tribunal Hearing
16. At the hearing before us we had the composite bundle of documents assembled by the appellant. Ms Clewley for the respondent confirmed that there was no Rule 24 response. Ms Clewley did not have a copy of the composite bundle but did have separate documents, including those that were before the First-tier Tribunal, and was content to proceed on this basis.
17. We heard submissions from the parties. Mr Pipe for the appellant confirmed he was seeking to rely on the grounds (a) to (d). In summary, the appellant reiterated the points made in the grounds while the respondent submitted that the FTTJ, taking proper consideration of the mental health and vulnerability of the appellant, made findings that were open to her to make and provided suitable reasons.
18. In the course of the hearing the appellant left the hearing room and we gave Mr Pipe time to take instructions. Mr Pipe subsequently indicated the appellant wished for the hearing to continue in her absence. Accordingly we completed the hearing in the absence of the appellant. At the end of the hearing we reserved our decision.
Discussion
19. We will consider the appellant’s grounds of appeal in the order they were advanced by Mr Pipe in his submissions.
Ground (a)
20. The core of the appellant’s complaint in this ground is that, when assessing the disputed credibility issues in this case, the FTTJ erred by failing to assess credibility from the starting point that it was accepted that “the appellant had told the truth about the core of her claim”.
21. The focus of Mr Pipe’s submissions concerns the FTTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s claims regarding events during a return visit she made to Nepal in 2011 and the receipt of a letter in 2016 from her cousin warning her it was unsafe for her to return. These events are at a later date after the period of domestic abuse and trafficking which the respondent accepts the appellant has suffered.
22. We consider the central issue in this appeal is whether the claimed adverse interest in the appellant by the actors of persecution has continued or revived since the period when it is accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic abuse from her husband and a victim of trafficking by Abbas. It is in this context that the claimed events of 2011 and 2016 need to be assessed. The appellant presents her case that the adverse interest in her was shown to be continuing in 2011 and 2016 in order to support her argument that at present she remains at real risk.
23. We accept that the undisputed past domestic abuse and trafficking is a factor for a judge to take into account when assessing credibility. However, it does not follow that acceptance of these previous events means that a judge should accept, without further consideration, the disputed claimed events of 2011 and 2016.
24. The respondent is correct to point out that the FTTJ refers at the outset of her decision at paragraph 3 to the fact that she is taking into account that the appellant has been given a positive conclusive ground decision as regards the claimed previous trafficking. At paragraph 14 of the decision the FTTJ begins her findings by noting the appellant’s account of domestic abuse is accepted. At no point thereafter in the decision does the FTTJ reject the accepted history of domestic abuse and trafficking suffered by the appellant before she left Nepal for the first time in 2009.
25. When considering the approach taken by the FTTJ, we are not persuaded that this is a judge who, as suggested by Mr Pipe, is simply quick to point out the factors that undermine the appellant’s claim. Rather, the FTTJ has identified that the appellant has been accepted in part in her claim and then proceeds to consider the disputed credibility issues over the claims of continued adverse interest. On these important issues in this appeal the FTTJ goes on to give a series of reasoned findings that the claims of continuing adverse interest lack credibility, firstly in respect of her husband and then as regards Abbas.
26. The appellant includes under this ground the criticism that the FTTJ at paragraph 17 of the decision errs in law by appearing to require corroboration for the claimed behaviour of the police in Nepal and the influence of her husband, his family or Abbas over the Nepalese police.
27. We accept that there is no requirement for corroboration in asylum or human rights law in this jurisdiction. It can be seen that the FTTJ in paragraph 17 expressly refers to there being no independent evidence from the police about the claimed reporting incident and there being no supporting evidence to demonstrate the claimed influence of the husband, his family and Abbas. However, reading the paragraph as a whole, we consider these are instances of the FTTJ noting it is the word of the appellant alone about these particular claims and then proceeding to find separate reasons not to accept what the appellant is saying. We are not persuaded that the FTTJ is here making adverse credibility findings on the basis of the appellant not providing corroborative evidence for the claims in question.
28. In the circumstances, we find no error of law by the FTTJ shown under ground (a).
Ground (d)
29. The appellant argues that the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to the appellant being an acknowledged victim of trauma as well as to the medical evidence about the mental health of the appellant including the expert psychological report dated 10 December 2019 of Dr Halari.
30. Mr Pipe advanced this in submissions as another ground making a general challenge to the approach taken by the FTTJ throughout the decision.
31. We can see that the passages cited at paragraph 21 of the appellant’s First-tier skeleton argument from the persuasive authority of The Queen (TVN) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 3019 (Admin) supports the proposition that a judge should bear in mind that a victim of trauma, such as domestic abuse or trafficking, may have their recollections affected by that trauma and that other evidence about the physical or mental condition of that person can establish the claim of having suffered trauma. We can accept such a general proposition.
32. The respondent is able to point out that the FTTJ in paragraph 12 and 13 of the decision referred in general terms to being aware of the mental health issues of the appellant described in the medical records and reports when deciding to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. The approach taken by the FTTJ here weighs against any suggestion that the judge did not generally have in mind the medical evidence before her and the appellant’s accepted history of trauma.
33. Moreover, we do note that in neither the skeleton argument nor the submission made to the FTTJ as described did the appellant refer the FTTJ to any particular part of the medical or other evidence related to the history of trauma and the mental health of the appellant as particularly relevant to any of the specific credibility challenges raised by the respondent concerning the claimed ongoing adverse interest in her.
34. We have already mentioned above that we consider that the FTTJ was alert in general terms when making her decision to the accepted previous history of domestic abuse and trafficking, which the medical evidence links to the mental health condition of the appellant.
35. Thus, although Mr Pipe took us in his submissions to paragraph 52 of Dr Halari’s report which records that the appellant appeared very confused throughout the assessment of the doctor, the attention of the FTTJ was not drawn to this paragraph in either the skeleton argument or in submissions made at the First-tier Tribunal hearing; even before us it was not argued that this piece of evidence was material to the consideration of any specific credibility issue as opposed to being a general consideration for a judge to bear in mind.
36. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the appellant establishes there is an error of law by the FTTJ under ground (d).
37. We turn to grounds (b) and (c) which focus more on particular parts of the FTTJ’s decision making.
Ground (b)
38. This ground concerns how the FTTJ assessed at paragraph 23 of the decision the issue of delay which resulted in a finding that s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 applied to the appellant’s case and that the delay undermined her claim.
39. The respondent submits that the FTTJ made a full consideration of the appellant’s case on this matter and reached a decision lawfully open to her, taking into account the appellant’s vulnerability.
40. As mentioned above, we have found the FTTJ to be generally alert to the vulnerability of the appellant because of her mental health when assessing the disputed parts of her claim. That said, we consider Mr Pipe has identified before us a relevant matter that was not given proper consideration by the FTTJ when assessing the effect of s.8 of the 2004 Act applying to the appellant’s case. This is that the application of s.8 of the 2004 Act did not prevent the respondent accepting that the appellant was credible about at least part of her claim i.e. her previous history of domestic abuse and trafficking.
41. We can see that the appellant raised this aspect of the claim before the FTTJ in the First-tier Tribunal skeleton argument at paragraph 19. The FTTJ makes no mention of this as a specific factor she has taken into account when determining the effect on credibility under s.8 of the 2004 Act. We consider the FTTJ does not engage with this point before reaching a decision on the effect of s.8 of the 2004 Act as undermining the appellant’s credibility regarding the disputed parts of her claim. When reading the finding made at paragraph 24 of the decision with what the FTTJ says at paragraphs 24 and 25 of the decision, we accept that, notwithstanding the other adverse credible findings, the FTTJ treated the adverse finding under s.8 of the 2004 Act as being of some significance in contributing to the undermining of credibility.
42. We find there is an error of law as argued by the appellant under ground (b).
Ground (c)
43. Under this ground the appellant argues that at paragraph 24 of the decision the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to the procedural chronology. The appellant argues it is evident from the chronology that the initial withdrawal of an asylum claim was in order for the appellant’s ILR application to be considered by the respondent and was not a renunciation of her fear of persecution.
44. We are not persuaded by this submission of the appellant. While an application for ILR on long residence grounds may have the same effect on ensuring the appellant does not have to return to Nepal as a grant of refugee status, the nature of such an ILR application can be understood as different to that of a protection claim. The ILR application is based on time spent resident in the UK and includes no assertion that the applicant is not safe in her home country of Nepal. In these circumstances, we consider the respondent is right to submit it was lawfully open to the FTTJ to treat the withdrawal of the asylum claim as indicating the appellant no longer viewed herself as in need of international protection.
45. Accordingly, we find there is no error law by the FTTJ demonstrated under ground (c).
Is the error of law we have found a material one requiring the FTTJ’s decision be set aside?
46. As mentioned above, notwithstanding the other adverse findings on credibility made, we read the decision of the FTTJ as treating the application of s.8 of the 2004 Act as playing a part of some significance in the overall conclusion to reject the credibility of the appellant regarding the disputed parts of her claim.
47. However, after making the adverse credibility findings and finding the appellant was not at real risk of further targeting, the FTTJ at paragraphs 32 to 40 of the decision does go on to consider the appellant’s case in the alternative. This is on the basis of accepting the disputed parts of the appellant’s claim regarding risk from the claimed actors. Here the FTTJ makes findings that it is not demonstrated that there is a lack of sufficient protection by the Nepalese authorities available to the appellant and also that internal relocation is reasonably available to the appellant.
48. As acknowledged by Mr Pipe before us, grounds (a) to (d) challenge only the FTTJ’s assessment of credibility and risk regarding the claimed actors of persecution. The findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are not challenged before us by the appellant.
49. In these circumstances, we find the error of law we have identified under ground (b) is not a material one because the dismissal of the appellant’s protection claim on the distinct issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation stands regardless. The error of law we identify does not require the remaking of the FTTJ’s decision.
Notice of Decision
We find there is no material error in law in the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision requiring the decision be set aside and remade. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed.

M Harris
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2025