Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001519

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61377/2023
LP/08342/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

RP
(ANONYMITy ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Kannangara of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka born on 4 August 1976. The appellant made a protection claim on 10 January 2019, which was refused by the respondent on 8 November 2023. His appeal against the decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ketteley (‘the judge’) on 23 October 2024, after a hearing on 9 October 2024.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal J M Dixon on 3 April 2025 on the basis that it was arguable that the judge had erred in law in reaching adverse credibility findings for the reasons given in paragraphs [23]-[26] of the decision and reasons.
3. The matter came before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and thus whether the decision should be set aside.
Background
4. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim is that he came to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities because of a friendship with a Tamil man, whom he calls Siva, and who the appellant says was wrongly accused of involvement in an attack on the Anuradhapura Airforce base (‘the Airforce base’) in October 2007. The appellant says he was driving a car from which Siva took photos of the Airforce base in April 2007 and that he was with Siva when he passed photos and documents to unknown friends in August 2007. In November 2007, whilst the appellant was living in South Korea, the appellant says his older uncle’s wife informed him by telephone that army personnel were looking for him in connection with the attack, and that they had abducted the appellant’s younger uncle. The appellant remained in South Korea until 7 April 2010 but on 16 April 2010 he says that three men in army uniforms detained him and tortured him, seeking information about Siva. The appellant was released on 12 May 2010 as a result of payment of a bribe and then made his way to South Korea and then the UK with the assistance of an agent. He arrived in the UK on 9 September 2011 with entry clearance as a student. He claimed asylum on 10 January 2019, only after service of notice as an overstayer.
5. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds, on the basis that the appellant’s account was not credible.
Submissions – Error of Law
6. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions by Mr Kannangara it is argued, in short summary, for the appellant as follows:
7. The appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal was wrong to find, at paragraph [23], that there was an inconsistency between the appellant’s evidence in his asylum interview and in his appeal witness statement in relation to the frequency of the visits of the appellant’s Tamil friend (Siva).
8. Secondly, the appellant criticises the Tribunal’s finding at paragraph [24], that it was not reasonably likely that the authorities would continue to watch the appellant’s empty family home almost 15 years after he left the country, when his uncle had been able to remain living in the same village. The appellant asserts that the First-tier Tribunal ignored the fact that it was the appellant who was of adverse interest to the authorities and that his uncle was not of adverse interest to the authorities.
9. In addition, the appellant argues that the judge erred by failing to find that release through the payment of a bribe was consistent with the country guidance in GJ and Others (post-civil war; returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 00319 (IAC) (GJ). The appellant also contends that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to find “that there was no time limit for the authorities to continue to have adverse interest”.
10. The appellant further criticises the judge’s finding at paragraph [25] of the decision and asserts that the First-tier Tribunal did not apply the finding at paragraph 394 of GJ, in relation to the ability of the appellant in that case, to travel through Colombo airport unhindered.
11. The appellant also criticises the finding at paragraph [26] of the decision that there was no evidence of an arrest warrant for the appellant and no evidence that Siva was involved in the attack on the base, with the appellant relying on background country information that indicated that arrest warrants are not issued to the suspect or their family members. The appellant further argued that there was no way for the appellant to provide any evidence of Siva’s involvement other than the evidence he had given at paragraph 17 of his witness statement.
12. There was no Rule 24 response. In oral submissions by Ms Tariq for the respondent it is argued, in short summary as follows:
13. Ms Tariq argues that the first ground, in respect of paragraph [23], amounts to no more than a disagreement, with the appellant failing to provide a coherent account over the three occasions on which he provided evidence about the nature and closeness of the relationship with Siva. This is significant as it goes to the heart of the appellant’s claim and the credibility of that claim. Paragraph 10 of the respondent’s review, dated 3 June 2024, raised a further inconsistency in relation to communication with Siva, with the appellant claiming at interview (Asylum Interview Record (AIR) 31) that he had not spoken to Siva since the appellant left for South Korea. But he later claimed not to know what Siva told the authorities when he was arrested. The respondent’s review maintained that the appellant had not explained how he knew Siva was arrested (AIR 47), when he claimed to have no contact with him. Ms Tariq submits that the appellant had not specifically challenged this issue.
14. In relation to grounds 2 and 3, Ms Tariq submits that the grounds were unclear. She submits that paragraph [24] of the judge’s decision had to be considered in the round, in light of paragraph [27] where the judge found the appellant not credible. It was unclear why the grounds argued that the judge had failed to make positive findings in the appellant’s favour, for example in relation to the authorities looking for the appellant; the judge did not accept the appellant’s account and found that the Sri Lankan authorities do not consider the appellant to be a supporter of the LTTE or that he facilitated preparation for the attack at the Airforce base in 2007. The judge’s findings from [24] to [27] were to be considered holistically with the judge engaging with the country guidance caselaw at paragraph [25]. Whilst the judge noted that corruption and bribery in Sri Lanka are widespread, the judge did not accept that this had taken place in the appellant’s case in light of the credibility issues identified.
15. Ms Tariq argues that there was no merit in ground 4 and the judge’s findings were correct. She submits that the respondent’s review, which was before the judge, had considered, at paragraph 13, the reliance by the appellant in the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) on RS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1796 (RS). Whilst the ASA had inferred that the appellant may have been added to a stop list or a watch list or a warrant issued for his arrest, RS considers persons who have escaped detention and the appellant in that case also travelled on false papers. The respondent had therefore distinguished the appellant’s case from RS, as this appellant was released from detention and claimed to have travelled on his own passport and therefore it was not accepted that the appellant was a person likely to be on a stop list.
Conclusions – Error of Law
16. The grounds of appeal challenged the findings of the First-tier Tribunal at paragraphs [23]-[26] of the decision. Although the grounds are not numbered, for ease of reference we refer to the grounds below, as grounds 1-4.
Ground 1 – findings at paragraph 23
17. At paragraph [23], the judge reached findings based on the appellant’s answer at interview, that he had been suspected of helping his friend Siva to attack the Airforce base because the friend had “been to my house a few times” (AIR 13). In his witness statement, the appellant stated that Siva had been friendly with his younger uncle and had visited him several times and that “Siva was living like a member of our family”. In oral evidence, the appellant confirmed that he meant that Siva was like a family friend.
18. Although the appellant asserts that there was no inconsistency between the statements, we disagree. It was open to the judge to conclude that the appellant’s answer at interview portrayed a significant difference in the depth of his relationship with Siva, to that given by his evidence at the hearing.
19. As the appellant’s relationship with Siva was central to his protection claim, the discrepancy was significant. It was open to the judge to consider the appellant’s credibility to be damaged by the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account in respect of the appellant’s relationship with Siva.
20. The judge rejected the appellant’s account in its entirety. Given the judge’s unchallenged findings in relation to the damage to the appellant’s credibility under section 8, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants. Etc.) Act 2004 and the further inconsistencies noted by the respondent in the respondent’s review, any error in relation to this particular issue is not material to the judge’s credibility findings in general.
21. It was open to the judge to reject as he did, including at [23] and [27], the appellant’s account of claimed risk on the basis of his claimed friendship with Siva and alleged association with the attack on the Airforce base. No material error of law is disclosed in Ground 1.
Grounds 2 and 3 – application of GJ
22. The First-tier Tribunal made express reference to GJ at paragraph [25] of the decision and noted that corruption and bribery were widespread in Sri Lanka. However, the judge did not accept that the appellant’s uncle would be able to bribe officials to release the appellant, if the appellant had been detained for involvement in a terror-related matter in circumstances where the uncle was said to be unable to protect other members of the appellant’s family. That finding was open to the judge on the appellant’s evidence.
23. Similarly, it was open to the judge to reject the appellant’s account that the authorities were still monitoring his empty house, given the very significant length of time since the appellant had left Sri Lanka. The appellant does not identify any legal error in the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning and we find that it was open to the judge to reject the appellant’s account for the reasons given at paragraphs [24] and [25] of the decision.
24. Although Mr Kannangara again sought to highlight in oral submissions, that it was the appellant that the authorities were looking for, not his uncle, the judge’s decision discloses that he was fully aware that the basis of the appellant’s case was that the authorities were looking for him, not his uncle. It was open to the judge on the evidence, to not accept the appellant’s account as credible, including that it was not reasonably likely that his uncle would be able to remain living in the same village if there was such significant adverse interest in the appellant as he claimed.
25. The appellant further criticises the judge’s findings at paragraph [25] of the decision, where the judge found that the appellant’s ability to leave Sri Lanka on his genuine travel documents, whilst being of adverse interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, particularly given the claimed seriousness of that adverse interest, was inconsistent with the available background information. Although the appellant asserts that the judge did not apply the finding at paragraph 394 of GJ , paragraph 394 did not form part of the country guidance in that case. Paragraph 394 of GJ was a finding made on the particular facts of that case, which included use of a false passport to evade the authorities. As such, it was not authoritative guidance for the First-tier Tribunal in this appeal.
26. On the appellant’s own case, he was wanted and had been detained by the Sri Lankan authorities, in connection with a terrorist attack on a military base. It was entirely open to the judge to find that the appellant’s ability to leave Sri Lanka on his own passport was not consistent with the available external evidence, or with the seriousness of the claimed charges.
27. We find no error of law to be made out in grounds 2 and 3.
Ground 4 – credibility findings / corroboration
28. It is the appellant’s case that he had not been provided with a warrant, and that this is consistent with the Report of the Home Office Fact Finding Mission to Sri Lanka dated January 2020 at paragraph 7.2.1. Further, the appellant says that there was no way for him to provide evidence of Siva’s involvement with the attack. The appellant asserts that by making those findings, the judge erred by failing to direct himself in accordance with Chiver (Asylum; Discrimination; Employment; Persecution) (Romania) [1994] UKIAT 10758.
29. Whilst it is trite law that it is possible to disbelieve a witness in some matters, whilst still being persuaded by the central facts of their account, the judge provided adequate reasons from paragraphs [23] to [27], why the appellant had failed to establish to the lower standard, that the core of his account was credible.
30. We conclude that there was no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the documentary evidence and heard oral evidence from the appellant; the judge was entitled to reach the findings he did and to reject the appellant’s account for the reasons given at paragraphs [22]-[26] of the decision.
31. It was open to the judge to find as he did at [26], that it was damaging to the appellant’s credibility that he had not provided any evidence to support his claim, where such ought reasonably to have been available to him, particularly in circumstances where the appellant claims to be in continued, if infrequent, contact with his elder uncle.
32. Whilst the judge referenced, at [26], the lack of an arrest warrant, this was in the alternative to the appellant’s failure to provide details of any charges brought against the appellant in his absence. Where the appellant claims that the authorities were looking for him in 2007 when he was in South Korea and again after he returned to Sri Lanka in 2010 and since that date, there was no error in the judge making adverse credibility findings in respect of the lack of any cogent evidence that the appellant has been of continuing interest to the Sri Lankan authorities for well over a decade. No error of law is made out in ground 4.
33. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Decision:
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
2. We do not set aside the decision. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

M M Hutchinson

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 June 2025