Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001539
PA/52431/2024
LP/09176/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

KNP (INDIA)
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Fazli, Counsel instructed by Solicitors’ Inn Limited
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 July 2025

ANONYMITY

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of India who appeals against the decision of the Respondent to refuse to grant him leave to remain on human rights and protection grounds. His dependent is his wife, also an Indian national, whom we shall refer to as ‘N’.
2. The basis of the Appellant’s claim is that he faces a real risk of harm in India arising from his marriage. The Appellant met N whilst he was in the UK as a student. She was already here as she had come to the UK from India as a spouse, but that marriage had subsequently broken down. The accepted facts are that the couple are from different castes in India. N is from the Dhobi caste; her family now strongly object to her being married to the Appellant, since he is from the lower-ranked Patalia caste. His family in turn strongly object to him being married to N, since she is some years older than him, and is a divorcee. The dispute between the families has resulted in significant unrest and violence in their home area in Gujerat. Members of the respective families have attacked each other, and on one occasion a mob descended on her family home demanding that the couple divorce. The local village councillors have decreed that they must divorce. The Respondent, and the First-tier Tribunal, accept that all of that is true and that the couple cannot therefore return to their home area.
3. The claim was nevertheless refused, and the appeal dismissed, on the grounds that it would be reasonable to expect the couple to relocate somewhere else within India, away from their families. The couple are both educated, healthy and capable of working, and integrating, back into Indian society.
4. The Appellant appealed against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and in a written decision dated 16 June 2025 the Upper Tribunal (myself and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ruth) upheld much of the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning. We were however satisfied that in certain respects the decision was flawed such that those aspects of the case would need to be reconsidered. In particular we were satisfied that in its assessment of whether or not it would be ‘unduly harsh’ to expect the couple to internally relocate, or to ‘integrate’ back into Indian society, the Tribunal failed to have regard to material country background evidence to the effect that parties to mixed-caste marriages can face significant societal discrimination there. This mean that the internal flight analysis had to be undertaken afresh. We also accepted that the decision below had said nothing at all about Article 8.
5. The matter was therefore relisted before the Upper Tribunal so that those errors /omissions could be rectified. Judge Ruth was not available to sit as a panel again, so on the 18 June 2025 UTJ Blum signed a transfer order to enable me to hear the case alone.
6. At the resumed hearing I heard from the Appellant and N. I heard the submissions and I reserved my decision which I now give.

My Findings
7. Although I am required to apply three different tests in this remade decision, before me Mr Fazli accepted that each of these requires me to evaluate the same factual matrix. Whether I am considering whether internal relocation would be ‘unduly harsh’ , whether there would be ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ such that the Appellant must succeed with reference to paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi), or whether the decision was overall an unreasonable, or disproportionate, interference with this family’s private life, the relevant facts are the same.
8. The Appellant’s primary contention was that he and his wife could not relocate because their families would be able to find them, either by way of the identity card system or by social media.
9. Both of these suggestions were rejected by the First-tier Tribunal, findings upheld on appeal by myself and Judge Ruth, and so therefore this matter falls outwith the scope of this remaking. Since the Appellant nevertheless insisted on restating this aspect of his case, I restate the relevant conclusions here.
10. The Appellant explained that the ID card itself is held by all Indian nationals. Both he and his wife have one. It needs to be produced in many social and civil situations, for instance if renting accommodation, the landlord would want to see it. The card itself does not state your caste, but an official with access to the relevant computer database – for instance a police officer – could access much more information about an individual using the details on the card. The Appellant told me that he was afraid that members of his family – for instance a cousin who is a police officer – could use their position to track the couple down no matter where they were living in India. I discount that possibility on the grounds that is entirely speculative. It would depend on some official in the place of internal relocation having some interaction with the couple which would result in their new address being entered on the official record. It would then also depend on the family in Gujerat – for instance this cousin – regularly checking the system to see if any new information had emerged. At the moment the family obviously know that the Appellant and his wife are in the UK, and there is no reason to believe that they would be alerted if that changed.
11. In the alternative the Appellant suggested that his cousin could “distribute his photograph to all the police stations in India”. That too is wholly unrealistic. There are thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of police stations in India serving a population of approximately 1 billion people. The Appellant and his wife have committed no crime. It is inconceivable that in those circumstances the cousin would do this, could do this, or anyone at any of these police stations would pay it any attention.
12. As for social media, the answer to the Appellant’s concerns is simple: do not use it, and then there will be no risk of the families discovering that the couple are no longer in the UK.
13. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that it would be unreasonable, or unduly harsh to expect this couple to relocate in circumstances where we know that there are instances of violence and discrimination against those who marry outside their caste. Although such marriages are not unlawful, societal prejudice against such unions remains. I accept that the country background material before me contains numerous examples of such instances of discrimination and in some cases persecution. What Mr Fazli was unable to take me to, however, was any evidence to show that inter-caste couples would encounter any difficulties from unrelated third parties. All of the articles to which I was referred were concerned with instances where an individual’s family, tribe or local community had got involved. He was unable to identify any examples of a couple in these circumstances being targeted in any way by wider society. I do not therefore accept that any risk of harm would arise in, for instance, and urban setting away from the families’ homes.
14. The Appellant holds a bachelor's degree, and both he and his wife are fit and well and able to work. They both grew up in India and are familiar with the society, languages and customs. He is certainly ‘enough of an insider’ to be able to integrate into, for instance, another city in India away from his home area.
15. The final point made on the couple’s behalf by Mr Fazli related to N’s difficult personal history. She had come to the UK as a spouse, but that marriage had been marred by violence and she had left him. They are now divorced, but she avers that she continues to suffer the emotional impact of having been subject to sustained domestic violence in circumstances where, as a newly arrived migrant, she was particularly vulnerable. Mr Fazli submits that this must be relevant to whether it is proportionate to expect her to return to India with her new husband.
16. The point that Mr Fazli makes, but is quite unable to develop with reference to any actual evidence, is that this history of trauma will make it more difficult for N to resettle in India. I am afraid that I am unable to accept that. Neither he, nor she, was able to explain why that might be. The violence occurred here, not there, and she would of course be travelling in the company of her new husband. There is no medical or any other evidence to suggest that this personal history would be an obstacle to N returning to India today.
17. It follows that I must dismiss the appeal on all grounds, since the facts do not establish that it would either be unduly harsh or disproportionate for this couple to re-establish themselves in India somewhere away from their home area.
18. It is appropriate that I do however record one matter that I raised at the hearing. The uncontested evidence in this appeal is that N came to the UK on a spouse visa, but the marriage broke down as a result of domestic violence. The Immigration Rules do of course provide a route under which survivors of such violence can apply for indefinite leave. When I asked N whether this had ever been done, she said that she had never been advised about any such route. It seems to me that this is a point which she, and her current legal representatives may wish to consider as a matter of urgency. It is not however something that I could legitimately weigh in the balance here, since there was no evidence called, it is not a matter that the Respondent has ever considered, and importantly, it is not her appeal.

Decision and Directions
19. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside in limited respects.
20. I remake the decision in the appeal by dismissing it on all grounds.
21. There is currently an order for anonymity in this appeal.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2025