UI-2025-001540

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 30 Sep 2025
• Promulgation date: 24 Oct 2025
• Publication date: 10 Nov 2025
• Last updated on: 10 Nov 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001540


First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56506/2023
LP/13375/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

RD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr J. Gajjar, Counsel instructed by SMA Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 30 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, RD is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including his name or address, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. An anonymity direction in like form was made by the First- tier Tribunal and it is appropriate for that order to continue in force in light of the fact that RD is an asylum seeker with mental health problems.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. In this decision I shall refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”). RD shall be referred to as the appellant and the Secretary of State shall be referred to as the respondent.
2. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of the FTT Judge Kempton (“the Judge”) dated 15 January 2025 in which the Judge allowed the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds.
3. In a decision promulgated on 19 August 2025 an error of law was found in the FTT decision allowing the appellant’s Article 8 appeal. A copy of that decision is annexed below and the contents of which will not be repeated save where required. This is the re-making of the appellant’s appeal in relation to Article 8 ECHR.
Background
4. The appellant is an Albanian national. He was born on 25 May 1997. He arrived in the United Kingdom as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child (“UASC”) on 6 February 2013 and claimed asylum, stating that he was at risk of harm due a blood feud between his family and another family in Albania. His application for asylum was refused but the appellant was granted limited leave to remain as a UASC.
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his asylum claim and his appeal was dismissed by FTT Judge Elek in a decision which was sent on 14 August 2012. The appellant subsequently made further protection submissions which were refused. The appellant’s appeal against this refusal was dismissed by FTT Judge Bart-Stewart in a decision promulgated on 27 August 2016. Further submissions were rejected by the respondent in 2020, and additional further submissions were refused in 2021. The appellant appealed against the refusal of the 2021 further submissions, and his appeal was dismissed by FTT Judge Feeney on 22 December 2022.
6. This appeal relates to the appellant’s further submissions made in May 2023. These submissions were refused with a right of appeal and the appellant appealed for a fourth time to the FTT.
7. In the decision dated 15 January 2025 the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection and Article 3 medical grounds but allowed his appeal on Article 8 grounds. The Judge found that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration to Albania. In her finding the Judge relied in part on the fact the appellant had no support from family or friends in Albania. The Judge also stated that it was “very clear that he does have this subjective fear and that is the reason why to a large extent he has mental health issues”.
8. The respondent was granted permission to appeal by the FTT. There were two grounds of appeal. By the first, the respondent contends that the Judge misdirected herself in law by failing to take the findings of the previous judges as her starting point for the analysis of whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s re- integration to Albania. By the second ground, the respondent contends that the Judge made a similar misdirection, or failed to provide adequate reasons, for finding that the appellant would have no family support in Albania, when the previous judges had all attached weight to the availability of support from the appellant’s uncle.
9. In relation to the first ground of appeal the Upper Tribunal considered that the gravamen of the challenge was that the Judge erred in concluding that the appellant has a subjective fear of return to Albania. Such conclusion was found to be flawed for failing to follow Devaseelan [2003] Imm AR 1 and for providing legally inadequate reasons. In finding an error in the manner asserted, the error of law decision sets out and analyses the findings of previous judges in relation to the appellant’s asylum claim as well as previous refusals of the respondent. The Upper Tribunal found that there was nothing in the previous decisions of the FTT or the respondent’s refusal decisions that suggested an acceptance of the appellant’s account regarding the claimed blood feud or an acceptance that the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania. The Upper Tribunal found that the Judge had erred in failing to explain the basis on which she concluded the appellant had such a subjective fear of return.
10. In relation to the second ground of appeal, the Upper Tribunal found a clear error on the part of the Judge for failing to apply the principles in Devaseelan to the findings made by previous judges about the availability of support in Albania from the appellant’s uncle. The Upper Tribunal found that the Judge’s analysis of whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Albania contained no evaluation of the respondent’s submission that the appellant could reintegrate “with family support of his uncle” and did not contain any reference to the significance which Judges Bart-Stewart and Feeney attached to the support which was available from the appellant’s maternal uncle in determining this issue previously. The Upper Tribunal considered that the availability of support from the appellant’s uncle was the Judge’s starting point in accordance with Devaseelan, but she failed to take it as such, and if the Judge was to proceed on the basis that support was no longer available she was required to explain why that was so.
11. The Upper Tribunal set aside the Judge’s conclusions that the appellant satisfies paragraph PL5.1 of the Immigration Rules and that he succeeds on Article 8 ECHR grounds. The Judge’s conclusions that the appeal fell to be dismissed on protection grounds (Refugee Convention, HP and Article 3 ECHR) were preserved.
The re-making hearing
12. At the hearing the appellant gave evidence predominantly via an Albanian interpreter after which I heard submission from Ms Nolan and Mr Gajjar.
13. Mr Gajjar accepted that the previous judicial findings are my starting point but in his submission there were grounds to depart from those previous findings due to the passage of time and taking into consideration the report of Dr Latifi dated 9 April 2023 (CB/192-209). In Mr Gajjar’s submission, the appellant’s mental health issues, the absence of remaining ties to Albania, and the length of time the appellant has lived in the UK, together give rise to very significant obstacles in the appellant integrating into life in Albania and/or give rise to exceptional circumstances which would amount to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant.
14. The appellant did not adduce any further evidence in support of his Article 8 claim which was not before Judge Kempton.
Analysis and decision
15. I start by reminding myself of the previous judicial findings in relation to the appellant’s Article 8 claim, including whether he would face very significant obstacles to integration into Albania.
16. Judge Bart-Stewart in 2016 and Judge Feeney in December 2022 both considered whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration to Albania in relation to paragraph 276ADE (1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules, as it was then. Both judges identified some difficulties the appellant would face in re-integrating into Albania taking into account his age when he left Albania and the amount of time he has spent in the UK.
17. However, as identified in the error of law decision, the previous judges attached significance to the steps which could be taken by the appellant to mitigate or avoid such difficulties. Although the decisions of Judge Bart-Stewart and Judge Feeney pre- date the Court of Appeal decision in NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, the approach they both adopted is consistent with the approach set out at [25] of NC. The error of law decision records at [25] to [26]:
25. Judge Elek noted that the appellant had previously lived with his maternal uncle and that he had made arrangements for the appellant to leave Albania: [7]. Judge Bart-Stewart noted at [27] that the appellant’s family could assist him on return “just as they provided the resources for him to travel to the United Kingdom.” At [29] of her decision, she noted that the appellant had family in Albania and that he had retained linguistic, societal and cultural ties with the country of his nationality.
26. At [27] of her decision, Judge Feeny accepted that the appellant was fifteen when he had left Albania as a child but concluded that “with his uncle’s assistance he can establish a life for himself there within a reasonable timeframe.” That finding was made in light of the appellant’s assertion that he had recently been assisted by his uncle, who was said to have sent documents to him in the UK which were adduced in that appeal.
18. These previous judicial findings are my starting point.
19. I note that Judge Kempton recorded in her decision that the appellant had a maternal uncle in Albania with whom he had infrequent contact and that the appellant’s evidence was that he had last spoken to his uncle “Perhaps more than six or seven months ago”. On re-examination at the re-making hearing the appellant claimed that he had had no contact with his uncle since the hearing before Judge Kempton in January 2025.
20. On the appellant’s account recorded in the decision of Judge Elek (CB/234) he lived with his uncle from 2008 after his mother’s death until early 2013 when his uncle arranged for him to leave Albania. In relation to his further submissions made in 2015 the appellant stated at the appeal before Judge Bart-Stewart in 2016 that his uncle had provided the documentation from Albania produced in support of his further submissions, although he claimed at the hearing that he had had no contact with his uncle since he came to the UK. Judge Bart-Stewart found at [25] of the decision (CB/227) that the appellant had given an inconsistent explanation of how he had obtained the additional evidence which he now sought to rely upon. Judge Bart- Stewart found that the appellant had family members in Albania with whom he was in contact who could either offer support to him or assist his relocation in Albania.
21. At the time of the hearing before Judge Feeney in December 2022 the appellant relied on further new evidence in support of his protection claim. The appellant had obtained the new evidence from his uncle. Judge Feeney found that the appellant was in contact with his uncle who could help him to reintegrate into society.
22. Historically it would appear that the appellant has sought to provide a narrative depicting minimal contact with his uncle in Albania. It is reasonable to assume the appellant would consider it in his interests to do so in terms of his immigration matters. However, previous judicial findings are that the appellant is in contact with his uncle. I find that there is no reason to depart from these previous judicial findings.
23. Mr Gajjar points to the passage of time as enabling me to depart from the previous findings in this regard. However, the appellant was found to be in contact with his uncle in December 2022, nearly ten years after his arrival in the UK; a considerable passage of time. I have not been directed to any evidence which would indicate any change in the past three years or so years since Judge Feeney’s decision which would explain a loss of contact between the appellant and his uncle.
24. On the appellant’s account his uncle is his only remaining relative in Albania. He lived with him from 2008 when he lost his mother until 2013, a period of at least four years when the appellant would have been aged 10 or 11 to 15 years old. During this time, it is reasonable to conclude that the appellant and his uncle would have had a close relationship, and that his uncle would have been viewed by the appellant as a parental figure. On the appellant's account, it was his uncle who made arrangements for him to leave Albania and who has provided assistance in providing him with documentation to support further submissions which were the subject of his appeals in 2016 and 2022. I find the assertion that the appellant would lose contact with such an important family figure in his life to lack credibility. I remind myself that the appellant’s account regarding his claimed risk arising from a blood feud has been found by previous judges to lack credibility.
25. If the appellant’s uncle was his only remaining relative in Albania, it is reasonable to assume the appellant would wish to retain contact with him, particularly in view of the fact he has been living unlawfully in the UK since reaching majority and would be aware that he is liable to removal to Albania. I find that it is in the appellant’s interests to claim that he has not retained contact with his uncle. I take into account the fact the appellant’s previous accounts of his circumstances have been found to lack credibility. I find there is no basis for me to depart from the previous findings that the appellant has family in Albania who could provide him with support on return there.
26. Even if it is the case that the appellant has truly lost contact with his uncle, there appears to be no reason why he could not re-establish contact with him should he wish to do so. Any claim that this would put his uncle at risk must be viewed in the context of previous judicial findings regarding the appellant’s asylum claim and the fact his uncle is related to him through his maternal family and is therefore not of the same clan - as recorded in the decision of Judge Feeney at [21] (CB/216). It is not accepted that contact between the appellant and his uncle would put the uncle at risk.
27. In Mr Gajjar’s submission, when assessing the appellant’s credibility, I should consider his admission in oral evidence before me that he had been working as a carpenter despite having no right to work. Mr Gajjar submitted this demonstrated the candour of his evidence.
28. I am unable to accept this submission. I note the appellant’s previous claims that he has never worked in the UK. These are inconsistent with his evidence before me. It is recorded in the decision of Judge Kempton at [43] that the appellant claimed to have never worked in the UK. This in my view emphasises that the appellant is prepared to give false evidence depending on what he considers to be his best interests. It was not suggested to me that the appellant had only started working for the first time since the hearing before Judge Kempton in January this year. The appellant’s admission that he had worked in the UK came after he had explained that he had no financial support from the state since he turned 25 years of age, which would have been May 2022. When I asked him how he supported himself he said that he sometimes worked as a carpenter.
29. The appellant was cross-examined on a further perceived inconsistency at the hearing. He was questioned regarding how he had found out that his brother had died. The appellant stated that his uncle had told him, he did not know how his uncle knew, and he did not remember when he had been told his brother had died. The appellant was taken to [7] of his witness statement which he had adopted as his evidence in chief. The witness statement records that his brother went into hiding abroad and contacted his father to tell him he was safe. The statement records that “My brother was too scared to even disclose his location and since that one time, we never heard from him again”. The appellant stated in oral evidence that he simply hadn’t mentioned that his brother had died when making his witness statement.
30. I note that Judge Feeney stated at [23] of her decision of December 2022 that “Sadly, his brother died in around 2017 of natural causes, not as a result of the blood feud”. It is not clear on what basis Judge Feeney made this finding.
31. Whilst I accept there are grounds to question the appellant’s consistency in relation to his brother, which is relevant to what family he may have remaining in Albania, I do not find this inconsistency alone is sufficient to depart from the previous judicial finding that the appellant’s brother had died.
32. In Mr Gajjar’s submission the appellant maintains that he has a subjective fear of return to Albania.
33. The error of law decision contains an analysis of previous judicial decisions in relation to the appellant’s claim of risk on return on account of a claimed blood feud. Judge Elek found that the appellant’s and the Reshiti family were not involved in a blood feud as defined in EH (Blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC) and that he could return in safety to Albania.
34. Judge Bart-Stewart found that the newer evidence adduced by the appellant was unreliable and that his claim was therefore “the same as that before the first Immigration Judge whose findings of fact are undisturbed…”: [25] to [27]. She considered that the appellant could approach the Albanian authorities for assistance, or he could relocate internally, such that there was no well-founded fear of persecution.
35. Judge Feeney found that the appellant had produced yet more unreliable documentation from Albania in an attempt to strengthen his claim for asylum and that there was no reason to depart from the findings previously made: [19] to [25].
36. In all previous judicial decisions, the appellant’s asylum claim has been rejected when applying the lower standard of proof. The matter of the appellant’s subjective fear is of course distinct from whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution, but it is undoubtedly related. There are no previous judicial findings that indicate it was accepted that the appellant has a genuine subjective fear of return. The finding of Judge Kempton in this regard was set aside in the error of law decision. In assessing very significant obstacles to integration and the appellant’s Article 8 claim, Judge Kempton proceeded on the basis that the appellant had a subjective fear of return to Albania because of the Reshiti family, but that aspect of the appellant’s narrative has never been accepted by the respondent or previous tribunals. I find there is no evidential basis for me to make such a finding. I find there is no evidential support for the appellant’s claim of genuine subjective fear from the report of Dr Latifi, applying the standard of proof of the balance of probabilities.
37. In Dr Latifi’s report he confirms that he is acting only as an expert witness in relation to the appellant’s mental health problems rather than his immigration matters, and confirms that the medical report is not to make assessments on the appellant’s credibility.
38. In relation to the appellant’s symptoms of anxiety the report states:
“[The appellant] exhibits symptoms of anxiety in the context of uncertainty about his future and the fear of removal to Albania, in particular the weekly reporting is one of the main contributing and maintaining factors for his anxiety …. His anxiety is more situational and related to the twice monthly reporting at the immigration centre. If he is exempt from this reporting or it is made once monthly over the phone his anxiety symptoms will alleviate significantly.”
39. Following a finding of major depressive disorder the report address the probable causes of depression, stating:
“The cause of depression is not fully understood. It is known that there is no single cause of depression, and it has many triggers. It can very a lot between people, and for some people a combination of different factors may cause their depression. Some find they become depressed without any obvious reason.”
40. Dr Latifi found that the appellant met the majority of possible causative factors for depression which included life events such bereavement, financial worries, and separation from family. Although Dr Latifi states that the appellant “believes that his problems stems from the alleged blood feud” he refers to the fact the appellant claims he has lost his mother and brother, is separated from his family and does not know the whereabouts of his father, is unemployed, lives in poverty, has no status and worries that he will be sent back to Albania.
41. Against the background of a number of judicial decisions which have rejected the appellant’s claim of a subjective fear of return to Albania based on the claimed blood feud, I do not find the report of Dr Latifi such that I should depart from those previous findings. The report is clear that the doctor does not seek to assess the appellant’s credibility. It is also noted that the appellant reported to the doctor that he was not working and dependant on charity from others. In evidence before me the appellant admitted that he did work. From this I conclude that either the appellant did not tell the truth at his meeting with the doctor, or his circumstances have changed in the two and a half years since that meeting. If there has been a change in the appellant’s circumstances it is reasonable to consider that his condition may have improved in light of such change and in view of Dr Latifi’s opinion about the factors causing the appellant’s depression. If the appellant did not give a true account to Dr Latifi about his employment and financial position, it of course may be the case that he was not truthful about other matters.
42. Taking into account the previous judicial findings and the further evidence the appellant relies on in his most recent further submissions, I do not find the appellant has a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania based on the claimed blood feud.
Very significant obstacles to integration
43. In order to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules the appellant must satisfy the provisions of paragraph PL5.1 in Appendix Private Life.
44. The error of law decision sets out guidance from the Court of Appeal in NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 on paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi), the predecessor to paragraph PL5.1(b) which is identical in all material respects for the purposes of this appeal. I do not repeat that guidance in this decision but take it into consideration. I conduct a broad evaluative judgment of the appellant and his circumstances, the likely obstacles to integration on the appellant’s return and reasonable steps that could be taken to avoid or mitigate obstacles.
45. I find it reasonably likely the appellant would encounter difficulties in his initial transition to life in Albania. It is not disputed that the appellant has no experience of life in Albania as an adult. He has no experience there in the employment market. It is also not disputed that the appellant has mental health difficulties. Although the report of Dr Latifi is now two and a half years old, his GP notes show that the appellant was prescribed 150mg of Sertraline in January 2024 (CB/81).
46. However, I find that there are reasonable steps the appellant can take to mitigate any such obstacles. He could, I find, seek support and assistance from his uncle, a family member who, on the appellant’s account, took him in for many years after his mother died, arranged for his journey to the UK, and provided assistance in sending documentation from Albania to support the appellant’s further submissions made previously. I find there is simply no reason to believe that this person would not be prepared to support the appellant on his return to Albania. If, as the appellant claims, he has lost contact with his uncle, there is no basis to believe that he would not be able re-establish meaningful contact with him. There are no reasonable grounds to believe that either the appellant or his uncle would be at risk as a result of re-establishing contact with each other.
47. It is accepted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant’s medication is available in Albania. If the appellant’s mental health condition deteriorates on return to Albania the Country Policy and Information Note, Albania: Mental healthcare, January 2025 indicates that various treatments for the appellant would be available to him. This was not disputed.
48. The appellant has acquired various skills and qualifications whilst he has been in the UK. He has undertaken courses which have provided qualifications including a City & Guilds Diploma in Site Carpentry and a City & Guilds Award in Health and Safety in a Construction Environment. He has undertaken and passed a “Skillsfirst” course in “Managing your own money”. He now admits to having worked whilst in the UK and therefore has employment experience. The appellant’s skills and experience can be used in Albania, as they have been in the UK, to enable the appellant to secure work.
49. The appellant is familiar with the language, culture and society of his home country. I find there is no reason to doubt that he would be able to reestablish his life there after some initial period of transition.
50. I accept that after an absence of over 12 years the appellant is likely to encounter some difficulties readjusting to life in Albania. However, conducting a broad evaluative assessment of the appellant and his circumstances, I find that he is unable to establish, on balance, that he would face very significant obstacles to his integration in Albania on return there. The appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
Article 8 ECHR
51. It is accepted that Article 8(1) is engaged on the basis of the appellant’s private life. He has been in the UK for over 12 years during which time I would accept that the appellant has established a private life in the UK.
52. The right to private life under Article 8 is a qualified right. Where Article 8(1) is engaged, I must then decide whether the interference with private life is justified under Article 8(2). If an appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to remain. The exception is where the refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences, such that refusal is not proportionate. The burden of proof is on the appellant to demonstrate unjustifiably harsh consequences.
53. In my proportionality assessment I must take into account the relevant statutory factors from section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”).
54. I attach significant weight to public interest in effective immigration control given that the appellant does not satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules. The appellant has remained in the UK unlawfully since November 2014.
55. I accept that the appellant speaks English and that he is capable of being financially independent, but these are “neutral” factors in the balancing exercise.
56. I take into account the appellant’s mental health problems but find there is appropriate treatment available to him in Albania. This was not challenged by Mr Gajjar. I weigh in the appellant’s favour the length of time that he has spent in the UK and that he has spent all of his adult life so far in this country. However, I take into account that since the appellant’s arrival in the UK his immigration status has either been precarious or, for the most part, unlawful. The “little weight” provisions from section 117B of the 2002 Act therefore apply.
57. Whilst little weight does not mean no weight, I am mindful of the fact there is very little evidence before me pertaining to the strength and quality of the appellant’s private life. There is no supporting evidence from third parties who know the appellant. Although the time the appellant has spent in the UK is capable of attracting some weight, I find I unable to attach sufficient weight to the appellant’s private life which would come close to outweighing the public interest in effective immigration controls. The appellant has not established that he would face unjustifiably harsh consequences on return to Albania.
58. For these reasons I find that the interference with the appellant’s private life is proportionate and the decision to refuse his human rights claim is not unlawful under section 6 Human Rights Act 1998.
59. I dismiss the appellant’s human rights claim under Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds is dismissed.


Sarah Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 October 2025


Annex

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001540


First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56506/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19/08/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
and
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

RD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr J Gajjar, instructed by SMA Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 8 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, RD is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including his name or address , likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. An anonymity direction in like form was made by the First-tier Tribunal and it is appropriate for that order to continue in force in light of the fact that RD is an asylum seeker with mental health problems.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of Judge Kempton. By her decision of 15 January 2025, the judge allowed RD’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his human rights claim. The appeal against the refusal of RD’s protection claim was dismissed by the judge, and there is no appeal against that conclusion.
2. To avoid confusion, we will refer to the parties as they were before the FtT: RD as the appellant and the Secretary of State as the respondent.
Background
3. The appellant is an Albanian national. He was born on 25 May 1997. He arrived in the United Kingdom as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child (“UASC”) on 6 February 2013 and claimed asylum, stating that he was at risk of harm at the hands of the Reshiti family because that family were engaged in a blood feud with his own. The feud had started, he said, when his brother had killed a member of the other family, Alban Reshiti, by accident.
4. The application for asylum was refused but the appellant was granted limited leave to remain as a UASC. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his asylum claim. His appeal was dismissed by Judge Elek in a decision which was sent on 14 August 2012. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused.
5. The appellant duly made an application for further leave which included further protection submissions. That claim was refused and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal for a second time. His appeal was dismissed by Judge Bart-Stewart in a decision which was sent to the parties on 27 August 2016.
6. The appellant was not removed despite exhausting his appeal rights. He made further submissions which were rejected in 2020. In 2021, he made further submissions again. Those submissions were refused with a right of appeal, which the appellant exercised. On 22 December 2022, however, his third appeal was dismissed by Judge Feeney.
7. In May 2023, the appellant made further submissions which relied in substantial part on a psychiatric report from a Dr Latifi. Those submissions were refused with a right of appeal and the appellant appealed for a fourth time to the First-tier Tribunal.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
8. The appeal was heard by the judge on 15 January 2025. The appellant was represented by Gregory Olphert of counsel. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer (not Mr Tufan). The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and submissions from the advocates before reserving her decision.
9. The judge’s reserved decision was prepared later that day. It is a lengthy document, running to 27 pages of single-spaced type, although the length of it is in part attributable to the judge’s verbatim reproduction of the appellant’s Appeal Skeleton Argument, the respondent’s Review and more than five pages of the respondent’s Country Information and Policy Note, at [16], [26] and [41] respectively.
10. The judge’s findings appear at [40] et seq. Having made reference to the headnote of EH (Blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC), the judge found that there was not a “blood feud situation which is pertinent to this appellant” and that he would in any event be able to relocate to another area of the country: [40]. Having considered the CPIN, the judge stated that there was no new evidence which persuaded her to depart from the findings of the previous judge in these respects. The appellant’s country expert (Dr Mirtezani) had not been given the previous three judicial decisions: [45].
11. At [46], the judge considered Dr Latifi’s report, in which the appellant was described as having depression and anxiety and to be at risk of suicide on return to Albania. Having considered AM (Zimbabwe) [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), the judge concluded that the appellant did not meet any part of the test for the establishment of an Article 3 ECHR case on health grounds. She thought that matters could be improved for the appellant “in the interim” if the Home Office permitted him to work, thereby giving him “a purpose in life”.
12. At [50]-[53], the judge explained why she considered that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration to Albania. Her conclusion was summarised at [53] in this way:
[53] However, I am of the view that there are very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Albania. As discussed above, the appellant has never been given an opportunity to work to gain experience in the qualifications which he has obtained. He has never worked for an employer. He has never lived as an adult in Albania. It is many years, indeed over a decade, since he lived there when he left at the age of 15. Coupled with his lack of experience; no family or friend support and no knowledge of how to go about obtaining suitable accommodation or employment, he would have to deal with his mental health issues. I accept that those mental health issues are not exceptional in the context of many asylum seekers. However, taking into account all the particular circumstances for this appellant, on return to Albania, a maelstrom of events will conspire against him to make life not only very difficult but very risky for him to the extent that there would be very significant obstacles to integration in Albania.
13. At [54], the judge set out and applied section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. At [55], she found that there was “no real risk of persecution of the appellant if he is returned to Albania.” Then, in the final three paragraphs of the decision, the judge said as follows:
[56] I would add at this juncture that the appellant does have a subjective fear of return to Albania. However, for all the reasons above set out above, that fear is not objectively justified having regard to the totality of the background evidence before me and the three previous determinations of three separate immigration judges.
[57] It is, however, very clear that he does have this subjective fear and that is the reason why to a large extent he has mental health issues. Having left Albania as a child he was simply relying upon the adults to tell him what the situation was. Even if it was not accepted by the respondent or the authorities in the UK that he is in fact subject to a blood feud, his experiences, as experienced by him in Albania, indicate to him because he had to stay in hiding that he was a potential victim of a blood feud. It may well be that his family was being overly protective. However, that will have had a significant influence upon him in that he has not been in a position to socialise or live normally in the country. That in itself also leads to very significant obstacles to his return to Albania given the very cloistered existence which he did have for the last few years when he lived in the country.
[58] He does however engage article 8 of ECHR in relation to the right to a private life due to those very significant obstacles on return.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
14. The Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal by the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Parkes). There are two grounds of appeal. By the first, the Secretary of State contends that the judge misdirected herself in law by failing to take the findings of the previous judges as her starting point for the analysis of whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s re-integration to Albania. By the second ground, the Secretary of State contends that the judge made a similar misdirection, or failed to provide adequate reasons, for finding that the appellant would have no family support in Albania, when the previous judges had all attached weight to the availability of support from the appellant’s uncle.
15. Judge Parkes considered both grounds to be arguable.
16. Mr Gajjar filed a skeleton argument in which he invited us to uphold the decision of the judge. We heard oral submissions from Mr Tufan in amplification of the grounds. We heard oral submissions from Mr Gajjar in amplification of his skeleton argument. We do not intend to rehearse their submission here; we will instead refer to those submissions in our consideration of the grounds of appeal.
Analysis
17. The appellant’s further submissions were made in May 2023. His Private Life claim under the Immigration Rules therefore fell to be considered under Appendix Private Life rather than paragraph 276ADE, which was deleted (subject to transitional provisions) on 20 June 2022.
18. The relevant part of Appendix Private Life in a case such as this is paragraph PL5.1, which provides as follows:
PL 5.1. Where the applicant is aged 18 or over on the date of application:
(a) the applicant must have been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years; or
(b) where the applicant has not been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years, the decision maker must be satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave the UK.
19. The leading authority on paragraph PL 5.1’s similarly worded predecessor is NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, in which Whipple LJ gave a full judgment with which Snowden and Newey LJJ agreed. At [20]-[26], Whipple LJ reviewed the previous authorities before summarising their effect. Given the relevance of what was said at [25]-[26] of her judgment to the instant appeal, we set out both paragraphs in full:
[25] It is not in doubt, based on these authorities, that (i) the decision-maker (or tribunal on appeal) must reach a broad evaluative judgment on the paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) question (see Kamara at [14]), (ii) that judgment must focus on the obstacles to integration and their significance to the appellant (see Parveen at [9]) and (iii) the test is not subjective, in the sense of being limited to the appellant's own perception of the obstacles to reintegration, but extends to all aspects of the appellant's likely situation on return including objective evidence, and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles (see Lal at [36]-[37]).
[26] I would add this. The test posed by paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) is a practical one. Regard must be had to the likely consequences of the obstacles to reintegration which are identified. In a case like this, where the only obstacle identified is the appellant's genuine but unfounded fear, particular care must be taken to assess the ways in which and the extent to which that subjective fear will or might impede re-integration. It cannot simply be assumed that it will. The likely reality for the appellant on resuming her life in her home country must be considered, given her subjective fear, and the availability of support and any other mitigation must be weighed. It is against that background that the judgment on whether the obstacles to reintegration will be very significant must be reached.
20. With those words in mind, we turn to consider the Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal. We propose to consider the second ground first.
21. In our judgment, the second ground discloses a clear error on the part of the judge, who failed to apply the principles in Devaseelan [2003] Imm AR 1 to the findings made by previous judges about the availability of support from the appellant’s uncle. In reaching that conclusion, we accept Mr Gajjar’s submission that the judge made reference to Devaseelan, and was plainly aware of it. We consider that she nevertheless failed to apply the principles in that decision, for the following reasons.
22. It is necessary to make some reference to the previous judicial decisions.
23. Judge Elek was not required to consider the appellant’s human rights, whether inside or outside the framework provided by the Immigration Rules, because the only ground of appeal available to him at that stage was in reliance on the Refugee Convention.
24. Judge Bart-Stewart and Judge Feeny both considered human rights arguments, however, and both specifically considered whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration to Albania. It is clear that both judges were concerned that the appellant would experience some difficulty in re-integrating into Albania. He left that country as a UASC and has been in the UK for a number of years and it is unsurprising that such concerns have been raised in those appeals. In each of the preceding decisions, however, the judges attached significance to the steps which could be taken to mitigate those obstacles, in accordance with the approach required by [25] of NC v SSHD.
25. Judge Elek noted that the appellant had previously lived with his maternal uncle and that he had made arrangements for the appellant to leave Albania: [7]. Judge Bart- Stewart noted at [27] that the appellant’s family could assist him on return “just as they provided the resources for him to travel to the United Kingdom.” At [29] of her decision, she noted that the appellant had family in Albania and that he had retained linguistic, societal and cultural ties with the country of his nationality.
26. At [27] of her decision, Judge Feeny accepted that the appellant was fifteen when he had left Albania as a child but concluded that “with his uncle’s assistance he can establish a life for himself there within a reasonable timeframe.” That finding was made in light of the appellant’s assertion that he had recently been assisted by his uncle, who was said to have sent documents to him in the UK which were adduced in that appeal.
27. It is clear that the respondent invited Judge Kempton to attach similar significance to the support which could be provided by the appellant’s uncle. The appellant gave an account of the family members who remained in Albania. The judge made reference to that at [15] of her decision, noting specifically that the appellant has “a maternal uncle in Albania and has infrequent contact with him.” At [33] of her decision, the judge recorded that the appellant had been cross-examined about the support he could receive from his uncle. His evidence was that “He speaks to him occasionally but not recently. Perhaps more than six or seven months ago.” At [37] of the judge’s decision, the submissions made by the Presenting Officer are summarised, including the submission that the appellant could reintegrate “with family support of his uncle”.
28. The judge’s analysis of whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration to Albania contains no evaluation of that submission. Nor does it contain any reference to the significance which Judges Bart-Stewart and Feeny attached to the support which was available from the appellant’s maternal uncle. That finding was necessarily the judge’s starting point in accordance with Devaseelan but she failed to take it as such.
29. Confronted with this difficulty during his submissions, Mr Gajjar asked us to accept that the judge must have found that the appellant’s uncle could not offer him any support. He took us to the findings that the appellant would have “no support whatsoever” and “no family or friend support” at [51] and [53] of the judge’s decision. Those conclusions only serve to highlight the error for which the Secretary of State contends, however. The judge gives no reasons for departing from the findings made by Judge Bart-Stewart and Judge Feeney and she gives no reason for rejecting the submissions made by the Presenting Officer in this respect. If the judge was to proceed on the basis that that support was no longer available, she was required to explain why that was so. With respect to the judge, we are unable to discern any reasoning which expressly or inferentially supports that conclusion.
30. It follows that ground two is made out, and that the judge’s conclusions at [53] cannot stand because she misdirected herself in law and failed to provide adequate reasons for the finding that the appellant would have no family support on return to Albania.
31. Before we come to the first ground, we observe that the structure and content of the final paragraphs of the judge’s decision was the subject of some discussion before us. We had initially thought when we read the judge’s decision that she had allowed the appeal on human rights grounds because (and only because) she was satisfied that the Immigration Rules were met: TZ (Pakistan) & Anor v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109; [2018] Imm AR 1301 refers, at [34].
32. That reading sits somewhat uneasily with the judge’s reference to s117B, however, since those statutory public interest factors are immaterial in a case in which the satisfaction of the Immigration Rules is positively determinative of the human rights ground of appeal. We were also unsure about [55]-[58] of the judge’s decision. Positioned as they are, after reference to s117B, they might suggest that the judge had considered, in the alternative to her primary conclusion under the Immigration Rules, whether Article 8 ECHR would nevertheless be breached by the appellant’s removal.
33. Mr Gajjar frankly accepted that the structure of the decision was somewhat difficult to comprehend. Given the way in which [58] is expressed, however, his submission was essentially that the judge had undertaken two separate assessments of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration, the first of which concluded at [53] and the second of which concluded at [58]. We consider that he was probably correct in that analysis of the judge’s decision. We have already concluded that the first part of that analysis was vitiated by legal error. It remains for us to consider whether the second part was similarly flawed.
34. Returning to the first ground, therefore, the gravamen of the challenge is that the judge erred in law in concluding that the appellant has a subjective fear of return to Albania. That conclusion is said to be flawed for failing to follow Devaseelan and for providing legally inadequate reasons.
35. We spent a good deal of time with Mr Gajjar trying to understand the basis of the finding. He accepted, we think, that the previous judicial decisions provide no basis for it.
36. Judge Elek expressed various concerns about the appellant’s account at [9], [10] and [13] of her decision. Despite those concerns, her ultimate conclusion was that the appellant’s family and the Reshiti family were not involved in a blood feud as defined in EH (Albania) and that he could in safety to Tirana.
37. Judge Bart-Stewart found that the newer evidence adduced by the appellant was unreliable and that his claim was therefore “the same as that before the first Immigration Judge whose findings of fact are undisturbed…”: [25]-[27]. She considered that he could approach the Albanian authorities for assistance or he could relocate internally, such that there was no well-founded fear of persecution.
38. Judge Feeney found that the appellant had produced yet more unreliable documentation from Albania in an attempt to strengthen his claim for asylum and that there was no reason to depart from the findings previously made: [19]-[25].
39. In recognition of the fact that the previous decisions evidently made no finding that the appellant’s narrative was true, or that he had a genuine subjective fear of return, Mr Gajjar invited us to consider something said by Judge Bart-Stewart at [14] of her decision:
The refusal letter of 27 July [2015] accepted the appellant’s brother accidentally killed Alban Reshiti and was tried in a military court and this started a blood feud and the documents do not provide any additional information that had not already been considered.
40. Mr Gajjar submitted that this was a complete answer to the Secretary of State’s first ground; the killing of Alban Reshiti had been accepted by the respondent as long ago as 2015, and the judge’s acceptance that the appellant has a subjective fear was based on that key historical event.
41. We did not consider that this was a complete (or any) answer to the respondent’s first ground. Devaseelan required Judge Kempton to take the previous judge’s findings as her starting point and it was clear that [14] was not part of Judge Bart-Stewart’s findings. We were also surprised by the suggestion that the respondent had accepted as long ago as 2015 that this event had taken place, since that sat rather uneasily with the findings made by each of the three previous judges.
42. We were therefore grateful to Mr Tufan, who was able (at Mr Gajjar’s request) to provide copies of three decisions which were made by the Secretary of State in 2015. There are (seemingly identical) decisions which were made on 24 and 27 July 2015, and a supplementary decision which was made on 14 October 2015. We spent some time at the hearing analysing these decisions to see whether they supported what was said by Judge Bart-Stewart at [14].
43. Having done so, and having also considered the decision letters after the hearing, we cannot locate the basis for what Judge Bart-Stewart said at [14]. The respondent did not accept that the appellant’s brother had killed Alban Reshiti in any of those letters. The high point for the appellant is something said in the October letter:
In the refusal letter dated the 27/07/2015, it was accepted that your brother accidentally killed Alban and was tried in a Military court and the started a blood feud.
44. Unfortunately, that statement is at odds with the reasoning in the letter of 27 July 2015. The reasoning in the July letter was (in summary) that even if the appellant’s claim was taken at its highest, he would not be at risk on return to Albania. That conclusion is obviously to be contrasted with one in which the Secretary of State accepts in terms the account given by an applicant for asylum.
45. What is clear, therefore, is that there was nothing in any of the earlier judicial decisions or in any of the respondent’s decisions which represented an acceptance of the appellant’s account that his brother had killed Alban Reshiti. Nor was there anything in any of those decisions which suggested an acceptance that the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania.
46. Nor, with respect to the judge, can we find anything in her own decision which explains the basis on which she concluded that the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania. The Consultant Psychiatrist, Dr Latifi, who had written a detailed report on the appellant’s mental health, concluding that his anxiety was “more situational and related to the twice monthly reporting at the Immigration Centre”, as the judge recorded at [46]. That report did not as we understand it suggest that the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania because his brother had killed another man and because his family had reacted to that by being “over protective” towards him, as the judge suggested at [57].
47. Ultimately, therefore, the error into which the judge fell in the concluding paragraphs of her decision might be shortly stated. She proceeded on the basis that the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of return to Albania because of the Reshiti family but that aspect of his historical narrative had never been accepted by the respondent or the previous tribunals. If the judge was to accept that aspect of the claim, and to treat it as determinative “in itself” of the question posed by paragraph PL 5.1 of the Immigration Rules (“very significant obstacles to integration”), she was required to provide legally adequate reasons for that finding. It is our conclusion that she failed to do so.
48. In summary, therefore, we conclude that the reasons given by Judge Kempton for finding that there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration to Albania were vitiated by legal error. The finding that he would have no support there ignored the previous findings that he would have the support of his uncle and the finding that he had a genuine subjective fear of return had no proper basis in the previous findings and was otherwise unreasoned.
49. It follows that we will set aside the conclusions that the appellant satisfies paragraph PL5.1 of the Immigration Rules and that he succeeds on Article 8 ECHR grounds. None of the other findings are tainted by the errors we have found, however, and we shall preserve the judge’s conclusions that the appeal fell to be dismissed on protection grounds (Refugee Convention, HP and Article 3 ECHR).
50. Having considered paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and the guidance given in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC); [2023] Imm AR 558, we direct that the remaining issues in this appeal shall be determined at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal on a date to be notified. The remaining issue is a narrow one and there is no proper basis for displacing the general rule that the decision should be remade in this tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal erred materially in law in allowing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds and that finding is set aside. The decision on the appeal insofar as it relates to Article 8 ECHR shall be remade in the Upper Tribunal on a date to be notified. The remaining findings are preserved.


Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


12 August 2025