Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001564

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56412/2024
LP/08618/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

UT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Wood, Legal Representative from IAS (Middlesborough) Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 14 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By way of a decision dated 6 August 2025, I found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 13 February 2025 which dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim made. I set the decision of the FTT aside. The error arose from the way in which the judge evaluated some of the documentary evidence on which the appellant relied and which I found likely to have impacted the entire credibility assessment. Accordingly, I did not preserve any of the findings of facts.
2. The remaking of the appeal was listed before me on the above date. I had the benefit of a 210 page hearing bundle. I heard evidence from the appellant who was questioned by both representatives and I asked a few questions for clarification. I heard submissions from both parties and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Background
3. The appellant’s protection claim centred on his family’s demand that he marry his elderly aunt following the death of her husband in 2021. At this time the appellant was living in Namibia. He was 22 years old and his aunt was in her late 60s. Once informed of the decision in 2022 he was pressurised by his parents and other family members, at times being subjected to physical assault and verbal and emotional pressure. He endeavoured to seek help from the local traditional authorities but to no avail. The police do not help in these circumstances. Therefore, he left Namibia for South Africa. After a period of 6 months in South Africa and a short stay in Botswana he flew to the United Kingdom where he claimed asylum. He claims his family would become aware of his return and he would be forced into the marriage or otherwise harmed.
The Legal Framework
4. The appellant made his asylum claim upon arrival into the United Kingdom on 4 January 2023. That means the assessment of his claim is governed by section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”). However, as Mr Wood confirmed at the hearing, the appellant accepts he is not able come within the scope of the Refugee Convention and he relies on humanitarian protection/Article 3 grounds.
5. To succeed on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee. He would need to show substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin against which he is unable or unwilling to avail himself of protection and where there is no internal relocation alternative.
6. Serious harm includes the death penalty or execution; unlawful killing; torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (as per Article 3).
7. The appellant has to show substantial grounds for believing that returning him would result in a real risk of Article 3 mistreatment.
8. As far as any documents are concerned, I am to evaluate those in accordance with the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKUT 00439 as follows:
“38. In summary the principles set out in this determination are:
1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”
The Issues to be determined
9. Mr McVeety confirmed that credibility was in dispute. However, the respondent’s position was that, even if the appellant is credible, there is sufficient protection for him in Namibia and a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative.
10. Mr Wood disputed that there would be sufficient protection for the appellant in Namibia. Furthermore, there remains a real risk that his family would be able to trace him on return so internal relocation is not safe and, in any case, it is not reasonable to expect him to go into hiding. Accordingly, he also submitted there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration.
Discussion of the Evidence
11. First, I consider the various strands running through the appellant’s claim, evaluating them alongside the respondent’s position and in light of the evidence of the country situation in Namibia. Having done that, I set out my conclusions, having taken into account everything in the round. I may not mention all of the evidence in the bundle or given orally, but I have considered it all.
The Documents from the Traditional Authorities
12. Mr McVeety made submissions about the document purporting to be from the Traditional Authorities dated 1 May 2022. The letter set out the customary practice of young girls being forced to marry marry men of their elders choosing, then addressed the appellant’s situation, namely that he was being forced to marry his aunt. Mr McVeety submitted that this rendered the letter unreliable as the Traditional Authorities failed to address the deviation in the appellant’s situation from what appeared to be the cultural norm (given that the appellant is male). Furthermore, he pointed out the inconsistency between the part of the letter in which the appellant was told he needed to seek protection from the police (as the situation was outside of the remit of the Traditional Authority), and the appellant’s evidence that the police do not get involved in this type of matter.
13. Mr McVeety’s concerns were put to the appellant in cross-examination. The appellant accepted that the letter only refers to the practice of forcing girls to marry, but he explained that by saying it is more commonly girls affected by such customs but that, occasionally, it also happens to men. Furthermore he maintained that the police decline to get involved in such issues.
14. Mr Wood submitted that it is not outside the realms of possibility that the appellant was being bounced between the police and the Traditional Authorities. He submitted that the document did offer support for the appellant’s claim as to what happened to him and that he was unable to obtain reliable protection in Namibia.
15. The letter from the Traditional Authorities starts by setting out the role of the Traditional Authority in Namibia and that it was established by statute to deal with the matters of customary law and practice. In addition to the part of the letter setting out the customary practice of forcing young girls to marry (under paragraph 1 on page 2), the letter also says, at (b), that:
“widows are inherited, like assets, and forced to marry a person related to the late husband”.
16. At paragraph 3 the letter says:
“the authority is aware of Mr UT I.D. No …..’s case versus his family regarding the force inheritance of his Late Ungle’s Wife (to marry her by force) to him…”.
17. Contrary to the respondent’s submissions, when considered in its totality, I do not find this part of the letter to be inconsistent with the first or with what is the situation in Namibia, according to the letter from the Traditional Authorities. To read otherwise is to fail to recognise the appellant’s aunt as a potential victim too. She is potentially being forced to marry the appellant as much as the other way round.
18. However, I am satisfied that the part of the letter which advises the appellant to report the matter to the police conflicts with the appellant’s insistence that the police do not act in such matters. In fact, it is possible that both can be true but the problem for the appellant is that he is unable to say what, in fact, happened when he reported the matter to the police as he did do so. On its face, the letter from the Traditional Authority does not offer support for their being a lack of protection from the police, otherwise why would they commend it as a course of action.
19. Overall however, I find the letter to offer some corroboration for the appellant’s claim about being required to marry his aunt.
Credibility
20. The respondent refused the claim partly as the appellant was found to be internally inconsistent with reference to the timetable of the claimed planned marriage given that he had provided two dates for the wedding and also that the description he gave of a marriage celebration in Namibia culminate on a Sunday, but neither of the two dates he gave for the wedding were a Sunday.
21. I have read carefully the account the appellant gave of his timeline. I am not sure where the appellant has said that his marriage was scheduled for 1 May 2022. He said in his interview that his uncle died on 25 December 2021 [20], that plans for the wedding were made in April 2022 [70], he was told about it on 1 May 2022 [70] which was the day he reported it to the Traditional Authorities [96] and the marriage was scheduled to take place on 25 May 2022 [20]. That was a Wednesday not a Sunday which appears to contradict what the appellant described about the ceremony at [118]. Furthermore, at [94] he said his parents abused him for about one month as he refused to marry his aunt. He was abused physically and mentally [53]/[92]. He said that it can take the Traditional authorities 3 days to get a print out of the case and by then he was on the run [98] and he left Namibia before any action could be taken [99] and because the abuse was getting too hard to take [102]. For two weeks prior to leaving he lived with a friend [106] and then travelled to South Africa [109].
22. In his witness statement the applicant said it was agreed in April 2022 that he would marry his aunt [11], that it was arranged in April [52] and he was told of that at a meeting at his aunt’s house in the holidays. At [38]/[41] of his witness statement he said he was told of the plan on 1 May 2022. He confirmed the wedding was set for 25 May 2022 [14]. The day after the meeting he told his mother he refused to marry his aunt [15] and this is when the abuse started [16] so he went to his friend’s house for 2 weeks [19]. After one month of abuse he could not take it anymore [20]. He reported the incident to the traditional authorities on 25 May 2022 and it took 3 days to report [21]. He fled to South Africa [23], leaving at the beginning of June 2022 [56].
23. In order to address the inconsistency with the marriage ending on a Sunday, the appellant explained in his witness statement that he was told he needed to be ready to marry by 25 May 2022 as that is when he would need to “give them a final decision as to where I stand” [47] and that he went to the Traditional Authorities on 1 May 2022 [47].
24. Mr McVeety did not cross-examine the appellant on this issue. Neither advocate made any submissions about it other than Mr Wood said that they agreed to disagree about dates. Overall, I find the appellant to have been broadly consistent on the timeline. I have noted a couple of inconsistencies on dates, but these were not put to the appellant in cross-examination. The main one was in relation to the date he reported the matter to the Traditional Authorities which he has consistently stated was 1 May 2022 (and which is corroborated by the letter from the Traditional Authorities) save once in his witness statement when he said 25 May 2022 (and when in a later paragraph he also said 1 May 2022). As this was not put to him in cross-examination, nor by me at the hearing, I have decided not to treat it as damaging the appellant’s credibility but to treat it as a mistake.
25. Another basis on which the respondent challenged the appellant’s claim was on the grounds of plausibility. The respondent decided it was implausible that the appellant was still being threatened by his family having relocated to South Africa for six months. He was considered not to have allowed the Namibian authorities a chance to protect him as he left Namibia prior to them being able to do so. At the time of his claim, he did not have any supporting documents.
26. At the hearing, Mr McVeety noted further inconsistencies. Firstly, he noted that the appellant said his aunt was in her 40s when he was first interviewed whereas he has otherwise said she was in her 60s (for example [62] of his substantive interview). This is an inconsistency, but as Mr McVeety accepted, on its own it is not enough to reject the appellant’s whole claim. I shall consider this in the round with the rest of the evidence.
27. As already identified in the respondent’s review for the hearing before the FTT, Mr McVeety also noted that at question 3.9 of his screening interview the appellant said:
“I studied in Johansberg South Africa July-Nov 2022”
28. Mr McVeety submitted this was inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that he fled to South Africa and, furthermore, that in order to study there, the appellant would have needed a visa which undermines his claim to have left in a hurry whilst under threat. He supported this submission by relying on a letter in the appellant’s bundle issued by the South African Department of Home Affairs. It is headed “Declaration of Foreigner as an Undesirable Person” and it declares him to be such on account of having “overstayed by 07 days as a time”. Mr McVeety said it is only possible to overstay if one had status in the first place which means he must have had a visa. I am not able to wholly accept that submission as the respondent has not directed me to any background country evidence as to the visa requirements in South Africa. I note that in his asylum interview, the appellant said that he kept having to return to the border with Namibia to get his passport stamped and this might provide another explanation as to why he was treated as an overstayer.
29. However, there is no doubt the appellant was internally inconsistent as regards what he was doing in South Africa. He has never repeated that he studied there after having said so in his screening interview. I am unable to accept the appellant’s explanation that this was a mistake, given the detail that was given in his answer at the screening interview. I find this damaging to the appellant’s credibility.
30. The respondent also rejected the appellant’s claim that his family is well connected and that his family continued to look for him. As to the motive for that, the appellant explained at [58] of his interview, that he is the only candidate for this marriage so it is only if it goes ahead that his family benefit from the wealth of the aunt they want him to marry. At [60] the appellant said his deceased uncle was rich but he “didn’t have power or authority”. In his witness statement he referred to another uncle (now deceased) [66] who was involved in politics and consequently this affords influence to the remaining uncles [67]. He provided some material about this person but nothing capable of showing the family relationship. The appellant made no reference to this person in his asylum interview.
31. In contrast, the appellant said at [110] of his asylum interview that he received the occasional text message from family whilst in South Africa but not once he changed his number [113] and they did not know he was in South Africa [112]. This suggests that the family had no ability to trace him. However, when asked if he could move away to avoid any risk he said he could not internally relocate or even go to another part of Africa as his extended family move around [114]. He said at [115] that he went to the capital in Botswana as no one would spot him there. However, in his witness statement, the appellant said he could not internally relocate as he has family throughout Namibia and they are well-known [70] and that they travel around Africa as lorry drivers [24].
32. I do not find the appellant has presented a consistent account of his family’s reach or influence in Namibia or beyond and I find this damaging to his credibility.
33. The respondent does not claim that section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 is engaged in the appellant’s case.
Sufficiency of Protection
34. In support of his submission that there was sufficient protection for the appellant in Namibia, Mr McVeety directed me to pages 94 and 95 of the bundle which is Freedom House’s report on Namibia dated 29 February 2024. That says that there is generally an independent judiciary in Namibia and the rule of law is constitutionally protected although there are some barriers to everyone accessing justice due to factors such as delay, cost, and a lack of resources.
35. Furthermore, in the refusal letter, the respondent relied on the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence (September 2021) to argue that there is sufficient protection for the appellant on return. As the title suggests, the CPIN is written from the perspective of women. The policy section of the CPIN notes there is generally an effective criminal justice system in Namibia including the police force and an independent judiciary (2.5.3). Having considered the country information parts of the CPIN on which that policy is based, I am of the view that there is reliable evidence from well-known sources such as the United States’ State Department report 2020 which justifies the respondent’s policy section, albeit there remain problems as to the efficacy and timeliness of the protection (7.3.6) and the involvement of the Traditional Authorities or family resolution which remove cases from state oversight (7.2.9).
36. In contrast, Mr Wood directed me to page 97 of the bundle, and a later passage in the Freedom House report. That said that gender based violence rates remain high. Mr Wood submitted that is a good indication that there is not sufficient protection in Namibia against gender based violence. I cannot accept that a single sentence in a very short paragraph addressing a number of factors including “protection from domestic violence” equates to a sustainable finding that there is a lack of protection.
Conclusions
37. Standing back and considering the appellant’s claim as a whole, I have found him to have been broadly consistent about the timeline of the marriage and that is corroborated by the letter from the Traditional Authorities. In respect of other aspects of his claim, I have found him to have been materially inconsistent.
38. Overall, I am not persuaded that the appellant’s account about the planned marriage is characterised by inconsistencies such that they justify a wholesale rejection of what he claimed.
39. I found illuminating that in his witness statement he said it was by 25 May 2022 that he needed to communicate his “final decision”. That suggests he had some choice over whether or not to marry notwithstanding the pressure he says he had been under prior to leaving.
40. The appellant’s admission on arrival that he had been studying in South Africa does not fit with his account about what he was doing there. I am satisfied he was studying there as he first claimed. Furthermore, I find the appellant has been inconsistent about his family having influence in Namibia and I find that he has exaggerated this part of his account to bolster his claim.
41. Taking all this into account, I find it reasonably likely that the appellant was put under pressure to marry his aunt, and he decided to relocate to South Africa to avoid that pressure. He was able to live there safely for a time but he had to leave and eventually he made his way to the UK.
42. Even though the appellant was put under pressure to marry his aunt in May 2022, whether or not that would be repeated now is far less clear. Firstly, the passage of time may have resulted in a changed factual matrix. For example, the aunt may no longer be alive or alternative arrangements may have been made. Secondly, and in any event, I am not satisfied that the appellant would be at real risk of being compelled through force to marry his aunt given what he said about being able to communicate his decision on the subject. Thirdly, and in any event, at its highest the appellant’s evidence was that the pressure put on him was emotional but included some physical acts of violence such as throwing shoes at him and leaving him in the woods. Whilst these acts are, of course, deeply unpleasant, they are not at a level as to amount to serious harm.
43. Taken together, I am not satisfied that on return there is a real risk the appellant would be forced to marry his aunt or that he would be subjected to serious harm or harm contravening Article 3 of the ECHR.
44. In case I am wrong about that, I nevertheless have considered sufficiency of protection. As mentioned above, the Traditional Authorities directed the appellant to the police which, in my judgment, indicated some confidence in the ability of the police to protect. The appellant’s insistence that there is no protection is not borne out by the objective evidence to which I have referred. Based on the objective evidence I have referred to above, the Namibian state has clearly put into place a framework to offer protection to victims of gender based violence and the appellant has not advanced a basis as to why that protection would not be available for him. The fact he left Namibia without following the advice of the Traditional Authorities means he has not tested the protection on offer. It is for the appellant to show he would not be sufficiently protected in Namibia and in my judgment he has failed to do so.
45. In any event, even if there were a risk of serious harm in the appellant’s home area against which there was no protection, I find there is a safe and a reasonable (not unduly harsh) internal relocation option available to him.
46. I have rejected the appellant’s claim that his family is well-connected and exert power and influence throughout Namibia. The appellant has failed to advance a reliable evidential basis to claim that his family would come to know of his return to Namibia. I was not directed to any objective evidence on this issue or any credible evidence to support the appellant’s claim that he would be located on return. Accordingly, I find the appellant can safely relocate within Namibia and I reject the claim that he would have to go into hiding.
47. The only basis the appellant claimed it would be unreasonable to expect him to relocate was in connection with his mental health ([71]-[72] of his witness statement). The appellant has given no real detail about any mental health problems from which he suffers nor were any medical notes or other evidence included in his bundle. Otherwise, the appellant appears to be a healthy young man who has received an education and has worked in Namibia. He has a son there. He has lived in Namibia throughout his life until he left in 2022 and accordingly is likely to retain linguistic and cultural ties.
48. In these circumstance, the appellant has failed to satisfy me that internal relocation elsewhere in Namibia would be unduly harsh. For the same reasons, neither would the circumstances on return amount to very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Namibia.
49. Mr Wood did not invite me to consider the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds and there is no real evidence of any private of family life in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, there is no basis to find Article 8 engaged in any event.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on protection and human rights grounds.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 November 2025