Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001577

First-Tier Tribunal No: PA/63067/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
DEPUTY UPPER TIER JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

SA +1
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Duffy, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of her family, is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or other person. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor (“the Judge”) promulgated on 19 February 2025, who refused the appellants’ claim. That appeal was against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) dated 18 April 2024 to refuse the appellant’s further submissions (protection claim) made on 21 February 2023, which is based on her fear of persecution on account of being a women at risk of an honour killing for having committed adultery and having a child out of wedlock.
2. The appellant sought permission to appeal from the First Tier Tribunal, which was granted.
Grounds of Appeal
3. The grounds are somewhat prolix and as a consequence overlapping. The appellant appeals on five grounds as follows:
(a) The Judge did not give adequate reasons for finding that: (i) the appellants ability to study in the UK and start a business in the UK, was inconsistent with her claims that her family are strict; (ii) a medical report was required to support her claims she was unable to recollect the name of the man she was being forced to marry; and (iii) the appellant was incredulous due to her inability to explain why her father waited to issue a fatwa and publicly denounce her;
(b) There was procedural unfairness as the Judge failed to put to the appellant his concerns about the appellant’s evidence that she wanted to settle in the UK and that he drew adverse inference from a claimed “undisputed section” in the respondents decision, when the source (a previous refusal and interview record) were not in evidence before the Judge.
(c) There was a material misdirection in the law as the Judge found the appellant’s son would be assumed to have been born in wedlock and will be able to be registered as such. Reliance was placed upon caselaw, that the appellant could not be expected to lie about such matters, given the risk of persecution;
(d) There was a material misdirection in the law as the Judge failed to apply the correct standard of proof;
(e) The Judge gave inadequate reasons for concluding that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan
Discussion and reasons
Ground One
4. In ground one Mr Duffy argued that the Judge erred by giving inadequate reasons for the conclusion that the appellant’s ability to travel to the United Kingdom to study was inconsistent with her claim to have come from a strict family and finding that the appellant’s claim was not credible.
5. In our judgment, at paragraphs 20-23, of the decision the Judge sets out carefully why the appellants claim is inconsistent. In those paragraphs he refers to her evidence that she had “an oppressively sheltered upbringing followed by an arranged marriage” and that she was threatened and tortured by her family. In contrast the Judge identifies evidence that she made a successful visa application to study in the UK and he finds that to do so she would have undertaken research on educational institutions/courses and demonstrated financial means to pay fees and maintain herself which would have required the input from the family. The Judge further identifies that in her asylum interview the appellant stated she wished to settle in the UK and start a business, something the Judge found was not indicative of the sheltered restricted upbringing the appellant claimed. The Judge also found that the claim of a forced marriage was inconsistent with the appellant’s account that she was then able to leave Pakistan and had funds to fly back to the United Kingdom and then within months of returning, have funds to apply for an extension to her student visa.
6. It is apparent from this that the Judge gave multiple reasons for rejecting this aspect of the appellants account which enabled the appellant to understand why the Judge found against her. In those circumstances the appellant’s assertion those reasons were inadequate is not made out. We are satisfied these were findings open to the Judge based on the evidence before him
7. Further, Mr Duffy also took issue within ground one, with some of the reasons the Judge gave for finding the appellant not to be credible. He argued that the Judge was wrong to hold the appellant’s expressed wish to settle in the United Kingdom and start her own business undermined the credibility of her asylum claim. Mr Duffy argued that no medical report was required to support the appellant’s evidence that she had forgotten the name of the man her family wanted her to marry. He also complained about the Judge’s reasoning concerning the appellant’s evidence of a fatwa taken out against her by father.
8. Mr Ojo submitted that the findings about the appellant’s credibility were open to the Judge based on the evidence recorded. With regards to the point about a medical report, Mr Ojo argued that the Judge, did not require a medical report at paragraph 18 but rather pointed to the fact there was no evidence of mental health difficulties or cognitive issues effecting the appellant’s memory. With regards to the fatwa issue, Mr Ojo argued that at paragraph 24, the Judge gives four reasons why he rejected the appellants account.
9. At paragraph 21, the Judge records that the appellant stated that she was unable to recall the name of the man she was being forced to marry due to her depression and notes that there was no evidence that the appellant suffered from mental health issues to the extent that she had memory or cognitive issues. We are satisfied that by making this observation the Judge was not requiring a corroborative medical report but instead was making the reasonable observation that appellant’s assertion that her inability to recall the name of her proposed husband was due to depression, was one that was unsupported by evidence.
10. At paragraph 24, the Judge set out the evidence related to the Fatwa and public disowning of the appellant by her father. He noted it was evidence which was adduced late and found the appellants’ account as to how she acquired this evidence incredulous. He set out carefully and in detail why he rejected the credibility of the appellant’s account about the fatwa. Contrary to the complaint made in the grounds, these were findings properly open to the Judge and there is no inadequacy of reasoning.
Ground Two
11. With regards to ground 2, Mr Duffy submitted that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to hold the appellant’s interview account that she wanted to settle and start a business in the United Kingdom against the appellant without the point being put to the appellant in cross examination or by the Judge. We reminded Mr Duffy that the interview record was quoted in the refusal decision and so the appellant was aware of the point that was being made against her. We also referred Mr Duffy to paragraph 29, of ABDI [2023] EWCA civ 1455. Mr Duffy replied that as the respondent was relying on the appellant’s interview answers, it was incumbent upon her to produce the entirety of the record and argued that the fact she had not done so amounted to a procedural unfairness. Mr Duffy confirmed that he was not aware if his instructing Solicitors made a request for this evidence but submitted that there was no mechanism to allow the representative at the hearing to address the issue, due to the Senior President of the Tribunals, current practice direction (dated 01 November 2024), which does not allow questions unless the Judge and/or the Presenting Officer raises it during evidence. We referred Mr Duffy to the provision within the Practice Direction for making an application to ask additional questions during examination in chief (PD8.4). We also pointed out that the issue having been raised in the decision letter the appellant could have addressed it in her written appeal statement.
12. Mr Ojo, referred us to paragraph 29 of ABDI, which he stated was authoritative on this issue. He also relied on paragraph 61-82 of TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, which sets out exceptions to the general principle of fairness requiring a party to put issues in dispute to the appellant. He argued the Supreme Court provides guidance that if the issue is secondary, there is no requirement for it to be put in cross examination. Mr Ojo submitted that this is such a case as the appellant comment in interview about settling in the United Kingdom was not central to the appellant’s appeal especially since the Judge made numerous other credibility points. Mr Ojo submitted the appellant was aware the respondent had raised her comment in interview within the refusal decision and the appellant knew it needed to be addressed. Further, the appellant was served with the previous refusal letters and asylum interviews at the time of that claim, thus she had access to this evidence and the failure to include them in the documentary evidence was not material. Finally, Mr Ojo pointed out the appellant did not make an application to adduce these documents, despite being on notice. Thus, he argued she had various options and was on notice.
13. We are satisfied that there is no procedural unfairness in the Judge’s approach to the appellant’s comments in interview about settling in the United Kingdom. The appellant was on notice of the reliance placed upon this evidence by the respondent, who directly quotes the relevant answers within her current decision. In these circumstances the appellant’s comments in her asylum interview that were quoted in the respondent’s decision were plainly relevant to the assessment the tribunal would have to make of her credibility. In those circumstances the observations of the Court of Appeal at [§29] of Abdi are relevant:
“There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12]).”
14. We are satisfied that the appellant had sufficient time to seek disclosure and/or address the points within her witness statement, yet she opted not to. She would have had access to this evidence as it was served upon her at the time of the relevant applications. Thus, in all the circumstances we do not accept that there is an issue of procedural unfairness.
Ground Three
15. Turning to ground 3, Mr Duffy argued the facts before the Judge were that the appellant would be returning to Pakistan as an unmarried women with a child out of wedlock, he submitted there was settled caselaw that she should not be expected to lie and that in those circumstances she would have to admit to the offence of fornication and would be subject to persecution. Mr Duffy argued that it was not fair or adequate to rely on the Country Policy information Note [CPIN] evidence in isolation. Mr Ojo submitted, that the Judge was very clear when setting out the country evidence he relied upon and applying it to the facts as accepted by the appellant and her partner before making the finding that the appellant would be presumed to be married to her child’s father.
16. We observe that at paragraph 26, the Judge set out the evidential basis for the finding that the appellant would be presumed to be in married to her child’s father. The Judge identified the relevant parts of the Country Policy information Note (the CPIN) including the fact that: “marriage may be entered into without a formal marriage ceremony, and that direct proof of marriage is not always required. Marriage may be presumed by prolonged cohabitation, and acknowledgement of the marriage status by the male partner. Acknowledgement by the man that he is the father of the child of the partnership, raises the presumption that the child is legitimate” . The Judge then applied that evidence to the accepted facts that the appellant and her partner have been in a relationship since 2023 and that the appellant’s partner accepts he is the father of the child and reached the conclusion that “on return there would be a presumption of marriage, which would confer legitimacy on the child”. This was a conclusion that the Judge was entitled to reach for the reasons he gave. This was not a case where the Judge was expecting the appellant to lie, instead he was recognising the evidence that legitimacy may in some circumstances be presumed. The Judge properly evaluated the accepted facts and country evidence before him and reached a reasonable and rational conclusion. There is no misdirection of the law.
Ground Four
17. As to the Judge’s claimed misdirection of the law, specifically the application of JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) [2024] UKUT 00100. Mr Duffy submitted that having found the appellant was not a refugee the Judge failed to properly apply the relevant standard of proof when making findings about whether she was entitled to humanitarian protection. He submitted the Judge was required to give additional reasons for an assessment on the lower standard of proof when considering humanitarian protection. He submitted that this was an inherent difficulty with Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA) but that the Judge could not avoid the requirement to gives additional reasons for his conclusion on humanitarian protection. Mr Ojo submitted the Judge was clear at paragraph 6 about the burdens and standards of proof that applied, setting out the relevant legal framework correctly and applying it within the decision.
18. It is unfortunate that there are three paragraphs numbered 24 in the Judge’s decision. It is however clear that under the heading entitled “law and conclusions” the Judge did consider the different standard of proof that applied to the different appeal grounds in a protection appeal. At [27] the Judge considers the appellant’s claim to be a refugee applying the law as set out in section 32 of NABA. The Judge addresses the second question in JCK, namely whether the appellant “does in fact fear” such persecution. The ‘subjective fear’ test. He finds on balance she does not, in doing so he refers to his reasoning at paragraphs 19-26 of the decision. In the next paragraph (incorrectly numbered 24), the Judge accurately sets out what must be established before an appellant can be regarded as someone eligible for humanitarian protection. The Judge then identifies that the appellant has not established that she meets that criteria, again for the reasons identified at paragraphs 19-26. We are not persuaded that the Judge was required to provide any additional reasons for rejecting the appellants assertion that on the lower standard he is eligible for humanitarian protection. The Judge is required to give himself the proper self direction and consider whether at the lower standard he would accept or reject the appellants account. This he does both at paragraph 6 and paragraph 24 reminding himself that the question is whether there is a real risk of the applicant suffering serious harm. Accordingly, there is no misdirection in the law.
Gound five
19. Mr Duffy submitted that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for his conclusion that the public interest in the removal of the two appellant’s outweighed their article 8 private life rights, relying on the assertion in the grounds that there was no detailed analysis in the Judge’s decision of the factors identified in the appellant’s skeleton argument. Mr Ojo however argued that the Judge clearly had regard to all relevant factors in the necessary balancing exercise conducted at the second paragraph 25 of the decision.
20. We note that the Judge who granted permission to appeal, whilst not limiting the grant of permission commented in the reasons part of the decision that this ground is not arguable. We agree with that observation. The Judge was not required to deal with every point raised in the skeleton argument. Instead he had to conduct a balancing exercise weighing the private and family life interest of the two appellants against the public interest. The Judge unquestionably does this in the second paragraph 25 before giving adequate explanation to enable the appellant to understand why he concluded that the public interest outweighed the appellant’s private interests. In reality that conclusion was inevitable given the real world situation is that the appellant, her partner and child will be returning to Pakistan together (as none have leave to remain).
Conclusion
21. Accordingly, we find there is no error of law in the Judge’s decision and the findings were properly open to the Judge based on the evidence before him.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore confirmed.

S K Kudhail

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 June 2025