Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2025-001589

FtT No: PA/55773/2023
LP/01139/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

AM (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Grigg, Counsel, instructed by HM Legal Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrel, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant challenges with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his asylum and human rights appeal. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was sent to the parties on 6 January 2025.
2. The parties agreed at the error of law hearing that there was a material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision consequent to a failure to adequately consider relevant Country Guidance decisions: PD 10.3 of the Practice Directions of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (1 November 2024); Roba (OLF - MB confirmed) CG [2022] UKUT 00001.
3. However, I consider it appropriate to address in this decision numerous additional concerns that have arisen in these proceedings to date:
i. A failure by legal representatives to file a competent appeal skeleton argument (ASA) with the First-tier Tribunal;
ii. A failure by legal representatives to file objective country evidence in an international protection appeal where their client had previously been recognised by the Competent Authority as a victim of modern slavery;
iii. A failure by the First-tier Tribunal to adopt a robust approach in marshalling the appeal before it;
iv. A failure by legal representatives to competently draft grounds of appeal to this Tribunal; and
v. A decision by legal representatives to file an appeal composite bundle consisting of 1,649 pages on the day before a listed hearing in the Upper Tribunal accompanied by a failure to serve the bundle by erroneously sending it to an incorrect email address thereby necessitating the adjournment of the hearing.
4. The various failings identified above resulted in the Upper Tribunal being required to devote significant time to its consideration of this appeal. Such time was not an appropriate use of judicial resources.
5. At the adjourned hearing held on 7 August 2025 the Upper Tribunal (UTJ O’Callaghan and DUTJ Walsh) reminded the appellant’s present legal representatives, HM Legal Ltd, who were in attendance, as to its inherent jurisdiction to govern proceedings before it and to hold to account the behaviour of legal representatives whose conduct of litigation falls below the minimum professional standards: R (Hamid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin).
6. A copy of this decision will be sent to the appellant’s former representatives, Osprey Solicitors, who filed and served the ASA with the First-tier Tribunal and who are reminded of the Upper Tribunal’s inherent Hamid jurisdiction.
7. A copy of this decision will be sent to the appellant’s former representatives, I & R Legal Services Limited, who represented the appellant at his hearing before the First-tier Tribunal and are reminded of the Upper Tribunal’s inherent Hamid jurisdiction.
8. The Upper Tribunal understands that there may be a connection between Osprey Solicitors, I & R Legal Services Limited and HM Legal Limited in respect of two solicitors.
Anonymity
9. The First-tier Tribunal issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that it be set aside.
10. The appellant has been recognised as a victim of modern slavery founded upon trafficking by a decision of the Competent Authority dated 14 February 2023. The Competent Authority recognised a period of forced criminality in Albania from approximately 10 January 2019 to 11 February 2019.
11. Under Section 2(1)(d)(b) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, a person who has made an allegation that they have been trafficked contrary to Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is entitled to the same lifelong anonymity as an alleged victim of a sexual offence. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to anonymity in these proceedings.
12. The anonymity order is confirmed and detailed above.
Relevant law
13. I address relevant law at the outset.
Country Guidance
14. In HM (Iraq) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1536, at [39], Richards LJ confirmed that country guidance decisions possess “a status and significance comparable to that which declarations can have in public law cases.”
15. The decision in Roba confirms that the decision in a “CG” case “constitute a legal rule imposing a presumption of fact”, at [20]. As a presumption, it can be overcome by evidence to the contrary. Roba notes that as time passes, it is more likely that there will be evidence to overcome the presumption, but the age of the decision does not itself affect the presumption. Though not a matter for me in this appeal, as to the scope of the presumption of fact, the recent November 2024 Practice Direction may go further than Roba at paragraph 10.1.
16. Additionally, in R (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm AR 535, at [90.4], the Court of Appeal held that a failure to identify and apply a relevant country guidance decision without good reason might amount to an error of law in that a relevant consideration had been ignored, and legally inadequate reasons had been given for the decision. The Upper Tribunal reaffirmed the possibility of a material error of law by such failure in Roba.
Appeal Skeleton Arguments
17. In TC (PS compliance - “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC); [2023] Imm AR 1427 a panel consisting of the Presidents of the Upper Tribunal and the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) confirmed that Practice Statement No 1 of 2022 emphasised the requirement on the part of both parties in the First-tier Tribunal to identify the issues in dispute and to focus on addressing the evidence and law relevant to those issues in a particularised yet concise manner. Such approach is consistent with one of the main objectives of reform and a modern application of the overriding objective pursuant to rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. It ensures that there is an efficient and effective hearing, proportionate to the real issues in dispute.
18. The Presidential panel observed that a Practice Statement-compliant and focussed ASA will often lead to a more focussed review, and in turn to a focussed and structured First-tier Tribunal decision on the issues in dispute. Reviews are pivotal to reform in the First-tier Tribunal.
19. The identification of ‘the principal important controversial issues’ leads to the kind of focussed and effective First-tier Tribunal decision required, addressing those matters, and only those matters, which need to be decided and concentrating on the material bearing upon those issues. The Presidential panel observed that procedural architecture in the First-tier Tribunal, including the Practice Statement under the reformed process, is specifically designed to enable these principal important controversial issues to be identified and for the parties’ preparation, as well as the hearing to focus upon them.
20. Importantly, First-tier Tribunal decisions should begin by setting out the issues in dispute with the parties having condensed their positions in a clear, coherent and concise ‘issues-based’ manner.
21. In Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC); [2023] Imm AR 1416 a panel chaired by the President of the Upper Tribunal confirmed that parties are under a duty to provide the First-tier Tribunal with relevant information as to the circumstances of the case, and this necessitates constructive engagement with the First-tier Tribunal to permit it to lawfully and properly exercise its role. The parties are therefore required to engage in the process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, being mindful of their obligations to the First-tier Tribunal.
22. Upon the parties engaging in filing and serving a focused ASA and review, a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.
Grounds of appeal
23. Grounds of appeal are to be properly delineated into separate, particularised complaints identifying legal error, as required: Nixon (permission to appeal: grounds) [2014] UKUT 368 (IAC) and Harverye v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2848, per Hickinbottom LJ at [55]-[58] (obiter).
24. The Upper Tribunal has recently confirmed in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC) that in applying for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, practitioners have a duty to carefully consider whether a challenge to the judge’s findings of fact, or the application of the facts to the legal framework, is material to the outcome of the appeal. Grounds of appeal are not an opportunity to present a list of errors no matter what the relevance of the error is to the outcome of the appeal. Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. The grounds of appeal will rarely need to be lengthy. Each ground of appeal should identify succinctly, in clearly numbered paragraphs or (sub paragraphs):
(a) The relevant passage(s) in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
(b) Any relevant primary or secondary legislation only to the extent necessary to do so.
(c) Any authority binding upon the judge that is capable of supporting the ground.
(d) Brief submissions proving a short explanation to support the ground.
25. Additionally, in Rai and DAM the Upper Tribunal confirmed that where there is any issue as to the grounds of appeal upon which permission has been granted, or the scope of the grounds that leads to an adjournment, the Tribunal may impose sanctions, including the making of orders for wasted costs against the parties or their representatives.
26. Where a representative makes an application for permission to appeal, the application should feature the name of the representative and should not be made solely under the generic name of the organisation making the application or with no identification of the author of the grounds: Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC); [2022] Imm AR 1360.
Relevant Facts
27. The appellant is a citizen of Albania and aged 23. He was granted entry clearance as a visitor and entered the United Kingdom on 16 August 2018 when aged 15. He states that he travelled to this country to visit his sister.
28. The appellant contends that he returned to Albania by car with a family friend on 5 January 2019. He details that on 13 or 14 January 2019 he was approached by a criminal gang to transport illegal items, and he agreed to undertake this task. He claims that the gang mistreated him and then beat him. A gang member felt sorry for him and helped him to leave Albania. The appellant states he left Albania on around 10 or 11 February 2019 and re-entered the United Kingdom by lorry on 14 February 2019. He claimed asylum the following day, asserting his fear that gang members will persecute/ seriously harm him on return because he refused to work on their behalf, escaped and remains indebted to them.
29. The respondent refused the international protection claim by a decision dated 19 August 2023. Her primary position is that the appellant did not return to Albania following his entering this country as a visitor in 2018.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
30. The appeal was heard at Taylor House on 3 December 2024. The appellant attended and was represented by Counsel, who I confirm was not Mr Grigg. The appellant was cross-examined.
Appeal skeleton argument
31. The appellant was initially represented before the First-tier Tribunal by Osprey Solicitors until July 2024.
32. PD 7.5 to 7.8 of the Practice Directions of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (1 November 2024), which was in force at the time of the hearing and was to be applied by the First-tier Tribunal, confirms in respect of an ASA:
“7.5. In accordance with rule 24A of the Procedure Rules, where the appellant is legally represented, the Tribunal will direct the appellant to provide an ASA and bundle.
7.6. The ASA should be no more than 12 pages of numbered paragraphs and should contain three sections: (a) a brief summary of the appellant’s factual case; (b) a schedule of the disputed issues; (c) the appellant’s brief submissions on each of those issues, which should state why the appellant disagrees with the respondent’s decision with sufficient detail to enable the reasons for the challenge to be understood, and must: (i) be concise; (ii) engage with the decision letter under challenge; (iii) not include extensive quotations from documents or authorities; (iv) identify but not quote any more than necessary from any evidence or principle of law that will enable the basis of challenge to be understood; and (v) cross-refer to any country information evidence schedule (see below).
7.7. An ASA that exceeds 12 pages must include an application for permission to rely upon it with concise reasons as to why it must be longer than 12 pages.
7.8. The name of the author of the ASA and date it was prepared must be included in it.”
33. This is consistent with the definition of “ASA” provided in the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (13 May 2022) in force when the ASA was filed in this appeal.
34. Osprey Solicitors filed an ASA with the First-tier Tribunal on 29 February 2024. The undated document, which does not disclose the author, is of real concern to this Tribunal consequent to it exhibiting a lack of professional competence.
35. At the outset, it is of significant concern to this Tribunal that the ASA references the asylum claim being subject to ‘certification’:
“24. ... The Respondent has stated that the Applicant can access protection from the Albanian state because the Albanian state is able to provide a sufficiency of protection an envisaged by the law Horvath [2000] UKHL 37. The Applicant submits that the Respondent’s conclusions both in respect of the decision on the asylum claim and the certification of the claim is based on public law errors and a failure to have regard to all relevant considerations.” [Emphasis added]
36. Though I have not heard from Osprey Solicitors, having considered the document with care I am satisfied it is more likely than not that this paragraph was cut and paste from either a pre-action protocol letter or judicial review grounds and placed into a template document. I note reference in this paragraph to “certification of the claim”, “public law errors”; and “Applicant” which are related to judicial review proceedings.
37. It is a concern to this Tribunal that the clear error in the document as to the “certification of the claim” was not identified by the First-tier Tribunal either at the hearing or in its decision. It would be a concern to this Tribunal if a skeleton argument erroneously challenged a non-existent certificate issued under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in a statutory appeal. There would be an expectation that a tribunal judge would seek to ascertain how such error found its way into a skeleton argument.
38. A further significant concern is the ASA advancing a false assertion of fact. At para. 24(ii) it is stated:
“The Respondent failed to consider cited [sic] her own Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human trafficking version 14 dated February 2023. This was a failure to take a mandatorily relevant document into account which undermine (sic). In particular the following sections of it were and are relevant:
Prevalence 7.1 Nature of exploitation 7.1.1.
...”
39. The challenged decision letter expressly states on the fifth page:
“B. I also considered the following Country Policy and Information Notes:
• …
• Country Policy Information Note: Albania: Human Trafficking, Version 14.0, Published February 2023, paragraphs 2.1.3, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.3.2, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.1.4, 7.1.1, 10.1.4, 10.1.6, 10.5.1, 10.5.2 and 10.6.4.” [Emphasis added]
40. Contrary to the assertion in the ASA, the respondent expressly clearly considered paragraph 7.1.1 of her then extant CPIN.
41. Misleading a court or tribunal is a serious breach of professional conduct: Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, at [111]; Gray v Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd [2022] EWHC 624 (Admin), at [147].
42. Despite the ASA being on its face misleading, the First-tier Tribunal failed entirely to engage with the professional conduct issue either at the hearing or in its decision. This Tribunal would expect a concern as to misleading a court or tribunal to addressed at a hearing and an explanation sought because of the professional conduct concerns that arise.
43. Much of the ASA exhibits a template quality, referencing out-of-date objective material, suggestive of inadequate professional consideration as to accuracy.
44. There is repeated reference in the document to “the CG cases cited above” where no country guidance case(s) is/are cited above. There is one sole reference to “EH”, which is understood to be EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348. It is entirely unclear from reading the First-tier Tribunal decision as a whole as to whether any country guidance decision was relied upon by the appellant, save for the reference in the ASA to a tribunal finding “in EH that there was not a sufficiency of protection”, as no reference to country guidance is recorded in the submissions of the appellant’s counsel, at [25]-[32]. The failure of the First-tier Tribunal to address this concern at the hearing may have contributed to the material error of law identified at [2] above.
45. The ASA adopts the approach of citing of out-of-date objective country evidence. Further, the ASA cites objective evidence that on its face is not relevant to the appellant and his case, for example children being trafficked for the purpose of committing criminal offences. The appellant was an adult at the date of the hearing, and it was not his evidence that he was trafficked to this country to commit crimes. The First-tier Tribunal failed to address these failings at the hearing or in its decision.
46. A further concern for this Tribunal is the adoption of an unhelpful approach of referencing objective country evidence without providing paragraph numbers. An example is a reference to a report of Asylos/ARC, “Albania: trafficked boys and young men” (May 2019), which is addressed in one paragraph of the ASA:
“Similarly, the Asylos/ARC report 2019 referred to potential difficulties in implementing law and policies (source cited at end of quote): “When asked for their views on the reason for the implementation gap between a strong legislative and policy framework in Albania with practice in reality, sources interviewed by ARC Foundation and Asylos mentioned: issues with identification; a lack of training and expertise; corruption; weak institutions; a lack of witness protection and legal aid; and distrust of the protection system which prevents victims from coming forward.” [emphasis added]
47. Contrary to the assertion in the paragraph cited above, no source is cited. The report runs to 319 pages. It appears that Osprey Solicitors expect a judge to read the entirety of the document to locate both the paragraph cited and its source. This is not the purpose of an ASA as addressed in TC and Lata. The adoption of this approach by Osprey Solicitors is not consistent with the duty placed upon representatives to help the First-tier Tribunal to further the overriding objective and cooperate with the First-tier Tribunal generally: rule 2(4) (a) and (b) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014.
48. The same approach is adopted in the ASA to several other documents. It is understood that over 500 pages of country objective material are referenced in little over a page and a half in the ASA often by no more than simple bold assertion or generalisation. The approach adopted is not aided by reference to “emphasis added” in respect of documents where there is no emphasis added. Again, this has the hallmarks of the use of cut and paste. The First-tier Tribunal failed to address the approach adopted in the ASA. This failure became an issue for the Upper Tribunal at the hearing listed in August 2025 where, by filing a joint skeleton argument and application to amend grounds of appeal, the appellant sought to rely upon over a thousand pages of objective evidence on the ground that:
“no country evidence was actually placed before the First-tier Tribunal in this case. There was no country evidence bundle, nor was there a country schedule ... the Appeal Skeleton Argument made extensive reference to country evidence.”
49. The appellant sought to rely upon the First-tier Tribunal’s failure to adequately gatekeep the appeal before it. At the adjourned August 2025 hearing the appellant sought to rely upon a composite hearing bundle running to 1,649 pages, of which 1,261 pages concerned country objective material not filed with the First-tier Tribunal, in addition to an authorities' bundle running to 443 pages. The premise advanced by the appellant when placing these documents before the Upper Tribunal was that as there had been a brief reference in the ASA to these documents, the First-tier Tribunal had implicitly placed upon itself a requirement to consider the entirety of the documents because there had been no express direction limiting the scope of the documents to those pages or paragraphs referenced in the ASA. The documents were named in the ASA, and without more the First-tier Tribunal was to consider them regardless as to whether they were addressed in submissions. The appellant was refused permission to amend his grounds in the manner advanced but was directed to re-serve amended grounds with permission to be considered at the hearing in November 2025. Amended grounds were filed in time for the November 2025 hearing, but this contention was abandoned.
50. The ASA fails to coherently state why the appellant disagrees with the respondent’s decision with sufficient detail to enable the reasons for the challenge to be understood. It fails to adequately engage with the decision letter under challenge, and it fails to adequately cross-refer, with clarity, to relevant and up-to-date objective country evidence. It wholly fails to satisfy the task it is required to engage with. The author of the document exhibits no clear understanding as to the role an ASA plays in proceedings.
Parties’ cases before the First-tier Tribunal
51. The appellant was represented at the hearing by I & R Legal Services Limited.
52. The respondent’s position before the First-tier Tribunal was that despite the positive conclusive grounds decision that the appellant is a victim of modern slavery, his credibility was still in issue, as was state protection, internal relocation and whether a Convention reason fell to be considered.
53. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant are set out at [25] to [32] of the decision. I observe that at no point is there any reference to the objective situation in Albania. There is no reference to country guidance decisions. The primary focus of counsel appears to be with regard to the appellant’s evidence as to his return to Albania in 2019 as well as the appellant’s concern that if he is now returned he would be identified by the criminal gang because Albania is a small country.
54. A striking factor of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, particularly in light of the paragraphs above, is that the appellant solely relied upon two bundles amounting to 48 pages in total and, very unusually in the experience of this Tribunal, filed and served no objective country evidence addressing the situation of trafficking in Albania was filed.
55. I observe the reference by the First-tier Tribunal at [15] of its decision that counsel for the appellant “did reflect on whether further objective evidence was required but confirmed that she would not be seeking an adjournment given that the respondent had served the review some time ago”. It is difficult to understand why the service of the review following the filing of the ASA was relevant to the question of whether an adjournment was required. What is clear to this Tribunal is that counsel for the appellant was content to proceed before the First-tier Tribunal with no objective country evidence filed.
Findings
56. The First-tier Tribunal found the appellant to be a victim of modern slavery. However, it concluded that he would not be at risk of serious harm upon return to Albania because he would be able to access state protection and it would be reasonable for him to internally relocate in the country. The First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant knew very little about the criminal gang, and in any event it had been so long since he had been targeted by them that they would not be interested in him on return.
57. As to country guidance, the First-tier Tribunal detailed, at [56]:
“56. The country guidance cases are specific to women (TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092), gay men (BF (Tirana – Gay Men) Albania [2019] UKUT 93) and blood feuds (EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348) which do not directly apply to the Appellant. However, when considering the factors relied on in those cases (and without those additional factors) I find that the Appellant would be able to seek state protection and internally relocate. When considering the Appellant’s individual circumstances, I find that on his own evidence he comes from a middle class family as stated at paragraph 2 of his supplementary appeal statement. I have already found that he would have the support of his family including his father and mother. Although not highly educated the Appellant has completed his GCSEs and would like to work as a physiotherapist. He confirmed in his answer to question 24 of the asylum interview (at page 332 of the appeal bundle) his mental health has improved. I find that he would be returning as a single man with the support of his family and is now an adult.”
58. As addressed below, the approach adopted by the First-tier Tribunal failed to expressly engage in its reasoning with country specific guidance not limited to women, homosexuals and blood feuds.
59. The First-tier Tribunal then proceeded to consider the appellant’s human rights (article 8 ECHR) appeal both inside and outside of the Immigration Rules. It found that the appellant could not succeed under paragraph 276ADE(1)(i) and that with regards to article 8 outside the Rules, it was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the public interest in the appellant’s removal outweighed his protected article 8 rights in respect of remaining in this country.
Grounds of Appeal
60. HM Legal Limited came on the Tribunal record on or around 13 January 2025. The appellant’s grounds of appeal run to eleven pages and were drafted by HM Legal Limited. It is a very poorly drafted document, exhibiting a lack of professional competence.
61. It takes until [29] of the document for the First-tier Tribunal decision to be addressed.
62. The grounds of appeal have a section titled “Issues”. The expectation is that this would succinctly identify in short terms the particularised grounds that follow as an aid to the Tribunal. Unfortunately, it is simply cut and paste from the ASA and has no relevance to the grounds that follow:
“Issues
20. Whether the facts claim (sic) fall within the Refugee Convention or can only be considered in relation to Article 3/8;
21. credibility;
22. whether Albania could protect the Appellant;
23. whether it could be reasonable for the Appellant to relocate within Albania;
24. whether there are very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania;
25. whether the decision is proportionate.”
63. The grounds are unhelpfully subdivided into general terms akin to a skeleton argument:
“Sufficiency of Protection”;
“Risk of Re-trafficking”;
“Internal Relocation”;
“Credibility”; and
“Assessment of Article 3 and Article 8”.
64. Much of the document relies upon objective country evidence that was not expressly relied upon by the appellant’s counsel before the First-tier Tribunal, being primarily referenced by name alone in the ASA. Complaints are advanced in generalised form, and much of its content appears either to be no more than a disagreement with findings made or seeking to again advance the appellant’s case as put before the First-tier Tribunal. I consider it to be an extremely unimpressive document, which I find strongly suggests a lack of understanding as to how grounds of appeal are to be properly particularised in this jurisdiction.
65. Upon considering the grounds as drafted, I identify ten individual grounds of challenge:
i. The First-tier Tribunal erred in not considering objective evidence when concluding that the appellant could access State protection in Albania, at [25]-[29];
ii. The First-tier Tribunal failed to address “the very real and specific nature of the threats the appellant faces”, at [30];
iii. The First-tier Tribunal “seems” to overly minimise the existing risk by considering the gang’s power in overly simplistic terms, at [32];
iv. The First-tier Tribunal’s focus on the appellant’s family background resulted in it overlooking the severity of the appellant’s experiences as a victim of trafficking, at [32];
v. The First-tier Tribunal failed to adequately consider the significant risk of re-trafficking on return to Albania, at [34]-[45];
vi. The First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion as to the availability of internal relocation is flawed, at [46]-[50];
vii. A general challenge to the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of credibility, at [51];
viii. A general challenge to the credibility assessment of the appellant’s ongoing family relationship, at [52]
ix. The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s article 3 claim, at [53]; and
x. The First-tier Tribunal failed to properly weigh the appellant’s right to family life in the United Kingdom, at [54]-[55].
66. In granting permission to appeal Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan sought with his customary care to distil the core of the grounds placed before him. He did so in one paragraph, identifying two primary issues.
“3. The judge’s consideration of state protection and internal relocation is very brief and it is arguable that the judge (i) failed to engage with the objective evidence about police and judicial corruption; and (ii) failed to give adequate reasons for concluding that there is adequate state protection and those the appellant fears can be avoided by internal relocation.”
67. Having relied upon an eleven-page document constituting his grounds of appeal, the appellant sought at the hearing before me in November 2025 to rely upon amended grounds of appeal drafted by Mr Grigg running to fifteen pages, with an annex that distils objective evidence running to a further eleven pages.
68. The amended grounds can be identified as follows:
(i) Failure to have regard to relevant submissions on police corruption and sufficiency of protection.
(ii) Inadequately reasoned and/or irrational application of TD and AD risk factors.
(iii) A failure to have regard to country guidance cited in the First-tier Tribunal’s appellant skeleton argument on internal relocation.
(iv) Failure to have regard to other country guidance, not cited in the First-tier Tribunal appellant’s skeleton argument, on internal relocation.
(v) Failure by the respondent to put relevant country materials before the First-tier Tribunal.
69. Ground 1 relies upon a section of paragraph 29 and one sentence in paragraph 26 of the original grounds. Two new paragraphs are inserted.
70. Ground 2 relies upon two original paragraphs, namely 34 and 35. Two new paragraphs are inserted.
71. Ground 3 relies upon the first sentence of paragraph 46 and a section of paragraph 48.
72. Grounds 4 and 5 are entirely new.
73. Ground 4 identifies the First-tier Tribunal failing to consider country guidance bearing directly on the issue of international protection. Reliance is placed upon AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC), at [186]-[187]. The grounds then state:
“50B. Nothing in the latest Country Guidance of TD and AD resiled from this finding. Similarly, the Tribunal accepted in BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC), at [181]:
“We accept Ms Young’s evidence that a person’s whereabouts may become known in Tirana by word of mouth. Albania is a relatively small country, and we accept as entirely plausible that a person might be traced via family or other connections being made on enquiry in Tirana. Whether that would occur would depend on the family being motivated to make such enquiries (which motivation would probably depend on awareness that the person may be living there) and the extent of its hostility. That is a question for determination on the evidence in each case.”
50C. This Country Guidance was a strong indication that, on the face if it, traffickers and other persecutors could track their victims down by word of mouth in Albania, due to the nature of Albanian society. Although these passages were not cited in the FTT ASA, it is a material error of law for the FTT not to have regard to relevant Country Guidance even if it is not cited to the FTT (DK (Serbia) [2006] EWCA Viv 1747).
50D. To the extent that the FTTJ found that it was “unclear” if the gang would still be interested in the Appellant ([83]), this was not a concrete finding that there was no real risk/ reasonable likelihood that the gang would pursue him on return. Any such conclusion would have had to engage with the detailed guidance in AM and BM supra at [168], concerning the various motives that traffickers may have for pursuing their former victims.”
74. The amended grounds expressly no longer rely upon paragraphs 20 to 25, 27 to 28, 30 to 33, 36 to 45, 47 to 48, and 50 to 55 of the original grounds.
75. Being mindful that this is an international protection appeal and considering ground 4 to be a Robinson obvious point, I granted the appellant permission to amend his grounds of appeal: Secretary of State for the Home Department v. George [2024] EWCA Civ 1192; [2025] 1 WLR 1025, at [75].
Analysis
76. Mr Terrell adopted a pragmatic, and if I may observe, an entirely appropriate position on behalf of the respondent by accepting that ground 4 established a material error of law. As confirmed by the Upper Tribunal decision in Roba, it was for the First-tier Tribunal to consider relevant country guidance decisions, even if not advanced by the appellant. Mr Terrell accepted that the First-tier Tribunal had been put in a very difficult position by the very poor nature of the representation before it. It was, in essence, having to deal with a black hole of evidence. However, it was accepted by Mr Terrel that for all its faults the ASA had tried to bring objective evidence to the table in respect of risk, and the First-tier Tribunal had simply failed to engage with the appellant’s case in respect of this objective evidence. Mr Terrell accepted, in terms of materiality, that it was very difficult to unpick the risk assessment consequent to the problems arising in this matter. A risk assessment is an evaluative task, and the Tribunal was required at the very least to consider relevant country guidance.
77. Mr Terrell was very clear in his concession that whilst he accepted ground 4 established a material error of law, there was an objection to favourable findings of fact being preserved for the appellant whilst those favourable to the respondent would be set aside.
78. Mr Grigg accepted, quite properly, that the holistic assessment as a whole was materially in error. The problems with the assessment commenced at the very outset of the judicial consideration and consequently he accepted that no favourable findings of fact should be preserved.
79. I am in agreement. I find that ground 4 establishes a material error of law and the only proper course is for decision to be set aside in its entirety and to be remade.
80. Both parties agreed that the appeal should properly return to the First-tier Tribunal. The difficulty in this matter is that there was no adequate exercise of procedural rigour by the First-tier Tribunal, although in circumstances where there was a significant deficiency in the conduct of those then representing the appellant. The one person who cannot be blamed is the appellant, and I am satisfied that it would be unfair to him to lose the ability for his appeal to be considered by the First-tier Tribunal consequent to the many failings of his previous representatives. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate that this appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal.
81. I observe that this is a matter where the First-tier Tribunal ought properly to have adopted a robust approach to procedural rigour and ensured that the appellant’s case was clear and focused before it. It possessed tools provided by the reported decisions of TC and Lata. The failure by the First-tier Tribunal to engage with the ASA, with all its faults, has led to its decision being set aside in its entirety. There is a concern that the ASA simply was not considered. It is not presently understood how the First-tier Tribunal considered itself suitably aided by the representatives before it when it records no submission on country guidance in an Albanian international protection appeal concerned with criminal gangs, modern slavery, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The First-tier Tribunal must be alert to the requirement to consider non-cited, relevant country guidance, and so can properly place an obligation upon the parties to identify the paragraphs of country guidance they rely upon and why. A risk in not marshalling the parties on the issue of country guidance is the possibility of relevant country guidance not being considered.
82. What is lacking from the decision is the fundamental requirement that the First-tier Tribunal begin its decision by setting out the issues in dispute with the parties having condensed their positions in a clear, coherent and concise “issues-based” manner.
83. The tools provided by TC and Lata were simply not utilised. That is a concern to this Tribunal. It has permitted a poorly prepared and poorly presented appeal before the First-tier Tribunal to succeed on appeal before this Tribunal, in part, through it having been poorly prepared and poorly presented at the initial hearing. Whilst the appellant may be grateful for Mr Grigg stepping in and aiding this Tribunal, he would no doubt have preferred the First-tier Tribunal to have required his representatives to address relevant country guidance decisions at the hearing in December 2024.
84. Finally, I repeat my observation made at the hearing to the appellant and Mr Grigg in respect of a response provided by the Albanian Ministry of Interior, dated 20 November 2023, confirming the appellant entered Albanian by a car on 6 January 2019. The First-tier Tribunal implicitly accepted the genuineness of the document at [48] of its decision: “I also note the verification document (at pages 77 to 80 of the [stitched] appeal bundle) supporting his claim to have entered Albania in January 2019.” That finding has been set aside. I have been unable to identify any explanation as to how the appellant secured this document beyond confirmation at para. 5 of his witness statement dated 23 February 2024, “I have provided official documentation from the Albanian authorities confirming my entry to Albania on 6 January 2019”. The First-tier Tribunal will no doubt be mindful of the Court of Appeal judgment in TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40; [2009] Imm AR 488, at [16]:
“16. Where evidence to support an account given by a party is or should readily be available, a Judge is, in my view, plainly entitled to take into account the failure to provide that evidence and any explanations for that failure. This may be a factor of considerable weight in relation to credibility where there are doubts about the credibility of a party for other reasons ...”
Directions
85. The President of the First-tier Tribunal has indicated that the Upper Tribunal may give directions to appeals that are remitted where the issuing of such directions may aid the listing of an appeal expeditiously. I consider that this is an appeal where those circumstances arise. At the hearing before me, and with agreement of the representatives, I made the following directions:
(i) A new ASA is to be filed by the appellant no later than 28 days before the listed hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
(ii) The respondent may, if so advised, file a response 7 days before the hearing.
(iii) The matter is to be listed for 3 hours with an Albanian interpreter.
Notice of Decision
86. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 6 January 2025 contains a material error of law. It is properly to be set aside.
87. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House to be heard de novo.
88. An anonymity order is confirmed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 November 2025