Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001600

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/57766/2024
LP/08866/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

RL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Carrington Wolf, Counsel instructed by Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes (“the judge”) dated 21 February 2025.
2. I am satisfied that the anonymity order should be maintained. Neither party asked me to discharge it. The appellant claims to be at risk of harm in Honduras. I am satisfied that the potential risk of harm upon identification and maintaining the integrity of the UK asylum system justify derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant arrived in the UK on 21 May 2022 and claimed asylum. The basis of his asylum claim is that he was threatened and was subjected to intimidatory behaviour on account of his involvement with the Libre Party, a political party in Honduras and that he would be at risk if he returned to Honduras.
4. In a decision dated 2 November 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 21 February 2025.
6. The appellant was represented by Ms Carrington Wolf, as before me, and the respondent was represented by J Lewis, a Home Office Presenting Officer.
7. In a decision dated 21 February 2025 the First-tier Tribunal Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge rejected the entirety of the appellant’s account.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal on the following grounds.
Ground 1: The judge erred by requiring documentary evidence to corroborate the appellant’s account. The judge noted the lack of evidence corroborating the appellant's account of (1) being employed by the Libre Party; (2) the threats written on the appellant’s car in the dust; and (3) threatening notes that the appellant had received.
Ground 2: The judge misunderstood the evidence by failing to consider that the appellant relied on screenshots.
Ground 3: The judge failed to have regard to relevant country background evidence in determining whether sufficiency of protection was available to the appellant.
Ground 4: The judge speculated in finding that the appellant, having made a police report, would be able to access state protection because the authorities were willing and able to protect him.
Ground 5: The judge failed to make a finding of fact in response to relevant witness evidence that the appellant relied on and that corroborated his account.
9. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission but permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 10 June 2025 on the following basis:
“1. The judge drew an adverse inference from the appellant not retaining a letter [23] and from him not having independent verification of his employment [21]. It is arguable that the judge fell into error by finding that the failure to provide this corroborative evidence undermined his credibility. See the discussion in paragraphs 86 and 87 of MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 on corroborating evidence. I therefore consider ground 1 arguable.
2. In paragraph 24 the judge stated that “The appellant must have known that the police could and would protect him otherwise he would not have sought their help and protection in the first place”. Arguably, it does not follow from the fact that a person reports a matter to the police that the police are willing and able to protect that person. It is therefore arguable the judge reached a conclusion on state protection on the basis of an immaterial consideration. The finding on state protection is also arguably undermined by a failure to have regard to the 2023 CPIN on gangs in Honduras. For these reasons, I consider grounds 3 and 4 arguable.
3. All grounds can be pursued.”
10. The respondent did not file and serve a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
11. At the hearing I heard submissions from Ms Carrington Wolf and Ms Nolan a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
12. Before me, Ms Carrington Wolf helpfully characterised the grounds under two headings, which I will adopt. The headings are:
(1) The judge’s requirements of corroborative evidence; and
(2) The judge’s failure to have regard to the evidence before him or failure to adequately understand it.
Corroboration
13. There is no requirement that an applicant must adduce corroborative evidence. [MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216]
14. On the other hand the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances be of some evidential value. For example, if it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, this may be a matter to which the Tribunal can give appropriate weight. [ST (Corroboration – Kasolo) Ethiopia [2004] UKIAT 00119]
15. The judge notes that the appellant has not provided what the judge describes as “credible evidence” of his employment or similar with the party at [21] and the judge considers the appellant’s failure to retain a threatening letter so that he can rely on it in evidence undermines his account at [23].
16. I am satisfied that the judge required corroborative evidence without first considering whether such evidence could reasonably have been obtained or whether there is a good reason for the appellant not having obtained it or in this case retained it.
17. In doing so, I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in law by placing too high a requirement on the appellant to establish his case.
Failure to have regard to relevant evidence
18. The judge rejected the appellant’s account that the appellant’s daughter was approached by a man who asked where her father was at [29]. This aspect of the appellant’s account is corroborated by a witness statement from his daughter’s mother accompanied by an identity document.
19. The judge also rejected the appellant’s account that his friend H found further written threats when picking up his post after the appellant had left the country. This aspect of the appellant’s account is corroborated by a witness statement from F again accompanied by an identity document.
20. There is no reference to either witness statement anywhere in the decision. It is not clear from reading the decision whether the judge considered that evidence and if he did why he chose to reject it. It is not possible for the appellant to know on what basis the judge rejected the evidence of these witnesses. Neither witness was called to give evidence orally, however that does not mean in itself that the judge was not obliged to consider their statements and/or give reasons why he rejected their evidence.
21. I am satisfied that the judge failed to consider relevant witness evidence and/or failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting that evidence.
22. The appellant relied on the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Honduras Gangs Version 1, November 2023 (“CPIN”). It was included in the appellant’s bundle and there are repeated references to it in the appellant’s skeleton argument.
23. The CPIN includes the following:
“4.1.1 - In general, the state is willing but owing to a lack of resources and competence, and high levels of corruption, is unlikely to be able to provide effective protection. (…)
4.1.5 - However, sources consider the Honduras National Police HNP to be under-staffed and under-equipped, with high levels of corruption. … Some sources suggest that due to a lack of resources many crimes are not fully investigated, and when investigations do take place they are lengthy and inefficient leading to high levels of impunity.”
24. I am satisfied that there are sections of the CPIN that are relevant in the state’s ability to provide protection and that it is not restricted solely to protection from risk arising from gangs but is relevant to protection more widely.
25. There is no reference to this CPIN anywhere in the determination. I do not accept the respondent’s submission that the judge was not required to consider it because it relates to risk from gangs and not risk on account of political opinion. It is relevant to the appellant’s case and the appellant clearly relied on it.
26. I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in law by failing to have regard to the CPIN and/or give reasons for rejecting it.
27. I am satisfied that the errors I have identified mean that the whole decision has been infected and needs to be set aside. I am satisfied that no findings of fact can be preserved.
28. The parties agreed that if I found that the judge had erred in the manner outlined in the grounds, it was appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
29. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement.
30. I am satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue and the appellant relies on his own evidence and witness evidence and significant findings of fact will need to be made.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law, and accordingly the decision is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved
32. This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 November 2025