Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001613

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53903/2024
LP/05272/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z Malik KC of Counsel, instructed by Liberty Legal Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, who is a national of Bangladesh, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana (“the judge”) promulgated on 8 February 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 6 February 2022 to refuse her asylum and human rights claim.
2. For the reasons set out below, the appeal is allowed.
Anonymity
3. Despite the appellant raising an international protection claim and it being an accepted fact that she is the victim of domestic violence and rape, the First-tier Tribunal failed to make an anonymity order in accordance with Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2022. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make an anonymity order given the particular circumstances of the appellant’s case.
Background
4. The appellant entered the UK in 2022 as a dependent of her husband who is also a Bangladeshi national. She was, however, a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband. The appellant therefore left her husband and reported him to the police. She moved to a women’s refuge. The appellant then claimed asylum on 6 March 2023 on the basis that she feared being killed by her husband or his father because she had reported her husband to the British police.
5. On 6 February 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. In that decision, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had been the victim of domestic violence. However, prior to the appellant’s appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent filed a Review dated 26 September 2024 in which she accepted that the appellant had been assaulted by her husband and that she had reported him to the police. Nevertheless, the respondent maintained her position that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh because she could avail herself of the protection of the Bangladeshi authorities or otherwise internally relocate to avoid her husband and his father.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appeal against the respondent’s decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 13 December 2024. However, in a decision promulgated on 8 February 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. On 2 June 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted the appellant permission to appeal on all five grounds:
(1) The judge erred in failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness and failing to make allowances for her clear vulnerabilities.
(2) The judge erred by failing to make clear findings as to whether or not she accepted the appellant was a victim of domestic violence, despite the respondent accepting that she was.
(3) The judge failed to consider the medical evidence regarding the appellant’s mental health and suicidal ideation which were a direct consequence of the abuse she suffered. Furthermore, the judge failed to factor this into her assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant re-establishing her private life in Bangladesh.
(4) When considering (i) internal relocation and sufficiency of protection, (ii) very significant obstacles to reintegration, and (iii) Article 8 outside of the Immigration Rules, the judge failed to engage with the Country Policy Information Notes (CPINs) on Bangladesh so far as they spoke to corruption in Bangladesh’s justice system, the availability of medication and mental health treatment, and the plight of single women in Bangladesh.
(5) In finding that the appellant has family in Bangladesh who would care for her, the judge erred by failing to take into account the appellant’s evidence that her older brother, who was the head of the family, mistreated her.
The hearing
8. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Ahmed, representing the respondent, conceded that the judge had made material errors of law for the reasons given by the appellant in Grounds 1, 2 and 3.
9. I did not therefore need to hear from Mr Malik.
Findings – Error of Law
Ground 1: Treatment of the appellant as a vulnerable witness
10. In SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC) a presidential panel of the Upper Tribunal considered Joint Presidential Guidance Note 2 of 2010, which applies to children and vulnerable adults giving evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. It was found that applying that guidance achieved two aims. First, the judge must ensure the best practicable conditions for the person concerned to give their evidence. And second, the judge must take the person’s vulnerability into account when assessing the credibility of their evidence.
11. Ms Ahmed conceded that the judge had failed to take into account the second requirement. I am satisfied that concession was properly made. It is not apparent from reading the judge’s decision that she took the appellant’s accepted vulnerability into account when assessing the appellant's credibility, for example at [18] where she rejects the appellant’s claim that she did not know where her estranged husband was presently living.
12. However, I am also satisfied that the judge failed to comply with the first requirement of the Joint Presidential Guidance. At the start of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge granted an application to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. That was clearly the right thing to do given it had been accepted by the respondent that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence and that she suffered from mental health problems, including major PTSD, as a consequence. Nevertheless, having listened to the audio recording of the hearing, I am satisfied that the judge made no allowances for this. She did not ask the appellant’s advocate (who was not Mr Malik) what reasonable adjustments needed to be made; she did not discuss with the presenting officer how he would approach his cross-examination, especially on sensitive topics; and she made no attempt to make the appellant feel comfortable or explain to her that she could take breaks if required.
13. Moreover, the judge appears to have taken a wholly inappropriate tone with the appellant throughout her oral evidence. For example, at 46:40 into the recording the appellant mentions the difficulty rape victims face in obtaining justice in Bangladesh. At this point, the judge, sounding irritated, interrupted by saying,
“Who asked you about rapes? Why are you talking about rape? You are not an expert witness on Bangladesh, do you understand? An expert witness can tell me what happened in Bangladesh. I have expert evidence on what happened in Bangladesh. There is a whole report on Bangladesh. I rely on the expert report not on what you tell me about Bangladesh. Why don’t you tell me about yourself.”
14. A few minutes later, at 51:55, the appellant gave evidence that parents in Bangladesh do not allow girls to go out alone after dark because it was not safe for them. The judge interrupted again, this time asking, “Have you researched this? Are you an expert?” The appellant explained that this was based on her own experience.
15. At 1:35:50, the judge, who sounds angry with the appellant, chastises her for not directly answering a question put to her by her own advocate about how long she held a particular job for.
16. There are others, but the above examples satisfy me that the judge did not heed her own direction to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. While the audio recording does not support the appellant’s claim in her witness statement dated 4 April 2025 that she was crying throughout the proceedings and that she suffered several panic attacks, the appellant was clearly upset at the start of the hearing, and I do accept her evidence that she found the judge’s conduct to be upsetting and stressful. The interjection regarding the appellant’s evidence about the difficulty in obtaining justice for rape victims in Bangladesh is particularly egregious given it was an accepted fact before the tribunal that the appellant was herself a victim of sexual assault.
17. I am therefore satisfied that the judge failed to ensure the best practicable conditions for the appellant to give her evidence and the hearing was unfair as a result.
The remaining grounds
18. As I have already found that Ground 1 is made out, I can deal with the remaining four grounds more briefly.
19. Ms Ahmed’s concessions in respect of Grounds 2 and 3 were, in my view, unwarranted. I have carefully read the judge’s decision and I am not satisfied that the decision is ambiguous with respect to whether the judge accepted the appellant was a victim of domestic violence. That aspect of the appellant’s case had been conceded by the respondent in her Review and there was accordingly no need for the judge to make findings on it. It is clear from reading the decision that she did not express any doubts, either express or implicit, about whether the appellant had been assaulted by her husband. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the judge did take into account the appellant’s mental health, including suicidal ideation, at [28] to [36] and at [42] to [44].
20. I am, however, satisfied that the judge did fail to engage with the CPINs, passages of which were relied upon by the appellant’s advocate in his closing submissions. This is material to the judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and reintegration and, consequently, I am satisfied that Ground 4 is made out.
21. Finally, I am also satisfied that Ground 5 is made out. At [40], the judge found that the appellant had family in Bangladesh who cared for her and wanted her to be safe, and that she could therefore return to them. However, the judge overlooks paragraph 6 of the appellant’s witness statement where she says that after her father died, her brother became head of the family, and that he acted in a controlling and violent way towards her and her sister. Furthermore, in oral evidence, the appellant said that she did not want to return to her family because she was scared that they would force her into another arranged marriage. At 1:52:45 of the recording, the judge said, “I am a bit confused. You say you have no contact with them; they don’t care about you. But if you go back, all of a sudden, they want to marry you [off] again, your family.” She then asks the appellant to explain this. The appellant said that if her family found her, they would force her to marry, because in Bangladesh families thought women were safer with a man. The judge then said, “That shows that they would care about your safety then.” The appellant answered, “They don’t care for me. They think what society will say [sic].” I am therefore satisfied that the judge’s findings at [40] that the appellant’s family cared for her and wanted her to be safe is an irrational mischaracterisation of her evidence.
Disposal
22. The parties were in agreement that because the hearing was tainted by unfairness as a result of the judge’s failure to properly treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness, the appropriate way to dispose of the case would be to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a new hearing with no findings preserved. I am satisfied that it is the appropriate course of action.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by material errors of law and is set aside in its entirety.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Hatton Cross to be reheard by any judge other than Judge Chana.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th October 2025